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INTRODUCTION
The period from 1860 to the early years of the 
twentieth century was a critical one in the colonization of 
Australia. It has been characterised by N.G. Butlin as "the 
phase of Australian economic development dominated by the 
problem of utilizing (Australia's) natural resources". At 
first sight this appears self-evident. Certainly the geogra­
phical extension and intensification of colonial settlement 
during the Long Boom of 1861 to 1891 and the accompanying 
accumulation of productive assets made a central contribution 
to the shape of the colonies' later development, as did the 
economic restructuring forced on the colonies by the subsequent 
depression. However, to take expanding resource utilization 
and capital formation as the central problem or fundamental 
determinant of the form of colonial development is a different 
matter. The manner of colonial resource utilization was 
ultimately constrained by the limitations of the resource base 
and of contemporary technology, but on closer scrutiny these 
physical limits appear to have been less pressing than were 
economic and political conflicts over who should control, and 
reap the products of, the colonies' natural resources.
This was starkly exemplified in the case of the 
pastoral industry. Pastoral resource utilization encountered
1. N.G. Butlin, Investment in Australian Economic Development
1861 - 1900, Cambridge, 1964. p. xiii (henceforward cited as
I.A.E.D.) .~
2. Defined as "net investment in fixed assets, i.e. additions 
to the stock of real capital".
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few limiting technical problems until at least 1891; on the 
contrary, one of the salient features of Long Boom land 
settlement was the sheer ease with which vast areas of the 
colonial interior were turned to the production of wool. 
Pastoralism required only a rudimentary technology which was 
readily adapted from pre-industrial European models, and in 
many regions sheep could be depastured on virgin country, with 
the ploughing back of profits being used to effect a gradual 
installation of the equipment necessary to accelerate the rate 
of production. While international demand remained buoyant, 
wool-growing was almost indecently profitable; being 
independent of local markets, it could outrun other forms of 
occupation; and the imperishability of the product and its high 
v a 1ue-to-weight ratio mitigated the inconvenience of relying on 
inefficient transportation facilitites. For many years it 
seemed that there was practically no physical limit to pastoral 
expans i o n .
But pastoralism's very success created problems of 
another order. Investors both local and British competed to 
participate in the industry, forcing the pace of expansion and 
bidding up the price of stock and land. Colonial governments 
made strenuous attempts to divert a portion of the proceeds of 
wool-growing into the public purse. And the many landless 
colonists who felt that the pastoral interest was excluding 
them from their rightful share in colonial resources mounted a 
series of political campaigns for land redistribution. The 
vigour with which the competition for land was prosecuted 
reflected the uneasiness of the relationship between the
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wealthy pastoral sector and the highly urbanized society whose 
emergence constituted the obverse of pastoral landed dominance. 
This was a relationship in which the interests of British 
capital were vitally involved, and the colonizing power showed 
little inclination to stand aside from the conflict. The 
interplay of all these forces was to have profound consequences 
for the distribution and utilization of the colonies' land, and 
ultimately for the shape of Australian colonization.
The ramifications of economic conflicts in the 
colonial parliamentary arena have been extensively studied by 
political historians, and it is not proposed that they be 
further examined here. The concerns of this study are twofold: 
first, to examine the implications of proprietorial competition 
and political conflict as they relate particularly to the 
pastoral expansion and crisis of 1880 to 1902; and, secondly, 
to assess the manner in which the British connection entered 
into, and was in turn affected by, the emerging pattern of 
intra-colonial class relationships. Some of the background to 
these questions and the issues involved will be discussed in a 
schematic fashion in the following sections and their 
particular contribution to New South Wales outback squatting 
explored in the body of the text.
Pastoral Investment : The Boom Years
The geographical dispersal of the colonial flock, the 
pastoral industry's capital requirements and the distribution 
of the proceeds of pastoralism were all critically affected by
the outcome of a series of struggles for economic control which
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took place in the colonial legislative arena. The State's role 
as ultimate landlord, its control over railway construction and 
its capacity to redistribute income between classes and sectors 
of the economy by varying its sources of revenue and its 
programmes of disbursement combined to make colonial political 
power an economic prize of no small consequence. New South 
Wales, in particular, while being at the forefront of Long Boom 
pastoral expansion, was also the scene of a persistent, vitup­
erative struggle between competing economic interests, each 
intent on securing control over the State for its own ends.
In each of the key areas of economic policy - public 
construction, trade policy and Crown land distribution - the 
pastoral lobby's early paramountcy came increasingly under 
challenge in the course of the boom as the squatters' 
parliamentary representation dwindled. On the question of 
tariff policy the free trade parties with which the squatters 
identified were opposed by a growing manufacturing lobby intent 
on gaining protection for import-replacing industries and by 
farmers' spokesmen urging the imposition of tariffs on imported 
grain.  ^ While public works, and especially railway 
construction, were generally bedevilled by conflicting 
parochial loyalties, the claims of the far-flung pastoral 
districts had to contend with an increasingly vocal lobby on
3. A .W . Martin, "Pastora1ists in the Legislative Assembly of
New South Wales, 1870 - 1890", in A. Barnard, e d . ,
The Simple Fleece: Studies in the Australian Wool Indu stry,
Melbourne 1962. p. 578 et passim.
4. B.D. Graham, The Formation of the Australian Country Parties,
Canberra, 1966 . pp . 32ff.
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behalf of urban and agricultural i n t e r e s t s . B u t  it was on 
the crucial land issue that the pastoral lobby was most 
isolated; from the earliest years of the boom, the pre-emptive 
occupation of cheap Crown land on which squatting had initially 
depended came under challenge from a powerful closer settlement 
lobby which linked urban and agricultural interest groups with 
the aspirations and idealism of the landless.
The ensuing conflict was long and bitter. From the 
first the odds were against the closer settlement "push" which 
carried in the Crown Lands Alienation and Occupation Acts of 
1861. The cattle-based pastoralism of the New South Wales 
interior was in decline, with the market for stock glutted and 
pleuropneumonia moving through the herds ; but wool-growing 
was rising in its place to usher in a period of extremely high 
profitability which would place huge incomes at the disposal of 
the squatters against whom the land legislation was directed. 
New South Wales squatters led the increase in production which 
lifted Australian wool exports from £3.7 million to £15.0 
million between 1861 and 1877 and their share of total export
gincome from 22% to a massive 59% in the same period.
5. Butlin, I .A .E .D ., o p . c i t . p. 357; M.E. Robinson, The New 
South Wales Wheat Frontier, 1851 to 1911, Canberra, 1976. 
pp. 193-9.
6. D. Baker, "The Origins of the Robertson Land Acts", 
Historical Studies, Selected Articles, First Series, 
Melbourne, 1964.
7. G.L. Buxton, The Riverina 1861 - 1891 : An Australian
Regional Study, Melbourne, 1967. p p . 30, 39.
8. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. cit . , p. 30.
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With wool-growing so much in the ascendancy the 
squatters' privileged position was difficult to assail, and the
QLand Acts of 1861 provided little ammunition for the purpose.3 
Whether the deficiencies of the Acts arose from sheer naivety 
or from an underestimation of the squatters' economic advant­
age, their basic strategy was sorely misconceived. They 
provided for small holdings to be taken up under the principle 
of "free selection before survey" but left this provision open 
to abuse by failing to specify adequate checks on the bona 
fides of selectors; at the same time they recognized certain 
pre-emptive claims by the pastoralists and made land available 
at auction with reserve prices which were low by market 
standard. This gave the squatters both the opportunity and
the incentive to secure their privileged status. The Acts 
entrenched a distinctly unequal competition between squatter 
and selector in which the squatter was left free to make full 
use of the advantages he enjoyed by virtue of his prior 
occupation and superior knowledge of the land, his capacity to 
influence local officials charged with the implementation of 
the Acts and, above all, his ability to produce the cash to buy 
his way out of trouble if necessary.
The squatters made use of the hiatus which followed 
the passage of the Act to have large areas of prime country in 
the Riverina officially reserved from selection,  ^^  and after
9. For a general account of the 1861 Acts see S.H. Roberts,
History of Australian Land Settlement 1788 - 1920,
Melbourne, 1924. p p . 236-46.
10. Buxton, o p . c i t ., p. 138.
1 1 . Ibid. , pp~. 148-9.
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the Acts were implemented a variety of devices was available to 
those who wished to safeguard their properties. Improvement 
purchases were made around buildings and watering points, and 
sometimes around token structures erected expressly to 
facilitate purchase. "Friendly" selectors were employed to take 
up land along the river frontages and in other areas which were 
likely to attract agriculturalists. Bona fide selectors were 
harassed by constant inspections to ensure that they were 
fulfilling the Act's residence requirements and taken to court 
on the slightest pretext.
Finally, if no other means would suffice to deter 
selection, the squatters were able to take out freehold over 
their runs, or at the least over strategically-placed points. 
Freehold purchase became more common in the 1870s as pressure 
from selectors intensified, and, after some of the loopholes in 
the Acts had been closed in 1875, the volume of purchases 
further increased, peaking at £3 million in 1877 and remaining 
high into the early 1880s. If a squatter was unfortunate
enough to encounter a serious competitor in the auction the 
cost could be ruinous, but uncontested auctions were the rule 
and most of the freehold taken up was purchased at the upset 
price. J Even if the pastoralist could not finance freehold 
purchase from his own pocket, borrowed funds were comparatively 
easy for him to obtain. The profitability of wool-growing 
attracted interest on the part of private lenders and financial
12. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. c i t . , p. 121 table.
pp. 159, 254-5.13. Buxton, op. cit.,
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institutions alike; this was supplemented by, and often merged 
into, the use of family connections to obtain borrowed funds. 
The lender could scarcely lose out of financing wealthy 
pastoralists to purchase freehold, as he received both the 
interest on the loan and an enhanced security over the assets 
mortgaged to him. At least one lending institution actively 
encouraged its clients to purchase freehold,14 and financiers 
generally benefited from the rising interest rates which 
accompanied the increased demand for borrowed f u nds.1^
But in spite of all these efforts, the squatters 
could not entirely eliminate selection. In the good seasons of 
the early 1870s in particular, many Riverina squatters were 
taken by surprise when selectors applied for areas which had 
been considered relatively safe. Furthermore, as pastoralism 
spread into the back blocks and the use of paddocking became 
more widespread, the purchase of strategic areas on the holding 
became insufficient to safeguard improvements and wholesale 
land purchases were increasingly necessary. u Some pastoral­
ists were inclined to let selection take place rather than face 
the cost of completely securing their holdings. Many assumed 
that they would be able to take the land back when the first 
dry season came and wiped out the smaller selectors, but these 
hopes were only partly fulfilled. The smaller selectors
14. J.D. Bailey, A Hundred Years of Pastoral Banking : A
History of the Australian Mercantile Land and Finance 
Company 1863- 1963, Oxford, 1 966 . pp . 80-81.
15. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. cit . , p. 100.
16. Ibid., p. 90 ; Buxton, o p . cit., p p . 258-9 .
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did suffer in the bad seasons, and many sold out for a song,
but the land they surrendered had to be shared between the
original pastoral lessees and the wealthier selectors, many of
whom had built up substantial family holdings by the latter
years of the boom. ^  ^  The rise of the intermediate-si zed
holding was facilitated by private subdivision of the original
pastoral properties, which was widely used to finance freehold
purchase and equipment of the remaining sections or simply to
1 fttake advantage of a rising land market. Subdivided blocks
and aggregated selections were often used for mixed farming, 
and these changing patterns of land ownership and use permitted 
the emergence of a moderately wealthy farmer/grazier class 
which in the long term made substantial inroads into the 
squatters' control over the land.
The competition for land had, broadly speaking, 
three main implications for the pastoral industry. First, the 
sale of land permitted the State to cash in on pastoral profits 
to an unprecedented extent, at least for the short term, and 
correspondingly diminished the income at the industry's 
disposal during its period of greatest flock expansion. 
Secondly, the high cost of land purchase in the better-watered 
central districts artificially enhanced the attractiveness of 
the drier, purely pastoral outback districts of New South Wales 
and Queensland in spite of the fact that pastoralism in these 
areas was riskier and less efficient than further east.
17. Buxton., ibid., p p . 191, 209-10, 254-5.
18. Butlin., I.A.E.D., op. c i t ., p p . 100-1.
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Final ly , the selection legislation had resounding effects, both 
direct and indirect, on pastoralism's capital requirements and 
its capacity to finance its expansion internally. To begin 
with, the cost of interest on purchasing freehold over a 
central districts run was about eight times that of an 
equivalent Crown lease. ^  In addition, the legislation 
provided a strong incentive for squatters in areas subject to 
selection to accelerate the installation of improvements, 
irrespective of their effect on productivity, to facilitate 
improvement purchases. All the associated costs were then 
passed on to a private land market which was already ridden 
with speculation and price inflation; that is, they shifted to 
the realm of competition among pastoral investors and out of 
the arena of the conflict between the squatter and the aspiring 
smallholder.
Before discussing the impact of the private land and 
stock market on the course of pastoral investment it is 
necessary to examine the interpretation of pastoral expansion 
put forward by N.G. Butlin, primarily in his Investment in 
Australian Economic Development , which has remained 
substantially unchallenged in spite of numerous criticisms of 
detail. Butlin emphasised the discontinuities in pastoral 
development during the Long Boom, identifying three dominant 
modes of investment which he claimed broadly corresponded with 
particular time-periods. The first form of investment, which
19. T.A. Coghlan, Labour and Industry in Australia, London, 
1918. p. 1348.
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he described as characteristic of the 1860s in New South Wales,
was the gradual equipment of station holdings using the
stations' own resources, principally of underemployed labour.
The second, corresponding with the major fencing programmes of
the 1870s, involved recourse to the market for contract labour
and short-term finance. The third, dominant in western New
South Wales and Queensland during intermittent booms after
1879, was one of rapid equipment of entire stations based on
substantial use of imported capital and conducted not by
2 0pastoralists but by real estate speculators. Thus, in
Butlin's words, pastoral investment "based initially on long­
term expectations,... eventually provided a rationale for the 
growth of a powerful real estate interest in the industry," and 
it was this "transition in attitudes" or "'deterioration' in 
the criteria of i n v e s t m e n t " ^  which was primarily responsible 
for the long-run instability of the industry.
However, these alleged discontinuities appear to have 
been differences of degree rather than of kind. The earlier 
phases of development seem to have been rather less gradual 
than Butlin had supposed. Buxton has pointed out that Butlin's 
evidence, being mainly derived from sheep stations, neglects 
the very different pattern of development on Riverina cattle 
runs, where improvements were being erected on a large scale by 
contract labour from the late 1 850s. ^  Successive accounts
20. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. c i t ., p p . 80-83, 418.
2 1 . Ibid. , p~ 58.
22. Ibid., p p . 418, 416 respectively.
., o p . c i t ., p p . 39-40.2 3. Buxton
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from the 1860s and 1870s indicate that in the western Riverina 
and parts of the Darling the pattern of development adopted was 
substantially similar to that employed in the 1880s.^4 In 
particular, the stocking of the unwatered back-blocks required 
a substantial initial investment in watering facilities; the 
difference between the development of the 1880s and that of the 
earlier period arose principally from the fact that a far 
larger number of back-block runs were being developed in the 
latter period than in the 1860s, when cheap river frontage runs 
were freely available.
The assumption that the enterprises of the earlier
period were largely self-financing is also open to challenge,
and Butlin himself presents a substantially modified account of
2 5early financial arrangements at a later stage in his work. 
Though reliance on borrowing from financial institutions was 
by no means as widespread in the first two decades as it was 
during the 1880s, private funds were redeployed through 
numerous channels to buy freehold and support new ventures. 
Squatting companies and wealthy squatters with multiple 
holdings diverted profits from established holdings into 
setting up new runs or used their earnings from cheap runs on 
the pioneering fringe of the industry to complete the equipment
24. J. Jervis, "The Exploration and Settlement of the Western
Plains", in Journal of the Royal Australian Historical 
Society, vol. 42, no. 1, 1957. p p . 7-8 (henceforward cited
as "Western Plains"). See also B. Hardy, West of the 
Darling, Sydney, 1969. p p . 73, 95-9.
25. Butlin, I.Ä.E.D., op. c i t . , p p . 130ff.
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of central districts properties. Many of the first 
generation squatting families were also linked by marriage, and 
the kinship network afforded funds for many an enterprising 
young man to set himself up on his own account. Funds also
came from colonial sources outside the industry; urban 
financiers were variously involved as outright mortgagees, as 
absentee owners and as members of partnerships in which they 
were associated with pastoral practitioners who were prepared 
to take charge of property management in return for a share of 
the profits and the prospect of eventually taking sole control 
by buying out their partners from the proceeds of the
p Qstation. The principal differences between the early period
and the 1880s were in the level of indebtedness and the extent
of British involvement in pastoral lending; these shifts will
2 9be examined in more detail below.
Finally, the distinction between an early phase of 
development in which investment was carried out by legitimate 
pastoralists with the object of improving productivity and a 
later phase in which stations were equipped by speculators for 
the sake of capital gains is not as clear as Butlin suggests. 
Speculative purchase and development were by no means absent
26. O.B. Williams, "The Riverina and its Pastoral Industry", in 
Barnard, e d . , op. c i t . , p. 434.
27. A. Crowley, "The Life and Work of Sir Samuel McCaughey", 
Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Soci e t y , vol.
40, no. 6, 1 954 . pp . 298-9; J.O. Randell, The Pastoral
Pattersons, Melbourne, 1977. p. 182.
28. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. cit., pp. 136-7; Buxton, o p . cit. ,
pp . 38-9, 42-3.
29 . P p . 18 f f .
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d u r i n g  the e a r l y  ye a rs  of the boom; nor can a r i g i d  d i s t i n c t i o n  
be dr a w n  b e t w e e n  the l e g i t i m a t e  p a s t o r a l i s t  and the land 
s p e c u l a t o r .  T h o u g h  c a s e s  can be f ou n d  of p a s t o r a l i s t s  w h o h ad  
no i n t e r e s t  in land d e a l i n g  and s p e c u l a t o r s  who had no 
i n t e n t i o n  of w o r k i n g  the p r o p e r t i e s  the y p u r c h a s e d ,  the m o r e  
r e m a r k a b l e  f e a t u r e  of p a s t o r a l i s m  d u r i n g  the b o o m  y e a r s  was the 
i n t e g r a l  a s s o c i a t i o n  w h i c h  d e v e l o p e d  f rom  an e a r l y  stage  
b e t w e e n  la nd s p e c u l a t i o n  and " l e g i t i m a t e "  p a s t o r a l  a c t i v i t y .
The o p p o r t u n i t i e s  for c a p i t a l  g ain s were
m u l t i f a r i o u s ,  a nd  the s q u a t t e r s  m i s s e d  few c h a n c e s  to l e v y
c h a r g e s  on la t er  e n t r a n t s .  B o n u s e s  c o u l d  be i m p o s e d  s i m p l y  by
v i r t u e  of the fa ct th at an u n o c c u p i e d  s t r e t c h  of l and  was
r e g i s t e r e d  in a s p e c u l a t o r ' s  name, and p r e - e m p t i v e  r e g i s t r a t i o n
wa s c o m m o n  p r a c t i c e  at and b e y o n d  the f r i ng e  of p a s t o r a l
o c c u p a t i o n  fro m the ti me of first  w h i t e  p e n e t r a t i o n  u n t i l  the 
3 0e a r l y  1880s. The l a r g e s t  w i n d f a l l  p r o f i t s ,  h o w e v e r ,  w e r e  
t h o s e  m a d e  fr om the d e v e l o p m e n t  and r e s a l e  of runs.
It seems l i k e l y  t h a t  e v e n  in the e a r l y  s t a g e s  of 
p a s t o r a l  e x p a n s i o n  p r o p r i e t o r i a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  h a d  p l a y e d  a 
l a r g e r  p a r t  in the i m p r o v e m e n t  of r uns  than B u t l i n  a l l o w s .  
F e n c i n g  was o f t e n  i n s t a l l e d  to p r e v e n t  a n i m a l s  s t r a y i n g  a nd to 
p r o t e c t  the run a g a i n s t  the i n c u r s i o n s  of d r o v e r s ,  b u l l o c k -  
d r i v e r s  and a d j a c e n t  l a n d h o l d e r s '  flocks. In c o n f o r m i t y  w i t h  
this, as W i l l i a m s  an d B u x t o n  h ave  b o t h  n ot ed , the p a t t e r n  of 
g r a d u a l l y  e x t e n d i n g  p a d d o c k  fen c es  out from a n u c l e u s  of f e n c e d
30. See be l o w ,  p p . 33, 4 0 f f .
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yards and horse-paddocks was less common in the Riverina, and 
the installation of perimeter fences prior to subdivision more 
usual, than Butlin has suggested. But as the wool boom
progressed, proprietorial considerations came to the fore and 
investment for the sake of capital gains became more aggres­
sive. Runs were commonly taken up for a few years, improved and 
their flocks allowed to increase, then sold at a premium in a 
good season. The fight against closer settlement, too, was 
directed not only towards safeguarding the integrity of 
pastoral enterprises but also towards protecting and enhancing 
anticipated capital gains on resale.
It was therefore a rare squatter who simply found a 
piece of land, improved it, secured freehold over it and stayed 
on it. Most successful pastoralists seem to have supplemented 
their incomes with a modicum of judicious land dealing, and the 
turnover of land ownership was fairly high throughout the boom
*3 9years. In the 1860s and for much of the 1870s, with
intensive inland pastoral development largely confined to the 
Riverina, land prices were far lower in the vast territories to 
the north and west. The sale or subdivision of an established 
Riverina run could provide capital for development on a larger 
scale in a new area. Some pastoralists diversified their 
holdings while maintaining their Riverina runs, but others
31. Buxton, o p . c i t ., pp. 38-9, 42-3 ; Williams in Barnard,
ed. , op. c i t . , p. 421; cf Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. c i t . , 
pp . 7 3-4.
32. See e.g. R.B. Ronald, The Riverina : People and P r o p e r t i e s ,
Melbourne, 1960. passim.
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traced a course via a series of windfall gains from the 
Riverina into the more remote corners of western New South 
Wales and Q u e e n s l a n d . ^  As the pastoral industry extended 
into these inhospitable territories, speculation and legitimate 
pastoralism became virtually inseparable. Absentee ownership 
was increasingly prevalent, and it made no material difference 
whether the city-dwe11ing runholder listed his occupation as 
"pastoralist", "financier" or "land dealer".
But if the motivation for pastoral investment 
remained substantially unchanged, the relationship between the 
growth in the volume of investment and the increase of pastoral 
proceeds did not. Pastoralism in the new semi-arid squatting 
districts was less efficient than central district squatting on 
several counts. Transportation costs were higher, flock 
reproduction rates lower, droughts more common and, especially 
in the back country, a large initial investment was required 
before runs could be permanently stocked. Rapid growth, 
especially when based on localized land booms, generated 
additional problems. High initial purchase costs, often 
entailing some degree of indebtedness, impelled new entrants to 
speed up the equipment of their holdings so they could maximize 
output in the shortest possible time. In many instances this 
produced labour shortages and overstrained the supply of 
construction materials, further escalating the scale of 
expenditure required. The demand for sheep repeatedly outran
33. See e.g. Bailey, op. c i t ., p. 88 ; Randell, o p . c i t . , p p .
153-163.
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the flocks' capacity for natural increase, and the price of 
stock rose correspondingly. This added a further burden to 
entry costs and accentuated the economic impact of stock 
losses. In the 1880s especially the internal economics of the 
industry were distorted by the continuation of heavy investment 
at the margin of expansion. Established squatters maximized 
breeding rates to take advantage of the market in stock; in the 
process they subjected their land to heavy grazing pressure and 
created supply conditions which exacerbated the long-term 
downswing in international wool prices. High stock prices kept 
property valuations at inflated levels long after the land 
booms had subsided. By the early 1890s pastoralism was in so 
precarious a position that any check to expansion would 
precipitate, not merely a fall in current income, but large 
capital losses across a wide range of pastoral assets.
It is clear, then, that the phenomenon of pastoral 
over-capita1ization was not so much a product of a shift in 
attitudes or investment criteria as of the perpetuation of an 
investment pattern derived from a period of extremely high 
returns into a set of material circumstances to which it was 
inappropriate. Throughout the boom years the protection and 
enhancement of capital values played a major role in the 
impetus for pastoral investment, its scope being restrained 
principally by shortages of capital. While intra-industry 
sources of capital remained important, the volume of new 
investment had to bear some relationship to the industry's 
increase in yield. This ceased to be the case during the early
1880s. A sudden inflow of British capital was used to finance
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an unprecedented land rush; then, in the latter part of the 
decade, imported funds were used to an extraordinary extent to 
prop up failing pastoral enterprises, even after the surge of 
activity on the land market had subsided. The source of the 
disjunction between heavy pastoral investment and stagnating 
profits is thus to be found in the manner in which British 
funds were channelled into the industry during the latter 
stages of expansion.
The Imperial Connection
Until the rise of urban land speculation in the 
latter 1880s, pastoralism was a pre-eminent focus for British 
lending to the colonial private sector. It was hardly 
surprising that squatters should have enjoyed the status of 
privileged borrowers. Squatting was widely seen as being far 
less speculative than mining. By comparison with 
manufacturing, it offered excellent security for loans; this 
was especially so after land tenure had been stabilized, but 
even before land mortgages became widespread wool and stock 
provided a fairly reliable source of collateral for short-term 
finance. And, unlike the smallholders who predominated in the 
agricultural sector, squatters were usually wealthy individ­
uals, many of whom had solid social and familial connections 
which could be enlisted to guard against the possibility of 
default. In the course of time the matter of connections became 
increasingly important as the distinction between the squatting 
fraternity and the colonial financiers who decided much of the 
disposition of British and local finance became blurred by 
financiers' taking up properties on their own account and
squatters' participating actively on the local boards of the 
financial institutions or occasionally withdrawing from direct 
involvement in squatting to become pastoral advisers to the 
finance houses. The fact that British investors were only too 
willing to permit their funds to be managed by such prominent, 
reliable colonial citizens left the pastoral financiers 
remarkably free to employ British capital in their associates' , 
and at times even their own interests.^
British capital thus became a major factor in the 
competition for land. As mentioned above, it provided the 
squatters with an important weapon in their struggle to thwart 
closer settlement. Borrowed funds also assisted the squatters 
to entrench themselves by giving them room to purchase flocks 
and weather bad seasons during phases of heavy capital expend­
iture. This aroused the rancour of the smallholders, who were 
leadinga hand-to-mouth existence and garnering funds wherever 
they could, generally at usurious interest, in an attempt to
o cfulfil the improvement conditions on their selections. The
fact that British capital was perceived as a class instrument 
exerted a powerful influence on the ideological complexion of 
smallholder populism and later of the political labour 
movement, both of which were to place heavy emphasis on the 
establishment of state-contro11ed lending institutions.
34. See p p . below.
35. M. Cannon, Life in the Country, Melbourne, 1973.
36. R. Gollan, The Commonwealth Bank of Australia ; Origins and
Early History, Canberra, 1968. pp. 17-19, 4 4 f f ; H. McQueen,
A New Britannia, Melbourne, 1 968. pp . 197ff.
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But even for the squatters borrowed capital was not 
an unmitigated blessing. During the 1860s and 1870s the inflow 
of funds was small, interest rates were high and foreclosure
o nwas by no means unknown. More importantly, though it can
O Qbe argued, as Butlin and Barnard have claimed, that during 
the earlier stages of pastoral expansion the availability of 
borrowed funds for intra-industry transactions played a creat­
ive role insofar as it freed 1oca1ly-accumulated capital for 
investment in capital facilities, this argument ceases to apply 
in the 1880s. During the early 1880s the sheer volume of imp­
orted capital became a major factor in the inflation of land 
and stock prices. Through the land rush of 1880-1882 and the 
continuation of heavy stock purchases over the remainder of the 
decade, wealth was redistributed from new entrants and squat­
ters in the marginal pastoral zones to pastoralists in estab­
lished districts and to investors with pre-emptive claims over 
land in the pioneering areas. Capital imports now began to 
have a destructive effect, setting in motion the vicious circle 
of indebtedness, compulsory overstocking and overproduction of 
wool which emerged among new entrants and squatters at the 
fringes of the industry, diverting a growing proportion of the 
industry's proceeds into the pockets of local and British 
financiers and eventually leading the industry into a state of 
crisis .
37. Bailey, o p .c i t ., p p . 39-40; Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. c i t .,
p. 100; R.L. Heathcote, Back of Bourke : A Study of Land
Appraisal and Settlement in Semi-Arid Australia, Melbourne, 
1965. (henceforward cited as Back of B o u r k e ) p. 126.
38. N.G. Butlin and A. Barnard, "Pastoral Finance and Capital 
Requirements", in Barnard, ed., o p . cit., p. 387.
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British investment's role in sustaining competition 
for pastoral land and stock was parallelled by its contribution 
to the urban land boom of the latter 1880s. In both cases a 
large part of the capital invested proved unproductive, p r inc­
ipally because the sudden inflow of outside funds was deployed 
to manipulate markets in existing assets for the sake of 
protecting capital gains which were threatened by a failure of 
locally-generated demand. That some of the practices as soc­
iated with this phenomenon were ethically dubious is of little 
account, being merely symptomatic of the close association 
between those who controlled the lending of British funds and 
those who borrowed them.39 The principal problem was that 
British investment in the colonial private sector contributed 
largely to imbalance in the colonial economy. The obligations 
it entailed, in the form of interest and dividend payments to 
Britain, were not matched by the consequent increase of 
production, much less of export earnings. This was especially 
serious when import-replacing industries were underdeveloped 
and the colonial governments were looking to increased export 
earnings to offset the balance of payments problems arising 
from their heavy overseas borrowing for public construction.
In this context it is pointless to discuss the 
origins of the 1890s depression in terms of "external" and 
"internal" causative factors. These are arbitrary categories 
which refuse to accommodate the genealogy of the phenomena in
39. See Chapter 4 below
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question. Methodologically they imply a preoccupation with 
the immediate; this has its reductio ad absurdum in a quasi­
psycho 1 og i c a 1 discussion of the relative importance of 
"internal" and "external" factors in British investors' 
motivation for eventually withdrawing their funds from the 
c o l o n i e s . ^  Far more important is an appreciation of the 
di sequi1ibrative impact of British capital inflow on the 
colonial economy in the medium term (that is, from about 1880) 
and of the extent to which the obligations this entailed 
magnified the adverse effects of the eventual downturn.
Nor can the internal/external dichotomy be
reintroduced at one remove by blaming the instability of
colonial development on the lack of restraint displayed by the
colonial financiers who were entrusted with the disposition of 
4 2British funds. British investors were no less willing
than their colonial agents to build up a clientele among the 
wealthy colonial land-owning class. At several points during 
the 1880s the inflow of capital earmarked for pastoral finance 
and urban development was such that financial institutions had
40. For example, among the "essentially domestic" problems to 
which Butlin attributes the colonies' external 
disequilibrium in the early 1890s, "easy credit conditions 
due to the availability of British funds" figure 
prominently (I.A.E.D., op. cit . , p. 414).
41. Though E.A. Boehm (Prosperity and Depression in Australia,
1887 - 1897, Oxford, 1971) notes that "diminishing returns
soon set in if the debate concerning the relative 
independence or importance of particular internal and 
external forces in making for the depression is pursued too 
far" (p. 324), he engages in speculation of this kind
himself (p p . 321-3).
42. See e.g. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. c i t ., p p . 415-6.
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difficulty finding outlets for their funds; to display 
restraint in such a situation was tantamount to voluntarily 
renouncing a share in a seemingly lucrative market. In the case 
of pastoral investment the large measure of discretion which 
British investors permitted their colonial agents and clients 
reflected and reinforced the squatters' identification with 
British interests. Within certain limits the squatters' 
interests were congruent with those of the British investors.
If they exceeded those bounds and ceased to provide their 
financiers with an adequate return, the latter were equipped 
with the sanctions necessary to bring the colonists to heel; 
but for the most part financiers and squatters were united in 
opposition to other sectional and class interests within the 
colonies. Debtors and creditors combined to form a discrete 
pastoral interest which, while taking on manifold political 
forms in employer associations, taxpayers' unions and anti­
democratic lobby groups, also served as a vehicle for the 
expression of imperial interests within the colonial political 
setting. Indeed, at times it appeared that the members of this 
group harboured more affection for their merinos than for the 
majority of their fellow-colonists.
To argue that the colonies' class structure was as 
much shaped by imperial influence as was the composition of 
their gross domestic product is not to imply that Britain held 
puppeteer-1ike control over the process of colonial 
development. A prolonged debate over the interpretation of the 
Long Boom and depression has hinged around this Eurocentric 
notion, attributed rather unjustly to Brian Fitzpatrick, and
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around N.G. Butlin's countervailing argument for the overriding 
importance of "internal" factors. Many of the limitations of 
the subsequent discussion can be traced to Butlin's lack of a 
clear theoretical focus. His Investment in Australian Economic 
Development is in essence an attempt to prove the non-existence 
of absolute British control over the Australian economy by 
sheer weight of counter-example, framed within a marginalist 
preoccupation with the responsiveness of the rate of growth to 
"external" and "internal" factors at the immediate level of 
causation. It offers an investor's-eye view of Australian 
development based on experiential categories which are often 
imprecise and lacking in critical or explanatory power because 
they take as given the existence of capitalist wage and 
property relations, not subjecting their impact to even the 
most cursory analysis. As a result, aggregate effects are 
emphasised at the expense of distributive effects and the nexus 
between the imperial connection and the relationship governing 
the distribution of power and wealth within the colonies is 
left unexamined. Above all, Butlin avoids raising the question 
of exploitation which, though perhaps not a polite term, is 
nevertheless critical to any discussion of imperialism, in that 
it permits an examination of imperial control, not in the 
abstract but in its specific, concrete instance, as it 
advantages the metropolitan power at the expense of the local 
economy.43 In the absence of any such yardstick, a large part
43. J. O'Connor, "The Meaning of Economic Imperialism", in R.I. 
Rhodes, ed. , Imperialism and Underdevelopment, New York, 
1969. p . 118.
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of the debate stimulated by Butlin's work has been confined to 
an ill-directed, inconclusive trading of examples and counter­
examples of "internal" and "external" influence.
This study is a necessarily limited attempt to move 
towards an alternative framework. Insofar as it addresses 
itself to the problem of exploitation its emphasis is congruent 
with that of recent Marxist discussions of Australia's imperial 
c o n n e c t i o n s . ^  But, though influenced by the Marxist theory 
of imperialism, this is not a theoretical work; rather it is 
intended to furnish material for reflection on some of the 
elements of the latter nineteenth-century Australian social 
formation which determined Australia's unique, ambiguous 
position, neither peripheral client nor "young centre", within 
the imperial nexus. To this end it will attempt to elucidate 
the complex of political and economic relations centring on 
the pastoral capitalist class through an examination of the 
expansion and crisis of pastoralism in the western districts of 
New South Wales.
44. In particular the work of D. Clark, "Australia : Victim or
Partner of British Imperialism?", in E. Wheelwright and K. 
Buckley, e d . , Essays in the Political Economy of Australian 
Capitalism, Vol. 1, Sydney, 1975.
- 2 6 -
MAP 1 :  W e s t e r n  N e w  S o u t h  W a l e s  T o w n s  a n d
T e r r i t o r i a l  D i v i s i o n  B o u n d a r i e  s , 19 0 1
, •  ENNGONIA
T I B O O B U R R A
• M I L P A R I N K A
W E S T E R N
W H I T E  C U F F S  9
• G H A L T A  «
W I L C A H N I A  q C O B A R o
D I V I 0 NO B R O X E N  HILL
M E N I N D I E ;
M O S S G I E L  J ü f f l l
------
K e y  :
© C e n t r e s  w i t h  p o p u l a t i o n  o v e r  5 0 0
C e n t r e s  w i t h  p o p u l a t i o n  u n d e r  5 0 0
....... T e r r i t o r i a l  D i v i s i o n s  u n d e r  1 8 8 4  L a n d  A c t
E a s t e r n  B o u n d a r y  o f  S t u d y  A r e a
S o u r c e s : N • s • W. S t a t i s t i c a l  R e g i s t e r  a n d  C e n s u s ,  1 9 0 1
-2 7-
CHAPTER 1
A Big Man's Frontier: Western New South Wales to 1878
For sixty years after the Australian colonies were 
founded, settlers seldom ventured into the interior of the 
continent. The numerous expeditions sent to explore the inland 
revealed nothing to tempt colonists away from the more temper­
ate districts close to the seaboard. Explorers followed the 
sluggish, meandering rivers of the Murray-Darling system 
westward, spurred on by the vision of a fertile inland basin, 
to find only waterless plains scorching under a desert sun. In 
1843 Charles Sturt carried the search for the chimerical inland 
sea still further west, beyond the Barrier Ranges; he returned 
disillusioned, having barely escaped with his life from a 
country which he described as "one of the most gloomy regions 
that man ever traversed". Yet, within a few years of his 
journey, white settlers were making their first tentative 
forays into the lands around the Darling, and during the next 
three decades the interior of New South Wales was brought 
firmly within the ambit of the British imperial economy.
The Occupation of the Plains
At first sight the interior held few attractions for 
the intending settler. The intense heat and searing winds of 
the summer months, the bitter nights of winter, brought 
discomfort to man and beast alike. As one followed the
1. Quoted by Hardy, o p . c i t ., p. 51.
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seemingly endless course of the rivers to the west, the open 
woodlands on the eastern edge of the plains merged impercept­
ibly into a drab wasteland of low shrubs and trees, interrupted 
only by the wooded river frontages and isolated chains of 
stark, rocky hills. The vast expanses between the major rivers 
were almost devoid of natural water catchments, rendering 
overland travel difficult at the best of times and perilous in 
a dry season. Surveying this wilderness, an early observer 
might well have believed that only the lure of gold would 
induce Western man to inhabit such an inhospitable land.
Yet from the latter 1840s white settlers began to 
filter through in ever-increasing numbers, drawn to the 
region not by mineral discoveries but by the profits to be made 
from raising cattle and sheep on its native pastures. With the 
extension of pastoralism into the central districts of the 
colony, squatters had been surprised to find that their animals 
thrived on the strange, unprepossessing grasses and shrubs they 
encountered there. The same species were to be found in 
plenty on the plains to the west.
Five major vegetational formations dominated the 
western districts.  ^ In the north-east of the region, 
extending beyond the Darling, the land was clothed by box
2. W.A. Brodribb, Recollections of an Australian Squatter,
Melbourne, 1976. p. 14; Buxton, op. c i t . , p p . 15— 17;
Williams in Barnard, e d ., op. cit., p. 417.
3. See R.M. Moore, ed., Australian Gr asslands, Canberra,
1970. p p . 219 f f , 234-8, 247-9, 253-4 ; R.O. Slatyer and
R . A . Perry, ed., Arid Lands of Australia, Canberra, 1 969 . 
pp. 79-85.
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forests (semi-arid shrub woodlands) which stretched south 
through the western Riverina onto the Murray River frontages.
To the west, the box country graded into shrublands and lower 
arid woodlands. The north-west was occupied by mulga (acacia) 
shrublands interspersed with areas of saltbush (shrub steppe) 
and smaller pockets of Mitchell grassland in the far north. In 
the central zone of the interior this gave way to a belt of 
arid woodland characterised by the prevalence of rosewood and 
belah. A large area of saltbush occupied the south-east, while 
the south-west corner was covered by two large areas of dense 
mallee (eucalypt) shrubland separated by the woodlands along 
the Murray-Darling junction.
The mallee alone of all these formations was 
dominated by a species which was not palatable to grazing 
animals.^ The other formations all contained a range of 
edible plants, from grasses to small trees. Pastoralists were 
able to turn to their own advantage those very qualities which 
allowed the native vegetation to survive the rigours of the 
plains' hot and droughty climate. The isolated thunderstorms 
which delivered much of the region's rainfall^ were quickly 
followed by a luxuriant growth of palatable grasses whose seeds 
sprang into life after months spent dormant in the loose, dry 
soil. Stock grazed these pastures preferentially when the 
season was good, while in a dry spell they fell back on
4. Moore, e d . , ibid., p. 221; Slatyer and Perry, e d . , i b i d . ,
p . 8 1.
5. Thunderstorms usually covered an area of between ten and
fifteen square miles (see Moore, ed., ibid., p p . 247-9).
-3 1-
browsing the numerous edible trees and the perennial 
saltbushes, bluebushes and mulga which dominated the shrublands 
and populated the understore of the woodlands. A consistent 
supply of fodder seemed thus assured,in spite of the region's 
erratic rainfall.
Nor was this the only virtue the pastoralists 
found in the plains environment. Few of the indigenous plants 
were poisonous to stock and only a small number of shrubland 
species had thorns or spines to protect them from grazing
Oanimals. There were few native animals to prey upon stock 
or compete with them for pastures and the indigenous fauna 
carried no harmful stock diseases. Among introduced diseases, 
parasites still caused problems but footrot and a range of
Qbacterial infections were checked by the hot, dry climate. 
Timber for fuel and construction was provided by the box 
forests in the east, the Murray River red gums which shaded the 
river frontages and the hardy cypress pine which grew on the 
low, sandy ridges of the i n t e r i o r . ^  Furthermore, the 
woodlands and mulga shrublands had been moulded by centuries of 
periodic burning-off at the hands of the Aboriginals until
6. Ibid., 240-3, 255-7; Slatyer and Perry, e d . , op. c i t .,
p . 8 6.
7. Moore, ed., i b i d ., p. 258.
8. I b id., p. 252.
9. V.G. Cole, "Animal Health", in G. Alexander and
O. Williams, ed., The Pastoral Industries of Australia, 
Sydney, 1973; I. McDonald, "The Merino Sheep in Australia", 
in A. Keast et a l , e d . , Biogeography and Ecology in 
Australia, The Hague, 1959. p. 491.
10. Moore, ed., o p . c i t . , p. 240; Slatyer and Perry, ed., 
op. cit., p.87.
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their open, park-like appearance and the lush grasses they 
produced after rain were such as to inspire early settlers to
i ilyrical eulogies.
But only along the major rivers was this abundance of
fodder coupled with a permanent natural water supply. It was
thus to the frontages that white settlers first turned. The
extreme west of the Riverina was the first part of the region
in which settlement became firmly established. By 1848 the
Murrumbidgee and Lachlan frontages had been largely taken up
and cattle runs extended five or six miles back from the
water. Meanwhile in the north, settlers were establishing
a foothold on the banks of the Bogan river. From these two
bases the penetration of the Darling lands began in the latter
1840s, with cattle being moved onto the Barwon frontage in 1846
1 3and up the Darling from the south shortly afterwards. The
occupation of these new lands was tenuous, and many of the 
"settlers" were wandering stockmen glad of the opportunity to 
roam as they pleased across country to which no white man laid 
claim. When faced with drought, labour shortages and
open hostility from the Aboriginals in the early 1850s, the
11. See e.g. Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition 
of the Crown Tenants in the Western Division of New South 
Wales, Minutes of E v i d e n c e , N.S.W. Legislative Assembly, 
Votes and Proceedings, 1901, vol 4. (henceforward cited as 
R.C.W.D. Minutes); evidence of R. Griffiths, p. 356.
12. Ronald, o p . c i t ., p. 58.
13. Hardy, o p . c i t ., p. 148; J. Jervis, "The West Darling
Country: its Exploration and Settlement", in Journal of
the Royal Australian Historical Society, vol. 34, 1949.
(henceforward cited as "West Darling") p. 148.
14. Hardy, ibid., p p . 63, 79; Jervis, i b i d ., p. 147.
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whites on the Bogan and Darling frontages beat a hasty retreat
1 5to the strongholds of the Namoi and the western Riverina.
After this episode, settlement on the Bogan was ban-
1 6ned until 1858, restricting access to the Barwon frontages.
But in the south major changes were afoot which were to ensure
that the setback was only temporary. The advent of the
Victorian gold-rushes had provided pastoralists in areas close
to the border with a ready-made market for meat, while the
inauguration of the Murray steamboat trade in 1853 had boosted
hopes that the western Riverina, and perhaps even the Darling,
would soon have a direct transport link to Adelaide and
Melbourne. With the return of good seasons pastoralism resumed
its northward march up the now "pacified" Darling frontage. By
1855 licences had been granted for the occupation of land as
far upstream as Mount Murchison, beyond the present site of 
1 7Wilcannia; the following year speculation in Darling lands
1 8was reported m  South Australia and in 1858 there was a
rush to lay claim to the plains between the Darling and the
1 9Barrier Ranges.
By the end of the decade new horizons had opened up 
for pastoralism in the interior. In 1858 river transport was 
at last extended along the Murrumbidgee up to Hay, which
15. Hardy, ibid. , pp . 67-8; Jervis, "Western Plains", o p .
c i t ., p p . 6-7.
16. Jervis, ibi d . , p. 6.
17. Hardy, o p . c i t ., p p . 79, 81.
18. Jervis, "West Darling", o p . c i t . ,
19. Hardy, o p . c i t ., p p . 83-4.
p . 150
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quick 1 y developed as a major port serving not only the western 
Murrumbidgee runs but also the Lachlan pastoralists, whose own 
river was swampy and unnavigable.^  The greatest triumph, 
however, was the successful navigation of the Darling in 1859, 
when one of the two rival riverboat captains who tackled the 
river managed to pilot his craft as far as Brewarrina.
Although the Darling was awkward to navigate even in
p pa good season and untrafficab1e during dry spells, it was
cheaper and faster than the overland transport by bullock dray
on which the earlier inland squatters had been forced to
2 3depend. It was eminently suited to wool transportation and 
woolgrowing quickly superseded the raising of beef cattle 
along the rivers. As early as 1861 a steamboat captain 
observed that the cattlemen along the Darling between Mount 
Murchison and Bourke had turned to wool-growing and similar 
changes were evident even further u p s t r e a m . ^  The north-west 
was overtaken by a minor settlement boom as pastoralists 
rushed to exploit the cheap, newly-accessible land along the
20. D. Jeans, An Historical Geography of New South Wales to
1900, Sydney, 1972. p. 190; J. Jervis, "The Western 
Riverina: a history of its development", in Journal of the
Royal Australian Historical Society, v o l . 38, 1952.
(henceforward cited as "Western Riverina") p p . 146ff ;
Ronald, op. c i t . , p p . 81-2.
21. Hardy, o p . c i t . , p. 85.
22. The river was closed again as early as 1860 (ibid., p. 86.).
23. See above, p. 2, on reasons for wool's adaptability to 
slower transport modes.
24. Jervis, "West Darling", o p . cit . , p. 153; L. Peel,
"History of the Australian Pastoral Industries to 1960", in 
Alexander and Williams, e d . , op. cit., p p . 54-5. Cattle
were still put onto virgin country in some areas to trample 
down scrub (Butlin, I.Ä.E.D., op. cit., p. 69).
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Darling's northern tributaries. With high prices reigning on 
the international wool market, the Warrego and Bree frontages 
were soon taken up. The Bogan, itself reoccupied after the 
lifting of the settlement ban in 1858, served once more as a 
staging point for settlers moving into the north-west.
The influx into the north-west was swelled by a movement of 
pastoralists upstream from the south Darling, where scab had 
broken out among the flocks in the early 1860s; but their hopes 
of escaping the disease proved vain, as it soon followed them 
up the r i v e r . D
In the 1860s, there was also a major extension of 
settlement away from the river frontages and into the naturally 
waterless "back blocks". The movement into the back country 
started among the western Riverina and south Darling cattlemen
during the 1850s, but gathered little momentum further north
2 7while frontage blocks were still freely available. Then,
with the extension of the river trade, blocks in the accessible 
triangle between the Lachlan, the south Darling and Willandra 
Creek came into d e m a n d , ^  and after severe flooding in 1863-4 
pastoralists showed increasing interest in the back blocks of 
the west D a r l i n g . ^  By the mid-1860s settlers had forged 
into the outback as far as the Paroo and the better-watered
o nareas of the Barrier Ranges.
25. Jervis, ibid., p. 146; "Western Plains", o p .c i t ., p p . 6-7.
26. Hardy, o p . c i t ., p. 94.
27. Ibid., p. 79; Ro nald, op. cit., pp. 104-5.
28. Jervis, "Western Plains", o p . c i t ., p.8.
29. Hardy, o p . c i t . , p. 134.
3 0. Ibid. , pp. 131-3; Jervis, "
p p . 153-4.
West Darling", o p . cit.,
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Characteristically, this spate of settlement was 
followed by a period of stagnation and partial retreat from 
1868 to 1870. Drought reduced wool production and disrupted 
river transport, while a slump in international wool prices cut 
into the returns the pastoralists received even when they 
managed to get their paltry clips to market. Expansion 
was checked and some runs abandoned along the Bogan and the 
mid-Darling.
But in the early 1870s with the return of good 
seasons and a renewed boom in wool prices, there was once again 
a waxing of interest in the western districts. The mid-Lachlan
frontages were taken up early in the decade and the back blocks
3 3shortly afterwards. From 1875 the long-neglected dry
plains between Hillston and Bourke were opened up as 
pastoralists moved to take advantage of the transportation 
facilities and growing local meat market brought by copper 
mining at Cobar and Mount H o p e .^
The areas abandoned in the late 1860s were reoccupied 
and settlement intensified on the west Darling back country. 
Between 1871 and 1879 six hundred new blocks were taken up in 
the area which was to become the New South Wales Western
31. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. c i t . , p p . 96-7; Hardy, ibid., pp. 95-
6; Williams in Barnard, ed. , o p . c i t . , p. 434 .
32. Jervis, "West Darling", o p . c i t . , p. 514 ; "Western
Plains", op. cit., pp. 6-7.
33. J. Andrews, "The Emergence of the Wheat Belt in South- 
Eastern Australia to 1930", in J. Andrews, ed., Frontiers 
and Men, Melbourne, 1966. pp. 57-8.
34. Jervis, "Western Plains", op. cit., p p . 9, 80,83-84.
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3 SDivision. By the end of the decade, with only the most
remote land along the South Australian border remaining 
u n c l a i m e d , ^  the New South Wales pastoral frontier had 
effectively closed, forcing adventurers in search of cheap 
virgin country to turn to the interior of Queensland and the 
Northern Territory.
The Changing Shape of Western Pastoralism
Pastoral penetration of the plains was far more than 
a simple process of geographical diffusion. As the frontiers 
of occupation were pushed out, there were fundamental changes 
in the pattern of western land ownership and use. While some 
of these changes were attributable principally to the 
intensification of settlement and the associated need to 
increase the volume of production from a set area of land, the 
development of the pastoral industry was also profoundly 
affected by the emergence of an oligarchy of colonial 
financiers and wealthy squatters who became increasingly 
involved in western pastoral ventures.
The big squatters' involvement in the occupation of 
the plains had begun during the 1850s. Many of the Darling and 
Murray frontage runs taken up then were occupied by Riverina 
pastoralists who used them in conjunction with their other 
holdings to fatten cattle for the meat markets on the Victorian
35. Butlin, I.A.E.D. , op. cit. , p. 102. For the boundaries 
of the Western Division see Map 1, p. 26 above.
36. Jervis, "West Darling", o p . cit., p. 155.
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o 7goldfields. While along the Murray frontages some moves
were made to fence and water the back blocks, as was being done 
in the western R i v e r i n a , ^  in most cases the squatters were 
attracted to the Darling frontages precisely because they could 
be exploited with a minimum of expenditure on capital facilit­
ies. Though a few squatters had a shrewd appreciation that, if 
the Darling proved navigable, windfall gains might be reaped 
from claiming land along the frontages, they were principally 
interested in applying the profits from operating their western
O Qruns to offset rising capital expenditures in the Riverina.
With the opening of the Darling river trade and the 
wool boom which followed, large squatters and pastoral 
entrepreneurs became interested in establishing fully-fledged, 
permanent stations along the river. The wool boom from 1861 to 
1868 and the accompanying flock expansion had more than doubled 
the colonies' gross wool proceeds, which stood at £7.4 million 
by the latter year. The stagnation and price slump of the late 
1860s were followed by a renewed boom, and gross wool proceeds 
reached £15.2 million in 1877.^^ Huge fortunes were amassed 
by many squatters in the established wool-growing districts and 
the boom attracted financiers, speculators and entrepreneurs of 
every description into pastoral ventures.
3 7. Hardy, op. c i t . , p. 67; Jervis , "Western Riverina",
o p . cit ., p p . 15-16.
3 8. Hardy, op. cit., p. 79.
39. Ibid., p p . 73, 80-1; Williams in Barnard, e d ., o p . cit.,
p . 434 .
4 0. But 1 in , I.A.E.D., op. cit., p. 98 (figures are e stimat e s ) .
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Fully-established pastoral properties were soon 
selling at a premium. The extent of freehold purchase in the 
central districts also grew as the good seasons of the early 
1870s spurred the spread of smallholding and forced the 
squatters to invest heavily in safeguarding their enterprises. 
Capital invested in the established districts, especially in 
the Riverina, was increasingly tied up in asserting ownership 
over existing assets.
These developments exacerbated the pastoral 
industry's centrifugal tendency, enhancing the comparative 
efficiency of investment in the newer pastoral districts of 
western New South Wales and Queensland while providing those 
investors who had capitalized on the wool boom and the Riverina 
land price inflation with the large-scale funds required to 
establish extensive outback enterprises. In the 1860s 
prospective investors employed explorers to comb the back 
blocks of western New South Wales in search of likely areas of 
unclaimed la n d , ^ 1 while the Bogan River Company (later known
as the Australian Pastoral Company) assembled huge holdings in 
4 2the north-west. Some of the wealthiest squatters from New
South Wales, South Australia and Victoria added western 
holdings to their personal e m p i r e s , ^  while smaller
41. Hardy, o p . c i t . , p. 134; Jervis, "West Darling", op. c i t . ,
pp . 8 3-4.
42. Jervis, ibid., p. 154; New South Wales Treasury, Transfers
of Runs. File 2/2185 (1866).
43. These included Sir Samuel Wilson, James Tyson, Hugh Glass 
(who was to come to grief in the depression of the late 
1860s) and Robert Barr Smith (NSW Treasury, ibid., and 
2/2188, Transfers of Runs 1869.)
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squatters reinvested capital gains from the sale or subdivision 
of Riverina holdings to take up and develop western r u n s . ^
In the latter 1870s, with heightened competition
between squatter and selector in the central districts
confronting the squatters with a Hobson's choice between
letting their holdings be dismembered and assuming the
4 Scrippling burden of wholesale land purchase, refugees from 
the Robertson Acts swelled the flow of settlers to the west.
The western districts were increasingly prized for their very 
aridity and the freedom from selectors which it conveyed, and 
the westward expansion of pastoralism became as much a retreat 
as an advance.
The quickening of interest in the plains afforded 
many opportunities for profit. The gains to be made from 
simple pre-emption were early recognized. Some speculative 
investors did not trouble to put stock on their land at all, or 
merely employed men to drove flocks across the runs to 
facilitate their claims. As late as 1882 there were complaints 
that much of the country between Cobar and Wilcannia was lying 
completely undeveloped, though technically "occupied" by 
speculators. In other cases holdings were only partially
44. e.g. R.H. Kennedy (Bailey, o p . c i t ., p. 105, Hardy, o p .
cit, p. 134); W . A . Brodribb (Australian Dictionary of 
Biography (henceforward cited as A .D .B .) v o l . 3. pp. 237-
9); the Desailly brothers (A . D . B . vol. 4. p p . 59-60 ).
45. Buxton, o p . c i t . , p p . 161 ff.
46. A witness to the R.C.W.D. related how he had been employed 
to drove flocks around Coan Downs and Gilgunnia in the
1 860s (R.C.W.D. Minu t e s , p. 547 evidence of A. Crombie) .
On the 1880s, see C. Lyne, The Industries of New South 
Wales, Sydney, 1882. p p . 233-4.
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developed, with settlement concentrating around natural water 
h o l e s , l e a v i n g  the back country unstocked except after 
rain. Land claims were thus able to outrun the actual spread 
of pastoral occupation.
Apart from the profits pre-emptive land claims 
yielded to the individuals and companies who made them, they 
had a marked effect on the process of pastoral expansion. They 
formalized the occupation of the land, gradually pushing the 
sporadic, unlicensed settlement common during the pioneering 
period out into the 1ess- favoured areas and eventually 
eliminating it entirely, assisted by government officials who
were keen to regularize settlement and ensure that it returned
4 8a regular income to the Crown.
Pre-emptive land claims also hastened the closing of 
the frontier by artificially restricting the availability of 
land from non-market sources. By ensuring that new entrants to 
the pastoral industry were required not only to pay rent to the 
Crown as ultimate landlord but also to compensate prior 
occupants for agreeing to transfer title, this allowed 
pressure to be maintained on pastoral land prices in the west 
itself and indirectly in the central districts. In effect, the 
stakes of the game had been raised, eliminating competition 
from small fry and enhancing the potential for capital gains.
47. See e.g. Hardy, o p . c i t . , p. 133.
48. Jervis, "West Darling", op. c i t . , pp. 146, 149.
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The large interests' dominance over the land market
was still restricted, however, by the continuing presence of
small pastoral holders who had taken up land in the pioneering
period. In some cases the small men were content to sell out
for a profit, and large investors were often able to play a
waiting game, relying on the fact that their own superior
access to capital would allow them to survive a slump or a
drought while the smaller lessees went to the wall. This
proved to be the case during the hard times in the latter
1860s. Heavily-committed pastoralists in the south were forced
4 Qinto insolvency or lost their holdings to their creditors,
and large investors became increasingly prominent in land
transactions in the north-west, often assembling huge holdings
from several sources. A second step in the raising of the
stakes was thus completed; not only had the price of taking up
a given area of land been raised, but land was increasingly
traded in consolidated blocks which could only be purchased by
5 1men of substantial means.
The consolidation of the western leases was clear by 
the mid-1870s. In 1875, of the runs in the Albert, Warrego and 
Darling districts not held by banks or finance companies, 55% 
were held by individuals or partnerships with eleven or more
49. Hardy, op. c i t . , p p . 95-6; Williams in Barnard, ed. op.
c i t , p . 434.
50. New South Wales Treasury, Transfers of Runs, 2/2187-8. 
See also Heathcote , Back of Bourke, op. cit. , p. 125.
51. New South Wales Treasury, Transfers of Runs, 2/2189 - 
2192 evinces the emerging pattern of wholesale 
transactions .
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runs in the same district. Lessees with only one holding in 
their district accounted for only 4% of the runs, while at the 
other end of the scale 34% of leases were contained in estates 
of twenty-six runs or more. As some lessees had holdings in 
several districts, the concentration of ownership over the 
region as a whole was rather greater than at district level.
Sir Samuel Wilson, the largest single landholder, held leases 
totalling almost three and a half million acres, and about a 
dozen other lessees had estates approaching or exceeding a 
million acres.
Pastoral technology and stock management practices 
changed markedly as the availability of unclaimed land 
diminished and holdings were aggregated in the hands of a few 
comparatively wealthy pastora1ist s . The earliest form of 
pastoralism on the plains was semi-nomadic and dependent on the 
changing availability of natural water supplies. The lesser 
pioneers followed their stock into the back country after rain, 
then returned with them to the frontages during dry seasons;
larger stockowners employed stockmen and shepherds, many of
5 3them Aboriginals, to do the same. Capital equipment was
virtually non-existent, labour intensity high and the grazing 
areas restricted for much of the year to land within easy range 
of the frontages and a few permanent water catchments.
52. Based on New South Wales Legislative Assembly,
Votes and Proceedings, 1875-6, v o l . 3, p p . 1034-1047.
53. Hardy, o p . c i t . , p p . 70, 98-9. On shepherding generally see
R. Ge n n y s , "Shepherds and Shepherding in Australia", in 
Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Soci ety, 11, 5 ,
1926. p p • 281-288 passim.
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During the 1850s and 1860s, as settlement on the
frontages intensified, pastoralists began to install artificial
watering points to allow the backs of their holdings to be
permanently grazed. In many parts of the north-west, in the
western Riverina and along Willandra Creek, earthen dams were
placed across intermittently-flowing creeks, often eliciting
c 4retaliatory action from runholders downstream. On the
south Darling and Murray runs squatters persevered with well-
C  Csinking in spite of a poor success rate. But the method of
water conservation which contributed most to the opening of
the back blocks until at least the 1880s was the sinking of
"tanks" - simple excavations, often of considerable size, which
held rainwater and r u n o f f . ^  Water conservation often
5 7entailed a substantial capital investment, but it allowed 
more stock to be run within the confines of each holding.
Stock were still shepherded, but the grazing pattern was 
diversified to alleviate pressure on the frontages, which even 
in the late 1860s were becoming denuded and trampled by heavy
C Ograzing combined with the pressure of travelling stock. °
A further step in the direction of capital intensity 
was the installation of fencing. Boundary fencing was 
installed on some western Riverina cattle runs in the 1850s,
54. Buxton, o p . c i t . p. 49; Hardy, ibi d , p. 101; Jervis, 
"Western Plains", o p . c i t ., p. 10.
55. Hardy, ibid., pp. 73, 99.
56. Ibid., p. 73; W. Tietkins, "Some Reminiscences of the 
far West of New South Wales", in Journal of the
Royal Australian Historical Society, 14, 4, 1929. p. 221.
57. Hardy, ibid., p. 99; see also Buxton, o p . c i t . , p p . 50-51.
58. Hardy, ibid., p p . 96, 98.
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primarily to keep the landholders' stock in and others'
C Qout. In the following decade fences were constructed on a
few runs around the Darling and lower L a c h l a n . ^  But the 
construction of post-and-rai1 or brush fencing was too slow and 
expensive, and the gains from perimeter fencing too widely 
doubted, for the practice to appeal to more than a handful of 
pastoral investors.
Only in the 1870's was close shepherding rendered 
unnecessary by the eradication of the dingo and the widespread 
installation of fencing initiated in the west. It was realized 
that perimeter fencing coupled with the judicious distribution 
of watering points across a holding would eliminate the 
necessity of shepherding. Subdivision fences of the kind used 
in the central districts could be installed later; in the 
interim the sheep were kept in and protected by the fence and a 
dispersed grazing pattern promoted by the scattering of water 
supplies. Pastures could be grazed more evenly, reducing the 
amount of dust in the fleece; fewer lambs would be trampled by
the flocks; and in the long term fewer permanent hands would be
6 1required on the station. By the mid-seventies the shift to 
fencing appeared inexorable. Galvanised wire became available 
from about 1873, allowing the rapid construction of durable 
fences. Within a year western pastoralists were buying wire as
59 . Bu x t o n , op. c i t ., p p . 42-5.
60 . H ardy, op. cit., p p . 70, 98-9; Jervis, "Western Riverina",
o p . cit ., p p . 23-4.
6 1 . But 1 i n , I.A.E.D., op. cit., pp . 92ff; Hardy, ibid., p. 179.
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as fast as it could be shipped up to them, and by the end 
of the decade shepherding had been superseded by set-stocking 
along the frontages and even in parts of the back country.
During the 1870s the pace at which stations were 
equipped began to accelerate. In most of the back country it 
was necessary to put in water conservation facilities before 
the land could be permanently stocked; the gradual accretion of 
equipment was therefore out of the question. Furthermore, the 
practice of equipping runs rapidly to enhance their market 
value became increasingly common, as is indicated by the 
frequency with which runs were advertised for sale with 
substantial newly-erected improvements listed among their 
assets. For the purposes of private transactions in pastoral 
1easeho1dings pastoralists maintained the fiction that the 
land, being Crown property, was of no intrinsic value. Prices 
were based on a figure per head of stock, incorporating 
surcharges for the value of improvements, the property's 
developmental potential and the previous holder's entrepren­
eurial initiative. With land and stock in heavy demand, the 
purchase of undeveloped runs and their resale with equipment 
and stock offered a double gain from charges imposed by virtue 
of pre-emption and from the natural increase of the flock.
This pattern of investment was by no means 
characteristic of the 1870s alone. In the 1860s the Desailly
62. Town and Country Journal, 18 August and 13 October 1874.
63. Hardy, op. c i t ., p. 179.
- 47 -
brothers had reputedly spent £130,000 and at one point employed 
three hundred hands to set up Mossgiel station, only to lose it 
by foreclosure in 1869. And speculative investment in the
1870s was dwarfed by that of the following decade. However, 
the pace of development in the 1870s had a marked effect on the 
financing of western pastoralism, prefiguring the large-scale 
indebtedness of the 1880s and 1890s.
The largest pastoralists had no need to seek finance 
on the open market. James Tyson, Samuel Wilson, William Taylor 
and their ilk could cover development costs on their western 
holdings by diverting funds from other parts of their sizeable 
personal empires. The same was true of the urban merchants and 
financiers who had taken up holdings as absentees.
Pastoralists of moderate means were in a far different 
position. In spite of high returns from wool and stock sales, 
a growing number of pastoralists fell into debt. Those who 
only had holdings in the west often had to borrow to finance 
improvements needed to lift the long-term rate of return on 
their holdings. Squatters with holdings in the central 
districts as well were sometimes worse off, as they faced the 
double burden of fending off selectors on the one hand and 
installing basic station equipment on the other. New entrants, 
too, found themselves committed to high initial purchase costs. 
To obtain finance for such long-term commitments as these, 
squatters usually had to mortgage both stock and land. There was
64. A.D.B. vol 4, p. 40; Jervis, "Western Plains",
p . 8 .
o p . c i t . ,
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also a demand for short-term finance to alleviate the cash flow 
difficulties which were endemic to the pastoral industry. The 
time-lag between clip and cheque, the unreliability of the 
Darling trade and the year-long wait for stock purchased "off 
the shears" to begin yielding a return all could produce 
liquidity problems, which were covered by short-term advances 
on the security of a stock mortgage or wool lien. Initially 
short-term lending was dominated by wool consignment agents who 
acted as intermediaries between the squatters and the banks, 
but during the 1870s the banks themselves became increasingly 
active in this area as they attempted to enter directly into 
the consignment b u s i n e s s . ^
Longer-term funds were provided by a variety of 
lenders. Records of transactions in western pastoral runs in 
the 1860s and mid-1870s show a general increase in the 
mortgaging of western runs. Financial institutions became 
somewhat more active in the 1870s. During 1866, for example, 
there were only eight transactions involving banks in the 
Albert, Darling and Warrego districts, all of them mortgages to 
the English, Scottish and Australian Chartered Bank; in 1873
65. General discussions of the financing pattern are provided
by Bailey, o p . c i t ., p. 82; Barnard and Butlin in Barnard, 
e d . , op. c i t ., p. 384-5, 392-3; and Butlin I.A.E.D., op.
cit p p . 127ff. On consignment agencies in particular, see
Bailey, l o c . c i t . , p. 21; S.J. Butlin, Australia and New 
Zealand Bank, London, 1961. (henceforth cited as S. Butlin, 
A.N.Z. Bank) pp. 236, 2 5 0 f f . ; on the banks' interest in
wool consignment see Anon. A Century of B a n k i n g , Sydney 
1934. pp. 41-2.
66. The New South Wales Treasury files listing run transfers 
are unfortunately incomplete; records for 1870-1872 
inclusive are missing, and the series terminates in 1876.
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transactions had risen to thirty-five, eighteen to and 
seventeen from banks, and three institutions were involved. The 
growth of financial institutions' activities was rather more 
marked and the number of institutions involved greater in the
western parts of the Lachlan pastoral district, where non-
6 7banking finance companies were also active.
The extent of private lending is more difficult to 
discern. The registers do not distinguish between mortgages 
and other transactions, and even where leases were held in the 
name of individuals known to be urban businessmen rather than 
pastoralists in their own right, the possibility that they were 
merely absentee owners cannot be discounted. Nevertheless, 
some financial relationships can be identified with a fair 
degree of certainty by examining the pattern of run transfers
or by comparing official lists of runholders with information
6 8from other sources indicating who was working the runs.
The pattern of obligations which emerges is a complex 
one. Mortgages to private lenders appear to have been about as 
common as bank mortgages, and in both cases mortgages were 
roughly balanced by discharges. But private finance was not 
only secured by mortgages. Long-term financial arrangements 
were often based on registering the holding in the joint names 
of a financial and a managing partner, and family partnerships 
were used to give junior members of the large pastoral clans a
67. New South Wales Treasury, Transfers of Runs, 2/2188-9.
68. Based on Treasury files 2/2185-92.
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start in the business. Occasionally senior pastoralists would 
also act as guarantors for loans to younger or less reliable 
kin.
Private loans were overwhelmingly supplied by men who 
had close connections with the pastoral industry, often of long 
standing, though by the 1870s few were practising pastoralists. 
James Tyson was conspicuous as the only large lender who was 
first and foremost a squatter. At the other end of the scale 
Francis Cadell, a river merchant of rather dubious reputation,
6 Qappears to have held mortgages over several runs. The
remainder would best be described as pastoral entrepreneurs. 
Although most were landowners in their own right, their most 
striking common characteristic was their close involvement with 
one or other of the wool merchandising houses. Among their 
number were Blackwood of Dalgety and Co., Ronald and MacBain of 
the Australian Mortgage Land and Finance Company, Barr Smith of 
Elder, Smith and Co and Hastings Cuningham, head of a 
woolbroking firm. Collectively these men represented a 
formidable power block within the pastoral industry. Their 
emergence as lenders during the 1870s was a harbinger of the 
larger role their companies were to play during the following 
decades.
Pastoral lending was a lucrative business in the 
1870s. As Butlin and Barnard have pointed out, the pastoral 
industry was not in a position to finance freehold purchases
69. On Ca d e l l 1s business ethics see A.D.B., v o l . 3, p. 324.
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and n ew  c a p i t a l  f o r m a t i o n  f rom  its c u r r e n t  i n c o m e  a f t e r  
7 01871. H i g h  i n t e r e s t  ra tes , p e a k i n g  at e l e v e n  per cent in
1879, y i e l d e d  la r ge  r e t u r n s  to i n s t i t u t i o n s  w i t h  a c c es s  to
B r i t i s h  and  c o l o n i a l  s a v i n g s  as well as i n c r e a s i n g  the
o p p o r t u n i t y  for p r i v a t e  i n d i v i d u a l s  and u n i n c o r p o r a t e d  p a s t o r a l
firm s to ski m off the c r e a m  of p a s t o r a l  p r o f i t s  w i t h o u t
c o m m i t t i n g  t h e m s e l v e s  to b u y i n g  l and  and s to c k  on a s e l l e r ' s
m a r k e t .  A s h a r p  (t h o u g h  m e r c i f u l l y  brief) d ro ug h t ,  c o u p l e d  wit h
a sl u mp  in wo ol p r i c e s  in 1877-8, h i g h l i g h t e d  the s q u a t t e r s '
7 2e m e r g i n g  d i l e m m a  : h a v i n g  c o m m i t t e d  t hei r own s u b s t a n t i a l
f o r t u n e s  to th e ir  h o l d i n g s ,  t h e y  were r e q u i r e d  to c ou r t  the 
p a t r o n a g e  of f i n a n c i e r s  for the sake of o b t a i n i n g  a l i t t l e  m or e  
cash.
For m o s t  of the d e c a d e  the d e v e l o p m e n t  of t his  c l i e n t  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  was m a s k e d  by the w ool  p r i c e  b o o m  a nd the 
c o n c o m i t a n t  d e m a n d  for la n d  and s to c k  as the i n d u s t r y  e x p a n d e d .  
P a s t o r a l  la nd was an e m i n e n t l y  m a r k e t a b l e  c o m m o d i t y ;  this was 
i l l u s t r a t e d  by s a l e s  such as t hat  of M o s s g i e l ,  the run w h i c h  
had co me  cl ose  to b a n k r u p t i n g  the D e s a i l l y s ,  for a r e p u t e d  
p r o f i t  of £ 1 2 0 , 0 0 0 . ^  W h i l e  this r e m a i n e d  the case, 
s q u a t t e r s  had  few q u a l m s  a b o u t  s i n k i n g  e ver  l a r g e r  a m o u n t s  of 
c a p i t a l  into a s s e m b l i n g ,  s e c u r i n g  and e q u i p p i n g  t he ir  h o l d i n g s .  
But, t h o u g h  i n d i v i d u a l  p a s t o r a l i s t s  c o u l d  m a k e  w i n d f a l l  g ain s  
from a b o o m i n g  land m a r k e t  w h i l e  e x t e r n a l  c o n d i t i o n s  f a v o u r e d
70. B u t l i n  and B a r n a r d  in B a r n a r d ,  e d . , o p . c i t . , p p . 388-9.
71. B ut li n,  I .A . E. D.  , op. cit. , p p . 100-1.
72. Ibid., p. 100.
• , v o 1. 3.,7 3. A .D . B p . 5 2.
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the wool industry, the rising cost of pastoral proprietorship 
was exposing the industry as a whole on two fronts, by 
increasing its dependence on borrowed funds while committing it 
to exacting a consistently high rate of return, without the 
option of retreat, from the drought-prone country of the 
interior.
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CHAPTER 2
The Western Land Boom 1879-1882
As was outlined in the previous chapter, the first 
thirty years of western pastoral settlement were marked by con­
trapuntal movements of land speculation, technological adapt­
ation, flock expansion, drought and retreat. The end result of 
this uneven development had been to concentrate western land- 
holding in the hands of the wealthier pastoral capitalists 
while at the same time establishing a skeletal technological 
framework for pastoral utilization of the arid and semi-arid 
lands. By the time wool prices began to move out of their 
1877-8 trough many of the incumbent western lessees were ready 
to take advantage of any upswing in demand for western hold­
ings; in some cases, especially among the back country lessees,
their readiness was reinforced by decidedly mixed profit exper-
1iences during the mid and latter 1870s. As a result, when
2buyers began to emerge, the turnover of holdings was high
and the movement to the west quickly assumed the proportions of
a fully-fledged boom.
1. R.C.W.D. M i n u t e s , evidence of A. Crombie, p p . 547-8.
2. No complete run lists could be found for the early 1880s. 
However, partial listings are given in N.S.W. Government 
Gazettes for 1881-2 (for details of references see n. 24 
below). Comparing these with the lists in Votes and 
Proceedings, 1875-6, vol. 3, pp» 1034-1047, we find that of 
the runs (some three hundred in number) in the Warrego and 
Albert districts for which details are provided, a majority 
(54%) had undergone some kind of transfer in the seven-year 
period. Simple transfers by sale appear to have accounted 
for 35% of holdings; the remainder of those changing hands 
were involved in intra-partnership changes, mortgages and 
discharges of mortgage (in that order of frequency). These 
figures must, however, be treated with some caution because 
of the incompleteness of the records on which they are based.
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Considered reflection on the past experience of 
outback pastoralism played little part in the upsurge of 
enthusiasm for western pastoral investment after 1879. The 
boom was principally the outcome of exogenous factors - the 
wool price rise, an influx of British capital and the rising 
cost of entry to the pastoral industry in established 
districts. Insofar as pastoralism's previous record in the 
west was taken into account, investors' assessments were 
coloured by the sanguine expectation that technological 
innovations, especially the use of artesian water, and the 
extension of the New South Wales railway network would enhance 
western pastoral profits in the medium term and pave the way 
for a repetition of the Riverina experience of capital gains.
The squatters were convinced that the outback's 
stock-carrying capacity was purely limited by lack of water.
The water conservation techniques adopted in the 1860s and 
1870s, however, had been only partly successful in raising the 
productivity of the back country. Tanks often took several 
years to fill; good catchments were hard to find and silting 
was common in sandy country; and in poor seasons when feed was 
scarce the steep-sided excavations served as death-traps for 
weakened stock. Dams were subject to flood damage and 
frequently aroused the resentment of neighbours whose access to 
water was restricted. Though wells could be made more 
efficient by the use of steam pumps, which were widely inst­
alled during the 1870s,^ they were costly and had a high
3. Hardy, o p . c i t ., p p . 100-1.
4. Ibid., p.99.
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failure rate. After all these problems, the discovery that an 
artesian basin underlay large areas of the north-west was 
hailed as a godsend.^ Bores offered the pastoralists a 
secure water supply, even in dry seasons, and the reticulation 
of bore water along systems of troughs or open channels provid­
ed a wider spread of watering points than had been possible 
under previous water conservation regimes.^ Many hoped that 
irrigated agriculture would also prove possible. Squatters 
rushed to take advantage of the new discovery; from being in 
the experimental stage in the late 1870s artesian boring had
7become widespread by about 1883.
Longer experience was to prove the limitations of 
artesian boring. Even at the turn of the century there was 
little successful private boring outside the area north of the 
Darling from Wanaaring to just west of Brewarrina. The central 
zone south of the Darling was hardly affected, and there were
Oonly a handful of flowing bores in the arid north-west corner.
5. Eighty thousand square miles of the Great Artesian Basin
underlay New South Wales (L. Walker, "Irrigation in New 
South Wales, 1884 to 1940", in Journal of the Royal 
Australian Historical S ociety, 28, 3, 1941. p. 191).
6. S. Wadham, R. Wilson and J. Wood, Land Utilization in
Australia, 4th ed. , Melbourne, 1964 . p p . 57-8.
7. There is some dispute as to the location and date of the
first successful artesian bore, with estimates ranging from 
1878 to 1880 (Hardy, op, c i t ., p. 180; cf. Ronald, op. c i t ., 
p. 136n.) . On boring in the Warrego, see Heathcote, Back of 
Bourke, op. c i t . , p . 120.
8. Distribution based on map accompanying R.C.W.D. Report. Of 
about 110 successful private bores shown within the study 
area, 33 were in the Wanaaring Sheep District and 69 in 
Bourke Sheep District or the northern section of Wilcannia 
Sheep District. Nineteen unsuccessful private attempts were 
also recorded. These figures are probably underestimates, 
as notification of private bores was not at that stage 
compulsory.
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No r did artesian water prove suitable for long-term irrigation, 
as in many areas the mineral content of the water was high.^ 
Drilling was also a costly operation; while Samuel McCaughey 
might be able to afford to install twenty-one bores on his two 
north-western stations, the grazier of lesser means had to 
content himself with tanks and dams. The trial and error proc­
ess by which the boundaries of the artesian basin were establ­
ished was thus an expensive one for the squatters who did not 
strike water. But there was a far more fundamental problem
with the diagnosis on which the squatters' vigorous pursuit of 
secure water supplies was based. Ultimately the carrying capac­
ity of the western region was limited by the supply of fodder,
and the watering programmes of the 1880s did little to overcome
1 2this limitation. The unbounded optimism vested in artesian
boring in the early 1880s therefore proved eventually to be 
misplac e d .
The other local development which aroused investors' 
interest was the prospect of an improvement in the region's 
transport system. The unreliability of the Darling trade and 
the high cost of overland transport had hampered western 
expansion. Profits were reduced by high freight charges and by
9. R.C.W.D. Summary of Evidence, p p . 82-3.
10. Crowley, o p . c i t ., p. 307 (figures as of 1901).
11. Bailey, op. c i t . , p. 98. Costs can be estimated from 
returns presented to the R.C.W.D. by the Superintendent of 
Public Watering Places and Artesian Boring (M i n u t e s ,
p p . 726-9) which show that the average cost of a government
bore in the region over the period to 1901 was £2,570 
(figures for 64 bores, including 8 failures).
12. See below p p .
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delays in realizing the clip, living conditions were made 
harsher by shortages of food, ^  ^  and the supply of labour and 
materials was disrupted. Until the early 1880s all these prob­
lems had been exacerbated by the New South Wales government's 
reluctance to provide money to develop the infrastructure for 
a trade which was primarily directed towards Victoria and South 
Australia. Government expenditure on transport facilities in 
the area was minimal; some wayside watering points were 
installed from the late 1860s but little was done to upgrade 
the rough tracks which served as roads, to provide bridges or 
to make the Darling less hazardous for n a v i g a t i o n . ^
By the late 1870s, however, it was clear that the New 
South Wales government intended to make a bid to draw the
13. A Sydney Morning Herald correspondent (7 September 1866)
reported that during a food shortage on the Warrego the 
population was subsisting on "beef and pig weed, more 
politely termed 'Warrego Cabbage'." In Walgett there were 
food shortages as late as 1882 (J. Jervis, "The Exploration
and Settlement of the North-Western Plains", in Journal of 
the Royal Australian Historical Soci ety, 48, 5, 1962
(henceforward cited as "North-Western Plains"), p. 443), 
while on the goldfields of the Corner country and at the 
Cober copper mines, both food and water were scarce on 
numerous occasions (Jervis, "West Darling", o p . c i t . ,
p p . 224, 226; Sydney Morning Herald, 4 November 1873).
14. On watering points, see Jervis, "West Darling",i bid., p.170.
Expenditure on western roads in the 1870s was mainly 
concentrated in the Riverina and on the W a 1gett-Narrabri 
road. In the late 1870s expenditure on western roads fell
to less than 1% of total estimates for subordinate roads 
administered directly by the Works Department (N.S.W.V.P. 
1878-9, vol. 5, p. 970). Some public punts and bridges were 
provided in the 1870s, but they were seldom adequate and 
tolls were high (see e.g. comment in Town and Country 
Journal, 21 October 1876). No attempt was made to lock the 
rivers, and a large part of the work of snagging the 
Darling was funded by Victoria and South Australia 
(R. Phillips, River Boat D a y s , Melbourne, 1972. p. 64).; see 
also I. Mudie , Riverboats Sketchbook, Adelaide, 1 975 . p. 42).
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region's trade away from the southern colonies. Railway lines
were built to Hay in 1882 and Bourke in 1885; well before they
reached their destinations the new lines were drawing trade
from the north and central west and from the Murrumbidgee and
Lachlan r u n s . ^  Moreover, closely accompanying the extension
of the railways there was a considerable increase in government
expenditure on roads, bridges and watering facilities in areas
1 6likely to be tapped by the new lines.
This threat to the commercial hegemony of Victoria in 
the Riverina and of South Australia on the Darling sparked off 
an intercolonial price-cutting war. All three colonies offered 
reduced charges or freight rebates on their railways, and the 
concessions were adjusted so as to provide the maximum benefit 
to the more remote pastoral stations which were not firmly tied 
to any particular colony's trading network. The rebate system 
did not work to the advantage of the merchants of the western 
towns, who found that they could be undersold by merchants from 
the colonial capitals selling directly to areas in which higher 
concession rates applied.17 The major beneficiaries of the 
competition between the colonies were the back country 
pastoralists and the mining companies, who were linked to the
15. Jeans, o p . c i t ., p p . 191-3, 199.
16. Expenditure on roads in the Riverina grew rapidly from 1881
and on north-western roads from 1885. The amounts involved 
were still relatively small, and the peak of expenditure on 
western roads was only 6.4% of total estimates for 
subordinate roads (N.S.W.V.P. 1887, v o l . 4, pp. 1040ff).
On bridges, see Jervis, "West Darling", o p . c i t ., p . 218;
watering points see Hardy, op. c i t ., p. 181.
17. Jeans, o p . c i t ., p. 199.
MAP 3: Western New South Wales T r a n sport Ne twork to 1900
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colonial capitals by a more efficient and reliable service at 
1 8reduced cost. By the early 1890s New South Wales had
succeeded, albeit at considerable cost, in making inroads into 
the other colonies' trading spheres on the Darling above 
Wilcannia, in the eastern Riverina and in the central Lachlan- 
Darling stretch which included the copper mines of Cobar, 
Nymagee and Mount Hope. Victoria retained a large share
of the western Riverina trade by dint of introducing freight
2 0rebates of between forty-three and sixty-six per cent.
South Australia's control over trade in the far west was
consolidated by the construction of a private railway to the
burgeoning mining centre of Broken Hill in 1888. South
Australian-based camel teams also serviced the country north of
the Darling, and the riverboat trade to Goolwa handled goods as
far up as Wilcannia or sometimes, when the river was high, to
2 1Bourke and Brewarrina.
Nevertheless the back country squatters did not 
benefit as much from intercolonial trading competition as they 
might have hoped. Agitation for branch lines to the central 
Darling, lower Lachlan and Walgett-Brewarrina areas bore no 
fruit until the twentieth century, and little was done to
18. The savings were particularly marked in the north-west, 
where long hauls and frequent disruptions had raised 
transport and insurance costs. The cost per bale for 
Bourke wool was reduced from 25/- to 15/- by the railway 
(Jeans, i b i d ., p. 199).
19. Bailey, op. c i t . , p. 130; Jeans, i b i d . , pp. 193-6, 199.
20. Jeans, ibid., p p . 194-5.
21. Ibid., p p . 199-200. On camel teams, see Jervis, "West
Darling", o p . cit., p p . 175-6.
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improve roads which did not contribute to the railways' share 
of trade. With back country holdings still dependent on the 
bullock t e a m s , transport costs remained a large item in 
stations' working expenses. In 1890-1891 transport costs on 
seven stations spread across the region averaged eighteen 
per cent of total working expenses and fourteen per cent of 
wool proceeds, and many growers were still paying considerably 
more to get their clips to the colonial ports than to ship them 
thence to England. Furthermore, railway extension made small- 
scale mixed farming seem a viable proposition in parts of the 
region's eastern fringe, necessitating protective freehold
purchases of strategic points on many western Riverina and
2 3Bogan holdings.
But in the region as a whole, freehold purchase was a 
far less pressing requirement than in the better-watered 
districts. In the enthusiasm of the late 1870s and early 1880s 
freehold costs and speculation had sent Riverina land prices 
soaring. This was bound to enhance the attractiveness of 
investment in leasehold estates in the interior, and especially 
in western New South Wales, where the infrastructure for 
further pastoral expansion was far better developed than in
22. Stations involved were Springfield, Tiltagara, Piangobla 
and Tindarey (Australian Estates Co. papers, 5 series) and 
Paddington, Cuthowarra and Langawirra (Australian 
Mercantile Land and Finance Company papers, 6 series). 
However, these are underestimates as on the A.M.L.F. 
stations several items of transport-related expenditure 
were entered under another head.
23. Buxton, o p . c i t . , p p . 189 , 256; Lyne , o p . c i t . , p. 251;
Robinson, o p . c i t ., p p . 128, 193-5.
- 6 2 -
western Queensland. No matter how untried the pastoral 
potential of the Darling back blocks, their emergence as a 
major channel for pastoral investment was guaranteed by the 
operation of the land market in the more favoured districts of 
the eastern colonies and South Australia.
Capital accumulated from a variety of sources, both 
colonial and British, flowed into the region in the early 
1880s. Among colonial investors, the pastoral entrepreneurs and 
the squatting families were joined by urban merchants and 
bankers. Sydney businessmen were active in the north and South 
Australians in the west Darling, but the bulk of the local 
capital invested in the area continued to come from Victorian- 
based i n t e r e s t s . ^  Though some private financiers engaged in 
mortgage lending, the characteristic vehicle for private finan­
cing remained the partnership or syndicate. Doubtless, too, 
there were cases where absentees began to channel development 
capital into holdings which they had previously held 
principally for speculative purposes. Among the private 
financiers who were active in the early 1880s the pastoral 
entrepreneurs remained prominent, and to their ranks were added 
E.M. Young, the general manager of the Australian Mortgage Land 
and Finance Company (A.M.L.F) and George Turner, a Melbourne 
financier who by the middle of the decade was closely associated
24. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. c i t . , p p . 65-6, 103. Comments made
here are based on partial run listings in New South Wales 
Government Gazette, 1 March 1881 p p . 1282-5, 6 January 1882
p p . 55-8, 17 January 1 882 p. 252 , 20 January 1 882 p. 323 ,
10 February 1882, p. 779.
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2 5with the Union Mortgage and Agency Company (U.M.A.).
There was also an upswing in institutional lending, 
and a considerable increase in the number of finance houses 
actively pursuing western business. During the 1870s there had 
already been some merging of the functions of the banks and 
specialist wool consignment agencies. Several banks had esch­
ewed relying on the consignment agencies as intermediaries and 
had gone into direct lending and consignment themselves while 
the specialist agencies, notably the British-based A.M.L.F. 
and New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency Company (N.Z.M.L.A.),
O  CLhad taken on the provision of long term mortage finance.
By 1879 199 western leases (13.3% of the total) were registered 
in banks' names and sixty-two (3.6%) in the names of other 
companie s .  ^^
The fact that the British companies had access to 
British funds at interest rates which were low by colonial 
standards constituted a threat to the market share of the local 
wool consignment houses, and in the late 1870s and early 1880s 
many of these agencies began to seek finance in Britain to 
close the gap. British investors, though on the whole 
enthusiastic about pastoral investment in the colonies, were 
reluctant to entrust their funds to purely Australian-based 
companies, and to facilitate borrowing a number of companies
26. Australasian Insurance and Banking Record (henceforward 
cited as A.I.B.R.), March 1890, p. 197.
27. N.G. Butlin, "Company Ownership of New South Wales 
Pastoral Stations, 1865-1900", in Historical Studies, 4,14, 
May 1950 (henceforward cited as 'Company Ownership'),
p. 96. Figures are for Western Division only.
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? ftfound it necessary to gain incorporation in Britain.
Usually this entailed vesting overriding powers in a British 
board of directors, but most of the companies had little 
difficulty in gaining the co-operation of congenial British 
merchants and erstwhile colonial luminaries who were ready to
view a place on the British board in the proper light, as a
p qceremonial rather than a managerial function. Having
thus allayed British lenders' fears, the companies were able to
use short-term debenture borrowings to raise large sums on the 
-j nLondon market.
From being chronically short of funds the pastoral 
industry thus found itself suddenly inundated with loan 
capital. At the same time wool earnings were also rising as 
production levels recovered from the 1877 drought and prices 
moved out of the trough of the mid-1870s. Between 1877 and 
1880 the volume of the New South Wales wool clip increased by 
48.5% and its estimated value by 52.6%, realizing £8.1 million
28. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. c i t ., p p . 142, 160-2; Bailey, op.
c i t , p. 55; N. Cain, "Capital Structure and Financial 
Disequilibrium : Pastoral Companies in Australia 1880-
1893", in Australian Economic Papers, June 1963 
(henceforward cited as "Capital Structure"). p p . 2-3. As
well as the Australian Mortgage Land & Finance Co., New 
Zealand Loan & Mercantile Agency and Trust & Agency Co., 
all of which had been previously incorporated, the 
following companies gained incorporation after the mid- 
1870s: Australasian Agency & Banking Corporation (1876-7);
Mort & Co. (1880); British & Australasian Trust & Agency 
Co. (1878); South Australian Land Mortgage & Agency Co. 
(1879); Queensland Investment Land Mortgage & Agency Co. 
(1879); Australasian Mortgage & Agency Co. (1879); Dalgety 
& Co. (1884); and Union Mo rtgage & Agency Co. (1885).
29. C f . discussion below p p . 108ff.
30. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. c i t . , 153ff; Cain "Capital 
Structure", op. cit., passim.
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Q 1in 1880. Much of the benefit of the increase accrued to
squatters in the established districts, who were able to pay 
off the debts they had incurred during the slump. In 1880 £3.8 
million worth of stock mortgages were discharged and only £2.8 
million taken up, while in the following year discharges of 
land mortgages almost trebled to reach £1.9 million.
The increase in capital imports coupled with the 
falling demand for borrowed funds in established areas produced 
an explosive market for pastoral finance. Pastoral lenders 
increasingly concentrated the inflow of capital on the newer 
squatting districts. In the 1870s several institutions had 
drifted into western involvement as their trusted clients took 
up Darling runs, but in the early 1880s investment in the 
region became systematic. Bank branches multiplied in
the western towns and the pastoral finance companies 
simultaneously extended their operations, sometimes by 
establishing branch offices but more often by entering into 
agreements with, or taking over stock and station agents who 
had already acquired a local c l i e n t e l e . ^
Such was the surfeit of pastoral loan capital that
31. T. Hall, Official Yearbook of NSW 1904-5, Sydney, 1906.
p p . 264-5. For comments on the estimates see Table 1. below.
32. N.S.W Statistical Register 1880, p p . 231, 233. See also
A .I .B .R ., February 1887, p p . 65-6.
33. Bailey, op. c i t ., p p . 75, 85-6, 88; N. Cain, "Pastoral
Expansion and Crisis in New South Wales 1880-1893 : the
Lending View" in Australian Economic Papers, December 
1963. (henceforward cited as "Pastoral Expansion") p p . ISO- 
198 passim.
34. The extension of bank branches can be traced through 
advertisements in the A.I.B.R. On takeovers of stock and 
station agencies see Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. cit., p. 142.
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the pastoral finance companies and the banks competed to 
finance land and stock purchases at attractive rates without 
assessing in any detail the likely performance of the 
enterprises they were funding. Thanks to British
investors' predilection for pastoral investment and to the 
cheapness of British debenture funds, the specialist companies 
were able to lend on a larger scale and more cheaply than the 
banks. As interest rates were bid down the banks were
forced to re-examine their position; by about 1883 several had 
resigned themselves to leaving the large squatting accounts to 
the finance companies and instead seeking outlets for their 
capital in urban development and among the smaller graziers and
o 7farmers. This established a lending pattern which was to 
last for the rest of the decade. Imported capital was heavily 
concentrated at the geographical margin of the industry, where 
it was lent in large sums to large clients; and the disposition 
of British funds was controlled by the local representatives of 
the pastoral finance companies, prominent among whom were the 
entrepreneurs who had become privately involved in the outback 
during the 1860s and 1870s.
The surge of outback pastoral investment which 
resulted had lasting ramifications for the fortunes of the 
industry. The most remarkable feature of the land boom was the 
extent to which the cost of entry to the industry escalated.
35. See below p p . 108ff.
36. See complaints in A.I.B.R., January 1881, p. 1; March 1881, 
pp. 79-80; July 1881 pp. 253-4.
37. See discussion in ibid., January 1883, p. 26.
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The effects of pre-emptive claims were magnified by rising 
stock prices as the pace of pastoral investment outstripped 
flock reproduction rates. Runs which a few years earlier would 
have been sold for twelve shillings per head of sheep changed 
hands freely at prices ranging from twenty shillings per head 
to an occasional thirty shillings on we 11-equipped runs with
O Oconvenient transport access. The initial investment
required was further increased by the fact that runs were sold 
as consolidated holdings commonly ranging from about a hundred 
thousand acres in the eastern part of the region to a quarter 
or half million acres in the far west.
The inflation of entry costs placed pastoral
investment far beyond the reach of the self-made man; a station
manager's lifetime earnings would pay for at most a part-share
3 9in a ten-mile block , and among the local commercial and 
manufacturing classes there were few individuals who could ever 
hope to amass the funds to purchase one of the consolidated 
holdings. The gap was bridged by the redeployment of capital 
within the industry and, increasingly, by imported funds. The 
widespread use of syndicates was a symptom of the increasing 
exclusiveness of the large landholder class. There were also 
instances of incumbent lessees' selling holdings to newcomers 
and providing them with loans to cover the balance of the
38. For examples see Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. c i t . , pp . 103-4;
Lord Casey, Australian Father and Son, Sydney, 1 967 . p p . 
67, 74; R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence of W. Sawers, p. 171,
cf. evidence of R. Griffiths, p. 353.
39. On a generous estimate a station 'manager might average
£200 per annum over a forty-year working life : a stocked
ten-mile block would seldom be sold for less than £15,000.
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purchase p r i c e . ^  And the finance companies were prepared to 
lend for land purchase and equipment, even in virgin country; 
for example, in 1881-2 Richard Goldsbrough and Co. advanced 
funds on three unformed stations and "in view of the difficulty 
in procuring suitable investments of their surplus funds", 
agreed to provide all but £20,000 of the £186,000 purchase 
price for Eremeran station near C o b a r .^ ^
As managing partner or mortgagor, the newly-arrived 
western lessee was by no means his own man. He received only a 
part of the station proceeds, and the chances of his being able 
to take sole control in the longer term grew slimmer as his 
initial financial dependence increased. Meanwhile by 1882 many 
of the western lessees of the previous decade had withdrawn 
from the area completely, some to lead a gentleman's existence 
on the proceeds of their speculations and others to attempt to 
repeat the performance in western Queensland and b e y o n d . ^  A 
further step in the concentration of pastoral capital was thus 
compl e t e .
The problem of rising costs was exacerbated by the 
fact that the western infrastructure was incapable of supplying 
the large quantities of labour and materials required to 
support a pastoral construction boom. For labourers the west 
was a place of last resort. The harsh climate, the long
40. See e.g. Randell, o p . c i t ., p p . 162, 166; R .C .W .D .
Minutes, evidence of H. Freeman, p. 334.
41. Cain, "Pastoral Expansion", o p . c i t ., p p . 187-8.
42. See e.g. Casey, o p . c i t . , p. 67; also A .D . B . vol . 3, 
pp. 237-9 (W. Brodribb); R.C.W.D. M i n u t e s , evidence of
A. Crombie, p p . 547-8.
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distances men had to travel to find work and the primitive 
living conditions on the western stations held no attraction 
even for migratory workers, let alone for permanent settlement. 
Pastoral labour demand had rapidly outstripped the supply of 
Aboriginal labour, and outback squatters had found it necessary 
to offer high wages to recruit white workers from outside the 
region. The substitution of set-stocking for shepherding 
reduced direct labour requirements in the medium term and 
introduced a more flexible system of labour usage based on 
specialized, short-term contract l a b o u r ; ^  but while fencing 
and watering facilities were being installed on a wide scale, 
labour often became critically s h o r t . ^
The shortgage in the early 1880s was severe. The 
sudden increase in labour demand created by heavy construction 
investment and rapid flock increases coincided with gold rushes
to Tenora and the arid nort h-west corner, and squatters were
4 5forced to pay large bonuses to secure their labour supply.
The transport system, too, was grossly overstrained. Supplies 
and construction materials were at best scarce and expensive 
and sometimes completely unobtainable. The boom degenerated
43. For a general discussion see Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. c i t .,
pp . 81ff. Also Hardy, op . c i t . , p p . 98-9, 1 06 .
44. In 1876 unskilled labourers were reported to be earning
between nine and ten shillings per diem in Bourke 
(unidentified newspaper cutting, quoted in Bourke and 
District Historical Society, History of B o u r k e , vol . 5. ,
Bourke, 1975. p. 54).
45. See e.g. Casey, op. cit., p.65. On the Corner gold rush see 
G. Blainey, The Rush that Never Ended, Melbourne, 1969.
pp . 137-8; E. Murphy, They Struck O p a l ! , Sydney, 1 968.
pp . 5 3 f f .
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in t o a chaotic rush; then, abruptly, it ceased. By early 1883 
much of the region was in the throes of drought, wool prices 
had fallen markedly and colonial lending had entered a
A  /Thiatus. The heady optimism of the boom years faded, never 
to be restored. But, ephemeral though the boom proved to be, 
it had ensnared a large number of pastoral investors in a 
complex of obligations from which they would not be able to 
extricate themselves.
46. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. c i t . , p. 107; J.C. Foley, Droughts 
in A u s t ralia, Bureau of Meteorology Bulletin no. 43, 
Melbourne, 1957. pp. 58, 242-3; Jervis, "West Darling",
op. cit., p. 158.
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C H A P T E R  3
D e f e n s i v e  D e v e l o p m e n t  1883- 18 91
The w e s t e r n  p a s t o r a l  i n d u s t r y  f ac e d  a d i s t i n c t l y
d i s c o u r a g i n g  p r o s p e c t  as it e m e r g e d  from the d r o u g h t y  s e a s o n s
of 1883-5. In th ei r ha s t e  to m a x i m i z e  r e t u r n s  d u r i n g  the b o o m
p e r i o d ,  w e s t e r n  l a n d h o l d e r s  had r a i s e d  s to c k  n u m b e r s  b e f o r e
t h e y  had time to i n s t a l l  s e cu re  w a t e r  s u p p l i e s .  W h e n  d r o u g h t
s t r u c k  t he y c o u l d  o n l y  s t a n d  by and w a t c h  t he ir  f loc ks  die.
For s q u a t t e r s  who h ad  p u r c h a s e d  s h e e p  in l arg e n u m b e r s  at b o o m
p r i c e s ,  th is was a c r u s h i n g  blow. T ho s e  who h ad b o r r o w e d
h e a v i l y  fell f u r t h e r  into d ebt  as the d r o u g h t  s l a s h e d  t h e i r
1wo ol  o u t p u t  and u n p a i d  i n t e r e s t  a c c u m u l a t e d .  T h e y  c o u l d  not 
sell th e ir  h o l d i n g s  w i t h o u t  e x t e n s i v e  l oss es ; the l a nd  m a r k e t  
h ad  s t a g n a t e d  and v a l u e s  d r o p p e d  as the d r o u g h t  d i s c o u r a g e d  
b u y e r s  and f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  g r e w  m o r e  w a r y  of f u n d i n g
o u t b a c k  s t a t i o n  p u r c h a s e s  f rom  a d i m i n i s h i n g  s u p p l y  of n e w  
2funds. But, to c a r r y  on, the w e s t e r n  s q u a t t e r s  w ere
r e q u i r e d  to m ak e h e a v y  o u t l a y s ,  n ot o n l y  to c ov e r  the i m m e d i a t e  
n e e d  to r e s t o c k  but  also to c o u n t e r  the e f f e c t s  of s ev e r a l  
d e v e l o p m e n t s  w h i c h  wer e p l a c i n g  w e s t e r n  p a s t o r a l  p r o f i t s  u nd er  
m o u n t i n g  p r e s s u r e  in the l o n g e r  term.
The s q ua t te rs '  b e l i e f  tha t w e s t e r n  h o l d i n g s  w ere  
im m un e to c l o s e r  s e t t l e m e n t  was c r u s h e d  by the L a nd  Act of
1. B ai le y , op. c i t . , p p . 97-8; Cain, "
op. cit., p. 188.
2. Cain, ibid., p p . 188-9.
P a s t o r a l  E x p a n s i o n " ,
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1884. The new legislation constituted a decisive move to check 
the aggregation of vast leasehold properties in the west and 
the rapid alienation of the public estate elsewhere. The nexus 
between smallholding and agriculture was broken, and greater 
emphasis was placed on assuring the Crown of a steady rental 
income to compensate for declining revenue from land sales.
Some concessions were made to the squatters' sensibilities. 
Closer settlement was no longer to be a free-for-all; instead, 
specific areas were set aside for subdivision, and the 
squatters were given extended tenure over the remainder of 
their holdings. But to the western lessees this was cold 
comfort indeed.^
The Act attempted to fit the system of land tenure to 
the peculiar requirements of the diverse physical environments 
to be found in various parts of the colony. For the purposes 
of the Act's administration, the colony was divided into three 
territorial divisions. The boundary between the Eastern and 
Central Divisions roughly followed the limit of agricultural
experience to 1 884, while the Central/We stern Division boundary
5ran close to the border between woodlands and saltbush plain.
3. On revenue considerations in the Act, see P. Lamb, "Crown
Land Policy and Government Finance in New South Wales, 1856- 
1 9 0 0 ", in Australian Economic History R eview, 7 , 1 , 1 967 .
p p . 5 8 f f .
4. For general discussions of the Act see Andrews, o p . cit . ,
p p . 43ff; Butlin, I .A .E .D ., o p . c i t ., p p . 90-2; Heathcote,
Back of Bourke, op. c i t . , PP* 4 3 f f . ; C. King, An Outline of 
Closer Settlement in New South Wales, Part 1: The Sequence
of the Land Laws 1788-1956, Sydney, 1957. pp. 99ff; Roberts, 
op. cit., pp* 2 9 1 f f .
5. Jeans, o p . cit. p. 286. The division boundaries are shown 
at Map 1 p. 26 above.
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In all divisions, pastoral leases brought under the Act were to 
be divided into two equal parts. The first of these would 
constitute the pastoral lease proper, and would continue to be 
held by the incumbent tenant; on this portion of the run the 
five-year leases current under the 1861 Act were replaced by 
ten-year leases in the Central Division and fifteen-year leases 
in the Western Division. The remainder of the run, to be known 
as the "resumed area", was open for closer settlement, though 
pending closer settlement the pastoral lessee was allowed to 
continue holding it under an annual occupation licence.
It was in its provisions for the tenure of 
smallholdings that the new Act departed most radically from its 
predecessors. A sharp distinction was drawn between the 
Central and Western Divisions. In the Central Division, closer 
settlement was still to be based on conditional purchase 
arrangements, though the maximum area available to an 
individual selector was increased to 2,560 acres plus 
conditional lease up to three times that area. In the Western 
Division, where the large areas required for pastoral 
production made the comparatively high cost of conditional 
purchase uneconomic, a new category of tenure known as the 
homestead lease was set up to cater for the smallholder. The 
area of a homestead lease was fixed at between 5,760 and 10,240 
acres and the term of the lease at fifteen years. Additional 
conditions were imposed to prevent homestead leases being taken 
up for purely speculative purposes. Homestead lessees were 
required to compensate the pastoralists for any improvements on 
the holdings, to fence the boundary within two years and to
- 74 -
reside on the holding for at least six months of the year 
during the first five years of the lease. Multiple ownership 
of homestead leases was also prohibited. Nevertheless, the 
increased area and the reduced overhead cost made homestead 
leases a far more attractive proposition for intending western 
smallholders than selection had been under the earlier 
1egis1 at ion .
The extent of demand for smallholdings can be gauged 
from the speed with which homestead leases were taken up. 
Though the move to take up western homestead leases was by no 
means as vigorous as the demand for Central Division 
selections, and large areas of the drier and more remote lands 
remained under occupation licence, there was a rush of 
applications for homestead leases in the vicinity of towns, on 
such river frontages as were made available and along the 
eastern margin of the area. In 1886, there were 233 homestead 
leases, their total area being just over two and a quarter 
million acres; by 1893 the number had risen to 1130 and the
flarea to over nine and a half million acres. Selectors in 
adjacent parts of the Central Division also took advantage of 
the opportunity to enlarge their holdings. The squatters in 
the better-favoured areas of the west were thus hardest hit by 
the Act's closer settlement provisions. Even though they were 
permitted to nominate which parts of their holdings should be
6. N.S.W. Statistical Register, 1888, p. 309, 1893, p. 362.
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7resumed, and were usually able to keep the best portions, 
the squatters keenly felt the effects of losing newly- 
constructed improvements and having their grazing area cut in 
half.
The Act went to some lengths to give its rent provis­
ions the trappings of impartiality. Rents were to be based on 
the holding's carrying capacity as assessed by a local Land
QBoard made up of disinterested experts. It was also stipul­
ated that rents were to rise automatically at five-year inter­
vals by one quarter of the original amount. But the Land 
Boards' decisions could be overruled by ministerial
Qdirective, and in practice the government's desire to 
augment its rental income took precedence over concern for the 
squatters' welfare. Nor were the squatters entirely satisfied 
with the calibre of the Land Board appraisers; one squatter 
commented that the appraisers did not know the difference 
between saltbush and paddy-melon, and others alleged that the 
Land Board officials customarily waited until rain had fallen 
before assessing the holdings' carrying capacities. In any 
event, the Act's implementation raised the Crown's annual rental
7. Both Butlin (I.A.E.D., op. c i t ., p. 91) and Heathcote
(Back of Bourke, op. cit, p p . 142-3) found marked differ­
ences between the values of improvements on resumed and 
leasehold areas. Heathcote also noted that in 1888 60% of
the holdings brought up for subdivision showed a higher 
carrying capacity on the leasehold than on the resumed area.
8. King, o p . c i t . , p. 104.
9. Lamb, o p . c i t . , p. 61.
10. The first comment was made by E. Quin (R.C.W.D. M i n u t e s ,
p. 245); other comments are given at R.C.W.D. Summary of 
Evidence, p p . 59-65.
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income from £438,00 0 to £ 1 , 1 58,000 at one blow, ^  ^  and the 
announcement of the new rents produced a flurry of political
activity in the west as squatters hastily formed Pastoral
1 ?Protection Associations to lobby for reductions.
Against this the Act's provision of extended tenure
on the pastoral lease counted for little. If the new closer
settlement provisions proved successful, or if it was judged
that they could be made successful by extending the area
available to smallholders, the squatters risked losing more
land when their new leases expired. Furthermore, the Act gave
neither pastoral lessees nor homestead lessees tenant-right in
improvements; at the expiration of either lease, all
improvements were simply to revert to the Crown. Many
squatters would gladly have substituted a five-year lease with
a high probability of renewal for a fifteen-year term at the
end of which they could be completely expropriated. But the
option was not open to them; though participation in the new
tenure system was technically voluntary, not to participate was
to risk having one's holding thrown open to closer settlement
when the current five-year lease expired. Few squatters were
prepared to take this chance, and the western pastoral holdings
1 ^were soon brought under the new Act.
11. Lamb, o p . c i t . , p.63.
12. Australasian, 19 and 26 June 1886 ; 3 and 24 July 1886; 7 
and 14 August 1886. See also W.A. Brodribb, Letters on the 
Land Law of 1884, Sydney, 1885; Wilcannia Pastoral 
Protection Association, The Western Division: The Land Act 
and the R a b b i t s , Sydney, 1886.
13. King, o p . c i t ., p. 99.
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In attempting to reconcile the 1884 Act's passage
with the spate of pastoral capital formation which followed,
Butlin downplays the Act's negative effects on the squatters
and attributes the pastoral investment of the latter 1880s
principally to the formation of new enterprises on the Central
Division resumed a r e a s . ^  One may doubt whether the
establishment of seventy-two new small-scale enterprises over a
four-year period in the central districts can explain the rise
1 Rof pastoral investment there in the 1880s; but whatever was
the position elsewhere, Butlin's assessment does not square
with the Western Division experience. Certainly, as Butlin has
noted, the pastora1i s t s ' later claims that the Act had halted
investment were exaggerated; very few squatters stopped
improving their runs, and those who did so were probably
influenced as much by extraneous considerations as by a belief
1 6that the Act had made further investment uneconomic.
However, Butlin has misconstrued the causal relationship 
between the Act's effects on the squatting interest and the 
upsurge in pastoral investment. Though the formation of 
homestead leases did stimulate small-scale capital investment 
on the resumed areas, much of the pastoral capital formation 
which occurred in the region in 1885-91 was undertaken by the
14. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. c i t . , p p . 90-2, 108.
15. Ibid., p. 92n.
16. The Paddington case, cited by Butlin, where it was claimed
that improvements were halted after the Act was passed, was 
probably influenced by severe rabbit infestation as much as 
by the new tenure conditions (ibid., p. 91; cf. E. Rolls, 
They All Ran Wild: the story of pests on the land in
Aus tralia, Sydney 1 969 . pp . 48-50 ).
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pastoral lessees, and was partly a product of the Act's
negative effects on pastoral profitability. As they had so
often done before, the squatters attempted to spend their way
out of trouble, hoping that further capital investment would
permit them to exact a maximum return from the diminished area
remaining to them and eventually enable them to recoup their
outlays by selling their properties. The capital formation
which occurred in the region in 1885-91 period was a symptom of
the industry's growing difficulties rather than of any excess
of optimism on the squatters' part. If the 1884 Act was an
expansionary measure in the west, it was so only in the most
indirect fashion; it is not usual for legislation which
expropriates landholders and reduces their share of their
holdings' proceeds to be viewed as stimulating its victims to
further investment. The key to this paradoxical reaction lay
in the continuing surfeit of British funds and the financial
institutions' willingness to continue lending to established
clients for defensive development. Though this was perhaps
somewhat encouraged by the extension of the western leases, the
security they provided remained flimsy; the primary motivation
1 7for the continuation of easy credit lay elsewhere.
The passage of the 1884 Act was not the only 
development which spurred the squatters to a defensive 
maximization of output. International wool prices were also 
undergoing some decline. A number of wool price series are
17. See Chapter 4 below.
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shown in the graph on the following page. The various series
betray broadly similar patterns of gradually declining prices
over the period to 1894, broken by shorter-1 ived fluctuations
producing minor peaks in 1880 and 1889. These price movements
had a marked influence on the experience of pastoralism in the
period of rapid flock expansion after the breaking of the
drought in the mid-1880s. The existence of short-term
fluctuations obscured the gradual decline to a considerable
extent; though hopes were fading rapidly by the early 1890s,
pastoral commentators in the 1880s hailed each upward price
movement, no matter how slight, as a harbinger of imminent 
1 8recovery. However, the underlying decline was eroding
returns per unit of wool produced. The Australasian Insurance
and Banking Record noted in 1891 that in the preceding seven
years the volume of Australian wool production had risen by
forty per cent, but its value had increased by only fourteen 
1 9per cent. Over a longer term, Heathcote found that a
thirteen-fold increase in Warrego sheep numbers between the 
1860s and the 1890s had produced roughly a ninefold increase in
gross income, indicating a decline of about thirty per cent in
2 0the gross return per head. Though growers may have been
insulated from some of the effects of this decline by 
reductions in marketing costs, principally those arising from 
the relocation of wool markets in the colonies themselves
1 8 . A. Barnard, The Australian Wool Market 1840 -1900,
Melbourne, 1958 . p. 205.; Butlin, I.A.E.D., o p . cit.,
p . 17 3.
1 9 . A . I . B . R . , Ma r c h 1891, p . 163.
2 0 . Back of Bourke, op. c i t . , p. 155.
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GRAPH 1: London Prices of Selected Types of Australian W o o l /
1875-1898
1875 1880 18981885 18951890
Key :
---  Victorian average merino fleece, annual average price
--- N.S.W. average export valuations, scoured and washed
--- Victorian average good merino greasy, annual average price
... N.S.W. average export valuations, greasy
*-rr> • Adelaide average greasy, annual average price
Source: Barnard, op. c i t ., p. 230. New South Wales prices are
based on an average of prices at which exporters valued their 
wool at the customs houses; Barnard's comment (p. 164) is that
these prices 'represent the hopes, or at best the formal expect­
ations of the growers... rather than actual realisations'. The 
figures frequently show discrepancies with realised prices, al­
though their accuracy improved during the 1880s, mainly because 
a larger proportion of the wool had already been sold in the 
colonial markets. The Victorian and Adelaide figures are based 
on compilations from trade records produced by A. Sauerbeck (to 
1877) and Helmuth Schwartze and Co. (from 1878). On the problems 
of using trade records generally, see E. Beever, " The Austra­
lian Wool Clip 1861-1900" in Economic R ecord, 39, 88, 1963.
p p . 437-55 passim.
2 1rather than in London, the magnitude of the price decline
2 2far exceeded that of the saving from this source.
Average wool prices, however, cannot provide an 
accurate guide to movements in western wool returns. The range 
of variation between prices paid for wools of different 
qualities was wide, with prices for top quality wool sometimes 
being three times those of inferior wool. Several
considerations suggest that the decline in western wool returns 
may have been greater than that indicated by the average price 
series. The strong-woolled merinos which predominated in the 
semi-arid areas had never commanded top prices, but the 
standard of the western wool clip probably deteriorated overall 
during the latter stages of flock expansion, partly because of 
dusty fleeces and tenderness in the fibre produced by severe
overstocking, and partly because of pastoralists1 reluctance to
2 4get rid of their older sheep and breeding ewes.
Furthermore, during the wool price trough of the early 1890s 
and to a lesser extent before that time, wool at the lower end 
of the quality range underwent a proportionally greater price 
decline and responded more slowly to upswings in demand than
21. Barnard, o p . c i t . , p p . 190ff.
22. It should also be noted that several mortgagee 
institutions, notably the A.M.L.F., which was the largest 
single holder of Western Division leases, eschewed the 
local market completely; their clients therefore did not 
get the benefit of local sales.
23. Barnard, o p . c i t . , p. 195.
24. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. cit . , PP* 176-7.
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2 5did high-quality wool. And finally, the grower's profit
margin was narrowed in the long term by declining production 
per head consequent on pasture deterioration. D
As wool prices fell, calculations of actual and 
putative profits arising from the natural increase of livestock 
came to play an increasingly important role in assuaging 
pastoralists1 and their creditors' doubts about the economic 
viability of their enterprises. Sheep from runs close to
the railways or in the vicinity of towns were sold for meat, 
but the largest source of revenue from the sale of western 
sheep in the latter 1880s was in the market for store stock to 
sustain the rapidly-expanding wool-growing industry in 
Queensland and within the west itself. The market for stores 
fluctuated wildly with changing climatic conditions; the high 
prices realised during the 1880s were also to a great extent 
dependent on the continuing expansion of pastoralism in the 
semi-arid lands. But this evanescent and often purely 
theoretical source of income provided an increasing number of 
western pastoralists with their only means of bridging the gap 
between diminishing wool returns and heavy fixed commitments to 
the Crown and their creditors.
25. See e.g. Australasian Pastoralists' Review (henceforward
cited as A.P.R.), December 1891, p. 398; the same pattern 
can be seen in the contrast between Melbourne and Adelaide 
greasy prices in Graph 1 ; Victorian prices dropped by
40.8% from 1880 to 1894 while South Australian prices, 
starting at a lower level, fell by 49.5%.
26. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. c i t ., pp . 177-8.
2 7 . Ibid . , pp~. 1 18-9, 169.
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Station equipment programmes interrupted by the
drought of 1883-5 were not resumed until the uncertainty surr-
2 8ounding the implementation of the 1884 Land Act had abated.
But from 1886 western squatters began to engage in heavy 
expenditure on station facilities with the aim of intensifying 
production to offset the cost-price squeeze while safeguarding 
their holdings against climatic fluctuations and the 
depredations of other species which competed with sheep for 
pastures. The techniques adopted by the squatters amounted to 
an injunction that the mountain should come to Mohammed. Their 
approach was unashamedly interventionist, their cosmology 
profoundly anthropocentric. They recognized few necessary 
limitations to man's ability to impose his will on nature, 
given only the technology, capital and labour required for the 
task. When the western environment proved recalcitrant, the 
squatters responded reflexively by redoubling their efforts to 
tailor their runs to the requirements of their balance sheets.
The interventionist faith had two main tenets : that
stock improved soil fertility and promoted vegetation growth, 
and that with control over the water supply in the west it 
would be possible to make the semi-arid areas bloom. The 
latter belief in its most extreme form extended into the 
assertion that climate was susceptible to manipulation by man. 
This found expression in the 'rain follows the plough' 
hypothesis, which was tested in the marginal wheatlands of
28. Town and Country Journal, 14 March 1885.
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South Australia and found severely wanting, and in periodic 
pressures on government to attempt to change the climate of the 
dry Centre by artificially flooding Lake Eyre and other inland 
basins. This belief system was by no means unchallenged;
there is a large body of literary evidence indicating the 
existence of a more pessimistic school of thought which held 
the Australian interior to be an incorrigible desert. But,
understandably, few sceptics were prepared to put their 
theories to a practical test, and the settlement of the west 
was left to those of a more optimistic persuasion.
Armed with these dogmas, the settlers showed little
restraint in their attempts to transform the western
environment. Deforestation was practised on a wide scale, and
the government did little to control the destruction of native 
3 1timber. In the woodlands along the eastern edge of the
region and the low woodland belt in the central west, 
ringbarking was widely used to promote the growth of grass; it 
was even suggested in the early 1890s that further ringbarking
would solve the problem of pasture deterioration more
3 2effectively than would destocking. Cypress pine, which
29. See D.W. M e i n i g , On the Margins of the Good E a r t h ,
Adelaide, 1976; T.M. Perry, "Climate and Settlement" in 
Andrews, e d . , o p . c i t ♦, p. 150. As late as 1938, Shann 
could still betray a similar idealism when he related how
"as the sheep ate out the saltbush,.....grasses both native
and new took its place in a soil lightly tilled and 
compacted by their busy feet" (E. Shann, An Economic 
History of Australia, Cambridge, 1 938 . p. 20 0 ) .
30. See Heathcote , Back of Bourke, op. c i t . , Part 1 for an 
outline of the controversy.
31. See R.C.W.D. Summary of Evidence, p. 123.
32. Letter to the editor, A .P .R ., January 1892, p. 241.
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grew along the ridges in the back country, and Murray River red 
gum from the river frontages were cut out to supply the 
construction industry, and proved to be a lucrative if short- 
lived source of additional income for many settlers. Wood
was also the regions's major fuel, and firewood was used in 
large quantities in the towns and mines; it was estimated that 
by 1887 the Cobar smelter alone had consumed 850,000 tons of 
wood, and huge areas were denuded of timber to supply Broken 
H i l l . ^  Furthermore, edible trees were used as fodder during 
dry seasons, and in some areas species such as kurrajong and 
myall were virtually eliminated by indiscriminate cutting and 
lopping. Replacement growth was inhibited by stock eating or 
trampling young seedlings. Nor did the squatters confine
their attentions to the vegetation. Native fauna which were 
suspected of preying on stock, damaging fences or eating too 
much grass were shot or, more commonly, p o i s o n e d . ^
Substantial risks were attendant on such ruthless 
modification of the plains' ecosystem. In the environment of 
the western rangelands, where feed availability fluctuated 
markedly with variations in temperature and rainfall, frequent 
adjustment of stocking rates was necessary to avoid long-term 
pasture deterioration. In particular, the edible perennial 
shrubs and grasses which provided a natural drought reserve
33. Hardy, op. c i t ., p p . 87, 97; Jeans, o p . c i t ., p p . 59-60.
34. Jervis, "Western Plains", op. cit., p. 82; R.C.W.D. Summary 
of Evidence, p. 26.
35. Jervis, ibid., p. 82; R.C.W.D. Summary of Evidence,
p p . 2 6-7.
3 6. Ro11s, op. cit., pp. 18-19 et passim.
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were often slow-growing, and their regeneration after excessive 
grazing was dependent on the presence of a complex of condit- 
ions which might only rarely coincide. Even apart from the 
dangers of soil erosion and increased drought losses attendant 
on routine grazing of the perennials, the health of the stock 
generally suffered in the short term, as many perennials were 
relatively indigestible, low in nutrients and deficient in
O Qessential minerals. Annual grasses and herbs of the
rangelands were also susceptible to the effects of 
overstocking. Populations of edible annuals were quickly 
reduced by selective grazing, and their germination was 
inhibited by the trampling of the soil; they were replaced by 
poisonous or unpalatable species and by plants with spiny 
fruits which were widely disseminated in the sheep's 
f l e e c e s . ^  The dangers of pasture deterioration and erosion 
were exacerbated when stock pressures remained heavy in dry 
seasons. With the reduction in ground cover, wind and water 
erosion increased dramatically, until ultimately topsoil was
removed to leave bare clay scalds and form shifting dunes in
4 0the sandy country.
37. Moore, e d . , o p . c i t . , p p . 241, 255ff; Slatyer and Perry,
e d . , op. c i t ., p. 86.
38. Slatyer and Perry, e d . , ibid., p p . 86-7.
39. Jeans, op. cit., pp. 58-9; R.M. Moore "Ecological
Observations on Plant Communities Grazed by Sheep in 
Australia", in Keast et al, ed., o p . c i t . , p p . 507, 510;
Williams in Barnard, ed., o p . c i t . , p p . 419-29.
40. J. Marshall, "Drought, Land Use and Soil Erosion", in J.
Lovett, e d . , The Environmental, Economic and Social 
Significance of Drought, Sydney, 1 973 . pp . 55-9, 69-7 1 .
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But the ultimate limitations imposed on pastoral 
expansion by the availabilty of fodder received little 
attention in the 1880s in spite of the fact that pasture 
deterioration had been evident for more than a decade, espec- 
ially along the Darling frontages. For the most part it
was felt that the pastures would look after themselves; when 
the native species were eaten out they would be replaced by 
exotics, which many believed provided superior grazing. Insofar 
as the squatters bothered about pasture maintenance at all, 
they were mainly concerned to avoid localized denudation, which 
made the wool dusty and reduced its value.
The abandonment of shepherding and the scattering of 
numerous watering points across the holdings reduced the 
problem of heavy concentrations of grazing near water and 
around the folds; but only a handful of innovative pastoralists 
attempted to tackle the broader problem of regulating grazing 
pressure by closer subdivision and strict control over stock 
n u m b e r s . ^  On most runs the stock were put in huge paddocks 
and simply left to breed, their population being controlled 
only by natural deaths and occasional sales. Moreover, after 
the implementation of the 1884 Land Act, pastoralists in many 
areas attempted to keep stock numbers constant in spite of the 
reduction in the size of their holdings. ^  With high flock
41. See e.g. Hardy, op. c i t ., p. 182; R.C.W.D. Minu t e s , p . 466,
evidence of A. Wilson.
42. Crowley, o p . c i t . , p. 300; R.C.W.D. Summary of Evide n c e ,
p p . 117, 121-2.
43. Heathcote , Back of Bourke, op. cit.,
R e p o r t , p. vii.
p. 145; R.C.W.D.
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reproduction rates during the good seasons which followed, the 
sheep population of the Western Divison rose by nearly half 
between 1885 and 1891, reaching a level which could not be 
sustained under existing pastoral technology without widespread 
damage to pasture q u a l i t y . ^
Heavy stocking increased station returns in several 
ways. The more herbage consumed by the sheep, the greater was 
the total wool output. Furthermore, provided that overstocking 
was not so severe as to give rise to periods of near­
starvation, which weakened the wool fibre and detracted from 
its market value, the return per unit of wool produced could 
also be increased by heavy stocking. Sheep from runs with 
close-cropped pastures had little vegetable matter in their 
wool and it was widely believed that undernourished sheep 
produced finer, and therefore more valuable, fleeces.^
Bushfire risk was also reduced, and high flock reproduction 
rates maximized the advantage the squatters could derive from 
stock sales, keeping their holdings' valuations roughly on a 
par with their mounting debts. ^
The purposes of the investment programmes of the 
latter 1880s were threefold. The fencing operations
44. See Graph 2 accompanying; detailed stock figures are given
in N. Butlin, "Distribution of the Sheep Population", in 
Barnard, e d . , op. ci t ., p p . 300-1.
45. J.L. Wheeler and K. Hutchinson, "Production and Utilization 
of Food for Ruminants", in Alexander and Williams, ed.,
op. c i t . , p p . 219, 221. See also C.E.W. Bean, On the Wool
Track, London, 1910. pp. 68-9; Wadham et a1. , o p . cit. , 
p p . 66-7.
46. See below p p . 121-2.
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GRAPH 2: Western Division Sheep P opulation by sub-Region,
1880-1904
w 4
19041880 1885 18951890 1900
Key :
Total Western Division 
West of Darling 
East of Darling
Source: B u t l i n , 'Distribution of the Sheep Population' , in
Barnard, e d . , The Simple Fleece, p. 300.
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interrupted by the breakdown of transportation during the 1883-5 
drought were resumed, though the squatters' efforts were now 
concentrated on the pastoral leaseholds proper, to the exclusion 
of the resumed areas. Extensive boring and tank-sinking 
programmes were undertaken to bring the back country into full 
production, maintain high stock densities and prevent a 
repetition of the drought losses which had crippled newly- 
arrived squatters in 1883-5. And the settlers became 
increasingly embroiled in a massive rearguard action to 
counteract the undesirable side-effects of the previous 
decade's wholesale intervention on the plains ecosystem.
The squatters' attempts to transform the plains into 
an ideal environment for sheep had removed any natural checks 
on the increase of other grazing fauna. Populations of several 
native species, including the various types of kangaroo, had 
grown rapidly with the provision of watering points and the 
elimination of indigenous predators, notably the dingo.
Kangaroos were seen as providing grazing competition and the 
damage they did to fences was much r e s e n t e d . ^  But these 
problems paled into insignificance beside the havoc wrought 
during the 1880s by the spread of the European rabbit.
The introduction of the rabbit to Australia was only 
achieved by dint of many decades' persistent effort. The 
settlers' early attempts to breed rabbits were foiled by the 
large number of predators found in the colonies. However by
47. Rolls, op. c i t . , p p . 126-7, 392ff.
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the late 1850s the u n s t i n t i n g  use of p o i s o n  h a d  m a d e  l arg e  
i n r o a d s  into the p o p u l a t i o n s  of d in go e s ,  p r e d a t o r y  b ir ds , w i l d
cats and g o a n n a s  in the s e t t l e d  d i s t r i c t s ,  and r a b b i t s  b e g a n  to 
4 8f l o u r i s h .  T h e y  m u l t i p l i e d  r a p i d l y  in V i c t o r i a  d u r i n g  the
1860s, and in the 1870s we re  i n t r o d u c e d  into the w e s t e r n
R i v e r i n a . ^  By the late 1870s r a b b i t s  w ere  f i r m l y  e s t a b l i s h e d
in the m a l l e e ,  and a few y e a r s  l ate r t he y h a d  b e g u n  to m o v e
into the w e s t  D a r l i n g  from So ut h  A u s t r a l i a .  The d r o u g h t s  of
the ea rl y  1880s t e m p o r a r i l y  s l o w e d  t he ir  p r o g r e s s ,  b u t t he ir
p o p u l a t i o n  q u i c k l y  rose in the g o od  s e a s o n s  a f t e r  1885. The y
s p r e a d  up the D a r l i n g  at a r e m a r k a b l e  pace; h a v i n g  i n f i l t r a t e d
as far as Co b a r  by 1884, in 1886 t he y w e r e  on the P a r o o  and in
the C o r n e r  co u n t r y ,  and by the f o l l o w i n g  year t h ey  had r e a c h e d  
5 0the B a l o n n e .
The rabbits' c o n t r i b u t i o n  to the d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of 
w e s t e r n  p a s t u r e s  is d i f f i c u l t  to a s s es s,  as it is d i f f i c u l t  to 
d i s t i n g u i s h  th e ir  i n f l u e n c e  from that of the sheep. How e ve r,  
t h o u g h  the s q u a t t e r s  in r e t r o s p e c t  w ere  i n c l i n e d  to b l a m e  all 
t h e i r  m i s f o r t u n e s  on the r a b bi t,  it is w o r t h y  of n ot e  t hat  
r a b b i t s  d i e d  off q u i c k l y  d u r i n g  dry s e a s o n s  w h i l e  s he e p  w ere  
st il l c o n s u m i n g  dry  feed, and that p a s t u r e  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  by the 
tu rn  of the c e n t u r y  was no t c o n f i n e d  to r a b b i t - i n f e s t e d  
h o l d i n g s .  It is also p o s s i b l e  that, h a d the r a b b i t s  n ot
48. Ibid., p p • 18-19.
49. Ibid., p. 32.
50. B a il e y,  op. c i t . , PP* 99-100; Rolls, ibid., pp. 41-2, 
46-9 .
51. R. C. W . D .  S u m m a r y  of E v i d e n c e . ,  p. 7.
arrived, the squatters would have allowed their flocks to 
increase to even higher levels until pasture deterioration 
reached a point of crisis.
But whatever the environmental effects of the rabbit 
influx, its economic impact on the squatters was catastrophic. 
Though rabbits' grazing patterns differed somewhat from those 
of sheep, they competed directly with sheep for feed. Rabbits 
cropped off young shoots, preventing grasses from growing tall 
enough for the sheep to eat, and in times of feed scarcity they 
would kill edible shrubs by eating their bark. Heavy
infestations could leave holdings completely devoid of grass 
even after r a i n . ^
In the early 1880s only a few squatters and station 
managers recognized the destructive potential of the rabbit 
infestation. Those who perceived the threat hastened to sell 
out before the land boom passed. Thus Kilfera station on 
Willandra Creek was sold in 1883 for £240,000, or thirty
shillings a head, when the owners realized the rabbit invasion
5 4was imminent. Its purchasers were subsequently bankrupted.
By the latter half of the decade many western lessees 
were ruing their failure to recognize the danger. As a station 
manager later commented, not without a trace of smugness, of 
the employers who had ignored his warnings, "They have been
52. F. Ratcliffe, "The Rabbit in Australia", in Keast et a l ., 
e d . , o p . ci t . , p. 548.
53. See for e.g.s R.C.W.D. Summary of Evidence, p. 3.
54. Casey, o p . c i t . p. 67.
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5 5sorry only once, and that is ever since." The squatters
spent vast sums in ineffectual campaigns to exterminate the 
pest. A bounty system was introduced in 1880 to encourage the 
trapping of rabbits, but it was abandoned in 1888 amid mounting 
complaints that the bounties encourages rabbiters to promote 
the spread of the r abbit.^  Thereafter, the government 
emphasised the installation of netted fences to keep the rabbit 
back, but the cost of netting was high, particularly as import­
ed netting was subject to a tariff; netted fences were also 
expensive to maintain and their effectiveness was reduced by 
the fact that the mesh used until the early 1890s was wide 
enough to let small rabbits pass. Eventually pastoralists
resorted to their old expedient of poisoning. The country 
press was studded with articles suggesting new techniques and 
providing recipes for vaious lethal brews. But poisoning, 
though cheaper than netting or trapping, had many drawbacks. 
Strychnine or. phosphorous baits were liable to be eaten by 
sheep, and the practice of netting in waterholes to force
rabbits to drink poisoned water could provide relief only 
5 8intermittently. The squatters' campaigns against the
rabbit had more deleterious effects on themselves than on their 
quarry.
55. R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence of A. Wilson, p. 465.
56. Rolls, op. c i t . , p p . 89-90, 105 ff.; Town and Country
Journal, 28 March 1885.
57. See A .P .R ., June 1891, p. 123; November 1891, p. 321,
February 1892, p. 470 ; Bailey, o p . c i t . , p. 102; Rolls, 
ibid. , pp. 1 0 8 f f , 1 1 9, 1 23 , 1 2 5-7 ; C .B . Schedvin, "Rabbits
and Industrial Development" in Australian Economic History 
Review, 10, 1, 1970. p. 28.
58. Rolls, ibid., pp. 13 Iff.; R.C.W.D. Summary of Evidence.,
pp . 12 5-8.
- 9 4 -
The difficulties of rabbit control were compounded, 
and the plains' carrying capacity was further reduced, by the 
enroachment of inedible scrub onto the pastoral lands. As 
heavy grazing and ringbarking had reduced the frequency of 
bushfires, thick stands of young trees began to grow between 
the Lachlan and the Darling in the latter 1 8 8 0 s . W i t h  the 
Darling floods of 1890 the pine, coolibah and box scrubs spread 
still further along the flood p l ains.^
The scrubs rendered large areas of land, including 
some of the best frontage country, virtually useless for 
grazing, and provided secure breeding grounds for rabbits and 
other vermin. Ringbarking alone had little effect, as the 
scrubs soon sprouted again, and squatters found they had to 
have the roots of the trees laboriously grubbed out to gain 
more than a temporary r e s p i t e . ^  Though most pastoralists 
attempted to check scrub growth on their leasehold areas, few 
considered the expense justified on the resumed areas; indeed, 
by the end of the decade many had begun to feel that their 
resumed areas were more of a liability than an asset.
The floundering western squatters received a further 
blow in 1888. A brief but severe drought produced stock losses 
of over a million and brought home the fact that drought
59. Jervis, "Western Plains", op. c i t ., p. 10.
60. Heathcote, Back of Bourke, op. cit., pp. 148-9; Jeans,
op. cit., p. 64; R.C.W.D. Summary of Evidence, p p . 125-8.
61. Bailey, o p . c i t . , p. 102; R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence of
Walgett and C o 11 arendebri lessees, pp . 628ff.
62. See below p. 98.
-95  -
r  nprovision in the region was still inadequate. J The western
lessees mounted a campaign for concessions from the Crown, as a
result of which a new Land Act was passed in 1889.®^ The Act
extended the term of Western Division pastoral and homestead
leases by twenty-one years. For Central Divison lessees whose
holdings had become overgrown, the Act created two new forms of
tenure, the scrub lease and inferior lands lease, with long
tenure and low rents. Automatic rent increases were abandoned
in favour of reappraisements at seven-year intervals to set
rents according to carrying capacity. This marked a major
departure from the assumption which had previously governed
official land policy, that occupation of the land necessarily
enhanced its worth. The concession was timely, as the western
leases would shortly have been due for an automatic increase,
but its results were rather less advantageous than the lessees
had hoped. When the holdings were reappraised after the Act
was passed, only a third of the Western Divison pastoral
leases, most of them in heavily rabbit- infested or scrubby
areas, were granted reductions; more than half had their rents
raised, some of them by margins far in excess of the twenty-
five per cent increase they would have paid under the old Act,
f ) sand the rest remained constant.
63. Foley, o p . c i t . , p. 59.
64. King, o p . c i t ., p p . 106-7 outlines the Act's provisions;
for the squatters' .agitation, see Australasian, 27 October
1888, 6 April 1889.
65. Calculated from R.C.W.D., Return Z. Exact percentages were: 
increases, 54%; decreases, 34%; constant, 12%.
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Nevertheless, the extension of tenure was a 
reassuring concession for both the squatters and their 
financiers, and pastoral prospects in 1889 were better than 
they had been since the land boom had subsided. The season was 
good, and flock numbers were recovering rapidly from the 
setback of the 1888 drought. Even the Insurance and Banking 
Record abandoned its usual cautious realism to comment, almost 
rev erently:
"It is, in fact, a striking instance of the harmony 
existing between the various forms of life upon this 
earth, and the conditions under which they live, that the 
merino sheep bred in the central districts of Australia, 
which are so liable to drought, possess so remarkable a 
drought-resisting power
The squatters' hopes rose further when wool prices reached
rtheir highest level in five years. Many anticipated a land
market revival which would allow them to dispose of their 
holdi n g s .
Indeed, in previous years this combination of 
conditions would almost certainly have provoked a flurry of 
activity on the property market. But sales of New South Wales 
pastoral land had been generally sluggish since the early 
1880s. Few colonists could muster the large amounts of starting 
capital required to purchase squatting properties, and the few 
who were able to do so were generally wary of investing in the 
New South Wales interior.
66. A.I.B.R., February 1889, p. 74.
67. See Graph 1, p. 80 above.
The adverse effects of the 1884 Land Act and the
menace of rabbit infestation were well-known, and investors 
generally eschewed New South Wales runs in favour of cheaper, 
rabbit-free Queensland holdings. The financial institut­
ions, too, though willing to continue to provide funds to est­
ablished western clients, were reluctant to advance money to 
cover the purchase of runs as they had in the early 1 880s. ^ ^
In this atmosphere the apparent recovery in 1889 counted for 
very little. Investors opted to bide their time to assure them 
selves that the recovery was an enduring one before introducing 
new capital into the region, and few western runs changed hands
Their caution proved justified. The London wool
7 0market relapsed sharply in the first half of 1890. Floods'
along the Darling system caused extensive damage to many front-
7 1age holdings, and a million sheep were lost. And, most
alarming of all, early in 1891 it became apparent that the
7 2price of store stock had begun to slide. Within New South
Wales flock numbers were approaching their natural limit, and
sheep exports to Queensland slowed as the northern colony
became capable of supplying its own stock requirements. By the
end of 1891 the market was saturated and surplus stock had
7 3become virtually unsaleable.
68 . On the comparative attractiveness of Queensland holdings
see Heathcote, Back of Bourke, op. c i t . , pp . 4 7-8.
69 . See below p p . 163-4.
7 0 . A . I . B . R . , Ap ril 1890, p. 252 ; June 1 890 , p . 40 2 .
7 1 . Ibid., March 1891, p. 162.
72 . See e.g. comments in U.M.A. report , ibid ., February 1891
P • 10 7.
73 . A . P .R., November 1891, p. 328.
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There was also growing concern at the consequences of 
overstocking. The Government Botanist issued a highly critical 
report on the state of the colony's native pastures and called 
for a general reduction in stock n u m b e r s . ^  His stand was 
supported by a number of the more enlightened pastora1is ts. 
Pastures in many areas had become "sheep-sick"; the most 
palatable native grasses had been eaten out, and many edible 
shrubs had been eliminated in the Western Division. Pasture 
deterioration was especially bad on the travelling stock routes 
on which the squatters had to rely to move stock in dry 
seasons. It was feared that a drought would find the squatters 
lacking either a feed reserve or a means of getting their 
flocks away. Cuthbert Fetherstonhaugh, a station manager and 
squatter of long experience, warned:
"Without doubt, if we do not reduce the 60,000,000 
sheep now in the colony within a few years, the short, 
sharp and decisive means of drought will reduce the nurnber 
for us, and to a greater extent than we shall relish".
The sudden reversal brought drastic action from a number of
outback squatters. In 1891 and 1892, 2.6 million acres in the
7 6Western Division were surrendered or forfeited. But most of 
the land which was handed back to the Crown was remote, 
undeveloped country held only under occupation licence: much
though they might have liked to turn their backs on their 
pastoral leases, few squatters had made so small an investment 
that they could entertain the option.
74. Ibid., August 1891, p. 199.
75. Ibid., December 1891, p. 391.
76. See Appendix A.
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By late 1891 the western pastoral industry was 
facing not merely a shrinkage in income consequent on low wool 
and stock prices but a major capital loss. It was clear that 
the western squatters could no longer look to a revival in 
property values to extricate themselves. In this climate the 
finance houses at last began to reassess their involvement 
in outback squatting.
The defensive development of the latter 1880s, like
the land boom which preceded it, had been buttressed by large
capital imports. The finance houses had pursued a fairly
passive policy during the drought of 1883-5; the flow of funds
from Britain had slowed, and though established clients were
provided with funds to tide them over the bad years, few
institutions had been in the market for new western 
7 7accounts. But thereafter the supply of British capital
i n c r e a s e d  r a p i d l y  as the L o n d o n  m a r k e t  r e s p o n d e d  h a n d s o m e l y  to
7 8the finance companies' attempts to raise debenture funds.
The finance companies advanced funds freely for their clients 
to restock quickly, even at the high prices reigning after the 
drought, and from 1885 they began once again out new western 
accounts.
77. Cain, "Capital Structure", o p . c i t ., p. 8.; "Pastoral 
Expansion", op. c i t ., p. 188; as mentioned in the latter, 
there were some exceptions to this trend, conspicuous among 
them the New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency Co.
78. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. cit., pp. 152 (table), 154-5; Cain,
"Capital Structure", ibid., p p . 12-13, "Pastoral
Expansion", ibid., pp. 188-90.
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This new lending phase was marked by vigorous
competition among the finance companies for new outlets for
their plethora of funds and by a general lack of caution in
advances to existing clients. Heavily indebted squatters were
still able to transfer their accounts from one institution to 
7 9another. Finance houses undercut each others' interest
rates in the race for new clients, and large loans were made on
no more security than a stock mortgage or a second mortgage
q nover the pastoral lease. Even at the end of the decade
new accounts were taken up, with the institutions justifying
their actions by claiming that the new Land Act had greatly
R 1improved their securities.
Established clients were virtually given a carte 
blanche. Unlike most other clients, western squatters were 
permitted to borrow to finance the installation of improvements 
on the assumption that the market value of the leases would be 
enhanced. Funds were also provided to maintain the squat­
ters in the manner to which they were accustomed, whether on
the stations or in the more exclusive suburbs of Sydney and 
8 3Melbourne. And increasingly as the decade wore on the fin­
ance companies found themselves making advances to cover defic-
fl 4its on the routine operations of their clients' holdings.
79. Cain, "Capital Structure", ibid. , p. 17. Details of these 
developments are discussed in Chapter 4 below.
80. I b i d . , p. 18; similar approaches were taken by the U.M.A. 
Co. (Australian Estates papers, 5 series).
81. A .I.B.R., October 1889, p. 744.
82. Cain, "Pastoral Expansion", op. c i t . , p. 189.
83. Bailey, o p . c i t . , p. 95; these expenses were the first to 
be curtailed.
84. See Australian Estates Papers, 5 series.
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The effects of this capital inflow were manifold. In 
the aggregate, by sustaining development in western New South 
Wales and in the Queensland interior at a pace and intensity 
which was not commensurate with the yield on the investment 
involved, capital imports postponed the day of reckoning for 
outback squatting and ensured that when the crisis did 
eventually arrive its effects were doubly traumatic. The 
cumulative demands of the land boom, the mid-decade drought and 
the defensive investment phase plunged a growing number of 
western stations into heavy debt. From mid-decade debt levels 
began to approach or even exceed asset valuations which were 
themselves inflated by the assumption that the market for stock 
would remain buoyant and the stations eventually be realizable
p Cat 1880 prices. Mounting interest commitments to Britain
had to be met by intensified exploitation of colonial 
resources. In the 1880s this was principally manifested as 
pressure to increase levels of pastoral output, which in turn 
led to further borrowing, pasture deterioration and 
oversupplies of stock and wool. The squatters did make some 
moves to lower pastoral wages during the 1880s but, although 
labour supply conditions had shifted in their favour since the 
beginning of the decade, they were frustrated by the organized 
resistance of the pastoral workers. Only when the depression 
of the 1890s intervened to break the power of the bush unions
were the costs of dependence on British capital able to be
8 6passed on to the pastoral workforce.
85. See below p p . 121-2.
86. Examined at Chapter 7 below.
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As the squatters' own equities in their holdings were 
progressively wiped out by debt, they began to appear less as 
independent agents than as administrators of the holdings on 
their creditors' behalf. Though they were accorded a large 
measure of discretion in their use of the funds provided to 
them, their effective control over their holdings was limited 
by their interest obligations and their trappings of social 
privilege were maintained on their creditors' sufferance.
Their growing dependence was concealed only by the continuing 
capital inflow which permitted the finance companies to keep up 
advances on failing western enterprises without being forced to 
consider the hard option of dispossession. At the merest sign 
of a reversal in the British money market the squatters' 
subordinate status was bound to be formalized and their freedom 
of action curtailed. In this sense the wave of foreclosures 
which took place in the 1890s as the finance companies 
attempted to put their houses in order did little more than set 
the seal on the outback squatters' demise.
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CHAPTER 4
The Politics of Pastoral Finance
Though the profligacy with which British funds were 
dispensed to the outback squatters obviously played a central 
role in the western pastoral industry's continued expansion 
through the 1880s, the phenomenon has proven difficult to 
explain in the language of economic rationalism. In the case 
of the pastoral finance companies especially, although shifts 
in the overall volume of lending can be traced to the progress 
of British share and debenture issues, the manner in which 
funds were distributed was determined by the companies' 
colonial directors and staff. The persistence with which these 
individuals pursued a policy of backing "a comparatively few 
clients with remarkably little restraint"^ appears to 
indicate an implicit faith in their clients' judgement which 
could hardly be regarded as characteristic of financiers as a 
class .
In their attempts to interpret the financiers' 
actions as rational, profit-maximizing behaviour, Butlin and 
Cain have both emphasized the importance of the pastoral 
finance companies' and banks' competing for the business of 
large squatters whose clips would yield a sizeable income to 
the institutions' wool commissioning operations. However, 
this provides at best a partial explanation. The quest for
1. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. cit. , p. 108.
, "Pastoral Expansion", o p . cit., passim.2. Ibid., 172; Cain
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wool commissions played a part in the companies' initial rush 
for clientele at the beginning of the decade, but the volume of 
advances quickly grew out of all proportion to the return in 
the form of wool commissions. This was even more the case 
later in the decade, when financiers showed themselves willing 
on several occasions to take over accounts which had been 
steadily sliding into debt to other institutions. Furthermore, 
in several respects the finance companies displayed 
monopolistic rather than competitive behaviour. Both in their 
local woolselling operations and in their overseas consignment 
business they acted as a cartel; and even in their lending 
business the longer-established houses in particular relied for 
much of their clientele on squatters who were more or less tied 
to a particular company by prior obligations to individual 
directors or, less often, managerial staff. In these 
cases, competition for accounts was out of the question; yet 
this does not appear to have diminished the companies' 
willingness to continue advancing funds to the clients 
concerned. The problem posed by the financiers' apparent act 
of faith thus remains unresolved.
The proponents of this explanation have themselves 
implicitly admitted its inadequacy by hinting at possible 
alternatives. Butlin adverts to, but does not explore, 'the
3. See p p • 109ff. below. Directors of various companies also
occasionally set up co-operative ventures; for example, 
William Taylor of U.M.A., Andrew Rowan of Goldsbrough Mort 
and Archibald Fisken of A.M.A. were partners in a 
Queensland squatting venture.
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emergence of a "powerful real estate interest" in the pastoral 
industry, and mentions the growing importance of "non-market 
criteria" in investment during the 1880s.^ Cain is rather 
more explicit, commenting that the companies were so far caught 
up in the prevailing optimism about the pastoral industry's 
long-term prospects that they were reluctant to lose clientele 
by gaining "a reputation for toughness" in the administration 
of their accounts; the companies' more bizarre excesses he 
attributes to poor management and to the "personalities and
antagonisms" of their directors which, he hastens to add, are
5beyond the scope of his study.
At the heart of the inadequacies of these 
explanations is their authors' reluctance to subject the 
phenomena in question to a political analysis, to examine this 
particular pattern of collective behaviour as a matter of class 
action rather than individual motivation. The manner in which 
British funds were dispensed within the pastoral industry is 
most easily explained as a product of a class relationship 
which subsumed that between lender and borrower.
The colonial squatters had enjoyed a long and 
mutually rewarding relationship with the banks and pastoral 
finance houses, the latter in their earlier role as wool 
commission agents. The squatters' station equipment 
programmes, their pre-emption of closer settlement and their
4. Butlin, I .A .E .D ., o p . c i t ., p p . 58 and 5 respectively.
5. Cain, "Pastoral Expansion", o p . c i t . , p. 196.
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ability to realize capital gains had all been much assisted by 
access to loan capital, especially during the downturns which 
had interrupted the general course of pastoral expansion. The 
banks and pastoral finance companies had in turn benefited from 
the expanding volume of business which accompanied the 
extension of the frontier, the enhanced security provided by 
freehold purchases and the high interest rates produced by the 
squatters' strong demand for funds.
By the early 1880s a substantial interpenetration of 
local landed capital with banking and merchant capital had 
occurred. Squatters who had ridden the tide of the wool boom 
and the associated land speculation reinvested their 
accumulated gains in the local wool houses and banks, in which 
they came to hold numerous directorships,  ^ while banking and 
mercantile profits were redeployed, often through partnerships, 
into direct ownership of pastoral enterprises. Imported capital 
was introduced into this nexus partly as a result of British 
companies' intervening to establish consignment agencies in 
competition with the local houses and partly by a process of 
co-option arising out of conflicts between the local wool 
houses and the banks, each of which sought to gain an edge by 
securing British funds. But in both cases the use of imported 
finance became subject to the internal dynamics of the local
6. The position of the wool houses is discussed in more detail 
below, p p . 110ff. At least six of the banks had directors
who were personally involved in western N.S.W. squatting; 
these were the City of Melbourne, Colonial, Union, English, 
Scottish and Australian Chartered, London Chartered and Bank 
of New South Wales.
-10 7-
financial/pastoral fraternity, with which even the British- 
owned firms hastened to identify themselves.
Wealthy, unashamedly socially exclusive and bound 
together by an intricate network of intermarriages, the large 
squatting families constituted a formidable bloc. Not even the 
most conservative lending institutions were immune to the 
attractions of such a wealthy and reliable clientele, and the 
specialist pastoral financiers in particular adopted avowedly 
elitist lending policies as they sought to secure their share 
of the large pastoral capitalists' business. Associations 
formed in this process could not be lightly renounced; a single 
act of indelicacy in a financier's dealings with a troubled 
client might bring down the wrath of an entire squatting clan. 
But such situations seldom arose during the boom years, and 
squatters' relationships with their financiers usually remained 
harmonious. As the specialist houses' share of squatting 
finance grew larger, the disposition of pastoral advances was 
increasingly governed by the predilections of financiers who 
shared a close personal association with the pastoral clique 
and a commitment to buttressing its privileged position against 
the meddlings of colonial governments, the threat of closer 
settlement, the importunate demands of pastoral employees and 
the temporary fluctuations of markets and the weather.
7. See e.g. A.M.L.F. papers, 6/110 (W. Cottee to W. Gray, 10
August 1886); Bailey, op. c i t ., p. 132; Cain, "Pastoral 
Expansion", op. cit., pp. 177ff.
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Ch a r a c t e r i s t i c a 1 1 y , the f i n a n c i e r  m e m b e r s  of this 
g e n t l e m e n ' s  cl ub a l l o w e d  t he ir i n v e s t m e n t  d e c i s i o n s  to be 
g u i d e d  by an a s s e s s m e n t  of the p e r s o n a l  q u a l i t i e s  of the c l i e n t  
and his b u s i n e s s  and f a m i l i a l  c o n n e c t i o n s  r a t h e r  t ha n  by any 
d e t a i l e d  s c r u t i n y  of the e c o n o m i c  v i a b i l i t y  of his e n t e r p r i s e .  
In the 1870s and ea rl y 1880s, as one a ft e r  a n o t h e r  the large 
s q u a t t e r s  p l u n g e d  th eir  f o r t u n e s  into the p u r c h a s e  and 
e q u i p m e n t  of run s in the i n t e r i o r ,  the c o m p a n i e s  f o l l o w e d  them, 
s e r e n e  in th e i r  c o n f i d e n c e  that a n ew era of c a p i t a l  g ain s was 
a b o u t  to begin.  Ev en in the l a t t e r  1880s and e ar l y  1890s, w hen  
n u m e r o u s  s q u a t t e r s  wer e m a n i f e s t l y  in t r o u b l e ,  it was d i f f i c u l t  
to c u r t a i l  len di ng . P e r s o n a l  a l l e g i a n c e s  b e t w e e n  f i n a n c i e r s  and  
c o m p a n y  c l i e n t s  b l o c k e d  the t i g h t e n i n g  of l e n d i n g  c o n d i t i o n s ;  
st af f sent out s p e c i f i c a l l y  to i m p l e m e n t  r e s t r i c t i v e  p o l i c i e s  
f o u n d  t h e m s e l v e s  b e i n g  s e d u c e d  by the r e l a x e d  l i f e - s t y l e  of the 
M e l b o u r n e  a b s e n t e e  set; a n d m a n y  c o m p a n i e s  w er e d e t e r r e d  from  
i n t e r v e n i n g  in s t a t i o n  m a n a g e m e n t ,  e x c e p t  in c a s e s  of p a t e n t  
i n c o m p e t e n c e ,  for fear of a l i e n a t i n g  a l arg e s e g m e n t  of t he ir  
c l i e n t e l e .
The p a t t e r n  of i n s t i t u t i o n a l  l e n d i n g  in the 1880s was 
s t r o n g l y  i n f l u e n c e d  by p r e - e x i s t i n g  b u s i n e s s  a l l i a n c e s .  The 
l a r g e  p a s t o r a l  c a p i t a l i s t s  who d o m i n a t e d  the p a s t o r a l  f in a n c e  
c o m p a n i e s '  lo cal  o p e r a t i o n s  had a c q u i r e d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  p e r s o n a l  
p a t r o n a g e  n e t w o r k s  from t h e i r  e a r l i e r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  ( u s u a l l y  in 
a f i n a n c i a l  r a t h e r  than m a n a g e r i a l  role) in s q u a t t i n g  
e n t e r p r i s e s  b o t h  in the w e s t e r n  d i s t r i c t s  and e l s e w h e r e  in the 
c o l o n i e s .  The f i n a n c e  c o m p a n i e s  p r i z e d  t he s e  men  for the 
c o n s t e l l a t i o n s  of a c c o u n t s  t h e y  b r o u g h t  w i t h  them, and were
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prepared to grant them considerable latitude for the sake of 
keeping their allegiance. In many cases company management 
appears to have left the supervision of accounts in the hands
Oof the particular directors who had acquired them. Advances 
were thus made on the recommendation of individuals who had 
close relationships with their clients or even in some cases 
held partnerships in the enterprises in question. Where there 
was some doubt about the credit-worthiness of an account, it 
was often secured by a guarantee from the responsible director. 
Similarly, the accounts of lesser squatters or individuals with 
whom the companies had no previous dealings were often taken up 
on their being guaranteed by a better-known relative or 
associate. Guarantors were sometimes remunerated for their 
assistance by a rebate on the interest earnings from the 
account.^ In this manner the patronage system stretched its 
tentacles far beyond the immediate circle of the larger 
pastoral capitalists.
It was natural that a mode of operation which allowed 
such wide discretion to a handful of individuals should produce 
wide variations in practice between and within companies. At 
its worst the system gave rise to an outright cronyism
8. This is evinced to some extent by the paucity of detailed 
station reports in company records before the 1890s. See 
also Cain, ibid. , p p . 192ff.
9. See e.g. notes on William Kilg o u r 1s account in Dalgety 
papers, 100/1/74. Guarantees from MacBain of the A.M.L.F. 
board of advice for the account of Canally, in which he had 
been a partner, are included in A.M.L.F. papers, 6/109; 
N.Z.L.M.A. papers 110/4/312 include an instance of a 
squatter's guaranteeing a small grazier's account.
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reminiscent of the operations of the companies involved in the 
parallel Melbourne land s p e c u l a t i o n s . ^  Around 1890 several 
pastoral finance companies were riven by allegations of 
misfeasance on the part of their directors. There was uproar 
at a meeting of Goldsbrough Mort shareholders in 1889, with 
Andrew Rowan and J.S. Horsfall, both directors of the company, 
accusing each other of taking personal loans. In Rowan's case 
at least the allegation was true; his Thurloo Downs station in 
the Western Division had been taken up by the company from the 
Bank of New South Wales two years previously with a debt of 
£12,000 outstanding. More seriously, he and others
involved in the company appear to have used company funds for 
urban land speculation. The meeting concluded with
Horsfall, who had resigned from the board, commenting:
"If you offered me ten thousand pounds a year to come 
back to the company, I would refuse it with scorn. I 
decline to be identified with any of these men.
Brawls of this kind did little for the confidence of share­
holders and British investors; for the most part the companies 
preferred to prevent them from coming to public attention.
But Goldsbrough Mort was by no means the only company 
affected. In 1890 the Union Mortgage and Agency Company
10. See M. Cannon, Land Boom and B u s t , Melbourne, 1972. 
(henceforward cited as Land B o o m ). passim.
11. Cain, "Pastoral Expansion", o p . c i t ., p. 189; Lands
Department records, 8/2226. The fact that Horsfall's 
secret price for eventually rejoining the company was a 
£10,000 advance to his son-in-law suggests that he too may 
have been involved in some dubious dealings (A .D .B ., vol 4, 
p . 427 ) .
12. Cannon, Land Boom, op. c i t ., p.94.
13. Quoted by A.I.B.R., November 1889, p. 820.
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(U.M.A.) was the scene of a similar struggle, this time 
involving the London and Melbourne boards. The chairman of the 
Melbourne board of directors, G.N. Turner, had guaranteed 
accounts on a number of stations, predominantly in western New 
South Wales, including several in which he was personally 
interested. His liability to the company having run up to 
£680,000 with little prospect of the capital being realized by 
the stations involved, the London board had become anxious to 
remove both Turner and his business. But Turner and his
partner J.S. Moodie, who had both been involved in Melbourne
1 4land speculation through the notorious Davies companies, 
could not produce the cash to repay the debts after the 
collapse of the Melbourne land boom. After a protracted 
argument, in the course of which Turner repeatedly threatened
to air the matter at a shareholders' meeting, the issue was
1 5settled privately.
There were also difficulties between the London 
office of the Australian Mortgage Land and Finance Company 
(A.M.L.F.) and its colonial board of advice. In 1891 Sir James 
MacBain, a prominent Victorian politician and pastoralist who 
had once managed the company's affairs and was now chairman of 
the board of advice, resigned after clashing with the general 
manager, E.M. Young, over supposed laxness and favouritism in 
MacBain's administration of several western New South Wales
14. Cannon, Land Boom, op. c i t ♦ , p p . 318, 326-7, 328.
15. This paragraph is based on correspondence in Australian 
Estates papers, 165/135.
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accounts, including one in which he held an interest. The 
company was thrown into panic at the prospect of the adverse 
publicity and loss of business MacBain's resignation would 
entail; his resignation was refused and the quarrel hastily 
patched u p .
The A.M.L.F. had already experienced some problems in 
its attempts to pull in the reins on its clients. In 1885, 
concerned at the growth of indebtedness on its outback accounts 
during the 1882-5 drought, the London office had appointed 
William Drysdale as inspector and sent him to the colonies with 
the intention of implementing more restrictive lending 
policies. Drysdale appears to have adapted rather too readily 
to Melbourne society. Young was not impressed by his 
inspector's taking on five new western New South Wales 
accounts, several of which were already in debt to other 
institutions, and Drysdale's appointment was not renewed in 
1 89 0 . 1 7
The Australian operations of the New Zealand Loan and 
Mercantile Agency Company (N.Z.L.M.A.) offer a similar case of 
rapid acclimatisation to the speculative mores of the squatting 
investment clique. The company did not have local directors 
with private patronage networks; rather, it appears to have 
vested complete discretion on its Australian manager, David 
Elder, a newcomer to the pastoral field who had been an
16. Bailey, op. c i t . , p p . 18, 128-9.
17. Ibid., p p . 104-5, 126. Drysdale was subsequently hired by
U.M.A.
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1 8accountant before joining the company in 1880. Throughout
the decade Elder showed an aggressive spirit in his pursuit of 
a squatting clientele, using the company's cheap funds to 
undercut his rivals. N.Z.L.M.A.'s western New South Wales
business grew in conformity with this policy; by 1885 the 
company already held mortgages over ten Western Division 
stations and was garnering clientele whenever it could, 
much to its competitors' chagrin.
The basis on which Elder assessed the worth of
station securities is unclear; certainly he wasted little
2 1effort on inspections. His failure to acquaint himself
with clients' properties and his general aggressiveness came 
under scrutiny during N.Z.L.M.A.'s liquidation hearings in 
1894, in the course of which the judge expressed his astonish­
ment that one transaction in which Elder had engaged did not 
result in his suspension. The board's failure to write
down station values and its paying dividends out of unearned 
interest also occasioned severe criticism. In spite of the
judge's finding a prima facie case of fraud against at least
2 3one of the company's directors no prosecution took place, 
leading the Australasian Insurance and Banking Record (by no
1 8 . A.D.B., vol 4, p . 13 2.
1 9 . Young of A.M.L.F . at one point commented "Surely there is
day of reckoning for this plunging company ... we cannot
run a race with them" ( 1 884 ) . See Cain, "Pastoral
Expansion", op. c i t ., p p . 190, 198.
2 0 . Lands Department , 8/2226.
2 1 . C a i n , ibid., p . 198.
22 . Ibid., p. 197.
23 . A . I . B . R . , Ap r i 1 - May 1894, pp . 240-1, 308, 313.
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means an organ of radical sentiment) to express its wonder at 
"the large measure of immunity which appears to attend direct­
orial misfeasance".^  Elder also remained in his position, 
albeit under rather closer supervision by the board.
Perhaps the company could not afford to disgrace the man whose 
activism in the Pastoralists1 Union had led the Bulletin to 
label him the "Napoleon of the capitalist party".
The lead of the large pastoral finance houses was
followed by several smaller companies. The Australasian
Mortgage and Agency Company (A.M.A.) arose out of Hastings
Cuningham's wool-broking business and apparently inherited his
c l i e n t e l e . ^  By 1900, £400,000 of the company's £1.5 million
2 8pastoral advances had been invested in the Western Division.
Two years later the company's managing director, Lewis Kiddle, 
resigned abruptly after two men were sent out from Britain to 
inspect the company's accounts. As the British shareholders' 
meeting which received the inspectors' report resolved unanim­
ously that it not be circulated, the reasons for his resig­
nation can only be surmised; the pattern, however is a familiar 
2 9one. The company subsequently was reconstructed and
3 0eventually went into liquidation. Similarly the Agency Land
24. Ibid., January 1895, p.11.
25. N.Z.L.M.A. papers, 110/1/1/1.
26. A . D .B . , v o 1. 4, p. 133.
27. Lands Department papers, 8/2226, and New South Wales
Legislative Assembly, Votes and Proceedings, 1876, vol 3, 
pp . 1 034ff. give a number of mortgages in Cuningham's name.
28. R.C.W.D. M i n u t e s , evidence of L. Kiddle, p. 264.
29. A .I.B.R., January 1902, p. 21.
30. Ibid., May 1902, p. 361, May 1903, p p . 404-5 discusses the
company's reconstruction.
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and Finance Company appears to have taken over some of the 
pastoral accounts of William Murray and Charles Sanderson, who 
held a number of western New South Wales runs, probably under 
mortgage, in the 1880s. Scant information is available
about this company, which liquidated during the drought of
1902, only thirteen years after it was first floated, with
3 2three Western Division stations registered in its name.
Even lending institutions whose policies were 
normally conservative became involved in substantial western 
New South Wales investments. Dalgety and Company appear to 
have been reluctant to commit themselves to large advances 
secured only on Western Division holdings; nevertheless, the 
company had acquired a large number of western properties by 
1890. The majority of Western Division mortgages held by 
Dalgety appear to have come from the company's relationship
with the Patterson family and from the personal clientele of a
3 3former Dalgety partner, Arthur Blackwood, and his family.
Closer examination of the Dalgety archives might shed more 
light on Blackwood's role in the f i r m ; ^  however, whether 
acting as private lenders or on behalf of the firm, Blackwood's 
family held partnerships in twenty Warrego and Albert runs in
31. Lands Department records, 8/2226.
32. A.I.B.R., August 1889, p. 558, July 1902, p. 509; Lands 
Department records, 8/2225.
33. Some biographical details on Blackwood are given in A.D.B.,
v o 1 3, p p . 177-8.
34. Dalgety archives are currently held at the Archives of 
Business and Labour, Australian National University; 
negotiations are in train for the inclusion of Dalgety 
London office papers in the collection.
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1875-6 and in eleven of the consolidated holdings registered in
1885 under the new Land Act. Of the latter, all but one
8 5subsequently passed to the company. Dalgety also acquired
six Western Division holdings from members of the Patterson 
family, and other clients accounted for fourteen mortgages.
Although, like the other companies, Dalgety was 
eventually to experience difficulties with its western 
accounts, its position was considerably stronger than the 
others' ; its business was diverse, its dividend and reserve 
policies conservative and its lending comparatively cautious. 
Dalgety preferred to concentrate on clients who had securities 
and income from sources outside the Western Division; debts 
were not allowed to escalate to levels approaching station
valuations; and, unlike several other companies, Dalgety seldom
3 7attempted to take on the full debt burden of the holding.
Nor does the company appear to have taken mortgages over 
western properties with which its shareholders were associated,
*3 ftexcept in the case of Blackwood and his partners.
For the most part the banks allowed the finance 
companies to make the running in western pastoral lending in 
the 1880s. In the early years of the decade the banks had felt
35. New South Wales Legislative Assembly. Votes and 
Proceedings, 1875-6, vol. 3, pp. 1034ff.; Lands Department 
records, 8/2225-6.
36. Lands Department records, loc. cit.
37. R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence of J.S. Aitken, p p . 282-6. For
examples see Dalgety papers, 100/4/1/99, 100/4/1/194.
38. Lands Department papers, 8/2225-6, cf. 1885 list of Dalgety 
shareholders in Mort and Co. papers, 13/11/7.
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the pinch severely. Where they had been able to charge eleven 
per cent interest on pastoral advances in 1879, they could now 
only get seven to nine per cent and were being undercut at that
O Qby the finance companies. The banks lost pastoral lending
business, and there were complaints that their funds were lying
i d l e . They also experienced a setback in their attempts to
enter directly into the wool consignment business in competit-
. 4 1ion with the non-banking companies.
The confrontation ended in a stand-off, with the 
banks largely leaving the finance companies to compete with 
each other. As early as March 1881 the Insurance and Banking 
Record was preaching the gospel of forbearance, urging bankers 
not to take the risk of competing for large squatting accounts 
but to redirect their energies into financing smallholders, 
traders and manufacturers.43 Nevertheless, the banks did not 
withdraw entirely from lending on western stations? the propor­
tion of holdings registered in their names remained virtually 
static at 13% between 1879 and early 1885, then grew gradually 
in the next few years, eventually hovering at about 19% in 
1 888-90.43
Little is known in detail about the banks' western 
lending operations, but a sketchy picture can be pieced
39. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. c i t . , p p . 100, 142-5; cf. Cain,
"Pastoral Expansion", op. cit., p. 187, who notes that 
Goldsbrough was lending at 6% in 1881.
40. A .I.B.R., January 1881, pp. 1/ 9.
41. See table, ibid., March 1890, p. 197.
42. Ibid., March 1881, pp . 79-80 .
43. N. Butlin, "Company Ownership", o p . cit. p. 96; Lands 
Department papers, loc. cit.
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together from various sources. Pastoral lease registers 
suggest that several banks changed their Western Division 
lending patterns markedly after 1885. The Australian Joint 
Stock Bank and the London Chartered Bank, which together held 
twelve station mortgages early in 1885, took on only one new 
mortgage between them in 1885-91; however, as only two of their 
original mortgages were discharged in the latter half of the 
decade they still held eleven stations in 1891.^^ Similarly 
the Commercial Banking Company, which with fourteen stations
was the largest mortgagee institution in 1885, took out only
4 5eight new mortgages thereafter. The Bank of New South
4 6Wales, seldom an aggressive western pastoral lender, had
foreclosed on at least one account and had its holder declared 
insolvent in 1887.^^ Its level of activity as a Western 
Division mortgagee was roughly constant over the decade as a 
whole, but the conditions it imposed on borrowers were 
extremely stringent, and in the second half of the decade it
allowed at least four western accounts to pass to other
4 8institutions or private lenders.
On the other hand there was a substantial increase in
the Bank of Australasia's Western Division mortgages between 
4 Q1885 and 1891. Starting with only two mortgages, the bank
44. Lands Department papers, 8/2226.
45. Ibid.
46. R. Holder, Bank of New South Wales: A Hist o r y , Sydney,
1970. p. 534.
47. Dalgety papers, 100/4/1/110.
48. Lands Department papers, 8/2226.
49. Ibid.
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took on ten new clients. The bank's pursuit of business was
sufficiently vigorous to worry Young of the A.M.L.F., who in
1887 decried "the reckless course of management" it had adopted
and declared, "we must not run a race with them on such lines
as to security - by doing so we should abandon the first
5 0principles of our business." The Union Bank likewise, in
spite of its general preference for indirect arrangements with
5 1mortgage companies, enlarged its Western Division holding
from one to eight stations between 1885 and 1891. By
1889, however, both banks had adopted more restrictive policies
and were actively moving to curtail advances. In the
Australasia's case, excessive enthusiasm in administering the
new policy gave rise to a legal battle with one of its Western
Division clients; in 1891 the former lessee of Innesowen
brought a suit in which the Court found against the bank on
five charges, including those of selling the station unstocked
in contravention of an earlier agreement and of depriving the
5 4plaintiff of property in the course of the sale.
But in spite of their growing concern the banks were 
unable to effect a large reduction in their western 
involvement; the overall number of bank holdings fell only 
marginally between 1 888 and 1 890 , then rose in 18 9 1 .  ^^
Though by comparison with the pastoral finance companies the
50. Quoted by Cain, "Pastoral Expansion", op. ci t . , p. 190.
51. S. Butlin, A.N.Z. Bank, op. c i t . , pp . 236 , 250 .
52. Lands Department papers 8/2226.
53. S. Butlin, A.N.Z. Bank, op. c i t . , pp 282-3.
54. A.I.B.R., November 1891, p. 817.
55. Lands Department papers, 8/2226.
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banks' western business was a relatively small component of 
their lending operations, the thirteen banks holding Western 
Division mortgages in 1891 probably made a substantial 
contribution to the overcapitalisation of western pastoralism.
The wool consignment-curn-finance companies and the 
banks were not the only avenues from which the pastoralists 
received funds. The Australian operations of the Trust and 
Agency Company, which was set up in 1860 to supply long-term 
mortgage finance to pastoralists in Australia and New Zealand, 
appear to have been heavily concentrated on lending to clients 
with western holdings. Although the company's clients' 
borrowings were not permitted to exceed half the valuation of 
the security, intermittent difficulties appear to have arisen 
in repayments after 1 882 . This may have been partly due to
the fact that several clients had contracted large debts to 
other c o m p a n i e s . ^
Private lenders were also active, as they had been in
the 1870s. Several private mortgages are recorded in the Lands
5 8Department archives; the principals of unincorporated
5 9woolbroking firms were conspicuous, accounting for many of 
the registered partnership holdings by the end of the decade. 
There was a marked tendency for private lenders to abandon
56. Trust and Agency Co. papers, 94/5.
57. For examples of multiple debts involving the company as 
first mortgagee, see Australian Estates papers, 165/315.
58. 8/2226; mortgages were marked with annotations, though not 
with complete consistency.
59. Among these were Hill, Clark and C o . , Sanderson, Murray and 
Co., J.B. Watt and W.O. Gilchrist.
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partnership arrangements in favour of taking a mortgage over
the holding or guaranteeing it for an institutional loan. This
probably reflected lenders' inability to supply the funds
required for defensive development, their dissatisfaction with
the return yielded by a share in meagre pastoral profits and
their desire to improve the security they held in return for
f) ntheir loans. In other cases private financiers withdrew
from the enterprises completely, often precipitating the 
remaining partners into the hands of financial institutions 
shortly afterwards. Over the period from 1885 to 1891 
inclusive, fourteen Western Division partnerships underwent
r awithdrawals and only three were enlarged. This suggests a
growing wariness among private financiers, in marked contrast 
to the optimism expressed in the public statements of most 
lending institutions.
Indeed, from about 1882 the companies' own records 
gave plentiful indications that western pastoralism was falling 
into difficulties. By 1885 numerous stations had run up 
substantial debts;DJ of ten U.M.A. accounts in western New 
South Wales, for example, seven were carrying debts in excess 
of half their valuations and another had actually exceeded its
60. Lands Department papers, 8/2226.
61. Ibid.
62. See e.g. A.I.B.R., October 1889, p. 744, January 1890, p. 
23, March 1892, p. 191. Where company reports expressed 
reservations about the prosperity of the pastoral industry, 
they usually stressed the importance of drought and other 
factors beyond human control.
63. See Bailey, op. c i t ., p p . 75, 97-8, 104; Cain, "Pastoral 
Expansion", op. cit., p.188.
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valuation.^  The position deteriorated further in the second 
half of the decade. Bailey has found that the debt per sheep 
on ten A.M.L.F. accounts in the Central and Western Divisions 
had reached 24/3d in 1889-91, and on the Western Division 
stations interest charges had risen to two-thirds of gross wool
f■ Cproceeds. Goldsbrough Mort's Western Division clients
must have been in a similar p o s i t i o n . ^  And on the U.M.A.
accounts for which information is available the debt per sheep
in 1890 ranged from 12/- to a massive 38/-, and the cost of
fi 7interest payments from 67% to 121% of gross wool proceeds. 
Mortgagee institutions, like their clients, were becoming 
increasingly dependent on stock sales to maintain a cash flow. 
In 1890, and apparently on several occasions before that, the
U.M.A. had to rely on stock proceeds to pay its dividend after
6 8its liquidity had reached "a point of extreme peril". On
the worst accounts even stock earnings were insufficient to
cover interest payments. In 1888, 14% of the A.M.L.F.'s
6 9earnings went to cover unpaid interest on advances; other 
companies allowed paper profits to accumulate from interest on
64. Australian Estates papers, 165/315.
65. Bailey, o p . c i t .,p p . 110, 112.
66. Cain, "Companies and Squatting in the Western Division of
New South Wales, 1896 - 1905" in Barnard, e d . , o p . c i t ., p.
438 (henceforward cited as "Companies and Squatting") cites 
ten stations with 497,000 sheep which together were 
security for almost a million pounds in 1896. Even 
assuming a higher-than-average rate of stock losses in 
1891-6, with advances fairly static in the interim this 
would indicate a debt well in excess of one pound per 
head.
67. Australian Estates papers 165/315.
68. R. Jeffray to W. Forrest, 9 January 1891, in Australian 
Estates papers, 165/135.
Bailey, op. c i t . , p. 113.69 .
-12 3-
7 0accounts which were mere l y  sinking into debt still further.
Still more alarming was the failure of the land
ma rke t to recover after the 1884 Land Act was passed. Between
1885 and 1891 inclusive, only about forty-nine Western Division
holdin gs changed hands on the market while 111 mort gages were 
7 1taken out, and the prices realized in the latter half of
the decade were seldom commensurate with those of 1880-1882 in
spite of heavy i nvestment in capital facilities. Neverthe-
7 3less the financial institutions, even including the banks, 
were rel uctant to accept this as a permanent loss, and held on 
in the hope of a market upturn rather than reassessing their 
securities. G o l d sbrough Mort even claimed that the 1889 Land 
Act had added thirty per cent all round to the value of the
company's leasehold s e c u r i t i e s , ^  and the U.M.A. continued to
7 5advance funds for further improvements until 1891.
Several companies made attempts to tighten up control 
over the widening deficits on their western accounts during the
1880s. There were some foreclosures; Gold s b r o u g h  Mort took over
7 6 7 7Pirillie, the A.M.L.F. Mount Arrowsmith and Conapaira
70. Jeffray to Forrest, 9 January 1891, in Australian Estates 
papers, 165/135; Coghlan, op. c i t ., p. 1645.
71. Lands Department papers 8/2226. This may understate the 
position, as it is likely that some private m o r t gages were 
not noted as such.
72. Randell, o p . c i t . , p. 166.
73. Coghlan, op. cit., pp. 1645-6.
74. A.I.B.R., October 1889, p. 744.
75. Aust ralian Estates papers, 5/16 (Tindarey) and Jeffray to 
Forrest, 9 J a n u a r y  1891, in 165/135.
76. Cain, "Companies and Squatting", o p . c i t . ,
77. Bailey, o p . cit., p. 137.
p . 454 .
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7 8and N.Z.L.M.A. some unnamed western stations. The banks
also foreclosed in some cases, though the frequency of
7 ftforeclosures is unknown. But in general financial
institutions seem to have been unwilling to remove incumbent
pastoralists from their stations. Stations could only be sold
at a loss on the prevailing market; the companies had
experienced difficulties in disposing of the numerous stations
which fell into their hands after deaths among an ageing
ft ngeneration of squatting clients. Furthermore, the bitter
enmities to which foreclosure would give rise would damage the
companies' wool commissioning business with their erstwhile
clients' relatives and associates. Even attempts to restrict
station expenditure and introduce closer supervision of
clients' holdings encountered problems when they had to be
administered by local officials who were inclined to regard
such measures as unnecessary intrusions. In the A.M.L.F.'s case
closer supervision of accounts was introduced after 1885 and
advances for improvements and for clients' personal expenditure
halted; but the difficulties, discussed above, between Young
and the company's colonial administrators hampered the snift to
8 1a stringent lending policy. Goldsbrough Mort and the
U.M.A. both appointed inspectors before 1890, but in neither 
case did this have a major effect on the company's willingness
78. Butlin, I.Ä.E.D., op. c i t . , p. 437.
79. Holder, op. cit., p. 534 notes that the Bank of New South 
Wales foreclosed on as many of its Central Division 
accounts in 1885-90 as in 1890-3, but it is unlikely that 
this practice was universal.
80. Bailey, op. cit., p. 107.
8 1 . Ibid. , pp^ 95~, T0 7 .
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Q 2to c o n t i n u e  l en d in g.  El d e r  of N . Z . L . M . A .  p a i d  no h ee d  w h e n
the c o m p a n y ' s  L o n d o n  s e c r e t a r y ,  a f t e r  a v i s i t  to the c ol o n i e s ,
w a r n e d  th at lo ss es  we r e b e i n g  i n c u r r e d  on p r o p e r t i e s  w ith  w h i c h
8 3the A u s t r a l i a n  m a n a g e r  had l i t t l e  or no a c q u a i n t a n c e .  But
p o w e r f u l  force s we r e e m e r g i n g  b ot h in B r i t a i n  and the c o l o n i e s  
to e n s u r e  th at c o l o n i a l  p a s t o r a l  f i n a n c i e r s  w o u l d  soon be 
j o l t e d  out of th e i r  c o m p l a c e n c y .
82. Cain, " P a s t o r a l  E x p a n s i o n " ,  o p . c i t . , p p . 
a n n o t a t i o n s  on A u s t r a l i a n  E s t a t e s  p ap e r s ,  
Cain, ibid, p p . 196, 198.8 3 .
192- 4 ;
6 series.
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C H A P T E R  5
C r i s i s  and the P a s t o r a l  I nt e r e s t .
S t u d i e s  of the 1890s d e p r e s s i o n  in A u s t r a l i a  h ave
c u s t o m a r i l y  e m p h a s i s e d  the d i s c o n t i n u i t y  b e t w e e n  t ha t  d e c a d e
and the t h i r t y - y e a r  b o o m  w h i c h  p r e c e d e d  it. In q u a n t i t a t i v e
t e r m s  the c o n t r a s t  b e t w e e n  the two p e r i o d s  is clear.  The
co l o n i e s '  i m p o r t a t i o n  of B r i t i s h  c a p i t a l  and t he i r  r at es  of
e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  s l u m p e d  v i o l e n t l y  in the 1890s c u l m i n a t i n g  in
a m a j o r  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s  in 1893. But the a d v e n t  of d e p r e s s i o n
has a l s o  b e e n  seen as m a r k i n g  a q u a l i t a t i v e  c h a n g e  in the
co l o n i e s '  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w it h  B r i t a i n ,  u s u a l l y  c o n c e p t u a l i z e d  as
the s u p e r s e s s i o n  of a st ate  of c o l o n i a l  a u t o n o m y  by a h e a v y
d e p e n d e n c e  on B r i t i s h  co n t r o l .  In B u t l i n ' s  wo rd s , " A u s t r a l i a ' s
1s a t e l l i t i c  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  B r i t a i n  s u d d e n l y  b e c a m e  v i t a l "  in 
the 1890s; or as D a v i d  Clark , w r i t i n g  from a M a r x i s t  p e r s p e c t ­
ive, p h r a s e s  it "the A u s t r a l i a n  w o r k e r  r e c e i v e d  a r e m i n d e r  of 
the d e p e n d e n t  n a t u r e  of our d e v e l o p m e n t  and of the t e n u o u s  
f o u n d a t i o n s  on w h i c h  his h i g h  s t a n d a r d  of l i v i n g  had  
r e s t e d . "  In e i t h e r  case the u n d e r l y i n g  m o t i f  is the s o u r i n g  
of an i m p e r i a l  c o n n e c t i o n  w hic h,  h a v i n g  p l a y e d  a c r e a t i v e  role  
in s t i m u l a t i n g  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  d u r i n g  the boom,  c o n t r i b u t e d  
l a r g e l y  to the s e v e r i t y  an d d u r a t i o n  of the d e p r e s s i o n  w h i c h  
f o l l o w e d .  D e b a t e  has then f o c u s e d  on w h e t h e r  the t r a n s f o r m a t ­
ion of the i m p e r i a l  c o n n e c t i o n  was an e x o g e n o u s  c au s e  of the
1. C a i n  " C a p i t a l  S t r u c t u r e " ,  o p . c i t ■ , p. 75.
2. Cl ark , o p . cit., p. 61.
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depression or merely an outcome of the problems plaguing the
sectors of the Australian economy on which British investors
3had concentrated.
This preoccupation with analysing the evident shift 
from a state of rapid growth and prosperity to one of 
stagnation and depression has, however, masked some of the 
important elements of continuity between the two phases. In 
particular, on closer scrutiny the qualitative change in the 
role of the imperial connection appears rather less dramatic. 
The assumptions that the colonies had autonomy during the boom 
and that British investment fulfilled a constructive function 
until the onset of depression are subject to challenge and 
qualification, especially as they relate to the 1880s. The 
highly visible British intervention of the depression years 
rested largely on the exercise of powers assumed as a necessary 
condition for boom-time lending, and the situation which 
impelled the British to make use of these powers owed much to 
the imbalance consequent on the concentration of capital 
imports on a limited range of colonial ventures, many of which 
made at best a dubious contribution to the well-being of the 
colonies. The cumulative effect of these developments was to 
inhibit the independent accumulation of capital within the 
colonial economy.
3. The principal contributions to this debate since the
publication of Butlin's I.A E-D have been those of A.R. 
Hall ( The London Capital Market and Australia, Canberra, 
1 963) and E.A. Boehm (o p . cit . ) .
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Uneven Development and its Aftermath
In his works on Australian development in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century, N.G. Butlin has amassed a 
wealth of evidence to support the proposition that the colonial 
economy was in a state of severe disequilibrium by the latter 
1880s. For his explanation of the 1890s depression, Butlin has 
placed much emphasis on the marginalisation of the pastoral 
industry, the growth of speculation in urban land and the 
decreasing efficiency of public investment in transport and 
communications.^ His discussion of the canalisation of 
investment into a few sectors where the marginal efficiency of 
capital was falling has countered the tendency of earlier 
writers to exculpate the colonies from any blame for the 
depression; nor can his evidence be accommodated to David 
Clark's more recent comment that the colonial economy during 
the boom underwent a "process of dynamic equilibrium which 
could not be indefinitely prolonged given the restraints 
imposed by [Australia's] external economic relationships." 
Though the excesses of the 1880s should not be allowed to 
overshadow the massive infrastructural development achieved 
during the Long Boom as a whole - the construction of a 
transport and communications network covering much of the 
eastern part of the continent, the extension of pastoral and 
agricultural settlement, the growth of mining and, to a lesser
4. Butlin I.A.E.D., op. c i t ., p p . 414-423 provides a summary
of the argument.
5- Clark, op. cit. p. 61.
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extent, manufacturing industry, and the installation of urban 
residential facilities on a large scale - the conclusion seems 
inescapable that by the latter 1880s the leading sectors of the 
colonial economy were encountering problems which went far 
beyond a simple dependence on imported capital.
But, on the other hand, it is facile to treat these 
problems, as Rowley appears to do, as merely being inevitable 
concomitants of capitalist development.^ It is far from 
coincidental that the three sectors of the colonial economy in 
which structural problems were most pressing were also the foci 
of British investment. The genesis of the "internal" disequil­
ibrium on which Butlin blames the depression is explicable in 
terms of the second-order political and economic effects of 
British intervention in the colonies; the "deterioration" of 
colonial investment criteria on which he places so much 
emphasis was symptomatic of a far deeper malaise. To this 
sectoral imbalance the colonies owed the balance of payments 
problems and chronic dependence on external supplies of capital 
which eventually exacerbated the dislocation associated with 
structural readjustment. The integral association between the 
orientation of boom-time British investment and the subsequent 
severe depression points up the arbitrariness of Rowley's 
adjudging Australia to have been a beneficiary of the imperial 
connection on the basis of an assessment of the boom period
6. K. Rowley, "Pastoral Capitalism", in Intervention, 1, 1972.
p . 2 4.
7. Butlin, I - A . E D . ,  op. cit. p. 416 et passim.
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alone , without consideration of the less palatable long-term 
consequences of British intervention.®
Butlin's claim that external circumstances "provided
a long-run expansive influence [on the colonial economy] until
gthe end of the 'eighties without much specific direction" is 
true only in a limited sense. Certainly, sections of the 
colonial commercial, pastoral and financial bourgeoisie were 
given considerable latitude in their deployment of British loan 
capital and with the exception of a few companies and private 
investors conspicuous among them the various British squatting 
ventures, the British generally eschewed direct ownership of 
colonial enterprises. In Australia, as in other territories 
whose indigenous populations had been overwhelmed by white 
settlement, British control was less hegemonic than in those 
parts of Africa, Asia and Melanesia where direct ownership of 
local enterprise was the rule; as exemplified in the previous 
chapter, the investment preferences and internal dynamics of 
the sections of the Australian bourgeoisie funded by British 
capital therefore played an important role in the administr­
ation of British interests.
But this emphasis on portfolio investment did not 
imply a complete abrogation of external influence and control. 
The state of international markets for the colonies primary 
exports had a profound influence on the orientation of economic
8. Rowley, op. c i t ., p. 19.
9. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. cit., p. 31.
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activity in Australia. In particular, the general bouyancy of 
the international wool market throughout the Long Boom 
contributed largely to woolgrowing's comparative advantage over 
agriculture in the arable districts, to the surge of investment 
in station equipment and eventually to the strategic position 
occupied by the pastoral industry during the 1880s and early
1890s when, in spite of the fact that its workforce was small,
1 0it provided more than half the colonies' export earnings.
The pattern of British investment was by no means 
directionless. Much of the finance which flowed from Britain 
during the 1880s was provided through the London and Scottish 
markets by investors of conservative habits. They were not 
interested in providing industrial risk capital, but were 
principally concerned to find established, safe, moderately 
remunerative enterprises in which they could invest their 
savings for fairly short terms. In practice this implied 
that they entered the Australian market in a large way only 
after twenty years of boom-level activity had demonstrated the 
colonies' capacity to provide sound investment outlets, and 
that their interest gravitated towards government bonds and 
short-term investments in private enterprises involved with 
lending on colonial land. Apart from a brief phase of mining 
investment in 1887-9, British investment in the colonial 
private sector was mainly oriented towards pastoralism and 
urban land development, either directly through debenture
10. Boehm, op. c i t ., p p . 63-6.
11. Hall, op. cit. p p . 44-5.
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r a i s i n g s  by p a s t o r a l  and u r b a n  m o r t g a g e  c o m p a n i e s  or i n d i r e c t l y
1 2t h r o u g h  b a n k  d e p o s i t s .
The o v e r a l l  v o l u m e  of B r i t i s h  i n v e s t m e n t  a n d its
d i s t r i b u t i o n  b e t w e e n  the v a r i o u s  b o r r o w i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  c h a n g e d
m a r k e d l y  ov e r the p e r i o d  fr om  1881 to 1892. T h e s e  s hi f t s  are
s u m m a r i z e d  in the a c c o m p a n y i n g  table. For the f ir st  h alf  of
the p e r i o d  the st ag e was d o m i n a t e d  by h e a v y  c o l o n i a l  g o v e r n m e n t
b o r r o w i n g  and  m o r e  m o d e s t  bu t n o n e t h e l e s s  s u b s t a n t i a l  p r i v a t e
b o r r o w i n g  for p a s t o r a l  i n v e s t m e n t .  T he s e  w ere  the y e a r s  in
w h i c h  the p a s t o r a l  f i n a n c e  c o m p a n i e s ,  t he i r  r ank s s w e l l e d  by
r e c e n t  L o n d o n  i n c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  set a b o u t  b r e a k i n g  t he i r
d e p e n d e n c e  on b o r r o w i n g  fro m the c o l o n i a l  ba nk s . The B r i t i s h
l e n d e r s  r e s p o n d e d  well, an d for the r e m a i n d e r  of the d e c a d e  the
p a s t o r a l  f i n a n c e  c o m p a n i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t ho s e  w i t h  L o n d o n  h e a d
1 3o f f i c e s ,  w e r e  ab le to b o r r o w  " v i r t u a l l y  at w ill " o b t a i n i n g  
d e b e n t u r e  fu n ds  in B r i t a i n  at i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t h r e e  to four per 
cent lower than th ose  c h a r g e d  on c o l o n i a l  p a s t o r a l  
a d v a n c e s .  ^^  The b a n k s  al s o d r e w  a l ar g e  v o l u m e  of B r i t i s h  
d e p o s i t s ,  s t r e s s i n g  the p r e d o m i n a n t l y  p a s t o r a l  o r i e n t a t i o n  of
12. G e n e r a l  a c c o u n t s  of th is  are g iv e n  in i b i d , p p . 57, 89ff;
Bo e h m , op. c i t . , PP* 1 2 6 f f ; But l in , I . A . E . D . ,  op ._c i t . ,
pp. 1 4 8 f f , 4 0 7 f f .
13. Bu tl in , ibid., p. 155. It is i n t e r e s t i n g  to note that
G o l d s b r o u g h  M o r t ' s  lack of a L o n d o n  h e a d  o f f i c e  p r o v e d  to 
be an o b s t a c l e  to its r a i s i n g s  e a r l y  in t his  p e r i o d  (Cain 
" C a p i t a l  S t r u c t u r e " ,  o p . c i t . , pp - 11-12).
M a n y  d e b e n t u r e  i s s u e s  w ere  r e c o r d e d  in the p a g e s  of the 
A . I . B . R . ; see also Cain, i b i d . , p p . 4, 12 et p a s s i m .
1 4 .
: Boehm, op. cit., p. 
141, based on Butlin, Australian Domestic Product, Investment and Foreign Borrowing, 
Cambridge, 1962. p. 424.
(a) 
Investment under this head was principally in urban land development.
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1 5their business, but as British funds still constituted a 
small proportion of total bank deposits the banks were not able 
to capitalize on the cheapness of British money to the same 
extent as the pastoral finance companies.
Nonetheless in the second half of the period capital 
imports by the pastoral finance companies increased at a much 
slower rate as the incorporation of new firms slowed and the 
optimism of the early 1880s faded. The rate of colonial 
governments' new borrowing also fell off. But the rise in bank 
borrowings, especially in Scotland, and the dramatic entry 
of urban land development companies into the British market 
after 1887 more than outweighed the effects of these reduct­
ions. Overseas borrowing peaked in 1888 and 1889, exceeding 
£22 million in both years. Even in 1890-1, when the tone of 
reports proceeding from the colonies was cautious or even 
gloomy, the comparatively high rates of interest offered by 
colonial institutions continued to attract British investors.
The Britons who placed their savings with colonial 
institutions on the assumption that they would yield a reliable 
return would have been somewhat disconcerted had they known the 
uses to which their funds were being put or the cumulative 
effect the capital inflow was having on the colonial economy.
15. It was estimated in the early 1890s that roughly two-thirds 
of the banks' advances were on pastoral and agricultural 
land (quoted in Boehm, op. c i t . , p. 219) and it appears to 
have been mandatory for chairmen to include an extensive 
assessment of the pastoral position in their addresses to
shareholders (as quoted in A.I.B.R.). 
16. Boehm, i b i d ., p. 142.
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The calls for funds to which they had responded so enthusiast­
ically were symptomatic of runaway growth in a few sectors of 
the colonial economy, each of which had been highly profitable 
at an earlier stage but was now facing a period of diminishing 
returns. A paradoxical consequence of British reluctance to 
invest in untried colonial enterprises was thus a channelling 
of imported funds toward sectors where the marginal efficiency 
of capital was declining, with the result that any adjustment 
towards a more balanced pattern of economic growth was deferred 
In each of the three major areas of British investment - 
government construction, pastoralism and urban land development 
- sections of the colonial bourgeoisie employed the seemingly 
inexhaustible supply of British funds to shore up their 
domestic political and economic power. Increasingly borrowed 
capital was turned to political ends, with scant regard either 
for the real return on the investment or for the longer-term 
shortcomings of dependence upon Britain.
Public construction policy became a matter of intense 
sectional political rivalry during the 1880s as the emphasis of 
railway development moved from the construction of major trunk 
routes to the installation of branch lines. As discussed 
above, intercolonial competition for the inland trade 
spurred the construction of duplicate lines into the interior 
and the institution of concessional rates for freight to and 
from marginal areas. In the fluid parliamentary political
17. See p p . 57-60 above.
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system of the day, shifting regional and sectoral alliances 
were formed as each member sought to capitalize on the oppor­
tunity to ensure his own re-election by distributing largesse 
among his constituents from the public purse. And, as the 
eighties wore on and boom-time levels of employment and wages 
showed a tendency to sag, governments began to sponsor increas­
ingly dubious construction projects for the sake of winning the 
labour vote. As public borrowing mounted, the burden of 
interest on the public debt impelled governments to further 
borrowing. By 1890-1891 the cost of servicing the public debt 
had approached a fifth of gross public revenue in New South 
Wales and Victoria and exeeded one third in Q u e e n s l a n d . ^
In the case of the pastoral industry, as outlined 
earlier, much of the demand for borrowed funds arose out of the 
squatting interest's attempts to counter the encroachments of 
closer settlement either by freehold purchases or by retreating 
further into the interior. The inflation of private market 
prices for land and stock created a heavy demand for borrowed 
finance among new entrants and squatters in marginal areas 
without adding to pastoral productivity. Expenditures on 
freehold purchase represented a constant drain on industry 
funds. And even expenditure on capital equipment during the 
defensive investment phase of the latter 1880s yielded, on
18. On public construction generally, see Butlin, I.A.E.D., op.
c i t . , p p . 291ff; on relief works, Coghlan, op. c i t .,
pp. 1 4 4 4 f f .
19. Boehm, op, cit., p. 174.
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Butlin's estimate, barely enough to cover mortgage interest on
2 0the capital expended.
The stagnation of the wool market exacerbated the 
effects of the interest burden. By 1889-91, on a conservative 
estimate, interest on pastoral borrowings from institutional 
sources alone was over a fifth of the industry's average cash 
receipts,21 and in 1893 Coghlan estimated that, excluding the 
pastoral industry's share of the banks' overseas payments, one 
eighth of the colonies' pastoral proceeds went to the payment 
of dividends and interest overseas.22 Nevertheless, in spite 
of its deteriorating position, the pastoral industry could at 
least claim to be paying its way in the colonies' balance of 
payments. The same could not be said of the urban land 
development which was the other major avenue of private 
investment in the colonies.
20. Butlin, I.A.E.D. , op. cit. , p p . 174-5.
21. This includes advances by banks, British insurance 
companies and the ten largest pastoral finance companies. 
Assuming the pastoral industry's share of total bank 
advances remained at the lower end of the range estimated 
by Butlin (I.A.E.D., op. c i t . , 144-5) for 1883, pastoral 
bank advances by 1889-91 would average £58.9 million.
Direct British insurance mortgages were probably about £5.6 
million (A .I.B.R., Sept 1893 p. 848 and Boehm, o p . c i t . ,
p. 141). The ten pastoral finance companies' advances 
averaged £22.2 million (Butlin, ibid., p. 143). The total 
invested was therefore about £86.7 million, which at an 
interest rate of 7% (on the lower end of prevailing 
pastoral rates) would mean an interest bill of £6.1 million 
per annum or 22.6% of estimated average cash receipts of 
£26.9 million (Butlin, i b i d , 174). This excludes other
insurance lending, the smaller finance houses and all 
private lending.
22. A.I.B.R. , September 1 893 , pp . 847-9.
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Until about 1887 the influence of capital imports on 
urban land development was largely indirect. Urban development 
relied heavily on the accumulation of local capital, especially 
through building societies; even the banks played a comparat­
ively small role, with urban housing loans comprising probably 
about a fifth of their lending business. British investment
became important only when its effects on interest rates and
2 4real wages became large enough to influence demand.
The colonies entered the Long Boom with a severe deficiency of 
housing stock, and the colonists early turned to providing 
themselves with a better standard of shelter. Over the Long 
Boom as a whole residential investment was a significant 
avenue of capital formation, accounting for over a third of
p f)total capital formation on Butlin's estimate.
The character of urban development changed markedly 
in the 1880s. For much of the 1870s, in spite of rising wages, 
urban construction was held back by the high interest rates 
which accompanied rapid pastoral expansion and heavy public
p 7investment. But from the early 1880s as British funds
flowed into the colonies and interest rates fell, the housing 
market began to boom. Building activity, and with it housing 
finance, was redirected away from construction by owner- 
occupiers towards speculative building in advance of the
2 3 . Estimate by Peel, 1893, quoted by Boehm
2 4 . Butlin, I.A.E.D., o p . c i t ., p . 245 .
25 . Ibid., pp. 215-6.
2 6 . I b i d ., p . 211.
2 7 . Ibid., p. 283.
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increase of housing demand. This movement was furthered by 
capital accumulation within the housing industry, as windfall 
gains were reinvested in new suburban developments; private 
funds which might otherwise have been used for pastoral invest­
ment were also turned to urban development after the escalation 
of pastoral entry costs in 1879-82. Large syndicates began to
rely heavily on manipulating the urban land market to assure
2 ftthemselves of capital gains.
The urban boom reached its apogee in Melbourne in
1888. New South Wales urban construction subsided after 
2 91884, but in the southern capital the momentum of expansion 
was sustained by the intervention of finance companies and land
mortgage "banks", which became involved in land purchase and
3 0development on a wide scale. Land values spiralled, both in
3 1the suburbs and in the central business district. And in
the penultimate phase of the boom numerous land development
companies, having somewhat overreached themselves, began to
turn to the British market for funds to overcome their internal
liquidity problems and finance still more grandiose development
projects. But the remarkable success these land "banks"
3 2enjoyed in their British borrowing was not matched by that
of their ventures in the colonies. The Melbourne land boom
28. Ibid., p p . 260-2, 273; G. Wood, Borrowing and Business in
Australia, London, 1930. p p . 54, 57.
29. Ibid., p. 285.
30. These companies' activities are examined at length in 
Cannon, (Land Boom, op. c i t .), passim.
31. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. cit., p. 287.
32. See Table 1 above., p. 133.
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came to an abrupt halt in the latter part of 1889 as it became 
clear that the housing market had been flooded. The turnover 
of urban property slowed and speculative builders and finance 
companies were left hopelessly overcommitted. For Victoria the 
waves of company crashes and individual insolvencies which 
followed signalled the onset of depression. J
The heavy concentration of investment in public co n ­
struction, pastoralism and housing had cost other sectors of 
the Australian economy dearly. Agriculture and manufacturing 
in particular faced a chronic dilemma. On the one hand, comp­
etition with the leading sectors forced up their labour costs, 
especially for low-skilled manual workers and seasonal labour­
ers. On the other, the adoption of more capital-intensive 
production methods was hampered by the diversion of locally- 
accumulated funds and imported capital alike into the leading 
sectors, which left agriculturalists and manufacturers 
dependent on ploughing back profits for capital equipment 
p u r c h a s e s . ^  Agriculture was further handicapped by the 
necessity of competing with the squatters for land; in New 
South Wales especially, much of the arable land remained 
uncultivated until the falling price of pastoral produce in the 
1890s impelled the squatters to diversify into crop production, 
often on a share- farming basis. The fledgling colonial
manufacturers were confronted with heavy import competition
33. Boehm, o p . c i t . , p p . 49ff, 255ff.
34. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. cit . , pp . 421-2.
p p . 12 7 f f .35. See Robinson, o p . cit.,
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f r o m  w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d  B r i t i s h  i n d u s t r i e s .  The m a i n  scope for 
i n d u s t r i a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  lay in the p r o d u c t i o n  of p e r i s h a b l e  
go o ds ,  items w h o s e  low v a l u e - t o - w e i g h t  r a t i o  m a d e  i m p o r t a t i o n  
co s ts  p r o h i b i t i v e ,  go ods  su ch as c l o t h i n g  and t e x t i l e s  w h i c h  
we re  p r o d u c e d  by cheap,  p r e d o m i n a n t l y  f e m a l e  l a b ou r,  and 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y  i n n o v a t i v e  i tem s d e s i g n e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  for 
lo ca l c o n d i t i o n s .^  T h o u g h  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  was able to e x p a n d  
on th is b a s i s  to r e a c h  11.8% of g ro ss  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c t  in 1886- 
90 an d e m p l o y  16.7% of the e a s t e r n  m a i n l a n d  c o l o n ie s'  w o r k f o r c e  
by 1891, m a n u f a c t u r i n g  e s t a b l i s h m e n t s  w er e g e n e r a l l y  small, 
c a p i t a l - t o - l a b o u r  r a t i o s  lo w and p r o d u c t i o n  t e c h n i q u e s  
i n e f f i c i e n t . ^  ®
T hi s left the c o l o n i e s  e x p o s e d  on s e v e r a l  f ron ts . Of 
the t h r e e  l e a d i n g  se c to r s ,  o n ly  the p a s t o r a l  i n d u s t r y  c o n t r i b ­
u t e d  d i r e c t l y  to the co l o n i e s '  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s ,  and even 
s q u a t t i n g  i n v e s t m e n t  was y i e l d i n g  d i m i n i s h i n g  r et ur n s .  The 
c o l o n i e s '  i m p o r t  bi ll c o n s i s t e n t l y  e x c e e d e d  t he ir  e x p o r t  
e a r n i n g s  b e t w e e n  1881 an d 1 891 ,^ ^ and the c a p a c i t y  of 
i n v e s t m e n t  in the l e a d i n g  s e c t o r s  to g e n e r a t e  i n c o m e  l o c a l l y  
was r e s t r i c t e d  by the i n a b i l i t y  of local  i n d u s t r y  to s u p p l y  
c a p i t a l  go o ds  and, in the c ase  of the p a s t o r a l  i nd u s t r y ,  by the 
p r i m i t i v e  n a t u r e  of the c a p i t a l  e q u i p m e n t  r e q u i r e d .  C a p i t a l  
g o o d s  i m p o r t s  h o v e r e d  a r o u n d  a q u a r t e r  of t ot a l  c a p i t a l
36 . See o u t l i n e  of d i s t r i b u t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l  w o r k f o r c e
B u t l i n ,  I . A . E . D . ,  op. c i t ., pp . 204-5.
37 . Ibid., p p • 22, 196.
COCO Ibid., p p . 206-7.
39 . Boeh m, op. cit., p.9.
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investment in 1881-91 and averaged over half the capital inflow 
during the p e r i o d . ^  Meanwhile, the cost of interest and 
dividend payments overseas had mounted in absolute terms from 
£5.3 million in 1881 to £12.2 million in 1891 and its share of 
export income from 19.3% to 3 3 . 7 % . ^  The combined burden of 
heavy imports and debt repayments grew heavier as the terms of 
trade moved against the colonies after 1 882 , ^  and the 
colonies' annual balance of payments deficit consistently 
exceeded £15 million between 1884 and 1890.^^
By the latter 1880s the colonies' position was pr ec­
arious. Under the stimulus of easy credit for land dealings, 
private investment had become heavily oriented towards activit­
ies which were dependent on capital gains from the continuing 
turnover of existing assets rather than on the real yield from 
those assets. Though the volume and assumed "value" of the 
assets controlled by the British-financed sections of the col­
onial bourgeoisie had increased, their capacity to realize 
their assets was declining. Neither public nor private invest­
ment was generating income or stimulating capital accumulation 
in other sectors of the colonial economy on a sufficient scale 
to sustain the markets for residential and pastoral property;
40. Ibid. p. 139. On the pastoral industry's inability to
stimulate industrial development, see G. Linge, Industrial 
Awakening: a Geography of Australian Manufacturing 1788-
1890, Canberra, 1979. p. 419.
4 1 . Ibid . , p . 18 1.
42. Ibid., p. 205. The general implications of this worldwide
shift are discussed in S. Amin, Unequal Development, 
Hassocks, 1975. p p . 163ff.
43. See Table 2 following.
Source: Boehm, op. cit
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on the contrary, exaggerated land prices had soaked up private 
savings to no good effect, while such surpluses as were being 
earned were siphoned back to Britain via imports and debt 
repayments. The "internal" problem of falling demand was thus 
closely associated with the consequences of external 
dependenc e .
Characteristically, difficulties did not emerge in 
all sectors of the colonial economy simultaneously during the 
1880s. While the inflow of British funds continued, problems 
encountered in one sector simply produced a redeployment of 
funds to other ventures. The slowing of the pastoral land 
market in the New South Wales interior after 1882 gave a fillip 
to pastoral investment in western Queensland and to urban 
speculation.44 Similarly, the failing of the Sydney land boom 
after 1885 left Melbourne land developers and the Broken Hill 
mining companies with fewer rivals on the British money market 
in the following years.
But each of these episodes left lenders with a legacy 
of overcapitalized, illiquid accounts. Financial institutions 
were faced with a choice between adopting a stringent policy of 
recalling loans, foreclosing on the worst accounts and curtail­
ing further advances or the softer option of continuing to 
finance their clients' enterprises, albeit often under closer 
supervision, in the hope that the market would eventually turn
44. See above p. 139.
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up. Few institutions chose the first option. Whether they 
were inspired by a genuine belief that the market would revive, 
a reluctance to alienate powerful clients or a fear of creating 
a public panic, numerous lenders allowed good money to follow 
bad through the latter 1880s, maintaining their internal 
liquidity by continued borrowing in Britain . ^  Similarly, 
colonial politicians were reluctant to risk unpopularity by 
curtailing public expenditure, and the Victorian and Queensland
governments in particular engaged in heavy borrowing on the 
4 f)London market.
Borrowing by private institutions became heavier 
after the collapse of the Melbourne land boom in 1889. Not only 
did land development companies continue to solicit funds in 
Britain, but a number of the banks of issue became involved in 
providing credit to building societies which were threatened by 
a loss of l i q u i d i t y . T h i s  mitigated the immediate effects 
of the land boom collapse. Building activity continued at a 
high level for some time, even in Melbourne, and only a
handful of companies failed in the immediate aftermath of the 
4 9downturn. Many of the urban land developers had a powerful 
incentive to stave off the liquidation or reconstruction of 
their companies, as they could not afford their practices to be 
exposed to public scrutiny. But this cynical exercise only
45 . Bo e h m , op. c i t . , p . 279; But1 in , I.A.E.D.,
pp. 426, 436-8.
46 . Boehm, i b id., pp . 168ff .
4 7 . Butlin, I.A.E.D. , o p . c i t . , p . 42 8 .
48 .
49 .
Bo e h m , op. c i t . , 
But1in , I.A.E.D.
p . 153.
, op . c i t . , p p . 428-9 .
50 . See Cannon, Land B o o m , o p . c i t ., p a s s i m .
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postponed their collapse while drawing the banks, many of which 
had hitherto stood more or less aloof from urban speculation,
C  'Iinto a greater dependence on British borrowing. A point had 
been reached at which any weakening in the British money market 
was almost certain to plunge the colonies into a major 
financial crisis.
This last, desperate fling was nonetheless of a piece 
with the defensive borrowing which had taken place earlier in 
the decade. Reviewing this experience, it is possible to give 
some specificity to, and examine the limitations of, the 
notions that the colonies were autonomous and that they 
benefited from British capital exports in the 1880s. Both 
notions rely on Australia being viewed as an undifferentiated 
entity whose interests are for most purposes equated with 
those of the politically and economically ascendant sections of 
the bourgeoisie which were favoured with a degree of control 
over the deployment of imported funds. In practice, this 
"autonomy" was severely limited. It was granted only to a 
handful of colonists, who exercised it subject to the assent of 
British lenders, and depended on colonial loans' yielding a 
higher return than a comparable investment in Britain. The 
competitive environment in which investment decisions were made 
was also strongly influenced by the state of international 
markets and by the direct involvement of British-owned, or 
largely British-owned, companies in the colonies. There was
51. See Table 1, p. 133 above.
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significant direct British involvement both in the pastoral 
industry and in banking, with four banks being London based and
C pBritons holding £6.5 million worth of bank shares in 1893.
Furthermore, in several respects the interests of the 
British-financed sections of the colonial bourgeoisie conflict­
ed with those of other segments of colonial society. The 
problems encountered by the capital-starved agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors have already been discussed. But in 
addition, insofar as British capital was employed to support 
land speculation, it could only advantage some segments of 
colonial society at others' expense. Just as British funds had 
been used to thwart closer settlement and support the concent­
ration of pastoral land ownership in the 1870s and early 1880s, 
the urban land speculation which they fuelled in the latter 
part of the 1880s ensured that, although house construction 
costs remained fairly constant, the market price of housing 
greatly increased and rents remained high in spite of the 
improved supply of housing. J These developments offset some 
of the benefits accruing to the working class as a result of 
heavy British-supported construction investment, which 
sustained wages for unskilled workers in particular at reason-
C Aably high levels through the 1880s. And in the longer term
52. A.I.B.R., September 1893, p. 848.
53. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. c i t ., p p . 275-7.
54. On which see P. Macar t h y , "The Harvester Judgement: An
Historical Assessment", P h .D . unpublished A.N.U., 1967.
p p . 5 1 f f .
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the colonial working class was to pay a high price for even 
these ephemeral gains.
In summary, British investment during the 1880s 
facilitated the aggregation of colonial land in the hands of an 
increasingly dependent local elite while inhibiting the 
independent accumulation of capital within the colonies. The 
consequent imbalance in colonial development, the consistent 
drain of interest and dividend payments to Britain and their 
replacement by further borrowed funds provided the immediate 
setting for the crises of the early 1890s. The principal 
distinctions between the boom and depression phases of British 
penetration were, first, that powers which had previously been 
left in abeyance were invoked during the depression to elim­
inate the last vestiges of autonomy among the client colonial 
bourgeoisie and achieve direct British control over their 
accumulated assets; and, secondly, that whereas the colonies 
had been able to satisfy their interest commitments during the 
1880s in part by further borrowing and in part by stepping up 
the exploitation of the land, the exactions of the following 
decade could only be met at the expense of the living standards 
of the colonists at large, and particularly of the colonial 
working class.
The Descent into Crisis, 1891-3.
If by 1891 the colonies were living on borrowed time, 
most of them at least did so with a certain panache. Indeed 
for much of the year it appeared that, with the exception of
Victoria, the colonies had shaken off the setbacks of 1889-90
- 1 4 9 -
and were proceeding to a new b o o m . ^  The New South Wales eco­
nomy in particular underwent a major revival. The season was 
good, with a heavy wool clip, and after a period of comparative 
quiescence the government had embarked on an extensive public 
construction programme which seemed eminently justifiable as 
public revenue boomed, running in advance of e s t i m a t e s . ^
Nevertheless, the signs of impending trouble were 
plentiful. Victoria was floundering in the wake of 
the land boom collapse; yet the Victorian government seemed 
determined to resurrect the colony single-handed, and blithely 
announced a substantial public expenditure programme in spite 
of its having incurred a large budget deficit in 1889-90.^^
On the housing front the market remained stagnant, vacancy
rates had risen and speculative developers were lumbered with
5 8costly, unsaleable properties. Even pastoral investors, in 
spite of the bumper season, were eyeing with apprehension the 
signs of pasture deterioration in the interior and the slumping 
wool and store stock markets.
Furthermore, contractionary pressures were developing 
on the British money market. Britain's capacity for capital 
export declined as her economic activity underwent a downswing 
after 1890; but, as Boehm puts it, "this decline in ability was 
reinforced and fairly quickly superseded in importance by a
55. The phases of the cycle in the various colonies are 
summarized in Boehm, op. c i t . , p. 26.
56. Ibid., p p • 175-6.
5 7 . Ibid . , p . 168.
58. See Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. cit., p p • 424ff.
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growing unwillingness to absorb the more risky overseas
S 9securities relative to domestic securities." This shift 
arose from a conjunction of factors which in the first instance 
were only indirectly related to conditions in Australia. In 
particular, following the Baring crisis of November 1890, in 
which one of London's largest discount houses was forced into 
liquidation as a result of its heavy commitments to defaulting
Latin American governments, "universal distrust succeeded to
f ) 0almost universal confidence" in London, and British 
investors began to probe more critically the manner in which 
their funds were being put to use overseas. They soon found 
evidence that their Australian clients had been less than 
j udicious .
Australian governments had hitherto been inclined to 
dismiss British criticism of their heavy borrowing as mere 
carping, and the London economic journals' repeated calls for 
restraint had exercised little influence on the progress of
r  *colonial government issues. But in the course of 1891 it
became clear that the critics' comments had begun to bite. In 
the first half of the year the South Australian, Victorian and 
Queensland governments encountered successive rejections in 
L o n d o n , ^  and even New South Wales, whose financial position
59. Boehm, op. c i t ., p. 166.
60. A.I.B.R., October 1892, p. 715; for other comments on the
Baring crisis, see W. Sinclair, "The Depressions of the 
1890s and 1930s in Australia: A Comparison", in N. Drohan
and J. Day, e d . , Readings in Australian Economics, 
Melbourne, 1 965. pp . 88-9.
61. Boehm, op . c i t . , pp . 1 68 , 1 73-4 .
62. Ibid., p. 165.
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was comparatively sound, was able to elicit only a lukewarm 
response when it placed a loan in September. There was
intense pressure for the colonial governments to curtail their 
dependence on British funds, undertake retrenchments and 
balance their budgets to restore their overseas credit in the 
longer term. The task, however, was far from simple. Inescap­
able commitments had been entered into before the setback, and 
several governments lacked the funds to repay debentures when 
they fell d u e . ^  Drastic cuts in current outlays were there­
fore necessary, and when the colonial governments abandoned 
their former practice of buoying up the labour market to count­
eract the stagnation of employment in private construction, 
unemployment rose rapidly. The increasing stringency of public 
finances contributed largely to the fact that the short-term 
cyclical contrasts previously evident between the eastern 
colonies gave way to a uniform recession by the end of 1891.
The British reverses had parallel effects on the
colonial private sector. The urban land development companies
which had been tiding themselves over with British funds ceased
to be able to do so. On Butlin's estimate there was a net
outflow of £4.38 million in British funds from these companies
f ) sin 1891. It also proved impossible for the banks to
continue their credit to the troubled building societies; 
though the revulsion in the British market had not yet directly
63. I bid., p . 177.
64. Ibid., p . 179.
65. See Table 1, p. 133 above.
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affected the banks' own raisings, their capacity to provide
credit suffered as a result of colonial government withdrawals
and the indirect effects of export receipts' being used to meet
overseas commitments. The shaky edifice of residential
finance crumbled almost instantly. In late July and early
August 1891 three land "banks" and a number of other companies
failed; each month thereafter brought further suspensions until
March 1892, by which time twenty Sydney and twenty-one
Melbourne companies had folded, tying up millions of pounds in
local and British deposits. The climax of the crash was
reached on 5 March 1892 when the Mercantile Bank, a bank of
note-issue associated with the Davies group of land companies,
suspended after the Associated Banks had rejected its request
that they support it against the effects of a continuing drain
f)  Qof depositors' funds.
The revelations which followed the closures did 
nothing for public confidence in the colonies' political and 
business leaders. Successive liquidation hearings exposed a 
seemingly endless catalogue of malpractices on the part of 
prominent individuals, among whom were numbered several former 
Ministers and other politicians. The Victorian political 
establishment made matters worse by closing ranks behind the 
miscreants; an Act was hastily passed to limit creditors' 
powers to have companies and building societies wound up, and
66. Boehm, op. c i t ., pp . 260-2.
67. Ibid., pp. 262-3; Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. cit., p. 429.
68. Boehm, i b i d . , p p . 281-2.
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the government later attempted to block the prosecution of Sir 
Matthew Davies, the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly,
f t  Qagainst whom the most damning allegations had been made.
The fact that many of the failed institutions had resorted to 
deceit and concealment to maintain a facade of prosperity right 
up to the day of their suspension was also profoundly disquiet­
ing. Fearful of being trapped by an unheralded suspension, the 
colonists began to display a marked reluctance to entrust their 
savings to financial institutions. Even after the first wave 
of suspensions had come to an end, popular suspicion was 
periodically fanned into full-blown panic by rumours of impend­
ing failures; deposits were converted into coin and hoarded, or 
shifted into the banks from the remaining building societies, 
precipitating further suspensions among the latter. And
towards the end of 1892 the movement began to spread to the 
weaker remaining banks of issue.
Superficially it appeared that the colonies had made 
substantial progress in adjusting to the exigencies of their 
changed situation during 1892. The liquidity of the banks had 
improved, reflecting their gains from the transfer of funds out 
of building societies; furthermore, rumours to the contrary 
notwithstanding, the banks' British deposits were holding or 
even advancing slightly. The colonies' balance of payments
position was also improving as import levels were slashed. But
69. Ibid., p p . 266-7; A.I.B.R., January 1893, pp« 1/ 13, June 
1 893, p . 595 .
70. Boehm, ibid., p p . 304-7.
71. Ibid., pp. 284-5; A.I.B.R., January 1893, p. 18.
- 1 5 4 -
if f i n a n c i a l  c o m m e n t a t o r s  h ad r e a s o n  to be p l e a s e d  w ith  the
c o l o n i e s '  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  the c o l o n i s t s  t h e m s e l v e s  did not. W a g e s
h a d  f a ll en  s h a r p l y  in b o t h  real a n d  m o n e y  terms; u n e m p l o y m e n t
h a d  ri s e n  wi t h the c o l l a p s e  of l a b ou r d e m a n d  in c o n s t r u c t i o n
a nd  a l l i e d  field s; the b u i l d i n g  s o c i e t y  f a i l u r e s  h a d left
d e p o s i t o r s '  fu n ds  l o c k e d  up and e x p o s e d  m o r t g a g e d  h o m e - b u y e r s
to the t h r e a t  of d i s p o s s e s s i o n ;  and, o w i n g  to the i n a d e q u a t e
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  of the c o l o n i a l  e c on om y , the r e d u c t i o n  in
i m p o r t s  ha d o n l y  b e e n  a c h i e v e d  at the cost of a m a r k e d  fall in
7 7c o n s u m p t i o n  lev el s .
H o p e s  that the c o l o n i e s  w ere  on the w a y to g r e a t e r  
s t a b i l i t y  e v a p o r a t e d  e a r l y  in 1893. The F e d e r a l  and C o m m e r c i a l  
B a n k s  had b o t h  b e e n  c l o s e l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w ith  b u i l d i n g  s o c i e t i e s ,  
an d d o u b t s  as to th ei r s e c u r i t y  h a d led to a d r a i n  of c o l o n i a l  
d e p o s i t s  in late 1892 w h i c h  i n t e n s i f i e d  in the n e w  year. The 
F e d e r a l ,  the n e w e s t  an d  s m a l l e s t  of the V i c t o r i a n  A s s o c i a t e d  
Banks, s u s p e n d e d  in late J a n u a r y ;  the C o m m e r c i a l ,  a far l a r g e r  
b a n k  and the l e a d i n g  h o l d e r  of B r i t i s h  funds, h e l d  out u n t i l  4 
A p ri l ,  w h e n  it f i n a l l y  s u c c u m b e d  to the c o m b i n e d  p r e s s u r e  of 
the run in the c o l o n i e s  and  a t h r e a t e n e d  loss of B r i t i s h  
dep o sits . ^
In bo t h c a s e s  the A s s o c i a t e d  B an ks  w ere  a p p r o a c h e d  
for a s s i s t a n c e ,  but in n e i t h e r  was it f o r t h c o m i n g .  The 
F e d e r a l ' s  p o s i t i o n  was e x t r e m e l y  u n s o u n d ,  as l at e r  l i q u i d a t i o n
72. Boehm, ibid., p. 190.
73. I b i d ., pp . 2 8 5 f f .
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hearings revealed, and none of the other banks was willing to 
take over its portfolio of dubious securities.^  The Comm­
ercial Bank's position, however, was rather less clear-cut. The 
remaining banks' refusal to come up with an offer acceptable to 
the Commercial, in spite of strong pressure from the Victorian 
government, owed much to their desire to eliminate a formerly 
aggressive competitor from the field. This led the London 
Financial Times to c o m m e n t :
"We are at a loss to understand the policy of the
Victorian Associated Banks, but it seems to us to lie
between the two alternatives of absolute idiocy and7 Scriminal selfishness."
The closure of the Commercial proved a shattering
blow to popular confidence in the banking system. A "nameless
7 6dread of insecurity" seized the colonies. One after another 
the remaining banks were caught up in runs, as individual 
depositors, companies and even municipal governments juggled 
their accounts from one institution to another in the hope of 
minimizing risk. British depositors too, though handicapp­
ed by the fact that their deposits were mostly placed for fixed
7 8terms, began to withdraw a substantial volume of funds. 
Suspensions followed in quick succession. By late May all but 
six of the nineteen banks operating in the mainland colonies 
had closed their doors as a prelude to reconstruction.
74 . I b i d . , p p . 287-9 .
75 . Financial Times, 13 April 1893 , quoted by Gollan, op. c i t . ,
p . 3 5. See also B o e h m , ibi d . , p . 197-8.
76 . A.I.B.R., April 1 893, p . 22 1.
77 . See e .g . Bailey , op . cit . , p p . 142-3; Town and Country
Journal , 2 7 May 1893 .
COf" See Table 1 . p . 13 3 a b o v e .
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The crashes were a "searing experience" for many 
7 9colonists. Small depositors who had been caught off their 
guard by the speed of the collapse were exposed to much 
hardship. Though the recons t r u c t i o n  schemes adopted by the 
banks locked up depositors' funds for several years, depositors 
had little option but to accept the terms offered; liquidation  
was out of the question given the depressed state of the 
pr op er ty  market. The New South Wales government passed 
p al li at iv e legi slation to permit depo sitors to receive Treasury  
funds up to half the balance of their current accounts, but 
this did little to counter the bes e t t i n g  economic paralysis.
The mo ne y supply had been cut in half, trade was at a s t a n d ­
still and wages and e mployment had undergone a further 
decline. For two years thereafter, the colonies were to
plumb the depths of depression.
The Squatters' Response
Seldom was the squatters' disdain for their fellow- 
colonists made so br u t a l l y  apparent as in the pastoral 
interest's initial reaction to the ba nking crisis. The 
Pastora 1i s t s ' Review had little doubt that the crashes had 
arisen solely from the self-i n d u l g e n c e  of the urban population, 
and of the wo rking class in particular. E ditorially it greeted 
the crisis with gleeful smugness, commenting:
"The town popu l a t i o n s  of Australia have been spoiled 
children. They have now met with the usual fate of
79. Gollan, o p . c i t . ,
8 0 . Ibid., pp . 3 2-3. p . 2 7.
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spoiled children and must come down to the realities of
O  1this work-a-day world."
In the R e v i e w 1s eye the crashes were a timely reminder of the 
importance of the pastoral industry, which alone could pull the 
colonies out of their difficulties. Of course, sacrifices 
would have to be made; it would be necessary to reduce wages 
and put labour back on the land. But these adjustments would 
follow automatically when the colonists were forced to recog­
nize that the urban prosperity of the 1880s had been chimerical 
and that wool-growing would always remain the backbone of 
Australian economic growth. Furthermore, with the deflation
of urban speculation, loan funds would be more freely available
p Oto squatting enterprises.
Even the far more moderate Town and Country J o u r n a l , 
though sympathetic to the plight of the smallholders and 
townspeople who had been caught by the crashes, was initially 
opposed to the suggestion that the government should intervene 
to alleviate hardship and felt that the pastoral industry would
p Abe able to lead the colonies to recovery. In a similar vein 
E.M. Young of the A.M.L.F. privately commented, in a letter to 
his station manager:
"There is one feature of the question that is more cheering 
- the failure of so many banks, the closing of so many 
branch banks all over the country, and the crippled 
condition of any banks that survive will tend to reduce
81. A .P .R ., May 1893, p. 121.
82. Ibid., May 1893, p. 106.
83. Ibid., May 1893, p. 97.
84. Town and Country Journal, 6 May 1893, 20 May 1893.
- 158 -
the s p e c u l a t i v e  s e l e c t i o n ,  and the G o v e r n m e n t  w a n t i n g  
m o n e y  so b a d l y  o t h e r  m e a n s  m a y  o p e n  for the a c q u i s i t i o n  of
O  C.w h a t  l a n d  we m a y  feel d i s p o s e d  to buy".
To s u m m a r i z e ,  a s s u m i n g  that the p a s t o r a l  i n t e r e s t  
co u l d  k e e p  its own h o u s e  in or de r , it st oo d  to g a i n  from 
d e p r e s s i o n  e l s e w h e r e  in five m a i n  ways. L a b o u r  c ost s w o u l d  
fall w i t h  the d e c l i n e  of p u b l i c  c o n s t r u c t i o n  and r e s i d e n t i a l  
i n v e s t m e n t .  Fu n d s  w o u l d  f l o w i nto  the p a s t o r a l  i n d u s t r y  and  
c a p i t a l  v a l u e s  a p p r e c i a t e  as a l t e r n a t i v e  i n v e s t m e n t  a v e n u e s  
were  d i s c r e d i t e d .  D i s r u p t i o n  of the local m o n e y  s u p p l y  w o u l d  
o ff er  the s q u a t t e r s ,  w it h t h e i r  g u a r a n t e e d  a c c e s s  to i nc o m e  
from o v e r s e a s ,  n u m e r o u s  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  to a c q u i r e  p r o p e r t y  
che ap ly . C o m p e t i t i o n  fro m s e l e c t o r s  a n d  m i d d l i n g  g r a z i e r s  
w o u l d  be re d uc ed ;  in this r e s p e c t  the p a s t o r a l  i n t e r e s t  was 
e s p e c i a l l y  h e a r t e n e d  by the e a r l y  f a i l u r e  of the C o m m e r c i a l  a n d  
J o i n t  S t o c k  b a nk s , b o t h  of w h i c h  had  p r i d e d  t h e m s e l v e s  on 
h a v i n g  d i v e r s i f i e d  e x t e n s i v e l y  into l e n d i n g  to s m a l l e r  
l a n d o w n e r s .  F i n a l l y ,  the s q u a tt er s ' p o l i t i c a l  b a r g a i n i n g
85. Th is  c o m m e n t  an d the a c t i v i t i e s  w h i c h  i n s p i r e d  it w e re  
e v e n t u a l l y  to h a v e  r a t h e r  u n p l e a s a n t  c o n s e q u e n c e s  for 
Young . In 1896 he and s e v e r a l  o t h e r s  wer e a c c u s e d  of 
d u m m y i n g  on the r e s u m e d  a rea  of M e r c a d o o l  h o l d i n g ,  a nd the 
l e t t e r  in w h i c h  t hi s  c o m m e n t  was m a d e  was p r o d u c e d  in 
e v i d e n c e  at the L a n d  B o a r d  h e a r i n g .  The c o m m e n t  d i d l i t t l e  
to e n h a n c e  Y o u n g ' s  p u b l i c  i ma ge  or the L an d B o a r d ' s  
d i s p o s i t i o n  t o w a r d s  him. The m e m b e r s  of the L a nd  B o a r d  
s t a t e d  th at t h e y  c o u l d  not too s t r o n g l y  e x p r e s s  th ei r  
d e t e s t a t i o n  of Y o u n g ' s  and his a s s o c i a t e s '  c o n d u c t ,  and  
f o u n d  a g a i n s t  them; th i s j u d g e m e n t  was u p h e l d  by the P r i v y  
C o u n c i l  a f t e r  a p p e a l s  l a s t i n g  for five years. Y o u n g  and 
o t h e r s  we re a l s o  c h a r g e d  w it h c o n s p i r a c y  at one p oin t;  
h o w e v e r ,  Y o u n g  d i e d  e a r l y  in 1897 and t he re  was no f u r t h e r  
m e n t i o n  of the c o n s p i r a c y  c h a r g e s .  (A .I .B .R . , J u l y  1896,
p. 494; M a r c h  1901, p. 193, May 1901, p. 348; A .P .R . , May 
1 897 , p . 138).
86. A . I . B . R . , Ap r il  1893, p. 239; F e d e r a l  S t a n d a r d ,  29 A p r i l
1 893 .
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power would be enhanced by a heightened public awareness of the 
pivotal role played by pastoral export earnings in maintaining 
the balance of payments and restoring the colonies' overseas 
credit-worthiness.
However, it was to become clear that these hopes 
rested on a serious misreading of the pastoral industry's 
internal strength, of the extent to which it could count on 
continuing British support, and of the resilience of the forces 
opposing pastoral hegemony. Though at the time of the 
financial crisis pastoralism was undergoing an upturn, the 
industry's structural problems remained unresolved. The 
decline in wool prices had been arrested and, as always, the 
squatting interest eagerly hailed this as signalling that wool 
had finally turned the corner; but the downswing resumed
q gsoon afterwards and continued until 1895. Contrary to the
impression created by the advocates of the frozen meat trade, 
the pastoral industry had not yet developed profitable means of 
disposing of its surplus stock. Finally, though in mid-
1893 the squatters were caught up in the flush of optimism 
which customarily accompanied general rain, the seasons they 
would face in the latter part of the decade were so harsh as to 
necessitate a drastic reassessment of prevailing notions of 
climatic normality.
87. Town and Country Journal, 6 May 1893.
88. See Table 1 above, p. 133.
89. See below p p . 177-8.
- 1 60 -
The Pastoralists1 Review's hopes that the squatters' 
status as privileged borrowers would be unaffected by the 
crisis also proved to be a pipe-dream. Indeed, it is difficult 
to see how such hopes could have been entertained at all. The 
minor shake-downs which had occurred in the pastoral finance 
companies before 1893 were far from sufficient to place 
pastoral lending on a secure basis, and there were few 
indications that British lenders' confidence in pastoral 
lending was on the upturn.
The pastoral finance companies' position was not 
materially different from that of the banks and urban land 
development companies. They had borrowed short-term funds in 
Britain for long-term loans in the colonies, relying on a 
revival in the land market to restore the liquidity of their 
colonial advances. Not only had this failed to eventuate but a 
major supplementary source of liquid funds had been eroded by 
the downturn in the market for store stock in 1891. This 
produced cash flow problems in several companies during 1891 
and 1892. Goldsbrough Mort and N.Z.L.M.A., both heavily
dependent on short-term British finance, began to watch the
9 0British money market with considerable trepidation and 
U.M.A. barely escaped a major crisis in 1891 when, having 
appropriated stock to the value of £32,000 to pay its dividend, 
it had difficulty selling them in t i m e . ^  Some of the
90. Cain, "Pastoral Expansion", op. c i t ., p p . 190-1, 197-8.
91. Australian Estates papers, 165/135, Ash to Drysdale,
7 November 1891.
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smaller companies were unable to conceal the deterioration of 
their position. Losses incurred by the Queensland Investment 
and Land Mortgage Company as a result of directors' doing 
business for the benefit of other compa nies with which they 
were associated were revealed when the company's shareholders, 
their suspicions aroused by poor returns and the arbitrary 
writing-up of property values, moved to sack the Brisbane board
Q  Oat the end of 1890. The South Australian Land Mortgage and
Agency Company also encountered problems. Though in mid-1891
it was clear that the company, pressed for cash, would not be
able to realize its stations without loss, a full-scale
writing-down of property values was deferred until the
following year; by that stage capital losses of £230,000 had
wiped out the company's reserve and necessitated a series of
9 3calls on shareholders' funds.
For the most part the major companies attempted to
keep up a brave face, but their public statements were
increasingly at odds with their performance. U . M . A . , A . M . A . ,
A.M.L.F. and Goldsbrough Mort all reduced their dividends in 
9 A1892 or 1893, while N.Z.L.M.A. paid its dividend for 1892 
out of imaginary profits after a year marked by restiveness 
among shareholders and heavy trading in shares at little more
92. A .I.B.R., January 1891, p. 31; November 1891, p. 833. For 
comments on the company's affairs, see Mort and Co. papers, 
13/5/3.
93. Ibid., June 1891, p. 425; July 1891, p. 510; July 1892,
p . 503.
94. Ibid., January 1892, p. 28; January 1893 p. 80; May 1893, 
p. 313; June 1893, p. 597.
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Q  Cthan the value of the paid-up capital. The companies' 
record offered little to convince British lenders to keep up 
the supply of funds. Lenders' suspicions were probably 
reinforced by the frankly pessimistic assessments of the 
pastoral position emanating both from the financial press and 
from institutions such as the Bank of Australasia, which as 
early as 1891 openly canvassed the likelihood of a shrinkage in
Q  (1pastoral values.
As British investors became more wary, the influx of
new capital which had marked the 1880s came to a halt. British
funds drained out of the finance companies between 1890 and
1894, the trend being interrupted only by a miniscule net 
9 7inflow in 1891. Those companies which were most dependent
on short-term debentures - Goldsbrough Mort, A.M.A. and
9 8N.Z.L.M.A. - faced additional liquidity problems. By early
1893 crisis management was the order of the day. When the bank
crashes came, the stronger finance houses were able to keep
their doors open, albeit with some difficulty; A.M.L.F., for
example, was caught with £80,000 in the C.B.C. Bank at the time
of its closure but was able to secure a large gold shipment 
9 9from London. Goldsbrough Mort, by contrast, was severely 
affected by the widening public panic. The company had not 
adequately covered itself against heavy withdrawals of its
95. Ibid., April 1892, p. 258; June 1894, p. 383.
96. Ibid. , May 1891, p p . 331-2.
97. See Table 1 p. 133 above.
98. On the companies' respective positions, see A .I .B .R ., June
1892, p p . 418-9.
99. Bailey, o p . c i t . , pp . 143-4.
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short-term colonial deposits. As a result of pressure for 
funds from clients whose bank accounts were locked up, coupled 
with a run on its Sydney and Melbourne offices, the company 
lost £202,000 in deposits in less than three months and found 
itself unable to repay maturing debentures; on 26 June, after 
an acrimonious exchange between colonial and London management, 
it finally closed its doors J  ^  N.Z.L.M.A. followed suit on 
11 July, as it too was unable to meet impending debenture 
withdrawals . "* ^  *
The increasing stringency of company finances was 
accompanied by a growing reluctance among British investors to 
act as mere rubber-stamps for decisions made by company 
management, and especially colonial management. The pastoral 
finance houses became the scene of a series of internecine 
struggles from which, without exception, colonial management 
emerged second-best. Though the clashes varied in timing and 
intensity, each marked a step towards direct metropolitan 
control over colonial pastoral production and closer scrutiny 
of pastoral lending practice.
Several companies had moved to put their business on 
a sounder footing before the general downswing in British 
capital exports took place. In 1888 Dalgety's London accounts 
committee resolved that a considerable number of properties 
should be sold up, and in the following year N.Z.L.M.A.
100. Cain, "Capital Structure", op. c i t ., pp . 14-16.
101. Cain, "Pastoral Expansion", op. cit. p. 196.
- 164 -
1 0 2foreclosed on several properties. The long-awaited
overhaul of A.M.L.F. accounts finally took place in 1890-91 
when E.M. Young came to the colonies to inspect the company's
position and set in train the foreclosure of six major 
10 2accounts. During 1890-91 the U.M.A.'s London board also
set out to check the acquisition of new accounts and remove the
business of T u r n e r , the chairman of the Melbourne board.
At Goldsbrough Mort the forced resignation of the general
manager, F.E. Stewart, in 1891 paved the way for a curtailment
1 0 sof new lending.
The companies also attempted to reform their 
borrowing policies, mainly by reducing the volume of their 
British raisings and shifting their emphasis from terminable to 
perpetual debentures.  ^^  However, they were unable to 
accomplish this change in time to avoid the effects of the 
outflow of British funds. It also proved more difficult to 
curtail colonial lending than had at first been anticipated. 
Although the overall volume of the finance companies' mortgage 
advances stagnated after 1889 and fell absolutely in 1891, 
there was little scope for action in the colonies to improve 
the companies' liquidity. Overcommitted squatters were in no 
position to repay loans, properties could not be sold, and in 
many cases the companies were being consistently required to
102. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. c i t ., p. 437.
103. Bailey, op. cit., p. 137.
104. Australian Estates papers, 165/135, Wigram to Forrest, 
19 June 1890; Wigram to Armytage, 26 March 1891.
105. Cain, "Capital Structure", op. cit., p. 14.
106. See e.g. A.I.B.R., September 1892, p. 645.
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cover deficiencies on station operations to keep the holdings
going. Indeed, the falling-off in advances in 1891 was
somewhat deceptive, as most of the decrease was due to the
foreclosures and writing-down being undertaken by the troubled
Queensland and South Australian companies; of the other
companies, six had a slight increase in mortgage advances and
only two showed a d e c r e a s e . T h e  companies' position
deteriorated with the disruption of financial affairs in 1892-3,
and all felt the effects of the widening gap between their
1 0 f tadvances and their permanent capital.
Pressure for the centralization of control continued 
throughout the decade. There were further foreclosures, and 
even on stations which nominally remained in the squatters'
possession company control over expenditure and and management
10 9became tighter. Company staff were retrenched and salaries
1 1 0cut. In several companies relations between British and
Australian shareholders became extremely strained, with the 
colonists often feeling that their judgement was being 
overridden by men who knew nothing about pastoralism and
British directors becoming aggrieved that, as one put it, "in 
Melbourne you seem to have acted as if the only duty of the 
London Board was to supply fresh Capital when you asked for
10 7. Figures f rom Butlin , I.A.E.D. , op. cit. , p. 143.
108. On which see A .I .B . R ., July 1893, p. 663.
10 9. See p p . 196-7 below; also Cain, "Companies and Squatting",
o p . c i t ., p p . 4 51f f .
110. See e .g . Bailey, op. cit., p . 158.
111. See e .g . A.M.A. report in A.I.B.R., October 1900, p. 780.
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1 1 2it". Several companies found it necessary to make calls on
their shareholders at various stages during the decade, and 
these too proved to be a source of friction, as in most cases 
colonial shareholders responded far less readily than did the 
British; the fact that some colonists had been bankrupted by
the calls did nothing to soften the British investors'
1 1 3re sentment.
Tension also arose between some companies' old London
management and the increasingly vocal British debenture- and
shareholders, especially where the companies' inability to
repay maturing debentures had necessitated the conversion of
short-term debentures to permanent share capital. N.Z.L.M.A.'s
London board was ousted after the revelations which followed
1 1 4the company's suspension. Goldsbrough Mort's initial
reconstruction scheme was rejected by the company's British
creditors, who used the threat of liquidation to force through
a new scheme which Australian shareholders found distinctly 
1 1 sunpalatable. And in 1893 a group of London stockbrokers,
complaining that the U.M.A.'s policies were being dictated by 
the ordinary shareholders, insisted that they be given a place
112. Australian Estates papers, 165/135, Wigram to Armytage, 
26 April 1893.
113. See e .g . A .I .B .R . , July 1895, p. 434; October 1899, 
p . 7 1 8; December 1899 p. 850 ; October 1901, p. 810, 
January 1902 p.22.
114. See above p p .
115. A.I.B.R., March 1894, p p . 168-9. On Goldsbrough Mort's
various reconstruction schemes, see N. Cain, "Financial 
Reconstruction in Australia 1888-1900", in Business 
Archives and Hist o r y , 6, 2, 1966 (henceforward cited as
"Financial Reconstruction") . p p . 168ff .
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on the London board; their nominee, Stanley Gray, subsequently 
became chairman of the board and implemented sweeping economy 
measures in the company's colonial office, cutting salaries 
severely and dismissing the general manager, who had been
a a rinvolved with the company since its inception. °
But not even the most rigorous economies could 
restore the companies' profits to pre-depression levels in the 
face of the problems confronting the pastoral industry. Even 
before wool had finally bottomed on the international market, 
the run of good seasons which had buoyed up flock expansion in 
the 1880s and early 1890s came to an abrupt end. From 1895 to 
1902 the interior was more or less consistently drought- 
stricken, and the companies were dragged down by the weight of 
their disproportionately heavy commitment to stations on the 
semi-arid margins of the industry.
The western districts of New South Wales alone prob­
ably accounted for about a third of the six major companies' 
total investment. By 1890 A.M.L.F., in spite of its comparat­
ive reticence after 1885, had £1.8 million, or 54% of its total
0
1 1 7volume of advances, secured on Western Division property.
In the same year 33% of U.M.A.'s advances were in western New
1 1 pSouth Wales, and Goldsbrough Mort's 1893 accounts showed
£1.2 million, 36% of the total, in the Western Division. ^ ^
116. See Australian Estates papers, 165/135.
117. Bailey, o p . c i t ., p. 86.
118. Australian Estates papers, 165/315.
119. Cain, "Pastoral Expansion", op. c i t . , p. 185.
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1 2 0A.M.A.'s advances showed a similar distribution. The
spread of Dalgety and N.Z.L.M.A.'s advances cannot be definit­
ely ascertained, but Cain estimates that Dalgety had at least a 
quarter of its funds in the region J  ^  and in N.Z.L.M.A.'s 
case western New South Wales stations accounted for practically 
all of the company's extensive losses on its Australian
1 p poperations. Several smaller firms were similarly affected.
The Agency, Land and Finance Co.'s western New South Wales 
lending was probably responsible for the difficulties which 
forced the company into liquidation in 1902, J and the 
woolbroking firms of Hill, Clark and Co. and Pitt, Son and 
Badgery were both severely affected by the consequences of some 
rather injudicious lending to western homestead lessees and 
medium-sized g r a z i e r s . T h e  larger companies' problems were 
compounded by the fact that most of them had large volumes of 
advances secured in other parts of the interior. Much of the 
balance of U.M.A.'s capital was invested in highly speculative 
Queensland ventures, Dalgety incurred heavy losses in Western
Australia, and Goldsbrough Mort was involved in a debacle in
12 5the Northern Territory. As drought losses mounted and wool
120. In 1900, the only year for which figures are available, a 
little less than a third of the company's advances were on 
western districts stations (R .C .W .D . Minutes, evidence of 
L. Kiddle, p. 264).
121. Cain, "Pastoral Expansion", o p . c i t . , p. 185.
122. I b i d . , p . 198.
123. A.I.B.R. January 1899, p. 25; January 1902, p. 25; July
1 902 , p . 549 .
124. On Hill, Clark and Co. see R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence of 
P. Close, pp. 194f f ; on Pitt Son and Badgery see A.I.B.R. , 
September 1899, p. 629; Pitt Son and Badgery Papers, 
10/2/1-17 passim.
125. Australian Estates papers, 165/315; Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. 
c i t ., p. 437; Cain, "Capital Structure", op. c i t ., p. 14.
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production fell, the companies' income from woolbroking and
I 9  ^consignment also diminished. By the time the drought
reached its climax in 1902, Dalgety alone was still paying a
dividend to shareholders and most of the other companies were
12 7showing a net loss on their operations.
The continuing losses on outback stations placed the 
companies in a dilemma. Though strict control of station 
expenditures obviously had to be enforced, wholesale foreclos­
ures would jeopardize their wool consignment business and their 
reputations as lenders in the longer term, especially where the 
accounts of long-standing and powerful clients were involved. 
The companies' responses to this situation varied. U.M.A. opted 
to acknowledge the shift in the emphasis of its business by 
floating a second company, the Australian Estates and Mortgage 
Co (A.E.M.) to take up the management of the stations of which 
the company had possession. But if the U.M.A. board had hoped 
that this would permit the company to dissociate itself from 
responsibility for the rather ruthless foreclosures which 
followed, it was mistaken; by the early years of the twentieth
century the company's wool business had been eclipsed, and it
12 8survived principally as a property management concern.
A.M.L.F., too, was eventually brought to realize that the
nature of its business had changed and that it must look to
12 9property management as its principal source of income.
126. See A .I .B .R ., January 1899, p. 2 0 ; July 1899, p. 487; July
1900, p . 5 17.
127. See A .I .B.R., March 1904, p p . 176, 2 03 .
128. Ibid., October 1899, p. 708.
129. Bailey, op. c i t ., p. 157.
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Even Goldsbrough M o r t , which had at first been extremely 
reluctant to engage in outright foreclosure, began to oust 
clients more readily in the late 1 890s.  ^^  N.Z.L.M.A. also
engaged in extensive foreclosures but was unwilling to keep up 
the management of the stations and adopted a realization 
policy, in spite of the heavy losses this entailed, for most of 
the latter 1 890s.  ^^  At the other end of the scale, Dalgety
was able to leave most of its outback clients in possession and
13 2concentrate on developing other aspects of its business.
Nevertheless, those companies which could afford to
tread cautiously usually did so. Even where foreclosures were
deemed necessary, most companies went to some lengths to
accommodate their former clients, often by offering them
employment elsewhere and absolving them of responsibility for 
13 3future loss. These policies appear to have been dictated
partly by the need to protect the companies' other business 
interests and partly by wider political considerations.
The maintenance of the political alliance between the 
pastoral finance companies and the squatters was important to 
both parties, if only for bread-and-butter reasons. The dep­
ression had not, as the Pastora 1i s t s 1 Review initially hoped, 
convinced the colonial population at large that the squatting 
interest was indispensable. On the contrary, the 1890s had
130. Cain, "Companies and Squatting", o p . c i t . , p p . 451ff;
"Financial Reconstruction", o p . c i t ., p p . 174ff.
131. See R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence of D. Elder, p p . 266-7.
132. Ibid., evidence of J. Aitken, p p . 282-6.
133. See p p . 214-5 below.
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seen a political and economic marginalisation of the large 
landowning class. At the same time the financiers, especially 
those of a definitely British complexion, had met with virulent 
hostility from the exponents of populist nationalism among the 
smallholders and within the labour movement.
As employers and landowners the pastoral finance 
companies and squatters faced common enemies. Their efforts to 
reduce their losses by intensifying their exploitation of 
labour were hampered in the first instance by the rise of the 
pastoral unions and in the second by the legislative regulation 
of working conditions and bargaining procedures which followed
I O Cthe emergence of the parliamentary labour movement. The
owners of freehold estates were threatened by the introduction
a q  rof land taxation, J° while those who were dependent on
leasehold tenure feared that their holdings would be thrown
open to closer settlement before they had time to recoup the
117losses they had made during the depression. The finance
companies were exposed to the additional danger that popular 
antipathy towards bankers and foreign capitalists would result 
in special arrangements being made for foreclosed holdings when 
the existing leases expired; to avert any such moves it was 
essential that the displaced squatters not be so embittered as 
to engage in public attacks on their erstwhile creditors.
134. Gollan, op. c i t ., pp . 2 7, 44ff.
135. See Chapter 7 below; see also A. P . R . , November 1896, 
p. 442; February 1902, p. 801.
136. I bid., April 1895, p. 93; June 1895, pp. 217-8, 221;
November 1896, p. 443.
137. Ibid., March 1897, pp. 2-3; July 1889, p. 278; A .I .B .R .,
June 1899, p p . 385, 386.
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The squatters for their part were still bound by 
numerous obligations to their financiers, and could ill afford 
to join the chorus of criticism of foreign capital. In any 
event, they had few enough allies elsewhere. During the boom 
years the pastoral plutocracy had not scrupled to make enemies 
in the course of defending and enlarging its share of the 
colonies' landed resources. But by the late 1890s, having 
lost much of their wealth and lacking the unhesitating support 
once provided by British capital, the squatters were left with 
little more to do than affect contempt for the "make-believe 
fights" of parliamentary politics and hope to break out of 
their political isolation by achieving a rapprochement with 
urban employers or even perhaps the smallholder lobby which
1 O Qthey had so long despised. This reversal of the squatters'
fortunes owed much to the failure of their ill-advised ventures 
in the semi-arid interior.
138. A.P.R., December 1901, p. 687; see also April 1898, p. 81,
March 1902, p. 63, April 1902, p. 68, December 1902, 
p . 698.
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CHAPTER 6
The Western Districts in Depression 1891-1902
The crises of the early 1890s and the recurring 
droughts of 1895 to 1902 had devastating consequences for the 
western districts of New South Wales. The superficial 
prosperity generated in the 1880s by capital imports and the 
expansion of pastoral and mining output vanished as prices for 
the region's few products tumbled and finance houses called a 
halt to pastoral lending. Stagnation then gave way to decline 
with the onset of drought in 1895. In the course of this 
decline the region sustained substantial economic losses which 
wiped out much of the capital invested during the preceding 
decade; the western flock was drastically reduced and the 
settlers' frantic attempts to stave off stock losses succeeded 
only in accelerating the degradation of the rangelands. The 
western population's standard of living was depressed as wages 
fell, unemployment increased, the range of goods and services 
available narrowed and drought exacerbated the discomforts and 
occasional dangers of outback life. The period as a whole was 
marked by a polarization of economic power; as the squatters 
were ousted and smallholders and petty entrepreneurs alike were 
thrown back on the labour market, control over the resources of 
the plains was increasingly vested in the hands of British and 
colonial financiers, and it was they who eventually reaped the
rewards of recovery.
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Creating a Desert ; Western Pastoralism and the Environment
1891-1902
"The essential features of white pastoral settlement - a 
stable home, a circumscribed area of land, and a flock or 
herd maintained on this land year-in and year-out - are a 
heritage of life in the reliable kindly climate of 
Europe. In the drought-risky semi-desert Australian 
inland they tend to make settlement self-destructive."^
The seif-destructive tendencies of white pastoral
settlement have seldom been made as starkly evident as they
were in the New South Wales outback during the depression. But
the havoc created in these years was not merely a product of
the ill-judged application of "European" models of settlement
to the interior; it was more particularly a product of the
unremitting application of capitalist property relations to the
region, the reckless pace at which it was incorporated into the
imperial economy and the disproportionately high levels of
capitalization permitted by heavy British investment during
the preceding decade. The inflation of land purchase costs and
rents, the free availability of mortgage finance and the
defensive development of the period from 1885 to 1890 had
combined to provide a situation in which the western lands were
required to produce an income sufficient to satisfy the
squatter's own requirements and at the same time pay a double
rent, to the Crown for legal title and the financier for his
ocontribution to the costs of purchase and development. A 
high and constant return was thus being demanded from a natural
1. F. Ratcliffe, Flying Fox and Drifting S a n d , Sydney, 1976.
p . 3 2 3 .
2. On rent under capitalist conditions, see E. Mandel,
Marxist Economic Theory, London, 1968, p p . 218ff.
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environment characterized by abrupt and violent fluctuations in 
pasture availability. This could only be a recipe for 
disas t e r .
Butlin has described pastoral investment as "the 
vehicle of human control of nature in the spread of settlement 
into the interior." It was also, in a sense which was 
painfully evident to the outback squatters of the 1890s, a 
process which delivered up a portion of humanity to the 
caprices of an environment which was ultimately far beyond 
their control. Some of the difficulties western pastoralism 
encountered could be attributed to simple ignorance. The 
squatters had been wildly inaccurate in their assessments of 
the western land's potential and of the measures required to 
exploit it with minimal damage; they had not predicted some of 
the negative side-effects which their intervention produced; 
and in their haste to develop their holdings they had often 
overlooked measures which were essential to mitigate the 
effects of drought. But the fundamental problem was a 
financial one: by the time the deficiencies of their earlier
strategies became apparent, the squatters had so far over­
committed themselves that to sacrifice income in the short term 
for the sake of conserving pastures would have spelt dis­
possession. Even the finance houses, themselves increasingly 
straitened for funds, gave managers little room to manoeuvre on 
many of the holdings they had taken over. A handful of the 
wealthiest squatters had been able to afford the luxury of
3. Butlin, I.A.E.D., op. c i t . , p . 5 8.
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cautious stocking during the 1880s and reaped the benefits in 
the 1890s. Thus Samuel McCaughey insisted on conserving the 
saltbush on his Warrego stations /  and Tyson's Tupra station 
was described at the turn of the century, with unconscious 
irony, as being in better condition than the rest of the Hay 
district because it had not been " i m p r o v e d .  But in the 
early 1890s, in spite of numerous warnings that the land was 
becoming "sheep-sick" as the wool industry reached the limits 
of natural pasture availability, few squatters were willing to 
admit that the gains from watering and ringbarking were at an 
end. 6 78
Nor was there much scope for developing ways of 
profitably disposing of large numbers of surplus stock. The 
market for store stock had collapsed during 1891 and a dry 
season in the first half of 1892 sent prices to rock-bottom;
grown sheep were reportedly being sold for two shillings and
7less when they could be moved to market. Still more w orry­
ing was the fact that the travelling stock routes were barren 
across large areas of the interior, and managers who had held 
off moving their sheep in the hope of rain found their flocks
gtrapped and dying in heaps on the stations. The losses of 
1892 justified the critics' worst fears; Fetherstonhaugh 
commented acidly that "sheep (had) been dying merely through
4. Crowley, o p . c i t ., p. 300.
5. R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence of G. Ashcroft, p. 589.
6. A.P.R., January 1892, p p . 421, 422.
7. Ibid., March 1892, p. 517; August 1892, p. 802.
8. Ibid., August 1892, p. 782.
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overstocking in a season when, under wiser management, the
Qsurplus would have been fit for export". Boiling down was 
reinstituted in many inland towns,  ^ and added impetus was 
given to the promotion of the frozen meat export trade.
After the initial collapse in the market for stock a number of 
wealthy squatters and finance company representatives, 
prominent among them John Cooke of the A.M.L.F., had urged the 
development of a frozen meat industry as a means of disposing 
of surplus stock, and during the early 1890s they raised 
capital to float several freezing and tinning works. But
the frozen meat trade was beset by problems throughout the 
decade. Some later commentators have been over-generous in 
their assessment of the industry's significance in the 1890s, 
projecting awareness of its eventual success back into the 
period of its initial development. The Australian flock
had not generally been bred for meat, and the condition of the 
sheep was often poor. British consumers showed a clear
preference for New Zealand and Argentinian meat over the
Australian product, which was regarded as being fit only for
1 4working-class consumption. The initial influx of Austral­
ian mutton glutted the British market for several years, and
9. Ibid., September 1892, p. 821.
10. See N.S.W. Statistical R egister, 1896, p. 497.
11. Companies and factory locations are given in A . P .R . , 
supplement, November 1895.
12. Boehm, op. c i t ., p p . 110ff; Butlin, "Colonial Socialism in
Australia 1860-1900", in H. Aitken. e d . , The State and 
Economic G r o w t h , New York, 1959. p. 76.
13. A . P .R . , June 789 1 , p p . 107-8.
14. Ibid., November 1891, p. 328; June 1894, p. 137.
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for some time meat exports were scarcely covering costs. 3 
The market began to revive around 1900, partly because of the 
demand for meat for the troops in South A f r i c a , ^  but by that 
time supplies of suitable animals were running short in New 
South Wales. Several freezing companies were only able to 
operate intermittently in the latter 1890s because of recurrent 
shortages of animals, and a number liquidated or were taken 
over when they found themselves unable to pay off their initial 
investment in capital equipment from a diminished volume of 
business. Boiling down remained the main way of disposing
of surplus stock. Between 1892 and 1900 inclusive, New South
Wales produced nearly six million hundredweight of tallow, over
1 8two million in 1894-5 alone. For a time boiling down was
yielding a higher return to the grower than meat exports or 
1 9local sales, but the London market collapsed in mid-decade, 
and thereafter returns were poor.  ^ Over the decade as a 
whole, neither frozen meat export nor boiling down yielded 
sufficient returns to induce outback squatters to get rid of 
surplus stock before large drought losses were imminent. By 
that stage much of the western vegetation had already been
15. In 1896 they were yielding a net return of a penny per 
pound (ibid., March 1896, p. 5, August 1896, p. 323).
16. Ibid., January 1 90 0 , p p . 632-3 .
17. Ibid., March 1898, p. 53; May 1898, p. 159; September
1899, p. 377. The industry was largely under foreign 
control by World War I (see R. Duncan, "The Australian 
Export Trade with the United Kingdom in Refrigerated Beef, 
1880-1940", Business Archives and History 2, 2, 1966.
p • 112.)
18. N.S.W. Statistical Register, 1900, p. 649.
19. A.P.R., February 1893, p. 1074; July 1893, p. 203;
February 1894, p. 605.
20. Ibid., June 1896, p. 180.
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se v e r e l y ,  eve n i r r e v o c a b l y ,  d a m a g e d .
Ev en b e f o r e  d r o u g h t  set in at the b e g i n n i n g  of 1895
the w e s t e r n  p l a i n s  we r e d e t e r i o r a t i n g  m a r k e d l y .  S ome  a rea s
ea st  of the D a r l i n g  had  b e e n  d e s t o c k e d  a ft e r  1891 as a r e s u l t
of h e a v y  r a b b i t  i n f e s t a t i o n s  on the c e n t r a l  D a r l i n g  a n d the
e n c r o a c h m e n t s  of i n e d i b l e  scrub a r o u n d  C o b a r  and a l o n g  the
Bogan; but in the w es t  D a r l i n g  s h e e p  n u m b e r s  c o n t i n u e d  to
2 2rise until the en d of 1894. C o n s e q u e n t l y  the o v e r a l l  s toc k
d e n s i t y  r e m a i n e d  high; f r o m  1891 to 1894 i n c l u s i v e  the w e s t e r n  
r e g i o n  as a w h o l e  was c a r r y i n g  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  one s h e e p  to six 
ac re s on a v e r a g e ,  as well as a s u b s t a n t i a l  n u m b e r  of o t h e r
l i v e s t o c k  and an i n c a l c u l a b l e  n u m b e r  of r a b b i t s .  T hi s
2 3c o n s t i t u t e d  gr o s s  o v e r s t o c k i n g  on a m a s s i v e  scale. The
ri v e r  f r o n t a g e s  wer e b ar e  of all but e p h e m e r a l  g r a s s e s ,  and 
q u i c k l y  b e c a m e  b a r r e n  in d ry spells . The e d i b l e  s h r u b s
w h i c h  p r o v i d e d  a n a t u r a l  d r o u g h t  r e s e r v e  w ere  u n d e r  h e a v y
2 5p r e s s u r e  w h e r e v e r  th e y we re w i t h i n  r e a c h  of water . P o i s o n ­
ous p l a n t s  were m a k i n g  an a p p e a r a n c e  in s e v e r a l  a r e a s . ^  A n d  
the la ck  of r e l i a b l e  m e a n s  of s t o c k  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  was e m e r g i n g  
as a m a j o r  i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l  d e f i c i e n c y  a c r o s s  the r e g i o n  as a
21. I b i d . , Jul y 1892, p. 746 ; S e p t e m b e r  1 892 , pp . 8 0 2 - 3  .
22. F i g u r e s  are g i v e n  in Hardy, op. c i t . , p. 199. See also  
G r a p h  2 above, p. 87.
23. This a v e r a g e  st oc k d e n s i t y  a p p r o a c h e s  or e x c e e d s  the 
m a x i m u m  le v e l s  c u r r e n t l y  r e g a r d e d  as p o s s i b l e  on the 
v a r i o u s  p l a i n s  v e g e t a t i o n  f o r m a t i o n s  (see S l a t y e r  and 
Perry,  ed. , op. cit., pp. 7 7f f ) .
24. A. P . R . ,  A u g u s t  1892, p. 782.
25. Je ans , op. c i t . , p. 61 c l a i m s  t h a t  s a l t b u s h  h a d  b e e n  
e l i m i n a t e d  ea st of the D a r l i n g  by 1890.
26. A. P . R . ,  A u g u s t  1893, p. 287; D e c e m b e r  1893, p. 386.
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whole , with many of the stock routes so inadequately watered,
or their pastures so badly degraded by heavy grazing pressure,
2 7that they were scarcely usable even during good seasons.
The reckoning came swiftly. 1895 was a dry year over 
much of the region, and the north-west was in a state of 
drought from February to October. By early winter large 
tracts of the north-west were desolate and stock and rabbits 
alike were dying of starvation. Several stock routes became
3 nimpassable. Lambing losses were heavy on runs which had no 
fodder reserves, and shearing had to be abandoned in parts 
of the north-west after cold weather had taken a heavy toll of 
the newly-shorn sheep. Starving sheep were also reported
to have died from the effects of eating poisonous plants, indi- 
gestible twigs and rabbit baits. Even when rain eventually
came the pastures were slow to respond, and in some areas only 
weeds and rushes grew.34 In any event, they were not given 
much time to recover. 1895 was only the beginning of a series 
of dry seasons; on Foley's estimation between 1895 and 1902 
inclusive the north-west experienced five years and two months
of drought and the rest of the region four years and one 
3 5month. With each dry period the vegetation and soils of the
2 7 . Ibid., March 1893, pp. 4, 44 .
28 . Foley, op. c i t ., p p . 242- 3 .
29 . A.P.R., April 1895, p. 55 ; Ma y 1895, p. 112.
30 . Ibid., June 1895, p. 165.
3 1 . Ibid., June 1 8 9 5 , • p . 221.
32 . Ibid., September 1895, pp . 376-7.
3 3 . Ibid. , Ma y 1895, p. 150; 
1 895 , p . 5 10.
November 1895, p. 482;
34 . Ibid., December 1895, p. 55 1.
35 . Foley, op. cit., p. 242-3 •
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region deteriorated further. By the turn of the century huge 
tracts of the plains would scarcely respond to rain, having 
been reduced to "wind-swept, barren wastes, a howling wilder- 
ness, with nothing but sand and stone".
Almost by reflex action the squatters began to cast
around for scapegoats. They blamed the parlous state of the
country on the Crown's rack-renting, on the rabbits, on the
3 7climate - in short, on anyone or anything but themselves.
Yet in the final analysis it was the squatters' own determin­
ation to avert the threats of forfeiture and dispossession, and 
the financiers' less excusable desire to wring every last penny 
from the region, which inflicted much of the damage on the 
land. The Pastora1ist s ' Review had little doubt that the 
region's vulnerability at the beginning of the drought was 
primarily the result of the squatters' tendency "to overstock
shamelessly and ruthlessly, pouring out animal life like water
3 8in the struggle to 'make the place p a y ' ." And after the 
droughts began most squatters showed themselves ready to 
subordinate all else to their desire to ensure the survival of 
as many sheep as possible.
By April 1895 stock in the north-west were having
difficulty getting feed within reach of water. The squatters'
3 9immediate response was to bring in "scrub-cutters". Scrub-
36. R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence of J. Boothby, p. 278.
37. See e.g. proceedings of 1896 Rabbit Conference as 
reported in A .P .R . May 1896, p. 143.
38. Ibid., May 1896, p. 148.
39. Ibid., April 1895, p. 57.
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cutting widened the range of feed available for the sheep,
partly by allowing back-country shrubs to be brought within
grazing range of water and partly by bringing the foliage of
trees and taller shrubs down to ground level where the sheep
could reach it. The hazards of denuding the countryside in
this manner were well-known; the Pastora1i s t s ' Review deplored
it as a "wasteful and mischievous" practice , ^  and one
squatter went so far as to suggest to the 1901 Royal Commission
that it be o u t l a w e d . ^  Nevertheless, the practice was
eschewed only by the most cautious managers. In the winter of
1896 it was observed that scrub-cutting had become "a permanent
institution" in the north-west, where it had not been halted
after the breaking of the 1895 d r o u g h t , ^  and when drought
returned scrub-cutting reached a new intensity. Mulga was cut
throughout the acacia shrublands, and in the woodlands and on
the saltbush plains myall, kurrajong and other edible trees
were lopped or, in many cases, simply chopped down to keep the
flocks a l i v e .^  Tales were told of squatters sending axemen
in to denude blocks within a few m o n t h s . ^  On many holdings
scrub-cutting was only discontinued when all the accessible
shrubs and trees had been cut out; this was equally common
4 Spractice on individua11y -owned and company-held stations. 
Scrub-cutting did not only have an adverse effect on the
40 . 
4 1 .
I bid., 
R . C .W .D
May 1897, p . 148.
. Minutes, evidence o f G . Ridd och, P • 327-8.
4 2 . A . P . R . , June 1896, p. 211.
43 .
44 .
Ibid.,
R . C . W . D
August 1902, p. 586 
. Minutes, evidence o f R . Peacock , P • 2 12.
45 . See R .C .W.D. Summary, p p . 1 1 , 1 16-2 0.
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species which were cut; by artificially maintaining sheep on 
land which was bare of low shrubs and grasses it contributed to 
the breakup of the soil and ensured that new pasture growths
after rain were immediately subject to heavy grazing pressures
4 f)which eliminated the more palatable grass species.
The exploitation of the region was intensified in 
several other ways. Along the eastern edge agriculture became 
more widespread as squatters became disillusioned with wool­
growing and let their land out for s h a r e - f a r m i n g . ^  Small­
holders also persevered with the attempt to grow crops in the 
western Riverina, on the lower Lachlan and along the Bogan; 
indeed in some cases agriculturalists seem to have operated on 
the "doub1e-or-nothing" principle, increasing the acreage sown
in an attempt to recoup their losses from earlier crop 
4 8failures. The dry cultivation techniques used exposed the 
soil to wind-blowing when the crops did not germinate or were 
turned over to stock . ^  The practice of cutting natural
C f)pastures for "bush hay" also became more common. In the
north-west and along the rivers squatters experimented with 
growing fodder under irrigation, using river-water and bore- 
water. The results were decidedly mixed; while some squatters
46 . A.P.R., November 1896, p. 469; October 1897, p . 389;
4 7 .
Riverine Grazier, 27 July 
Robinson, op. cit. , p p . 8,
1897 . 
129-30, 1 46- 7; see also Riverine
00
Grazier, 19 February 1897. 
See e.g. Riverine Grazier, 14 June 1898
49 . 
5 0 .
Robinson, op. cit., pp. 153, 176. 
A.P.R., March 1896, p. 2.
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were able to grow fodder at a comparatively low c o s t , ^  
yields were often poor in hot, dry seasons and prolonged 
irrigation with artesian water could destroy soil fertility if 
the mineral content of the water was high. In spite of
initial successes in cultivating native fodder plants, esp­
ecially saltbush, this practice hardly proceeded beyond the 
experimental stage; by the early years of the twentieth century 
Australia had exported twenty thousand pounds of saltbush seed 
to the west coast of the United States,^  but at home 
saltbush destruction had proceeded so far that it was feared 
that seed would have to be imported from the American plant­
ations if the species were to be reestablished in their native 
habitat. ^
During the drought years the battle to counteract the 
encroachments of other species on the sheep's fodder supply 
continued. Much effort was invested in clearing inedible scrub 
from the Bogan, Cobar and Lachlan districts. The spread of 
pine, box and coolibah scrub in these areas had accelerated
principally because the reduced frequency of bushfires had left
5 5undergrowth to multiply without check. Squatters, small­
holders and government alike mounted sustained clearing
51. Ibid. , September 1 897 , p. 356 ; April 1 899, pp . 1 19 — 20;
November 1 899, pp . 567-8 . See also R.C.W.D. Minutes,
evidence of T. Keats, p. 137, W. Dickson, p. 48 and
J. Fitzgerald, p. 52.
52. R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence of W. Palmer, p. 48 and 
J. Fitzgerald, p. 52.
53. A.P.R., January 1902, p. 737.
54. R.C.W.D. M inutes, evidence of F. Turner, p. 737.
55. Various comments on this are given in R.C.W.D. Summary,
pp . 2 8-9.
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programmes, concentrating on the north-western rivers where 
much of the best land along the flood plains was disappearing 
under a mass of s a p l i n g s . ^  In the Cobar back-blocks some 
clearing was also performed by the squatters on their leasehold 
areas, but scrubby resumed areas were often abandoned; as a 
result over two million acres of land lay unoccupied in the 
district at the turn of the c e n t u r y . ^  Towards the end of 
the drought there were signs that the settlers' belief that 
trees were merely a hindrance was in the process of changing,
C Qand it was even suggested that pine scrub be conserved. But 
by then an area probably amounting to several million acres had
rz nalready been stripped of cover.
Rabbit destruction also continued, much assisted by 
the dry seasons. In the early stages of the drought rabbits 
died in huge numbers, and for several years poisoned water and 
baits proved effective in keeping the population to a minimum; 
in the process the settlers were of course continuing their 
elimination of the rabbits' natural predators and ensuring that 
the rabbits would be able to multiply rapidly when good seasons 
returned. The poisoning of insect-eating birds was also held 
responsible for some of the local insect plagues which occurred 
during the droughty y e a r s . ^  Fortunately, the use of poison
56. See e.g. evidence of D. Hatten, R.C.W.D. Minutes, p p . 6-7.
57. See Australian Estates papers, 5/10, 5/13, 5/16.
58. R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence of C. Rennie, p p . 491-2.
59 . I b i d . , evidence 
Turner, p. 311.
o f G . Frew, p . 74 ; R. Hay, p p . 200-3;
60 . Ibid., evidence o f (inter alia) R . Peacock, p. 2 0 6 ; H
Freeman, p p . 339, 342.
61. A.P.R., August 1899, p. 315; Rolls, op. c i t ., PP* 137-9.
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had to be discontinued in some areas where feed was so scarce 
that sheep ate the baits; it is noteworthy that after one such 
episode in the central west the goanna population increased 
sufficiently to check the revival of the rabbit population in 
the interval between two droughts. Nonetheless evidence to 
the Royal C o m m i s s i o n ^  and the numerous warning notices 
published in western newspapers indicate that the practice 
remained general. Poisoning was given added impetus in the 
latter years of the drought when wild dogs, many of them 
escapees from rabbiting packs, began to prey upon the 
f l ocks.^  The squatters displayed a stubborn determination 
to counter the adverse consequences of their past intervent­
ionism with further interventions which were no better- 
advised .
By late 1898 and early 1899, however, it was clear 
that the western environment was proving intractable. The 
effects of scrub-cutting, ringbarking and heavy grazing were 
compounded by the deforestation effected by wood-cutters 
supplying fuel for the towns and mines and timber for construc­
tion purposes. By 1901 there was little pine left west of 
Cobar or on the west Darling, and the price of timber was
c. crising rapidly; around Broken Hill especially, every stick 
of timber had been cut o u t . ^  And as ground cover was 
reduced the topsoil of the western districts began to move.
62 . A.P.R., December 1 896 , p . 5 3 9 ; Apri1 1 897 , P • 113.
63 . R.C.W.D. Summary, PP • 128-31.
64 . Ibid., p. 22; A.P . R. , Apri1 1900, p . 69 .
65 . R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence of R. Hay,- PP • 202 -3 .
66 . I b i d . , evidence of F. Hamilton, p. 425 and A . Crossing,
p . 444.
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In the latter part of 1898 it was observed that 
duststorms seemed to be increasing in frequency and intensity
r  m~7across much of the western region;D even on the eastern
edge of the region, at Hillston, duststorms became a weekly
event during November and December, and occasionally the clouds
of dust were so thick that business in the town was suspended
f ) 8for several hours. Over the following years severe dust
and sandstorms came to be accepted as a normal feature of
western life. The wind moulded the soil into new patterns,
stripping off the surface in one area and depositing it as
loose dunes in another. By 1900 the greater part of the region
had been affected, excepting only the scrub country north-east
of the Darling. Around Mossgiel and in the western Riverina the
land was scarred by spreading patches of windblown territory
and large bare areas where the topsoil had been stripped away
leaving only "scalds" which "would not support a flea, let 
7 0alone a sheep." The west Darling was being rapidly over­
taken by the shifting sands. On Avoca station near Wentworth
over a hundred square miles of the leasehold area were 
7 1windblown. Further north near the South Australian border
the whole of Buckalow station was in a state of "utter
7 2windswept desolation". On the mid-Darling the frontages
67. A.P.R., October 1898, p. 392.
68. Hillston Spectator, November and December 1898, esp.
19 November 1898.
69. A.P.R., October 1899 p. 442; February 1900, p. 693; 
February 1901, p. 767.
70. R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence of H. Farrar, p. 583; see also 
evidence of A. Cameron, p. 358 and W. Walker, p. 560.
71. Ibid., evidence of A. C udmore, p. 435.
72. I b i d . , evidence of W. Parker, p. 428.
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were blistered and bare, while the back country was covered in
dunes interrupted only by patches of stony, cement-hard subsoil
7 1to mark where the ridges had been. The position was
similar in the arid Corner country and on the Paroo, where all
that was left of the Mitchell grass was an occasional blackened
tussock in the middle of a "howling wilderness".^  The earth
7 5around Enngonia, north of Bourke, was "as bare as a brick"
7 6and scalding had occurred as far east as the Culgoa. The 
wind erosion more than anything else finally convinced settlers 
and lenders alike that the losses sustained in the western 
districts would have to be accepted as permanent.
Pastoral Profits and Losses 1891-1901
"Most of [the pastora1ists] had the country, but now7 7the country has the pastoralists ."
By 1902 the New South Wales interior had undergone a 
twofold crisis in the course of which a large part of the 
capital invested during the boom years had been annihilated, 
initially by the collapse of the market value of western 
stations and their products, and subsequently by the physical 
destruction of the elements of pastoral production - stock,
73 . Ibid., evidence of E . Quin, p. 248; G. Ri d d o c h , p . 3 19
C. Archer, p. 456; A . Wilson, p . 466 .
74 . Ibid., evidence of J . Boothby, p . 2 7 8 ; cf . evidence of
T. M a c k a y , p. 482.
75 . Ibid., evidence of C . Conway, p . 34 .
76 . I b id., evidence of W . Dickin son , p . 18 7 . For a general
discussion of the problem, see J. Maiden, "The Sand-Drift 
Problem in New South Wales", Journal of the Royal Society 
of New South Wales, 37 , 1 90 3 . pp . 99ff.
77. Ibid., evidence of A. C udmore, p. 437.
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station equipment and the fertility of the land. As Heathcote 
has pointed out, it is impossible to measure the effects of 
drought with accuracy. This is more particularly the case
when drought is accompanied by a wider economic crisis which 
independently affects the market values of stock and pastoral 
products. Nevertheless, by any reckoning the losses of the 
1891-1902 period in the interior were substantial.
The sheep population of the Western Division in 1902 
stood at 3.6 million, a little more than a quarter of its peak 
levels in 1891 and 1894. Though some of this decrease can be 
attributed to the removal of sheep on agistment to other
regions, deliberate culling and a shift from sheep to cattle in 
7 9some areas, the bulk of the flock reduction arose from 
lambing failures, forced sales and outright losses on the 
stations. Lambing percentages were mostly poor from 1895 to 
1902, and there were general failures in 1899, 1901 and 1902;
in 1899, for example, no lambs, survived on the A.E.M.'s 
Overflow group of stations or on two of its other properties,
while on its Tindarey holding the survival of fifty lambs was
8 0scant recompense for a mortality of nearly twenty thousand. 
Though squatters close to Broken Hill and other towns were able
to dispose of some of their stock for local consumption at a
8 1reasonable price, large numbers of sheep had to be boiled
78. R. Heathcote, "Drought Perception", in Lovett, e d . ,
op. c i t ., p p . 20ff.
79. On which see below, p. 198.
80. Australian Estates papers, 5/10, 5/13, 5/15, 5/16.
81. Ibid; Thackaringa, near Broken Hill, showed consistently 
higher stock prices than other stations.
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down in the earlier stages of the drought. Returns from stock 
sales were extremely low, with average prices for some stations 
falling below three shillings a head, until about 1899 when 
shortages of sheep for slaughtering and the advent of a brief 
wool boom sent stock prices up at last. Finally, there
were large stock losses over and above ordinary mortality 
rates. Lambing failures were often accompanied by heavy losses 
among the ewes; waterholes were lined with the carcasses of 
starving sheep; whole flocks were let die on the run rather
Q *3than risk travelling over the stock routes. Overall
mortality rates arose above twenty-five per cent on several
occasions, and the losses this entailed were made doubly hard
to recoup by the 1902 drought in the eastern and central
districts, which reduced the New South Wales flock by thirty-
six per cent and thereby ensured that restocking from the
8 4market would be extremely expensive.
The destruction of station equipment represented a 
major additional capital loss. The west Darling and the other 
wind-blown areas were worst affected. At best the sand-drift 
meant that managers had a continual battle to keep station 
equipment clear; at worst, drifts could form to depths of three 
or four yards, growing at speeds of up to a foot per week and
82. Ibid; Cain, "Companies and Squatting", o p . c i t ., p. 456.
83. See e.g. A.P.R., April 1896, p. 85; July 1896, p. 234; 
August 1898, p. 275; March 1900, p. 33; March 1902,
pp . 1,5.
84. Note series of stock prices in Cain, "Companies and 
Squatting", op. cit. , p. 456.
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8 8burying "improvements" without trace. Tanks and dams 
rapidly lost capacity through silting, and occasionally 
disappeared completely. Fences, stockyards and other 
structures were covered by dunes. One west Darling station 
manager installed three rabbit-proof fences on top of one 
another before deciding that he was wasting his t i m e . 
Rabbit-netting was especially prone to being buried when the 
sand was blown up against it, and was widely recognized by the 
turn of the century as being useless on sandy country. The
sand-drift dramatically revealed the flimsiness of the 
structures in which the squatters had invested so much and the
O Qephemeral nature of pastoral occupation on the plains.
Even more alarming was the prospect of a permanent 
decline in the quality of the regions's soils and pastures. As 
it happened, the pastoralists underestimated the recuperative 
capacity of the rangelands; some vegetation species were 
dormant, not extinct, and when heavy rains eventually came
Q Qherbage grew back in the dunes. Nevertheless, enduring
damage had been done to the perennial shrubs both in the boom 
years and during the drought, and the natural drought reserve 
fodder of the region as a whole had therefore been seriously 
depleted. The replacement of edible by inedible species also
86. I b id., evidence of N. Sadleir, p. 420.
87. Ibid., evidence of I. Chambers, p. 39.
88. Other evidence to R.C.W.D. on this question includes that 
of D. Hatten (ibid., p. 51); E. Hayes, p. 208; A. Cameron, 
p. 358; P. Waite, p. 410; W. Parker, p. 429; J. Leigo,
p . 469 .
89. Bean, op. c i t ., p p . 96-7.
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represented a long-term diminution of the region's stock­
carrying capacity which was practically irreversible, as the 
investment required to assist the regeneration of native fodder 
plants was far out of proportion to the economic return it 
would yield.^ ^  The much-vaunted eradication of the prickly- 
pear, already a pest in the north-west during the 1890s, needs 
to be viewed in the context of a general record of failure to 
check or reverse the deterioration of Australia's rangelend 
vegetation.^  ^ Furthermore, the damage done by the scalding 
and compaction of the soil proved difficult to reverse. The 
settlers who, like George Miller of Redan station near Broken 
Hill, had watched "what used to be fine rich flats covered with 
the best of cotton and saltbush" become "nothing but an immense 
clay-pan" found that little regeneration took place even
after rain. Smallholders were severely affected, some of -£hem
9 3losing all the topsoil from their plots of land. And 
finally, the spread of rabbits had saddled western pastoralism 
with a competitor which was to continue to reduce the amount of
Q Afeed available to stock for at least half a century. It is
understandable that observers with long experience of the 
outback were inclined to believe that the western lands would 
never recover from the desolate condition they were in by 
1 90 2 .
90. Slatyer and Perry, e d . , op. cit., pp . 86, 118.
91. On prickly-pear, see Rolls, o p . c i t . , p p . 354ff.
92. R.C.W.D. Minutes., evidence of G. Miller, p. 427.
93. Ibid., evidence of A. Cameron, p. 358.
94. On the initial effects of the introduction of myxomatosis, 
see Hardy, op. cit., p. 240.
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The growing conviction that western pastoralism was 
not a paying proposition, coupled with the general financial 
stringency which prevailed after the 1893 crashes, sent station 
market values to rock-bottom. Even before the drought the 
market had been very poor; for example, the owners of Mount 
Poole, near Milparinka, had been unable to get a bid of 
fourteen thousand pounds in 1893 for a holding with thirty-five 
thousand sheep and station equipment which had cost thirty-two
Q  Cthousand pounds to install. Under drought conditions many
holdings changed hands for little more than the value of the 
few stock remaining. In the latter 1890s Nymagee, a station of 
115,000 acres with four thousand sheep and fifty thousand 
pounds worth of improvements, brought a little more than three
Q  CLthousand pounds at auction; similarly Mulurulu was bought
for five thousand pounds with eleven thousand sheep and fifteen
9 7thousand pounds' investment in capital equipment. One of
the few stations to be sold at a good price in the 1890s was 
Quantambone, near Brewarrina, which was bought for sixty-six 
thousand pounds in 1897; but this was little more than an 
aberration, and in the longer term a costly one, on the 
purchasers' part.88
For the surviving squatters, and even for the finance 
houses, the bottoming of the western land market represented
95. R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence of A. Lang, p. 485.
96. Ibid., evidence of G. Frew, p. 71.
97. Ibid., evidence of H. Ryan, p. 292; for other examples see 
evidence of H. Welsh, p. 108; W. Scanlan, p. 110; D. Elder, 
p. 265; F. Eastwood, p. 296; W. Findlay, p. 420.
98. Ibid., evidence of J. Pearson, p. 145.
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the closing of a trap. The fact that they had set the trap 
themselves did nothing to make their position more palatable. 
Much as they would have liked to see the last of their western 
holdings, to sell them would entail almost as great a loss as 
to hand them back to the Crown. A few of the most desperate
squatters sold out, but others decided to hold on to their
9 9stations when they realized how poor the market was. At
various stages several of the financial institutions adopted 
realization policies under pressure from British shareholders 
and depositors, but the prices realized were so ruinous that 
even the British were soon convinced that there was little 
option but to hang on to the remaining properties until the 
market eventually l i f t e d . S o m e  finance houses were able 
to get rid of the responsibility for managing foreclosed 
holdings, and at the same time co-opt additional private
10 1capital, by offering mortgage finance to new purchasers.
But several of the companies had resigned themselves to 
managing their holdings in the long term and were using sales, 
or as a last resort forfeitures, to dispose of only the most 
unprofitable holdings and those which lay too far from their 
main groups of stations to be placed under joint manage- 
ment. As the Pastora 1ist s ' Review described the position
99. Ibid., evidence of W. Findlay, p. 420.
100. A.I.B.R., September 1901, p. 717, December 1901, p. 973; 
A.P.R., August 1897, p. 312, May 1902, p. 151; Bailey, o p . 
c i t . , p . 15 7; R.C.W.D. Minu t e s , evidence of D. Elder,
p . 2 6 6.
101. Several such transactions are recorded in N.S.W. Lands 
Department, 8/2225.
102. A.I.B.R., August 1900, p. 621; Bailey, op. c i t ., 
pp . 1 6 0 , 1 85 .
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in 1902, stations mainly changed hands "from the fellow who 
borrowed to the fellow who lent, and both wish they had never
i n ' )seen the place".
The western pastoral lessees who remained took a 
number of steps to salvage what they could from an unfavourable 
situation, accepting the fact that a substantial part of the 
capital they had invested would have to be regarded as lost.
The large pastoral finance houses with multiple western 
holdings were uniquely placed to adapt to the changing 
requirements of western pastoral production. The companies 
could use reserved earnings, or at worst calls on their share­
holders, to cover the writing-down of capital values to a point 
at which company stations would pay a reasonable rate of 
interest without heavy stocking. ^  By contrast, mortgaged
squatters usually still had to pay interest on the full 
1 0 5‘debt, and even some of the wealthiest pastoralists came
close to being bankrupted by the shrinkage of station 
values. D Having removed the pressure to maximize short­
term earnings on the stations in their possession, the 
companies were able to overhaul the operations of the stations 
to ensure steady returns, mitigate the effects of drought and 
thereby place themselves in a position to take maximum
103. A .P .R . , March 1902, p. 5.
104. See e.g. Australian Estates papers 165/5; Memo re Assets;
valuations in A.M.L.F. papers, 6/106; Cain, "Companies and 
Squatting", o p . c i t . , pp. 450, 455.
105. R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence of J. Aitken, p p . 284-5,
J. Niall, p. 287, M. Armstrong, p. 356.
106. See below p p . 213-4.
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advantage of any general improvement in climatic conditions or 
pastoral values. Few individual squatters, even those who were 
not in debt, had sufficient financial backing and diversity of 
holdings to do the same.
Even before foreclosure most of the companies had 
gone to some lengths to impose a Spartan lifestyle on their 
clients and employees by reducing absenteeism, cutting wages 
and prohibiting lending for personal expenditures. This 
emphasis continued when the stations were taken over absolut­
e l y , 107 but it was allied with other measures to maximise the 
advantage the companies could derive from the sheer size of 
their holdings. As the numbers of properties held by the 
companies increased, large groups of stations were brought 
under joint management. All the A.M.A.'s foreclosed stations 
were administered jointly, directly from the company's Austral-
1 Q  Oian office. Goldsbrough Mort had brought its ten west
10 9Darling stations under a common manager by 1900. A.E.M.
1 1 0had a block of six stations in the Cobar district, and
A.M.L.F. groups of three on the lower Darling and seven in the 
1 1 1north-west, each of which was managed as a single unit.
This practice had several advantages. It permitted 
the companies to cut expenditure on salaries for clerical and
107. Bailey, op. cit. , pp . 107, 139-40 ; for an ex ampie of an
absentee moving into residence on the holding, see Corona 
station records 51/20/2
108. A .I .B .R ., October 1899, p. 719; R .C .W .D . Minu t e s ,
evidence of L. Kiddle, p p . 254ff.
109. Cain, "Companies and Squatting", o p . c i t . , p. 446.
110. Australian Estates papers, 5/10.
111. A.M.L.F. papers 6/106; Bailey, o p . c i t . , p . 166.
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managerial staff, and probably on some skilled manual workers' 
wages as well. Sheep could also be moved from station to
station to take advantage of localized rain, to ensure that 
breeding sheep were allotted the best pastures, and to 
circumvent the hazards of the stock routes when taking sheep to 
sale. By these and other means several companies, notably
Goldsbrough Mort, were able to minimize mortality rates and 
keep their breeding sheep alive through the worst years. This 
later allowed them to capitalize on the high stock prices which 
reigned after the 1902 drought. Thus, ironically, one of
the effects of the concentration of capital during the depres­
sion was to permit the international financial institutions to 
preside over the adoption of stock management practices which 
were reminiscent of nothing so much as the techniques of 
precapitalist nomadic pastoralism.
Individual squatters were hard put to achieve a 
similar flexibility of grazing patterns. They could rent the 
grazing rights to vacant western lands; land was often let out
on this basis by homestead lessees who were unable to restock
1 1 5after droughts. Sheep were also sent to the central and
eastern districts on agistment, especially in the south where
112. For example, the A.E.M.'s six Cobar stations were run by a 
manager, an overseer, a bookkeeper, two married couples 
and eight general hands.
113. Cain, "Companies and Squatting", o p . c i t ., p. 441; Hardy, 
op . ci t . , p. 196.
114. Cain, ibid., pp. 441-2; see also A .I .B .R ., February 1903, 
p. 100, Bailey, op. c i t ., p. 179.
115. Federal Standard, 16 July 1898; R.C.W.D. M i n u t e s , evidence 
of T. Conolly, p. 4 et passim.
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stock were taken to summer pastures on the mountains. ^  ^  But 
agistment was expensive, and even within the west the ruling
price for grazing rights was in excess of the Crown 
1 1 7rental. Rented country was also hard to find, particularly
in times of general drought. Substantial rebates were
given on the railways for the carriage of starving stock^ ^
but it was still risky to move stock when they were in poor
condition, especially where they had to pass over the stock
routes for any distance. In the most severe seasons many
individual squatters could do little more than get rid of their
remaining stock and face the certain losses of restocking at
1 7 0high prices after the drought broke.
The wealthiest pastoral lessees were advantaged in 
several other ways. It was virtually impossible to mitigate 
the effects of drought and environmental deterioration on the 
cheap. In areas where sand-drift was coupled with an increase 
in the population of wild dogs, or where scrub growth was
thick, stations were restocked with cattle rather than with 
17 1sheep; during the drought years this was an expensive and
12 2often risky step to take. Artificial feeding was necessary
116. See e.g. A.P.R., October 1899, p. 440.
117. Ibid., May 1899, p. 141.
118. Ibid., June 1897, p. 175; January 1902, p. 739; March 1902 
p. 1; at some stages Western Division pastoralists found 
it necessary to purchase land elsewhere for their stock 
(A.I.B.R., December 1898, p. 823).
119. Starving stock were carried at half rates, stock feed and 
sheep for boiling down at quarter rates (A.P.R., June 
1897, p. 178).
120. Foley, o p . c i t . , p. 61.
121. Alexander and Williams, e d . , op. c i t ., p p . 56-7; A.P.R.,
June 1896, p. 211.
See e.g. Australian Estates papers, 5/16.1 2 2 .
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to keep flocks alive through some of the worst seasons, and the 
price of forage soared in response to the increased demand 
until in some cases hay was almost as dear as f l o u r . E v e n  
when artificial feed was given only to breeding sheep, horses 
and working bullocks the bill could be high. Nevertheless the 
use of hand-feeding was widespread, particularly during the 
1902 drought. A.M.L.F., by then the largest single Western 
Division lessee, spent £42,000 in that year to keep stock 
losses to 26.5% on its own and 30% on is clients' 
stations. Goldsbrough Mort, with expenditures of fourteen
thousand pounds, or 34% or its station budget, on "drought and 
other" expenses, had losses of 21.4%. 125 Even though A.E.M.'s 
stations were close to the eastern edge of the region, this 
company too spent four thousand pounds on artificial feed in 
1902, keeping losses to 21.8% but failing to save many of its 
breeding sheep, including half the rams on its Cobar group of
1 O  Choldings. Those graziers who could not afford expenditures
on such a scale resorted to feeding their sheep on anything
from home brews of straw and molasses to boiled prickly 
1 2 7pear.
With the extraordinary expenses necessitated by 
drought and the increased maintenance costs occasioned by sand
123. While flour was sold at about £10-12 per ton, forage
prices ranged from £7 to £10 per ton in 1900 (R .C .W .D .
Minutes, evidence of M. Feehan , p. 15; J. Thomas, p. 17;
F . Bacon . p . 15 1).
124. Bailey, op. c i t . , p. 179.
125. Cain, Companies and Squatting", op. cit., p p . 443-5, 456.
126. Australian Estates papers, station reports.
127. A.P.R., September 1899, p. 399, May 1902, p. 140.
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drift and noxious scrub growth, the most ruthless cost-cutting
could not produce expenditure reductions commensurate with the
stations' falling output. In spite of some variations in
practice, evidence from company and private stations is
congruent with the pattern noted by Cain in Goldsbrough Mort's
case; basic working expenses exclusive of drought outlays were
reduced, but ordinary expenses per head of sheep crept upwards
12 8even before drought outlays sent them soaring.
The cost-price squeeze in which western pastoralism 
had been caught during the latter 1880s and early 1890s had 
been principally the result of mounting interest bills and 
falling wool and stock prices. In the 1895 to 1902 period the 
pressure was maintained by the inflexibility of station 
expenditures, even excluding interest payments, coupled with 
falling output. The general upward trend in wool prices after 
mid-decade was not sufficient to counterbalance this. From the 
trough of 1894 wool prices rose gradually and uncertainly until 
1899, when a brief boom was stimulated by speculation in
Europe, only to be cut short by lagging demand and financial
12 9instability on the Continent. Prices plummeted close to
their mid-1890s level in late 1899 and 1900 before resuming an 
12 0upward course.
128. Cain, "Companies and Squatting", o p . c i t . , p. 445. Outlays 
per head for A.M.L.F. stations are given in A.M.L.F. 
papers, 6/106, and Australian Estates station reports show 
a similar pattern (see Appendix C ) .
129. See A.P.R., March 1900, p .1; June 1900, p. 251.
130. Ibid. , August 1900, p. 331, September 1900 p. 456, October
1 90 0 p . 47 3 .
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The extent to which western pastoral lessees shared 
in the benefits of the general upturn varied widely. Fluctua­
tions in output were mainly responsible for the variations, but 
throughout the period the wool market was distinctly unstable 
and the timing of sale could also prove important. The range 
of variation was illustrated by the differing experiences of 
the pastoral finance companies during the 1899 boom. Both 
N.Z.L.M.A. and Goldsbrough Mort caught the rise with reasonable 
clips, the later lifting its gross earnings from ten stations
1 O Iby 15% over the previous year; A.E.M. sold some of its
wool at a good price, but enormous losses on its east Darling
holdings sent its western stations' wool cheque plummeting by 
13 256% ; part of the A.M.L.F. clip arrived too late for the
boom and the company's earnings from its lower and west Darling 
properties fell slightly as a result ; and A.M.A. made an 
ill-advised decision to ship its wool to London, with the 
result that the clip was still in transit when the boom 
collapsed. At the individual station level fluctuations
were even more violent and their pattern more difficult to 
discern. But in spite of intra-regiona1 variations in timing 
and extent, the available station records indicate that gross 
wool proceeds failed to recover from their level of the 
mid-1890s, and in several cases fell well below it, because
131. Cain, "Companies and Squatting", op. c i t . , p. 443; on 
N.Z.L.M.A. see A.I.B.R., December 1900, p. 947.
132. Australian Estates station reports; see also A .I .B .R ., 
October 1900, p. 783.
133. A.M.L.F. papers, 6/106.
134. A.I.B.R., October 1900, p p . 775, 780.
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1 -) cof the reductions in output occasioned by the drought. Nor
were western stations able to bridge the gap by stock sales as 
they had in the 1 880s.  ^^
This is not to suggest that squatting on the plains 
had become completely unprofitable; on the contrary, if capital 
losses are not taken into consideration most stations yielded a 
surplus over operating expenses for the drought period as a 
whole. However, working cash surpluses were not always as high 
as those found by Cain on Goldsbrough Mort's ten western 
stations, which together yielded an average of £24,100 per year 
from 1896 to 1902, representing 2.5% on the company's capital 
investment. J Goldsbrough Mort were fortunate in 1899 (a 
year which alone accounted for 36% of the total cash surplus) 
and the company was probably favoured by the geographical 
spread of its holdings and exceptionally good management of 
flocks. A.E.M., by contrast, with its holdings concentrated in 
the scrubby country around Cobar and its heavy stock losses 
before the 1899 shearing, earned only £9,200 on average from 
six stations in 1895-99 and £3,700 from ten stations in 1900- 
02; overall, this represented a return of about one per
I O Ocent. Some individual stations were yielding far less;
Tindarey, for example, in spite of a company investment of 
£191,000, made a net loss during the last three years and by
135. Australian Estates station reports; A.M.L.F. papers 
6/106.
136. Australian Estates and A.M.L.F. papers, loc. c i t .; cf.
pp . 80 , 86 above.
137. Cain, "Companies and Squatting", op. cit., p. 448.
138. Australian Estates papers, station reports. See Appendix B.
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1 -3 Q1902 was c a r r y i n g  on ly 3,600 s he ep .
W h i l e  the c o m p a n i e s '  s t r i c t  r e g i m e  had  e v i d e n t l y  
f a i l e d  to r e s t o r e  the s h o r t - t e r m  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of t h e i r  
h o l d i n g s ,  the l o n g - t e r m  c o n s e q u e n c e s  of p a s t u r e  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  
a r o u s e d  fu r t h e r  c o n c e r n .  W i t h  s a n d - d r i f t  in the w e s t  of the 
r e g i o n  and scrub g r o w t h  in the east, the r e m a i n i n g  l e s s e e s  were  
b e c o m i n g  a w a r e  th at to i n c r e a s e  p r o f i t s  and  a c c o m m o d a t e  g r e a t e r  
f l oc ks  on th eir  w e s t e r n  h o l d i n g s  a f t e r  the d r o u g h t  t h e y  w o u l d  
h a v e  to p u m p  in m o r e  m o n e y  to r e p a i r  d a m a g e d  f e n c i n g  a n d  
w a t e r i n g  f a c i l i t i e s  a nd  cl e a r  o v e r g r o w n  land. The c o m p a n i e s  
we re  r e l u c t a n t  to f i n a n c e  this on t h e i r  o wn or t h e i r  cli en ts '  
h o l d i n g s  u n l e s s  h i g h e r  r e t u r n s  c o u l d  be e x p e c t e d .  But t he re  
was scope for r e t u r n s  to be l i f t e d  a n d the v a l u e  of w e s t e r n  
s t a t i o n s  to be i n c r e a s e d  by g o v e r n m e n t  c o n c e s s i o n s  o v e r  ren t al  
and  te nu re;  and in the late 1890s the s q u a t t i n g  l o b b y ' s  h a n d  
was s t r e n g t h e n e d  by the f i n a n c e  c o m p a n i e s '  i m p l i e d  t h r e a t  to 
w i t h h o l d  i n v e s t m e n t  fr o m the r e g i o n  a n d  let the w e s t e r n  la nd s  
be a b a n d o n e d  u n l e s s  the g o v e r n m e n t  e x t r i c a t e d  the w e s t e r n  
l e s s e e s  from th e ir  p r e d i c a m e n t .
The w e s t e r n  s q u a t t i n g  l o b b y  h a d  m a d e  some g a i n s  from  
the 1895 L a n d  Act. The Ac t ' s  p r o v i s i o n  for r e a p p r a i s a l  of 
W e s t e r n  D i v i s i o n  r e n t a l s  h ad  r e s u l t e d  in a g e n e r a l  r e d u c t i o n ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  for some of the p o o r e r  h o l d i n g s . ^  ^  W e s t e r n
139. I b i d . , 5/16.
140. See e.g. c o m m e n t s  q u o t e d  in A . I . B . R . ,  D e c e m b e r  1901,
p . 996 .
141. The rent r e d u c t i o n s  are shown  in R . C . W . D .  R e t u r n  Z. For 
c o m m e n t ,  see A . P . R . ,  June 1895, p. 166, S e p t e m b e r  1896,
p . 350 .
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Division leases were also extended for seven years, lessees 
were given the right to compensation for improvements taken 
over by smallholders, and some of the more remote pastoral 
leases in areas where closer settlement was unlikely to be 
viable were restored to their pre-1884 dimensions by the
1 A 0attachment of the resumed area to the leasehold.
But the squatters remained dissatisfied. As the 
drought dragged on and the western flock dwindled, the 
government's assessments of Western Division runs' carrying 
capacities began to appear over-optimistic , and Crown rents 
began to consume a large proportion of the stations' profits. 
On six A.E.M. stations, for example, Crown rents in 1898 and 
1899 amounted to one and a half times the return the company 
gained from the stations. The collapse of the 1899 wool
boom and the heavy losses sustained during that season spurred 
the squatting lobby to mount a major campaign in 1900. The 
campaign was carefully orchestrated; it was initiated by a 
series of Sydney Morning Herald articles, written by a co­
operative publicist, aimed at creating an atmosphere of public
14 4alarm at the state of the western districts. These were
followed by public meetings in the major western towns, which 
called on the government to establish a Royal Commission to
142. A .P .R . , April 1 895 , pp . 94-5, May 1 895, p. 144; Coghlan,
op. c i t . , p p . 1974-5; Lamb, o p . c i t . , p p . 67-8.
143. Australian Estates station reports.
144. Sydney Morning Herald, 23 November 1899; these articles 
were supposedly subsidized by contributions from the 
squatters (R.C.W.D. Min u t e s , evidence of P. Oakden,
p . 99 ) .
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14 5inquire into the plight of the western tenants. When the
government acceded to this demand, local meetings and publicity 
in the Pastora1ists1 Review were used to focus squatters' 
evidence to the Commission around four demands - the granting 
of new forty-two year leases, the setting of reduced rents to 
apply for the duration of the lease, the recognition of 
lessees' right to compensation for improvements at the 
expiration of the term, and the extension of Western Division 
conditions to the purely pastoral areas nearby in the Central 
D i v i s i o n . T h e  squatting lobby was also careful not to 
antagonize the powerful closer settlement lobby; homestead 
lessees were invited to many of the local meetings, and the 
Pastoralists' Review urged squatters not to take a strong
position against the extension of the maximum area permitted to
14 7be taken up as a homestead lease.
On the whole the activists were fairly successful in 
marshalling opinion behind these demands; but the government, 
and the Legislative Assembly members who dominated the Royal 
C o m m i s s i o n , h a d  preoccupations of their own. Though they 
were concerned at the possible problems of pest control and the 
reduction of Crown revenues which would attend the abandonment 
of the western lands, they were also inclined to feel that the
145. A .P .R . , April 1900, p. 70, May 1900, p. 133.
146. Ibid., June 1900, p. 224.
147. Ibid., August 1900, p. 382.
148. Though McMaster, the chairman of the Commission, was a 
Lands Department official, the remainder of the 
Commission's members were parliamentarians, prominent 
among them Willis, a Bourke newspaper proprietor of 
populist leanings, and Spence, the A.W.U. leader.
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squatters had contributed to their own downfall by over­
stocking, and they were most reluctant to grant concessions 
unconditionally, fearing that the finance companies would take 
advantage of them to expropriate the remaining squatters.
Their misgivings were reinforced by the evidence of a
handful of mavericks, several of them dispossessed pastoral-
ists, who criticized the high interest rates and high-handed
14 9treatment imposed by the finance companies. One went so
far as to describe the finance houses in these terms:
"They have oppressed us, and made our lives bitter.
You can hardly call your soul your own. They drive a 
man to desolation, to desperation, drink and suicide."^ ^
Such unpardonable breaches of etiquette brought wrathful 
retorts from the Pastora 1ist s 1 R e v i e w , which staunchly denied 
the existence of any conflict of interest between squatters and 
the finance the houses. Nor did the notion of the Crown's
intervening in any way to limit the finance houses' ability to 
foreclose appeal to the remaining squatters; for, as Quin of 
Tarella put it:
"You cannot deal with a man who has lent money to
another; if the conditions are not favourable he will
1 5 2button up his pockets and refuse to lend."
Nevertheless, the Royal Commission's fear of large-scale 
dispossessions overrode any concern at the possibility of the
149. R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence of D. Hatten, p p . 10-12,
W. Bedford, p p . 79-81, W. Lindsay, p. 182.
150. Ibid., evidence of E. Killen, p. 333.
151. A .P .R ., October 1900, p p . 480, 509.
152. R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence of E. Quin, p. 253.
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f i n a n c e  house s' r e f u s i n g  to m a k e  a d d i t i o n a l  loan c a p i t a l  
a v a i l a b l e .  The C o m m i s s i o n ' s  c o n c e s s i o n s  to the s q u a t t i n g  
i n t e r e s t  w er e  m a d e  s u b j e c t  to the c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  t he y  s h o u l d  
o n l y  a p p l y  to m o r t g a g e d  runs a f t e r  the m o r t g a g o r ,  the m o r t g a g e e  
a nd  the Cr o w n  h ad  r e a c h e d  a g r e e m e n t  on the a d j u s t m e n t  of the 
c o n d i t i o n s  a t t a c h i n g  to the debt; a nd f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
w er e  to be r e q u i r e d  to gi v e  g u a r a n t e e s  t h at  t h e y  w o u l d  m a k e  use
of the la nd in the b e s t  w a y p o s s i b l e  b e f o r e  t h e i r  h o l d i n g s  were
1STb r o u g h t  u n d e r  ne w c o n d i t i o n s .
The C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e p o r t  d e p a r t e d  f rom  the s qu at t er s'  
w i s h e s  in s e v e r a l  o t h e r  ways. T h o u g h  r e d u c e d  f i x e d  re nt s  a n d  
n e w  f o r t y - t w o  ye ar l e a s e s  w ere  s u g g e s t e d ,  t e n a n t - r i g h t  was o n l y  
r e c o m m e n d e d  on a l i m i t e d  n u m b e r  of i m p r o v e m e n t s .  H ow ev e r ,  w h e n  
the bill  r e a c h e d  the c o m m i t t e e  s ta g e  in the L e g i s l a t i v e  
A s s e m b l y ,  it was a m e n d e d  to i n c l u d e  m o s t  m a j o r  s t a t i o n  s t r u c t ­
u r e s  as well as r i n g b a r k i n g  and s c r u b b i n g . 1 The C o m m i s s i o n  
di d n ot  r e c o m m e n d  a ny  m a j o r  a l t e r a t i o n  to the b o u n d a r i e s  of the 
W e s t e r n  D i v i s i o n .  A nd  th e r e  was some i n d i g n a t i o n  at the p o w e r s  
g i v e n  in the i n i t i a l  bi ll to the W e s t e r n  La nd s C o m m i s s i o n ,  
w h i c h  was set up to o v e r s e e  the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  of the new 
c o n d i t i o n s  of t e n u r e  and to s u p e r v i s e  the o c c u p a t i o n  of the 
W e s t e r n  D i v i s i o n  t h e r e a f t e r ,  e q u i p p e d  w i th  the p o w e r  to s p e c i f y  
s t o c k  c e i l i n g s  and o r d e r  p a s t o r a l i s t s  to i n s t a l l  i m p r o v e m e n t s  
on p a i n  of f o r f e i t u r e . T h i s  a t t e m p t  to e s t a b l i s h  some
153. A . P . R . , Dec em b e r 190 1 / P • 688; R . C . W . D .  R e po rt ,
15 4.
pp . x i x 
A . P . R . ,
- xxi . 
Dec embe r 190 1 / P • 690 .
155. I b i d ., Dec e m b e r 1901, P • 689 .
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control over the exploitation of the western lands was aborted 
at the committee stage after intensive lobbying by the 
squatting i n t e r e s t . T o  compensate for this and other 
additional concessions to the squatting lobby, the bill was 
amended to provide for resumptions up to one-eighth of the area 
of a pastoral lease where the land was required for closer 
settlement. The Western Lands Act of 1902 as it finally 
emerged embodied three of the four demands presented by the 
squatters : they had gained an effective tenant-right in
improvements, provision had been made for rent reductions to 
boost the flagging profits of western holdings, and they were 
assured of undisturbed occupation of their stations, excepting 
minor resumptions, until 1943.
Furthermore, in spite of the Royal Commission's 
caveats it was impossible to prevent the new Act from 
conferring advantages on the already advantaged pastoral 
capitalists. The pastoral finance houses had little difficulty 
in complying with the conditions set down for inclusion under
the new Act, and only four company or bank stations were
15 7finally refused coverage. No information has been found on
the arrangements made for mortgaged stations where agreement on 
the writing-down of the debt was required; but no matter how
156. Ibid., December 1901, p. 690.
157. N.S.W. Lands Department papers, 8/2225. The holdings 
concerned were Tarcoola (A.M.L.F.), Tiltagara and 
Connulpie Downs (A.E.M. or U.M.A.), and Cuthero (Bank of 
New South W a l e s ) . Murrin (Murray and Sanderson) and Lake 
Victoria (A.M.L.F.) were initially refused but later 
granted coverage.
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much was written off the debts of the mortgagors who retained 
possession of their holdings, the Act's once-off provision for 
debt adjustment could neither act as a brake on future dispos­
sessions nor restore control over the western lands to the 
squatters who had already been ousted. By the time the Act was 
introduced a major shift in the distribution of control over 
the western pastoral industry had already occurred. Many of 
the self-made men, the squatting pioneers who had amassed 
fortunes in the boom years and squandered them on stations in 
the outback of New South Wales and Queensland, had been 
dispossessed or bankrupted. Their place was taken by the 
companies and a handful of speculative investors who bought 
stations at bedrock values during the drought years in antici­
pation of their gaining value after the drought.
The Lands Department register of Western Division
pastoral leases shows 125 pastoral leases (40.7% of the total
1 S Rnumber) as being held by companies at the end of 1902. No
distinction is made between mortgagees and absolute holders, 
but evidence from the Royal Commission minutes and elsewhere 
indicates that a substantial majority, possibly two-thirds, of 
these stations were held absolutely by the companies. The 
position of the sixty-eight properties (22.1% of the total) 
registered as held by banks is less clear, as the banks were 
generally reluctant to detail their foreclosures, but it seems 
that the banks held a smaller proportion of their stations
158. These and later figures are based on ibid., 8/2225-6.
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absolutely than did the finance companies, though with varia-
1 C Qtions from one bank to another. This was partly a result
of the banks' attempting to offload stations by foreclosure, 
sale and remortgage, as well as their willingness to advance 
funds on the security of western leaseholds purchased by 
speculators during the drought, presumably at low prices. On 
15% of the bank stations the original lessees had been dis­
placed by one or other of these means immediately prior to the
a rtaking out of a mortgage. ou
Nor did the original lessees necessarily survive on 
the forty-eight stations (15.6% of the total) held by partner- 
ships or the sixty-six (21.5%) held in individuals' names. D 
Some of these registrations were mere legal fictions; some of 
the U.M.A.'s stations were held in the name of a partnership 
involving the chairman of the London board, and Queensland 
Estates Ltd. had its two stations registered under the names of 
a Mr. Keating and of a partnership of which this gentleman was 
a m e m b e r . M o r e  significantly, only on 52% of the partner­
ship holdings and 44% of the individuals' stations had any
159. For example, in 1900 the Australian Joint Stock Bank held 
five of its eight Western Division runs absolutely, while 
the Commercial Banking Company of Sydney was working only 
one of seventeen holdings registered in its name (see 
R.C.W.D. Summary, pp. 89-96) .
160. N.S.W. Lands Department records, 8/2225.
161. For these purposes, properties held by the executors of 
individuals' estates are regarded as being held by
individuals.
162. N.S.W. Lands Department records, 8/2225, cf. R.C.W.D. 
Minutes, evidence of H. Ryan, p. 292.
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continuity of ownership been retained since 1890,163 and it 
is likely that even if some of these cases private lenders had 
begun with a purely financial involvement and later taken over 
station management. Since the onset of drought in 1895, 34% of
the partnership and 42% of the individual holdings had changed 
hands, most of them by sale and a minority by private mortgage. 
In all, at least 27% of the partnership and 12% of the indiv­
idual holdings were registered in the names of men who had 
originally taken them up as mortgagees ; many of these
appear to have been held absolutely by the erstwhile lenders at 
the end of the drought.
The situation was similar in the western Riverina. 
Many of the 1880s squatters were squeezed out by foreclosure 
and by the accumulation of land in the hand of a small number 
of private investors, several of whom had little previous 
involvement in the pastoral industry. Throughout the interior 
of the eastern colonies a new generation of speculators who had 
been fortunate enough to be excluded by the high entry costs of 
the industry during the Long Boom was moving in, often with the 
assistance of the omnipresent finance houses, to pick up some 
of the remnants of the boom-time squatting empires. A few
163. Ownership is taken as being continuous where holdings 
remain in the hands of an individual or unchanged 
partnership, are transferred by way of inheritance or are 
held by partnerships with at least one common member 
throughout the period.
164. This may be an underestimate, as it is clear from the 
transfers to pastoral finance companies that not all 
mortgages were recorded as such.
165. Indicated by the fact that several were subsequently 
disposed of without reference to the original lessees.
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amassed sizeable fortunes from these beginnings. Along the 
eastern edge of the region, and especially in the western 
Riverina, the old squatting runs were subdivided after the 
drought for sale as medium-sized grazing and mixed farming 
properties. Further west Sidney Kidman began his land­
owning career by purchasing three Corner runs after they had 
been forfeited; 0/ by using western stations in conjunction 
with his stock-dealing and butchering business, as had Tyson
before him, Kidman eventually built up an empire which included
1 ftabout a third of the west Darling country. This process
should not be viewed in Social Darwinist terms, as the
progressive elimination of all but the most effective and
16 9expert pastoral managers. Pastoral expertise had long
been a commodity and the manager an employee, or at best a 
junior partner whose eventual transition to finance company 
employee was virtually painless. "Survival" in control of a 
holding through the drought was principally a function of the 
pastora1i s t 's access to capital, preferably from sources which 
had nothing whatsoever to do with outback squatting.
Among the squatters who held on to their properties, 
even if mortgaged, the men who entered the industry during the 
1880s are conspicuously absent. Having sunk their fortunes and 
contracted debts to cover the inflated costs of land purchase
166. Ronald, op. c i t . , passim.
167. N.S.W. Lands Department, 8/2225.
168. See Hardy, op. cit., p p . 231-4.
169. R.L. Heathcote seems to be advancing such a notion in "The 
Pastoral Ethic", in N. Harper, e d . , Pacific C i r c l e , 2, St 
Lucia, 1972. p. 50.
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and station equipment during the boom, they were among the 
first to be eliminated when they failed to pay interest or 
suffered stock losses. Only a handful of the wealthiest boom­
time purchasers, most of them with outside investments, were 
still around in 1902.170 Even the ranks of the squatting 
families who had carved up the region between them in the 1860s 
and 1870s were noticeably thinned. Those who profited most out 
of their outback ventures were the prudent investors - Barr 
Smith, the Fairbairns, Dangars, Brodribbs and others - who
quickly sold their western holdings and withdrew to better-
1 7 1watered districts or into the realms of pastoral finance.
Those who let the inexorable spiral of land speculation carry 
them into the outback of New South Wales and Queensland su f­
fered heavily. The Kennedys had lost many of their stations, 
having been ousted from the west Darling by the A.M.L.F. in 
1898-9 after the death of their p a t r i a r c h . D e s p i t e  his 
familial connections Tom Patterson, immortalized as the ideal 
employer in "Flash Jack from G u n d agai", left his dependents 
penniless on his death in 1 90 2 . ^7  ^ Charles Fisher's exten­
sive interests in western New South Wales, Queensland and the 
Northern Territory sent him bankrupt in 1895, with debts of 
£1.5 million and assets of barely half that amount The
170. See e.g. biographical notes on F. Armytage (A .D .B .,
vol 3, p. 52) and Samuel McCaughey (Crowley, o p . c i t . , 
p . 298 ) .
171. See e.g. A.D.B., vol 3, pp. 237-9 (Brodribb), vol 4,
p. 147 (Fairbairn); A.P.R., December 1891, p. 369 (Dangar)
172. Bailey, op. c i t ., p p . 139-40.
173. Randell, o p . c i t . , p p . 182-3.
174. A.D.B., vol 4, p. 249.
-2 14 -
estate of William Taylor, whose interests had extended from
Keilor to the Queensland interior during the boom, was found to
be in deficit when he died in 1 903 . W.H. Suttor , founding
president of the New South Wales Pastoralists1 Union, was also
17 6close to bankruptcy by the turn of the century.
But though the depression highlighted the ultimate 
dependence engendered by the squatters' status as privileged 
borrowers during the boom, shreds of the old privilege 
remained. The financial institutions were reluctant to provoke 
confrontations, especially with their more powerful clients. 
Many squatters were compensated handsomely for the surrender of
worthless equities, or employed on high salaries as managers of
17 7the holdings they had once owned. Lesser pastoralists
were still able to invoke the support of powerful kin to gain a
stay of execution, and financiers often waited until their more
17 8prominent clients died before foreclosing on their estates.
In few cases did financiers make a vigorous attempt to recoup
their capital by asserting claims over squatters' other 
17 9assets. And as the depression drew on through the long,
17 5. Ibid., v o 1 6 , p . 249 .
1 76 . Ibid., v o 1 6 , p . 229 .
177. See e.g. A . P . R . , October 1897, p. 402, March 1898, p • 3 ;
R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence of M. F eehan, p. 16, C.
Ma c Phe r son , p . 9 1 , M. Armstrong, p. 114, J. Niall, p . 23 7 .
178. Bailey , op . c i t . , pp. 140, 163; W. Rodier to J.H.
Patterson , 19 April 1900 in J.H. Patterson papers, private
correspondence, Topar station; R.C.W.D. M i n u t e s , evidence 
of W. Palmer p. 48, L. Kiddle p. 258.
179. See e.g. A .I .B .R ., October 1898, p. 667 (report on
A.M.L.F.'s absolving MacBain's partners and executors of 
any liability for losses incurred in relation to their 
Western Riverina properties) and notes on the same 
company's treatment of Henry Ricketson's heirs in H. Peck, 
Memoirs of a Stockman, Melbourne, 1942. p. 124.
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agonizing denouement of drought some squatters were only too
i o nrelieved to walk away from their desolate runs.
The process was not without its casualties. At least 
one squatter suicided, and others sought oblivion in 
alcohol. ^  ^ Nor could the financial institutions entirely 
avoid the odium which attended their occasional legal battles 
with recalcitrant clients. But on the whole the ousting
of the western squatters proceeded with remarkably little fuss, 
and radical nationalists' appeals for a crusade against foreign 
bankers found little sympathy in squatting circles. For those 
pastoralists who had remained in possession of their mortgaged 
holdings, whether in the western districts or elsewhere in the 
colonies, to attack one's creditors was a distinctly risky 
operation; in any event it was widely felt that a man's debts 
were his own responsibility, and a rather shameful matter which 
was best not aired publicly. Even among those who had lost all 
their holdings there were many who, as well-paid employees of 
the finance houses, enjoyed the shadow if not the substance of 
their erstwhile social status and retained a close identific­
ation with the interests of the squatting clique. And it was 
this clique's abiding conviction that the demise of outback 
pastoralism was principally attributable to the impositions 
inflicted on the squatting interest by a State which was
180. R.C.W.D. M i n u t e s , evidence of M. Armstrong, p. 114, 
J. Niall, p. 236, E. Quin, p. 252.
181. A.P.R., February 1893, p. 1052.
182. See e.g. Bailey, o p . c i t ., p . 137; R.C.W.D. Min u t e s ,
evidence of J. Cousins, p. 43.
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subservient to the illegimate aspirations of organized labour 
and the envy of the pe11y-bourgeoisie .
The Demise of the Pastoral Frontier : Western Life, 1891-1902
The frontier life of the Long Boom years, though 
later bestowed with the timeless quality of legend, was as 
ephemeral as the pastoral prosperity which produced it. The 
flock increases of the 1880s, the headlong rush to equip the 
back blocks in 1879-82 and the defensive investments of the 
latter boom years had created a strong demand for manual 
labour. However, the introduction of fencing and watering and 
the increasing emphasis on short-term, specialised contract 
work had permitted the squatters to circumvent some of the wage 
pressures arising from labour shortages. Permanent station 
hands were left with only the 1east- ski11e d , poorly paid work, 
while seasonal and construction workers were required to shift 
around from station to station in their own time and at their 
own expense. By thus fragmenting station labour and minimising 
the idle time for which workers had to be paid, the pastoral- 
ists were able to reap much of the benefit of increased labour 
productivity.
Outback living conditions were generally poor. The 
thrust of westward expansion had outrun the provision of any 
but the most rudimentary services. Housing was primitive even
I Q  Oby contemporary standards; transport and communications
183. Discussed in more detail p p . 222-3 below
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were erratic away from the railheads and waterways; outside the 
towns health care was largely confined to home cures and patent 
medicines and educational facilities were seldom available 
except to families who could afford a private tutor or gover- 
ness; and the monotony of life on the isolated stations
was broken only by occasional race-meetings, visits to town
18 5and, naturally, the annual holiday spree.
In the areas served by the river trade supplies were
erratic, and profiteers lost no opportunity to force the price
18 6of food up when the rivers ran low. Many of the common
forms of non-market, household-based production - growing 
vegetables, keeping a cow or setting up a small orchard - were 
impossible without irrigation; and although Chinese market 
gardeners quickly established themselves in most of the towns, 
fresh fruit and vegetables were seldom obtainable in the back
country, with the result that bushworkers were exposed to the
1 R 7hazards of scurvy and other deficiency diseases. Perma­
nent station hands were paid partly in kind, customarily 
receiving a pound a week plus their keep and sometimes a cash 
bonus to stay on the station during the shearing season; they
184. Hardy, op. c i t . , p p . 204-5; R.C.W.D. Summary, p. 19; on
education in the back country generally see S. Smith and 
G. Spaull, History of Education in New South Wales 1788- 
1925, Sydney, 1925. p p . 180ff.
185. On which see Bean, op. cit., p p . 208-9 , 2 1 4 .
186. See e.g. C. Proud, The Murray and Darling Trade in 1883, 
Adelaide, 1883. p. 24; Tibooburra T e l e graph, 10 February 
1 8 9 1 .
187. Jervis, "North-Western Plains", op. cit., pp . 208 , 236-7 .
On the role of non-market production in nineteenth century 
industrial societies, see H. Braverman, Labor and 
Monopoly Capital, New York, 1974. p p . 271ff.
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were thus unlikely to starve on the station, even if a diet of 
damper and mutton left something to be desired. But they were 
dependent on their employers in the extreme. Station employees 
often had no option but to purchase any additional items they 
might require from station stores which commonly charged high 
prices and enforced a prohibition on the consumption of 
alcohol, and any thought a station employee might have of
bringing a wife with him was contingent on the employer's
1 ft 8agreeing to employ her or provide extra rations.
Seasonal and contract workers, too, were usually
sentenced to celibacy for the duration of their stints on the
stations; wives and dependents were left behind in the western
towns or in the more easterly districts. To keep up their
recruitment of workers from outside the district employers in
the west generally offered higher rates than their eastern
counterparts, especially in times of severe labour 
1 ft ftshortage, but such shortages became less common in the
latter 1880s as rural construction slowed. The earnings of 
contract workers varied widely. There were heavy skill 
loadings for some occupations; for example, a competent shearer 
on the standard western piece-rate of twenty shillings per 
hundred could probably expect to earn about two and a half 
times as much as an adult shed hand, and the differential was 
greater if one considers that both had to pay equally for their
188. Cannon, Life in the Country, op. c i t ., p p . 45, 53; Murphy
op. cit., p. 32.
189. Coghlan, op. cit., p p . 1239, 1441-2 gives some rates.
- 2  1 9 -
keep."'^ With payment by piece-rates widespread in 
construction, shearing, clearing and vermin destruction, 
individual workers' earnings were heavily dependent upon their 
speed and efficiency. A large element of luck was involved 
when piece-rates were paid, as any number of unforeseen
problems could halt the work; erratic supplies of materials
19 1disrupted construction work in the early 1880s, and
shearing was always subject to the vagaries of the weather.
The higher western rates were also partly offset by the time 
workers had to spend travelling, often on foot, from station to 
station.
On the whole, taking temporary work in the outback 
was something of a gamble. But for skilled workers, provided 
they could tolerate the living conditions and secure a 
consistent supply of work, potential earnings were high. A 
single contract on a large western run might mean several 
months' continuous work, and was therefore far preferable to 
shopping around for short contracts on the smaller stations 
further east. Doubtless there were many whose expectations 
were not fulfilled, young men who headed for the outback 
confidently anticipating that they would dazzle the west with
190. Pastoralists' Review data on sheep numbers per stand and 
duration of shearing for a few western stations indicate 
that average earnings were in the vicinity of £3/10/- per 
week (A.P.R., August 1892, p. 759, July 1894, p. 259, 
August 1894, p. 313). Shed hands' wages were in the 
range of 25/- to 30/- a week, and less for juniors. On 
the other hand, shed hands did at least receive their pay 
during delays in the shearing.
191. Butlin in Barnard, e d . , o p . c i t ., p. 337; Butlin, 
I.A.E.D., op. c i t . , p. 107.
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their shearing prowess only to find themselves working as 
pickers-up or tar-boys for a pound a week. But there were 
others, especially among the struggling sma11-h o 1d e r s , for whom 
a sojourn in the outback provided a much-needed supplement to
1 Q  Othe family income. Even the austerity of station life had
a certain advantage, in that one had to exercise some ingenuity 
to avoid saving while actually on the job; and though after six 
weeks or more incarcerated on an outback run there was 
obviously a strong temptation to celebrate one's release with 
an uproarious session at the nearest shanty, those who had 
something to save for could expect to find a tidy sum at their
1 Q  Odisposal. With all this the outback came to occupy a
unique place in colonial workers' life and lore. For many it 
offered a rare opportunity to escape from the monotonous 
drudgery of unskilled labour in the cities and on the farms; 
for others it provided a refuge in a more personal sense, a 
haven of anonymity where they could leave behind them the 
unwanted consequences of past misdemeanours or the 
oppressiveness of an unsatisfactory domestic life. But to
treat the outback as the apotheosis of contemporary colonial 
society is a nonsense. The frontier was moulded powerfully by 
the very disparity between conditions there and life on the 
"inside track"; its distinctive way of life could only be
192. J. Merritt, "W.G. Spence and the 1890 Maritime Strike",
in Historical Studies, 1 5, 60 , 1 973 . pp . 594-5 .
193. The growing frugality of bu shworkers' habits is mentioned 
by R. Ward The Australian Legend, Melbourne, 1 966, pp . 
188-91.
194. See Bean, op. cit., p. ix.
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sustained while it remained incidental to the experience of the 
bulk of the colonial population, which was concentrated in the 
urban areas and along the seaboard. The collapse of the urban 
boom therefore had immediate and disastrous consequences for 
the f rontier.
With the aid of the 1891 census one can sketch out 
the lineaments of western New South Wales society as it stood 
on the brink of depression and industrial confrontation. By 
the time the census was taken in March 1891 the thrust of 
pastoral expansion and the Broken Hill mining boom had been 
exhausted; the western labour market was weakening as unemp­
loyed from the seaboard and Victoria drifted west in search of 
work. Within a few months, with the onset of the shearing 
season and the 1891 shearers' strike, the influx of unemployed 
was to become a flood of strike-breaking labour, enabling the 
pastoralists to inflict a crushing defeat on the organized 
seasonal workers. When examining the census results it is thus 
necessary to bear in mind that the census probably included an 
unusually large number of new recruits to the region, but that 
many members of the usual seasonal workforce would not yet have 
come to the west, or if employed there during the off-season 
may have been recorded as being engaged in non-pastoral 
pursuits. However, this qualification notwithstanding, the
census provides an invaluable glimpse of the society of the
1 9 5plains at the close of the Long Boom.
195. Summaries of some census data are at Appendix C.
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Though with a total population of a little more than
sixty-two thousand the western districts remained sparsely
inhabited,  ^^  they had undergone a massive population growth
in the preceding decade. Since the census of 1881 the Western
Division's population had increased at an average rate of 10.2%
19 7per annum, the total increase for the decade being 163.3%.
As might be expected, much of the increase had been drawn from
among men of working age, with the result that males comprised
64.5% of the total population and the male population was
19 8concentrated in the twenty to thirty-nine age group. The
excess of males was not the only feature which suggested that 
western settlement was rather impermanent and had been estab­
lished in some haste. The provision of housing had not kept 
pace with population growth. Tents made up 30.5% of the total 
housing stock, and even the more permanent dwellings were
seldom constructed of durable materials such as brick and 
1 9 9stone. Dwellings were generally smaller and more crowded
than was usual at the time. Almost a third of the population 
lived in one- and two-roomed dwellings, and average densities 
were well in excess of one person per r o o m . ^ ^  In addition,
196. This figure includes about two thousand Aboriginals. 
Except where otherwise noted, Aboriginals were excluded 
from census data, as information on them was collated 
separately.
197. Census of N .S .W . 1891, p. 371.
198. 46.1% of the male population was in this age group; this 
is the more remarkable because of the fact that many 
seasonal workers were not yet in the district.
199. 47.4% of dwellings were made of wood.
200. Average densities ranged from 1.82 persons per room in 
one-room dwellings to 0.9 in 7- to 10-roomed dwellings.
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over nine hundred people were recorded as being without any 
kind of h o u s i n g . ^ 1
Over the decade the region's population had become
considerably more urbanized, largely due to the meteoric growth
of Broken Hill, whose population was close to twenty thousand
by 1891. The pastoral towns and the lesser mining centres
seemed insignificant by comparison. Although in the region as
2 0 2a whole 56.7% of the population was urbanized, outside the
2 Q 1Barrier district the urban proportion was only 28.5%, and
only eight towns had populations in excess of five hundred. 
Families which had followed their breadwinners into the west 
tended to congregate in the towns, where schooling and other 
services were more freely available than in the purely rural 
areas. The nine largest towns accounted for only 43.6% of the 
adult male population, but their share of the under-twenty 
age group was 58.1% and of the adult female population 63.9%. 
This produced a marked contrast in composition between the 
towns' population and that of the rural areas, especially in 
their proportion of males. The towns' population was 58.3%
201. As people sleeping in the open are fairly hard to detect, 
it is conceivable that this is an underestimate.
202. This compares with 65.9% for the colony as a whole. Both 
are subject to some qualification as the census' 
definition of an urban area is extremely liberal and some 
of the hamlets included in this category would not 
normally be regarded as urban areas.
203. That is, the county of Yancow inna, including Broken Hill, 
Silverton and the adjacent pastoral area.
204. "Adult" is defined here and subsequently as aged twenty 
years or more. The towns were Bourke, Balranald, Broken 
Hill, Cobar, Hay, Hillston, Silverton, Wilcannia and 
W e n tworth.
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masculine, while in the rural areas males made up 71.3% of the 
total population and 80.3% of the adult population.
Reflecting the high proportion of adult males in the 
population, the rate of workforce participation was high; only 
45.3% of the population was classified as "dependent". The 
occupational distribution of the workforce reflected the narrow 
economic base of western settlement. Even excluding seasonal 
workers, pastoralism employed 18.7% of the workforce directly. 
With the opening of Broken Hill, the mining share of the 
workforce had risen to 18.2%; but outside the Barrier, which 
accounted for 88.3% of the mining workforce, pastoralism was 
clearly in the ascendant, its share of the workforce being 
29.2% while the copper mines of Cobar, Mount Hope and N ymagee, 
the remnants of the Corner goldfields and the nascent White 
Cliffs opal field together employed only 3.4% of the workforce. 
Apart from pastoralism and mining, domestic service was the 
largest employment sector, with 12.6% of the workforce; by 
comparison with the rest of the colony all other major sectors 
were underrepresented, especially manufacturing, trade, 
agriculture, transport and the professions. The vast bulk of 
the western workforce was concentrated in physically demanding 
manual occupations which offered few opportunities for 
advancement and even scantier chances of graduating to employer 
status. Once they had passed their physical prime many workers 
would lack a secure income; and with inadequate medical 
services, poor diet, polluted water supplies and the lead- 
ridden environment of Broken Hill, even some of the younger
-2 2 5-
2 0 5d e n i z e n s  of the p l a i n s  h ad  no f u t u r e  to loo k f o r w a r d  to.
The one c o n s o l a t i o n  w o r k i n g  on the p l a i n s  o f f e r e d  was a 
r e a s o n a b l y  h i g h  c a s h  income; b u t  e ven  this d e p e n d e d  on a 
l a b o u r  s c a r c i t y  w h i c h  w o u l d  e v a p o r a t e  w it h the s l i g h t e s t  e a s i n g  
of c o l o n i a l  e c o n o m i c  growth.
By the l a t t e r  p a r t  of 1891 the rise of u r b a n  u n e m ­
p l o y m e n t  and the sq u a t t e r s '  i m p o r t a t i o n  of n o n - u n i o n  l a b o u r  h a d  
p l u n g e d  the w e s t e r n  la bou r m a r k e t  into a state of c h a o s  w h i c h
rwa s to last for s e v e r a l  years. UD W i t h  d e p r e s s i o n  g e n e r a l  
t h r o u g h o u t  the c o l o n i e s ,  d i s p l a c e d  w e s t e r n  w o r k e r s ,  m a n y  of 
t h e m  u n e m p l o y e d  as a r e s u l t  of th ei r  s u p p o r t  for the u ni o n  
m o v e m e n t ,  h ad  few p l a c e s  to turn. E m p l o y m e n t  in b o t h  t own  and 
c o u n t r y  was d i s r u p t e d  by the c o l l a p s e  of the l an d  b oo m,  the 
w i t h d r a w a l  of B r i t i s h  c a p i t a l  and the cuts in e x p e n d i t u r e  on 
p u b l i c  c o n s t r u c t i o n .  M a n y  u n e m p l o y e d  w o r k e r s  w en t f o s s i c k i n g  in 
t i m e - h o n o u r e d  fasion , but m o s t  fo un d  the r e t u r n s  m e a g r e ;  the 
few ne w fi eld s w h i c h  o p e n e d  up in the e ar ly  1890s in the 
e a s t e r n  c o l o n i e s ,  n o t a b l y  the W y a l o n g  g o l d f i e l d  and the W hi te
C l i f f s  opal field, c o u l d  not o f f s e t  the g e n e r a l  d e t e r i o r a t i o n
2 0 7of the l a bo u r m a r k e t .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  e m p l o y m e n t  in m a n y
205. On lead at B r o k e n  Hill see G. B la in e y ,  The R i se  of B r o k e n  
Hill, M e l b o u r n e ,  1 968. ( h e n c e f o r w a r d  c i t e d  as R .B . H . ) p p . 
86ff; B. Ke n ne d y ,  Silver, Sin and  S i x p e n n y  A le : Ä S oc i a l
H i s t o r y  of B r o k e n  Hill, 1883- 1 92 1 , M e l b o u r n e ,  1 978. pp .
6 2 ff.; on s a n i t a r y  c o n d i t i o n s  see Anon. The B a r r i e r  Tin  
and S i l v e r  F i e l d s  in 1 8 8 8 , A d e l a i d e ,  1970. pp. 22-3; R. 
Kea rn s,  B r o k e n  Hil l 1 88 3- 189 3:  D i s c o v e r y  and D e v e l o p m e n t ,
B r o k e n  Hill, 1975. p p . 25-6.
206 . See b e l o w  p p . 260ff  .
207. See A .I .B .R . , J u l y  1893, p. 672, A pr il  1894, p. 225;
C o g h l a n ,  op. c i t ., p. 2020; Jer v is , "West D a r l i n g " ,  o p . 
c i t , p p . 2 4 9-5 1 .
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established mines was affected by low world metal prices and by 
financial problems following the banking crisis. Within the 
west itself, the growth of mining at Broken Hill slowed as 
metal prices slumped, then employment was reduced by the 
industrial confrontation of 1892 and subsequent management- 
initiated staff cuts; and mining at Cobar was virtually at
a standstill for several years owing to lack of capital until
the mine was handed over to British interests, initially in
2 0 91894 on a leasehold basis and later by outright sale. With
all this, social dislocation was severe. Wage cuts were 
widespread in the west as elsewhere; employers were able to 
take advantage of the deterioration in the labour market to by­
pass the unions and impose their own terms. For several years 
the annual influx of would-be seasonal workers far exceeded 
stations' shearing requirements. Those who failed to find work 
often experienced severe deprivation, and deaths on the track 
were numerous; a Pastora 1i s t s 1 Review correspondent callously 
attributed this phenomenon to the wanderers' lack of bush 
experience . ^  ^
The financial crisis caused widespread dislocation. 
The failure of the Australian Joint Stock Bank in particular 
was greeted with shock and incredulity in the numerous western 
towns where it had branches. Several towns were left entirely
208. Blainey, R.B.H., op. c i t ., pp . 60-62, 69; Kennedy, o p . 
c i t ., pp . 71-2, 76.
209. A .I .B .R ., August 1893, p. 790, March 1894, p. 171, April 
1901, p . 268.
210. A .P .R ., March 1897, p. 32.
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? 1 1w i t h o u t  b a n k i n g  s e r v i c e s .  By the time the c r a s h e s  had run
th ei r c o u r s e  the t o w n s  we re  v i r t u a l l y  at a s t a n d s t i l l .  Local 
g o v e r n m e n t s  were s e v e r e l y  f i n a n c i a l l y  e m b a r r a s s e d ,  as t hei r  
an n ua l  e n d o w m e n t s  f ro m  the c o l o n i a l  g o v e r n m e n t  had b e en  p aid  
just b e f o r e  the c l o s u r e s ,  and c o u n c i l s  h ad to r e s o r t  to
pipr e t r e n c h m e n t s  and w a g e  cuts. W i d e s p r e a d  d i s m i s s a l s  were
p 1 1also r e p o r t e d  from the st a t i o n s ,  and the B r i t i s h  B r o k e n
2 1 4Hill C o m p a n y  shut d ow n  its m i n e  and s me lt er.  E ve n
h o s p i t a l s  and b e n e v o l e n t  s o c i e t i e s  h a d d i f f i c u l t y  c a r r y i n g  on
2 1 Swi th  th eir  fu nds  l o c k e d  up. I n i t i a l l y  l oca l s t o r e k e e p e r s
p r o v i d e d  c r e d i t  to t h e i r  c u s t o m e r s  to k e e p  b u s i n e s s  m o v i n g ,  bu t
th ey  we re  soon f o r c e d  to d e s i s t  w h e n  t hei r own p o s i t i o n  b e c a m e  
2 16p r e c a r i o u s .  Th e r e  was m u c h  r e s e n t m e n t  at the t erm s of the
banks' r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  s ch e m e s;  it was g e n e r a l l y  f el t that  
d e p o s i t o r s  w er e b e a r i n g  a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  b u r d e n  w hi le  
s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  who ha d p r o f i t e d  m o s t  f r om  the b o o m  per i od ,  w er e  
not c o n t r i b u t i n g  as m u c h  as the y should. D e p o s i t o r s  w ere
c a u t i o n e d  by the p o p u l i s t  p r e s s  a g a i n s t  g i v i n g  t he ir  p r o x i e s  to 
the c h a i r m e n  of the b a n k s ,  and th er e  was some t a lk  of
l i q u i d a t i o n  b e i n g  p r e f e r a b l e  to r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  on the t er ms  
2 18o ff er ed .  But the l i q u i d a t i o n  o p t i o n  c o u l d  not be
s e r i o u s l y  e n t e r t a i n e d  for long, and by the m i d d l e  of the year
211. Th ese  i n c l u d e d  H i l l s t o n  and B a l r a n a l d  ( R i v e r i n e  G r a z i e r ,
2 5 A p r i 1 1 8 9 3 ).
212. To wn  and C o u n t r y  J o u r n a l ,  27 M a y  and  10 J un e 1893.
213. R i v e r i n e  G r a z i e r , 9 June 1893.
214. To wn and C o u n t r y  J o u r n a l ,  8 J u l y  1893.
215. Ibid., 17 June a n d  8 J uly  1893.
216. Ibid., 1 J u l y  1893; R i v e r i n e  G r a z i e r ,  16 and 23 M a y  1893.
217. F e d e r a l  S t a n d a r d , 6 May 1893; S i l v e r  Age, 24 May 1893.
218. F e d e r a l  S t a n d a r d , 2 M a y  1893; R i v e r i n e  G r a z i e r ,  6 M a y
1 893 .
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the westerners were more or less resigned to the fact that they 
would have to limp through the aftermath of the crisis as best 
they could.
The pressures initiated by the general depression 
were sustained in the latter part of the decade by the 
protracted drought and the financial institutions' consolid­
ation of station management. As flock numbers fell, the demand 
for seasonal workers in particular became erratic. Permanent 
hands were retrenched as station managers came under stronger 
pressure to restrict expenditure, and there were further wage
reductions both for station workers and labourers in the 
2 19towns. But whereas in the first half of the decade the
deterioration of the labour market on the plains had been 
largely due to the indirect effects of general economic 
depression, the position after 1895 was rather different; the 
onset of drought was closely followed by the first tentative 
signs of a wider economic recovery, and in the latter 1890s it 
was the peculiar problems of western settlement which held the 
centre of the stage.
Drought gave western life a bitter edge, even at 
times a nightmarish quality. Summer temperatures were extreme
even by local standards; in 1896 a heat-wave in Bourke caused
2 2 0dozens of deaths and sent residents fleeing from the town. 
Howling dust storms blanketed the region with monotonous
219. See below p p . 293ff.
220. A.P.R., February 1896, pp. 617, 650; Western Herald,
January 1896.
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regularity, confining the population to their homes, and foot 
travel on many outback roads became hazardous as waterholes 
dried up. Water shortages occurred in most of the major towns; 
as the rivers turned to chains of stagnant pools, residents
p 2 iquarrelled over who should use the remaining water.
Pollution of drinking water became a worse health hazard than 
ever, and each summer brought its epidemic of typhoid and other
pp?waterborne diseases. At one point the Cobar water supply
2 2 ^was declared unfit for human consumption, and on another
occasion the residents of Booligal were moved to protest when 
the woolscour upstream from the town persisted in using the
? O Alittle that was left of the Lachlan to dump its effluent.
Fires, always a hazard in the wooden houses of the towns,
became almost impossible to control when fanned by the hot 
2 2 5summer w i n d s .
The economic consequences of drought extended far 
beyond the pastoral industry. Mining was periodically 
disrupted by lack of water; Broken Hill had problems with its
water supply, and in 1902 six hundred men were thrown out of
2 2 6work at Cobar when the water supply to the mine failed.
The river trade ground to a standstill, and many roads became
221. Hillston Spectator, 7 and 14 January 1899.
222. See e.g. Kennedy, op. c i t ., p. 80; Western Herald, 28
March 1896.
223 . A . P .R . , May 1899, p. 125.
224. Riverine G r a z i e r , 19 November 1897.
225. Ibid., 1 February 1898.
226. On Broken Hill see A.I.B.R., February 1899, p. 99, March 
1902, p. 195; on Cobar see A.I.B.R., March 1902, p. 195 
and also A.P.R., November 1895, p. 512.
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2 2 7i m p a s s a b l e  e x c e p t  to cam el s.  As a r e s u l t  t r a d i n g  p a t t e r n s
ch an ge d , b e c o m i n g  i n c r e a s i n g l y  c e n t r e d  on the r a i l w a y s  and
h a s t e n i n g  the d e c l i n e  of the D a r l i n g  r i v e r  t r a d i n g  towns, w h i c h
we re  a l r e a d y  s u f f e r i n g  fr om  the p l u m m e t i n g  of d e m a n d  in their
2 2 8we st  D a r l i n g  an d Q u e e n s l a n d  h i n t e r l a n d s .  This shift,
h o w e v e r ,  left some r e g i o n s  v e r y  b a d l y  s e r v e d  for t r a n s p o r t .
The 1902 d r o u g h t  h i g h l i g h t e d  t h e s e  d e f i c i e n c i e s .  T ra d e  in m a n y
p a r t s  of the b a c k  c o u n t r y  was p a r a l y s e d ;  t h e r e  was s t a r v a t i o n
at Wh it e C l if f s,  and it was r e p o r t e d  t hat  in p a r t s  of the
2 3 0r e g i o n  l o c u s t s  we r e b e i n g  s o ld  for food.
It is d o u b t f u l  w h e t h e r  the b u l k  of the w e s t e r n  
p o p u l a t i o n  s h a r e d  in the full b e n e f i t  of the w i d e s p r e a d  
c o m m o d i t y  p r i c e  d e c l i n e  of the d e p r e s s i o n  years. Rents did  
fall in the p a s t o r a l  towns, a nd a r t e s i a n  i r r i g a t i o n  p r o v i d e d  a 
r e a s o n a b l e  s u p p l y  of fr ui t  and  v e g e t a b l e s ,  at l e a s t  in the 
n o r t h - w e s t .  But m a n y  c o m m o d i t i e s  w h i c h  had f o r m e r l y  b e e n
l o c a l l y  p r o d u c e d  ha d to be i m p o r t e d  into the reg i on , and 
s p e c u l a t i o n  and m a n i p u l a t i o n  of e r r a t i c  s u p p l i e s  w ere  w i d e ­
spre ad , w it h  the r e s u l t  t hat  p r i c e s  r ose  a c r o s s  the b o a r d  as
2 3 2ea ch  d r o u g h t  set in. In the l a t t e r  ye ar s  of the d r o u g h t
m e a t  s u p p l i e s  were sca rc e ,  e x p e n s i v e  and o f t e n  of a b y s m a l l y  
poor q u a l i t y .  In H i l l s t o n  t her e was no m e a t  to be had in 1899,
22 7 . A . I . B . R . ,  M a r c h  1899, 
M a r c h  1900 p. 33, May
p. 157; A.P.R .  
1902, p . 140.
, O c t o b e r  1896, p. 387,
228 . See R. C .W . D .  S u m m a r y , P • 40 .
229 . A .P .R . , D e c e m b e r  1902 / P • 65 7 .
2 3 0 . Ibid., F e b r u a r y  1902, P • 843 .
23 1. Ibid., June 1893, p. 
p. 204, J a n u a r y  1897,
155,
P •
J uly  1893, 
55 1.
p. 216, June 1896,
23 2 . See for e x a m p l e  A . I . B • R • , J uly  1902, p . 552 .
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forcing the butchers to close down temporarily; at the same
time their counterparts in Hay took the more creative step of
establishing a cartel to raise prices. Supplies of wood
2 14for fuel also ran low, and successive crop failures in the
marginal wheatgrowing areas along the Bogan and in the western 
Riverina made it necessary to import wheat; though feed for 
stock was carried at concessional rates on the railways, food 
for humans was not. And with small traders being forced out of 
business the population of the pastoral regions became a 
captive market for a few large trading companies which could 
indulge in monopolistic practices at will. In all, the
west in time of drought was a rather unpleasant place to live, 
and certainly no place to be unemployed.
Fortunately for the western working class there were 
other options. From the middle of the decade onwards urban 
employment revived slowly. Mining activity was also on 
the upturn. Within the west, the Broken Hill and Cobar mines 
increased their labour force and the White Cliffs opal field
moved into full swing; further afield there was work to be had
2 3 7on the Western Australian goldfields and at Mount Lyell.
Several large-scale public works programmes had also been 
initiated as unemployment relief; these seem to have attracted
233. Riverine Graz i e r , 13 July 1897.
234. Jervis, "North-Western Plains", op. c i t ., p. 453; R .C .W .D .
S umma r y , p p . 123-5.
235. See p. 246 below.
236. A.P.R., October 1896, p. 388; Coghlan, op. cit., pp.
2 0 3 9 f f .
237. A.P.R., December 1896, p. 495, September 1890, p. 380; 
Coghlan, ibid., p. 1942.
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some w o r k e r s  of a m i l i t a n t  bent, and a f t e r  a s e r i e s  of 
i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i o n s  the re l i e f  w o r k e r s  s e c u r e d  for t h e m s e l v e s  
c o n d i t i o n s  w h i c h  w er e r a t h e r  b e t t e r  than t ho se  p r e v a i l i n g  on
p o om a n y  w e s t e r n  p r o p e r t i e s .  The young , u n a t t a c h e d  m e n  who
had f o r m e d  such a large  p a r t  of the w e s t e r n  w o r k f o r c e  in the 
1880s were able to ad apt  to this c h a n g i n g  s i t u a t i o n  w ith  
c o m p a r a t i v e  ease by s h i f t i n g  o c c u p a t i o n s  or l e a v i n g  the r e g i o n  
e n t ir el y , and the s u p p l y  of n e w  r e c r u i t s  d i m i n i s h e d  s u b s t a n t -  
ially. This p r o c e s s  of a d a p t a t i o n  c o u l d  not r e - c r e a t e  the
c o n d i t i o n s  of l a b o u r  s c a r c i t y  w h i c h  had p r e v a i l e d  d u r i n g  the 
boom; u n e m p l o y m e n t  p e r s i s t e d  and s e a s o n a l  l a b o u r  was o c c a s i o n ­
al ly  o v e r s u p p l i e d . ^ ^  But the m a s s i v e  l a b o u r  s u r p l u s e s  of the 
ea r ly  1890s c ea s ed , a nd  by the end of the d e c a d e  it was 
b e c o m i n g  a p p a r e n t  t ha t o u t b a c k  w ag e r at es  c o u l d  not m u c h  l o n g e r  
be h e l d  do wn to the ba r e s u b s i s t e n c e  l e v e l s  t h ey  had r e a c h e d  in 
the t r o u g h  of the e c o n o m i c  c o l l a p s e . ^  ^
The c h a n g e s  this w r o u g h t  in the c o m p l e x i o n  of 
o u t b a c k  s o c i e t y  are m a d e  c l e a r  by an e x a m i n a t i o n  of the 1901 
c e n s u s  res ul ts . Ru ral  s e t t l e m e n t  r e t r e a t e d  t o w a r d s  the east; 
the rural p o p u l a t i o n  of the w e s t  D a r l i n g  fell by 34.9% b e t w e e n  
1891 and 1901 and th at of the east D a r l i n g  by 15.1%, r e s u l t i n g  
in a to tal  fall of 22.7%  in the r ura l p o p u l a t i o n  of the region .  
But this was o u t w e i g h e d  by a 31.7% i n c r e a s e  in the u rba n
238 . A . P .R .,  F e b r u a r y  1 897 , pp . 603-4, June 1 899, p. 189,
O c t o b e r  1900, p. 478, May 1901, p. 144.
239. See b e l o w  p. 234n.
240. See e.g. R. C . W . D .  M i n u t e s ,  e v i d e n c e  of K. M a c k e n z i e ,  p p . 
53-4; W e s t e r n  F r e e  Press, 2 June 1899.
241. See p p . 302-5 below.
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population, which produced an overall population increase of
about five thousand and an urbanization rate of 69.1%. Though
Broken Hill remained the main focus of urban growth, the lesser
mining towns of Cobar and White Cliffs and the closer
settlement centres of Walgett, Brewarrina, Hillston, Hay and
Balranald also expanded, so that in spite of the decline of the
Darling River towns the urbanization rate outside the Barrier
2 4 2increased to 47.5%. By 1901 the municipalities housed
56.6% of the adult male population, 70.5% of adult females and 
65.3% of the under-twenty age group.
The attenuation of the plains' frontier character 
becomes clearer when the shifts in population composition, 
housing standards and workforce participation are taken into 
account. The outback's status as a male preserve was eroded. 
The overall masculinity rate fell from 64.5% to 59.0% during 
the decade, and adult males as a percentage of the total
population decreased from 44.4% in 1891 to 37.2% in 1901. The 
whole of the western population increase was accounted for by 
the growing numbers of women and children, while the adult male 
population fell by 9.3% overall and by 27.5% outside the
242. Now ten in number with the addition of Brewarrina, White
Cliffs, although more populous than: Silverton and
several of the pastoral towns, was not incorporated as a 
municipality.
243. The masculinity rate in the rural areas was still 65.4% 
overall and 73.9% among the adult population, while the 
towns' masculinity rate was 55.1%. It is noteworthy that 
the pastoral towns, with the exception of Brewarrina, were 
closer to an even male/female distribution than were 
Broken Hill and Cobar, Hay and Balranald even showing a 
slight excess of females.
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municipalities; a small net recruitment of males into the 20-29
age group was far outweighed by net losses in all older age 
24 4groups.
As the migratory pastoral workforce diminished and
Broken Hill became more solidly established, there was a
general improvement in housing standards. Tents made up only
10.8% of the housing stock in 1901, and dwellings were on the
whole larger and less crowded. Though conditions in one and
2 4 5two room dwellings were still cramped, these smaller
houses and tents together only accounted for 13.7% of the 
population; 61.4% of the population dwelt in homes of between 
three and six rooms at average densities only slightly in 
excess of one person per room. However, the improvement in 
housing standards was not unqualified. As local timber became 
scarce and expensive, new dwellings were increasingly made of 
iron, never a material noted for its insulating proper­
ties . And although the shift away from the stations meant 
a reduction in workers' dependence on their employers for
244. Taking the progression of each age cohort over the period
(so that, for example, the 10-19 age group in 1891 is 
compared with the 20-29 age group in 1901) there was a net 
recruitment of about 2,500 males into the 1901 20-29 age
group and a loss of about six thousand in the 30-49 
cohort. For population shifts in the colony as a whole see 
N. Hicks, "Demographic Transition in the Antipodes", in 
Australian Economic History R eview, 1 4 , 2 , 1 974 . pp . 131-2.
245. Average densities were still in excess of 1.5 persons per 
room .
246. See Blainey, R .B .H . , o p . c i t . , pp. 104-5; an increase to 
54.1% in the proportion of dwellings made of wood was due 
to the depletion of the total housing stock rather than to 
new construction, while iron buildings' share grew from 
8.4% to 17.1% over the decade.
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h o u s i n g ,  it is l i k e l y  th a t  t h e i r  o p p o r t u n i t y  to own t hei r h om e s  
in the to wn s was less in the 1890s t ha n  in the b o o m  years. 
K e n n e d y  fo un d a d e c l i n e  in p r i v a t e  h o m e  o w n e r s h i p  in B r o ke n  
Hill d u r i n g  the d e p r e s s i o n ,  and it is p r o b a b l e  that
f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s  and u n e m p l o y m e n t  h ad s i m i l a r  e f f e c t s  in o th e r  
centres.
The c h a n g i n g  p a t t e r n  of w o r k f o r c e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in 
the d e p r e s s i o n  y e a r s  r e f l e c t e d  not o n l y  the d e c l i n e  of the 
p a s t o r a l  i n d u s t r y  but also  a f u r t h e r  n a r r o w i n g  of the r e g i o n ' s  
a l r e a d y  r e s t r i c t e d  i n d u s t r i a l  base. The p a s t o r a l  w o r k f o r c e  
fell by 12.3% in a b s o l u t e  t erm s o v er  the 1891-1901 p e r i o d ,  and 
by 1901 m a d e  up on ly 16.9% of the total w o r k f o r c e ;  f u r t h e r m o r e ,  
the fact th at the M a r c h  c e n s u s  d id not i n c l u d e  the s e a s o n a l
w o r k f o r c e ,  w h i c h  d e c l i n e d  m o r e  r a p i d l y  than the p e r m a n e n t
2 4 8w o r k f o r c e ,  p r o b a b l y  m e a n s  that the c e n s u s  r e s u l t s
u n d e r e s t i m a t e  the e x t e n t  of p a s t o r a l  w o r k f o r c e  s h r i n k a g e .  
O u t s i d e  the B a r r i e r  d i s t r i c t  p a s t o r a l i s m  r e m a i n e d  the m o s t  
i m p o r t a n t  e m p l o y m e n t  se cto r,  e m p l o y i n g  28.7%  of the w o r k f o r c e ,  
but the m i n i n g  s e c t o r  had grown r a p i d l y  to r e a c h  12.9% of the 
w o r k f o r c e .  In a b s o l u t e  terms, this was a 237% i nc r e a s e .  W he n  
the B a r r i e r  d i s t r i c t  was i n c l ud ed ,  m i n e  e m p l o y e e s  c o n s t i t u t e d  a 
s t a r t l i n g  27 .2%  of the r e g i o n ' s  t ota l w o r k f o r c e .
A g r i c u l t u r e  and s e c o n d a r y  i n d u s t r y ,  by c o n t r a s t ,  w er e 
b l i g h t e d  by the d e p r e s s i o n .  The a g r i c u l t u r a l  w o r k f o r c e ,  n ev e r
247. K e n n e d y ,  o p . c i t . , p. 78.
248. See b e l o w  p. 294.
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large, shrank by 14.8% in absolute terms and was only 4.0% of 
the total workforce in 1901,240 after drought had dashed the 
hopes of dryland wheatfarmers along the eastern edge of the 
region. More importantly, secondary industry underwent a 
pronounced decline. In 1891 building, manufacturing and other 
secondary industries had employed 25.3% of the workforce, but 
by 1901 their share had fallen to 16.9%.^“*^  The construction 
industry was among the worst affected; as investment capital 
dried up and population growth slowed, construction employment 
plummeted by 41.4% in absolute terms. The motley collection of 
small-scale industries which made up the rest of the secondary 
sector similarly felt the effects of falling local demand, 
shortages of 1oca11y -supplied raw materials and the long-term 
erosion of their competitive position following the extension 
of the railways.
The services sector was the only area outside mining 
to show any improvement in employment opportunities over the 
decade, with its workforce share rising from 28.3% in 1891 to 
32.0% in 1901 and absolute increases being registered in each 
of the subcategories of transport and communications, profes­
sional, mercantile and domestic occupations. But this did not 
presage any substantial improvement in career opportunities,
249. This was not necessarily a continuous decline, as 
sharefarming became fairly widespread on the eastern edge 
of the region during the mid-1890s, then lost popularity 
after crops failed and other employment opportunities 
improved.
250. This compared with a smaller fall from 29.2% to 26.4% for 
the rest of the colony.
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and certainly did not indicate an embourgeoisement of the 
western workforce. Domestic servants remained by far the 
largest single group in the tertiary sector, comprising 41.7% 
of the tertiary workforce. Professional employment was far 
below the norm for the colony as a whole, with professionals 
making up only 14.0% of the tertiary workforce. And, with the 
solitary exception of the transport and communications area, 
virtually all the increase in tertiary employment resulted from 
the entry of poorly-paid female workers into the tertiary 
workforce; the fact that male employment in the professional, 
mercantile and domestic areas fell concurrently by 10.7% 
suggests that women were preferred because of their lower wage 
expectations at a time when employers themselves were pressured 
for funds.
The growth of the female workforce also represented 
another dimension of declining per capita earnings. While the 
total workforce fell in absolute terms by 3.1% over the decade 
and the male workforce diminished by 7.2%, female workers grew 
in number by 31.1% to reach 14.6% of the total workforce. This 
marked no liberalization of female employment opportunities - 
over sixty per cent of the female workforce was still in 
domestic service - but was linked to the increasing proportion 
of women in the population as a whole. And while wage cuts, 
unemployment and the replacement of male by female workers were 
depressing the average level of earnings, per capita earnings 
fell still further as a result of a 21.8% increase in the 
dependent population which, coupled with the shrinkage of the 
workforce, produced a fall in workforce participation rates
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from 54.7% in 1891 to 49.0% in 1901. The independence on which 
the apparently reckless affluence of the frontier workers had 
been based in earlier decades was thus increasingly hedged 
around by the demands of domestic life. It is ironical that 
the very years in which the literary celebration of the bush 
ethos reached its ascendant also witnessed the dispersal, 
domestication and impoverishment of many of that e t h o s 1 
erstwhile standard-bearers.
Yet the western districts at the close of the 
depression were more than ever a working-class domain. . The 
tide of prosperity in the 1870s and 1880s had buoyed up a 
small local petty-bourgeoisie, principally comprising small 
landholders, contractors and traders. With soaring pastoral 
land prices, rags-to-riches stories of the Tyson mould had 
become a thing of the past and the scope for social mobility 
had been severely circumscribed. However, only a small amount 
of starting capital was required to become a construction 
contractor or buy at least a part-share in a bush store, public 
house or bullock team. The 1884 Land Act had also permitted 
small investors to circumvent the high land prices ruling in 
the private market, and homestead leases were widely taken up 
both for "legitimate" full-time grazing and for use in 
conjunction with other enterprises such as carrying, butchering 
and stock-dealing. Each town had its little group of stock and 
station agents, urban landlords and traders, many of the last- 
mentioned being riverboat-owners as well as retailers; together 
with local professionals, public servants, bank managers and 
middling rural landholders, these constituted a self-
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consciously respectable stratum of citizens who, until the rise 
of the union movement, held a virtual monopoly over municipal 
affairs .
During and even after the boom years, the political 
and economic interests of the smallholders and those of the 
more prosperous townspeople tended to coalesce. Their 
relations with the squatting interest were highly equivocal.
The local commercial classes were far from being mere minions 
of the squatting interest. For many local traders, the demand 
generated directly by the stations constituted a fairly small 
part of their business. Many stations preferred to place bulk 
orders with large metropolitan suppliers rather than contend 
with the capriciousness of local prices, leaving local 
retailers to cater for the townspeople, smallholders and such
of the pastoral workers as were not supplied by the stations 
2 5 1themselves. With the exception of construction contract­
ors, stock and station agents and other entrepreneurs who dealt 
prinicipally with the large stations, the western petty- 
bourgeoisie saw its interest as lying with the success of 
closer settlement rather than with the continuing ascendancy of 
the large squatters. Many entrepreneurs also harboured landed 
ambitions which could not be realized while the squatters 
controlled the availability of land. The urban traders and 
smallholders therefore clashed repeatedly with the squatting
251. See e.g. A.P.R., November 1895, p. 507; Jandra papers 
16/22/6/95; R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence of D. Hatten, 
p. 11, K. Mackenzie, p p . 53-4, S. Moses p. 65, R. Symes
p . 476 .
- 240 -
252interest on the closer settlement issue. Some of this
feeling carried over into support for the pastoral workers
against their employers in the strikes of the early 1890's. The
labour movement's inveighing against bankers and monopolists
struck sympathetic chords in the closer settlement lobby, and
traders who catered principally for the working class were not
inclined to risk their clientele for the sake of standing on
2 5 3their honour as employers. These political alignments
indicated the extent to which the interests of the local petty- 
bourgeoisie were dissociated from those of the squatting lobby. 
The depression was to reveal how tenuous was their hold on 
economic independence.
Many of the hopes vested in closer settlement were
dashed by the depression. For the western homestead lessees,
the new decade had opened badly with the 1890 Darling flood,
which played havoc on the smallholdings clustered along the
2 54river frontages. In the years of low prices, financial
stringency and drought which followed, the ranks of the
smallholders were severely thinned. The size of their holdings
restricted them greatly in the drought as, unlike the squatters
and the companies, they were unable to move their stock around
2 55over large areas to catch sporadic thunderstorms. Small­
holding on the river frontages also had its problems, as 
decades of heavy grazing pressure had left the frontages devoid
252. See e.g. A.I.B.R.; December 1899, p.873; A.P.R., June
1892, p. 696.
253. See below p p . 255-7.
254. R.C.W.D. Summary, p p . 28-9.
255. A.P.R., June 1896, p. 199.
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of drought-resistant edible shrubs, and, in the north-west
especially, frontage smallholdings were overrun by dense stands
2 56of inedible scrub in the wake of the 1890 floods.
Heathcote has found that smallholders' stock losses during the
2 571890s were heavier than squatters' in the Warrego district, 
and it is probable that this was the case in the western dist­
ricts as a whole. For many smallholders, lacking the capital 
reserves or the access to cheap credit to restock, any reverse 
was sufficient to necessitate the abandonment of their 
holdings. These men went back onto the labour market, leaving
their holdings to their creditors, leasing the grazing rights
2 5 8to nearby landholders or forfeiting the land outright.
Even some of the more prosperous graziers who had assembled
medium-sized composite holdings out of several homestead leases
went to the wall under the strain of low returns and mounting 
2 59debts. Perhaps worst affected were the west Bogan and
western Riverina smallholders who had taken inferior Central
Division lands under conditional purchase, only to face more
stringent restrictions on the area they were permitted to take
up and heavier annual payments to the Crown than smallholders
2 6 0on similar Western Divison land. Too heavily committed
to throw in their holdings but unable to sell for a reasonable 
price, selectors on inferior lands mounted a vigorous campaign
256. See R.C.W.D. Summary, p p . 10-11.
257 . Heathcote, Back of Bourke, op. c i t . , p. 146.
258. Ibid., p p . 139-141; R.C.W.D. Summary, p p . 18-22.
259. See e.g. Pitt, Son and Badgery papers, 10/2/9, 10/3/1;
R.C.W.D. M inutes, evidence of C. Singleton, p p . 22-3,
J. Cousins, p p . 42-3, T. Bossley, p p . 164-5.
260. A .P .R ., December 1899, p. 614, August 1901, p. 375.
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for state loans and called for their installments to be
deferred until the drought broke; but relief, when it came, was
26 1too little and too late for many smaller selectors.
By the turn of the century the squatting lobby was 
loudly proclaiming closer settlement in the west to be an 
abject failure and calling for a halt to the further subdiv­
ision of holdings. Certainly the aims of the legislators who 
had introduced provision for closer settlement had not been 
fulfilled. The desert had not been made to bloom; on the 
contrary, it had reasserted itself in an aspect even more 
terrible than before. Would-be yeomen were scattered to the 
winds, droving in Queensland, mining in Western Australia, 
working for the squatters and financiers whose grasp they had 
hoped to elude. Even those who remained on their blocks were 
agitating for the relaxation of residence conditions so that
they and their families could escape an existence which was
262arid in every sense of the word. And, with much of the
land set aside for closer settlement having reverted to the 
control of the squatters or having been taken over by finance 
houses, little was left of the populists' vision of unlocking 
the lands.
But among all this, new patterns of settlement were 
emerging which would not have been possible had the squatters 
retained landed control. If the Land Act of 1884 had not
261. A . I .B .R . f March 1899, p. 158, April 1899, p. 232,
September 1900, p. 683; A.P.R., June 1896, p. 194, July
1896 , p. 218, November 1 898 , pp . 451-2, March 1 899 , p.5.
262. A .P .R ., October 1900, p. 509; R.C.W.D. Summary, p p . 101-2.
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achieved its aim of closer settlement it had, much to the
squatters' chagrin, permitted a new, rival group of pastoral
capitalists to set themselves up without incurring the entry
costs imposed by the older squatting clique. This emergent
group of wealthier smallholder families benefited as much as
did the squatters from the abandonment of others' selections
263and homestead leases. By allocating closer settlement
blocks among the various family members and taking out grazing
rights over additional areas, medium-sized graziers had
assembled holdings ranging in size up to fifty or even a
264hundred thousand acres. Many of the graziers had suff­
icient capital to invest in flock improvement, especially at 
the depressed stock prices of the 1890s. By the latter years 
of the drought several were making their marks in the colonial 
and English wool sales with clips yielding as high a price as
the best of the squatters' flocks. 265 Most of the prosperous
graziers were, however, concentrated in the north-eastern
2 6 6corner of the region and around the western Riverina.
West of the Darling and on the dry central stretch between the 
Lachlan and the Darling, woolgrowing alone could provide only a 
bare and erratic livelihood, and the smallholders who had 
stayed on had usually developed alternative sources of income.
263. See e.g. R.C.W.D. Summary, p. 20.
264. A .P .R ., April 1893, p. 74, November 1897, p. 534,
September 1900, p. 451, October 1900, p. 477; Buxton, 
o p . c i t , , pp . 244-5 ; Coghlan, op. c i t . , p. 1979 ; Hardy,
o p . cit., p. 187.
265. See e.g. A.P.R., November 1896, p. 479.
266. Ibid., September 1900, p. 451; R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence
of C. H ebden, p. 54, G. Frew, p. 69, E. Quin, p. 243,
D. McLean p. 486.
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Indeed, by 1900 western smallholdings were being put
to a variety of uses which could scarcely have been foreseen by
those who framed the 1884 Land Act. Many homestead lessees
were concentrating principally on supplying the western towns
with m e a t ; ^ ^  a few, even as far west as the Barrier, were
268dairying with irrigated or imported fodder. On the
eastern fringe, extending some way into the Western Division,
wheat-growing was practised with highly variable results, many
269crops being eventually used as fodder. But, perhaps more
important, smallholdings were being increasingly employed by
local businessmen in association with their other enterprises.
Butchers and stock dealers in particular used homestead leases
as staging posts on which stock could be held until ready for
slaughter or sale, and teamsters and mail contractors took up
holdings to assure their draught animals of water and 
2 7 0pasture. Even used in these ways individual homestead
leases on inferior land without easy access to a town were not
a paying proposition during the drought years, and many
homestead lessees found themselves earning money in business or
2 7 1outside employment only to spend it on their smallholdings.
All this was a far cry from the economically self- 
sufficient small-scale woolgrowing envisaged by the proponents
267. R.C.W.D. Minu t e s , evidence of W. Bannister, p p . 106-7.
268. R.C.W.D. Min u t e s , evidence of J. Henry, p. 81, J. Thorn, 
p . 449 .
269. Andrews, o p . c i t ., p p . 58-9; A.I.B.R., April 1899, p. 231; 
A .P .R ., November 1 895, p. 512; Robinson, o p . c i t . , p. 20 0.
270. R.C.W.D. Minu t e s , evidence of H. Colless, p p . 45-6,
E . Quin p . 246.
271. Ibi d ., evidence of C. Coburn p. 476; R.C.W.D. Report, 
p . xvi .
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of the 1884 Land Act, and by the time the Royal Commission
began its investigation into the position of the Western
Division lessees there was mounting pressure for the upper
limit on the size of individual smallholdings to be relaxed and
made more flexible according to the sheep-carrying capacity of
the land, so that homestead lessees would be able to run a
2 7 2sufficient number of sheep to provide them with a living.
The remaining smallholders also campaigned vigorously against
the Lands Department's practice of offering abandoned land in
large areas as improvement leases, many of which were taken up
by pastoralists and finance companies, rather than throwing it
273open to closer settlement. The Royal Commission's report
and the subsequent Western Lands Act, as well as providing for 
rent reappraisements and lease extensions, adopted the sugg­
estion that homestead leases be enlarged where possible and
their size based on the carrying capacity of the land rather
2 7 4than on any arbitrary maximum area. But the smallholders'
claims that they could make better use of the abandoned lands
than the squatters and companies were greeted with scepticism,
and the practice of letting abandoned areas as large, long-term
2 7 5improvement leases persisted. In any event, the concess­
ions which were granted to the homestead lessees constituted 
little more than belated tampering with a legislative framework
272. R.C.W.D. Summary, p p . 31-39.
273. R.C.W.D. M i n u t e s , evidence of M. Good, p. 25, C. Conway, 
p. 35; see also Hillston Spectator, 7 May 1898.
274. A .P .R ., December 1901, p. 688; He athcote, Back of Bou r k e ,
o p . ci t ., p p . 74-5; R.C.W.D. R eport, p p . xvi-xvii;
Roberts, op. cit., p. 295.
275. R.C.W.D. Report, p. xii.
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which had proved to be incapable of redistributing and dispers­
ing land ownership so as to lay a secure foundation for wide 
participation by smallholders in the western pastoral industry.
Small entrepreneurs in the pastoral towns and rural
areas could not long survive the diminution of local demand
which followed the fall in workers' and smallholders' earnings
and the lapsing of investment in pastoral improvements. In the
river towns the problem was exacerbated by the halting of the
river traffic, which forced trade to be reoriented towards the
railheads. By the end of the drought the remaining river trade
was concentrated in the hands of a few large companies, notably
Rich and Co. in the north and Permewan Wright around the south- 
2 7 6west. Business in the small pastoral hamlets was severely
affected by the fall in rural labour demand, and in the latter
years of the drought many country stores were only limping
27 7along on the strength of the trade in artificial feed.
Local companies also lost custom to metropolitan retailers, who
2 7 8aggressively promoted their mail order services. And with
276. Rich and Co. did exceptionally well out of the depression
(see A.I.B.R., December 1898, p. 823; A.P.R., March 1895,
p p . 5, 27; R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence of E. Martin, p. 50);
Permewan Wright had rather more difficulty, but benefited 
in the longer term by the elimination of their competitors 
(see A .I .B .R ., May 1899, p. 316, May 1902, p. 382; A .D .B . 
vol 5, p. 432). See also R.C.W.D. Minu t e s , evidence of
C . Coburn p . 459.
277. R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence of G. Martin, p. 51, T. Vicary,
p . 59 .
278. Jeans, op. c i t . , p. 193; advertisements for Sydney firms 
abounded in western newspapers. The role of the railways 
in thus advantaging the capital cities is discussed in 
general terms in G. Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance, 
Melbourne, 1966. p. 264.
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town rents falling, houses lying vacant and the markets for
2 79stock and land in the doldrums, many smaller entrepreneurs
lost their customary sources of speculative gain and, like the 
smallholders, were forced to sell their labour for a living.
These phenomena of depression were by no means 
confined to the western districts. A similar polarization of 
income and concentration of economic control occurred through­
out the colonies over the decade. But the western districts of 
New South Wales, along with the equivalent pastoral regions of 
Queensland and to a lesser extent South Australia, experienced 
losses of exceptional severity and duration. Even the eventual 
recovery was halting and partial? there was no semblance of the 
enthusiasm which had marked the early 1880s. This was partly 
attributable to the physical losses sustained by the region as 
a result of more than a decade of over-exploitation of the 
pastoral resource base; flock numbers never again approached 
the peaks of the early 1890s. It was also an outcome of the 
intensification of external control over production in the 
western districts during the depression. The boom of the 1880s 
had produced only a tiny, fragile middle class within the west 
itself; earnings had been exported to, and investment capital 
imported from, the colonial capitals in the first instance and 
Britain in the second. When capital was concentrated during 
the depression, therefore, few westerners were numbered among
279. Mullen papers, A295; R.C.W.D. Min u t e s , evidence of
M. Good p. 24, H. Colless, p. 46, W. Daniell, p. 64, 
C . Coburn p . 461.
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the inheritors. Control over the established pastoral 
infrastructure was transferred to interests based outside the 
region, whither the rising earnings of the post-depression 
years were in turn exported. Nor did the new masters of 
outback squatting show any inclination to indulge in the 
profligate capital investment which had marked the early 1880s. 
The western districts settled quietly down to being an economic 
and social backwater, more than ever before a sheep-walk and 
quarry for the benefit of absentee capitalists.
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CHAPTER 7
From Confrontation to Attrition : Class Organization and
Conflict 1886 - 1902
One of the first products of the looming pastoral 
depression in western New South Wales was a sharpening of class 
antagonisms which, beginning in the mid-1880s, culminated in 
open conflict in the early 1890s. By 1886 western pastoral- 
ists, reeling from the effects of drought and the cost-price 
squeeze, were beginning to cast about desperately for ways of 
increasing the monetary returns from their stations. Many 
factors in the equation were beyond their control. They could 
do nothing to reverse the long-term fall in wool prices, inter­
est payments were a burdensome but inescapable fixed cost and, 
with rabbits launching a major offensive after the drought, a 
substantial increase in expenditure on vermin destruction was 
imminent. The squatters had to make the most of the few 
options open to them; these included raising production by 
lifting stock densities, lobbying the Crown for more favourable 
lease conditions and cutting expenditure on wages.
Several western pastoralists appear to have believed 
that a wage reduction would be the simplest to effect. Accord­
ingly in April 1886 seventeen pastoralists, all but one of them 
from the north-west, placed a blunt advertisement in the 
Australasian informing shearers that henceforward they should
expect to be paid only 17/6, rather than the usual 20/-, per
1hundred sheep shorn on the signatories' stations. The
1. Australasian, 3 April, 1886.
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advertisement was republished on subsequent weeks, and by the 
end of June forty-six squatting runs were on the list, forty- 
four of them in western New South Wales. The bald manner in 
which the wage cuts were announced indicated the squatters' 
implicit faith that their word as employers would have the 
force of a decree. They were quickly disillusioned by the surge 
of union activity which their ill-advised action precipitated.
The Rise of the Western Unions
The shearers responded to the threat of wholesale 
wage reductions with an immediate display of unexampled solid­
arity. Having organized themselves into a union in Bourke, 
they set out for Nocoleche and Dunlop, two of the stations
where reductions were threatened, and refused to work until the
3managers agreed to "pay the pound". At Dunlop the strike 
lasted for several weeks and the strikers had to be sent 
supplies by other shearers after the manager refused to supply 
them with rations;^ but eventually the squatters were forced 
to concede to their demands.
This signal victory spurred on the move towards 
unionism. Early in 1887 delegates from the various local
2. Ibid., 26 June 1886.
3. Ibid., 19 June 1886. Other accounts of the action are given
by Hardy, op. c i t ., p p . 212-3 and Ward, o p . c i t ., p p • 214ff.
It appears that the shearers' militant attitudes persisted 
through the season, as in October they refused to work under 
the station agreement at the Meadows, in the Cobar district 
(M. Welsh, Diary, 18 October 1 886) .
4. W.G. Spence (History of the A . W . U . , Sydney, 1961, p. 11) 
puts the duration of the strike at nine weeks; Hardy (ibid., 
p. 213) places it at seven.
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unions met in conference to form the Amalgamated Shearers'
c:Union (A.S.U.) with W.G. Spence at its head. The shearers 
then went onto the offensive, plumping for a 20/- rate 
throughout New South Wales rather than only in the western
fadistricts. By mid-1887 the union was claiming a membership 
of fourteen thousand,^ and in the shearing season of that 
year further concessions were secured. After strikes at 
various stations in the western Riverina and around Ivanhoe, 
local squatters agreed to raise the rate from 17/6 to 20/-, to 
modify some penalty provisions and to improve station
gaccommodation for the shearers.
In New South Wales as in Queensland, the western 
districts quickly emerged as a union stronghold, and most of 
the A.S.U.'s decisive battles were fought in the early shearing 
sheds of the outback runs. A number of factors probably contr­
ibuted to this. As Merritt has suggested, shearers may have 
been willing to engage in industrial action at the beginning of 
the season because it left them with a chance to make up their 
lost earnings later o n .  ^ From the union's point of view it 
was also tactically advisable to concentrate on the early 
sheds, as success there might induce pastoralists elsewhere to 
accept the A.S.U. 's terms for the rest of the season. But
5. Australasian, 22 January 1887.
6. On the reasons for the higher western rate see Merritt,
op. c i t ., p p . 595-6.
7. Australasian, 28 May 1887.
8. Ibid., 20 August 1887, 27 August 1887; Merritt, op. cit.,
p~. 59*7 .
9. I b id., p. 597.
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a b o v e  all, the i s o l a t i o n  of the o u t b a c k  sheds was a boo n to the 
A. S. U. o r g a n i z e r s .
Ev e n af t e r  the r a i l w a y s  to Hay, B o u r k e  and B r o k e n  
Hill were op e n e d ,  the j o u r n e y  to the o u t b a c k  runs was f o r m i d ­
a b l e  e n o u g h  to d e t e r  the m a n  who  was o n l y  an o c c a s i o n a l  
s h e a r e r ,  and w i t h i n  the r e g i o n  i ts e l f  B r o k e n  Hill, the o n ly
l a r g e  p o p u l a t i o n  ce ntr e, was h a r d l y  a p r i m e  s o u r c e  of n o n - u n i o n  
1 0la bo u r.  The me n who sh or e in the w est  w ere  t h e r e f o r e  m o r e
l i k e l y  to be s h e a r e r s  fi r s t  and f o r e m o s t  who w o u l d  i d e n t i f y  
w i t h  the u n i o n  m o r e  r e a d i l y  than the c a s u a l  w o r k e r s  c o m mo n  
f u r t h e r  east. In the h o t - h o u s e  e n v i r o n m e n t  of a she arers' hut 
on a w e s t e r n  run u n i o n  d i s c i p l i n e  c o u l d  be e n f o r c e d  by p o w e r f u l  
i n f o r m a l  s a n c t i o n s  w i t h  l i t t l e  fear of l eg al  r e t r i b u t i o n .  And 
if a c o n f r o n t a t i o n  wi th the e m p l o y e r  did o ccu r,  s t r i k e - b r e a k i n g  
l a b o u r  was h ar d to get and s low  to arrive , e s p e c i a l l y  w h e n  the
i ilo c a l  p o p u l a t i o n  was s y m p a t h e t i c  to the union.
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  the w e s t e r n  s h e a r e r s  were not m e r e l y ,  as
t h e i r  o p p o n e n t s  w o u l d  h av e  it, b e i n g  led a s t r a y  by "the
p e r n i c i o u s  c o u n s e l s  of a few v i o l e n t  and s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  
1 2a g i t a t o r s . "  The A. S.U . c a t a l y s e d  g r i e v a n c e s  b o t h  old and 
new. C r a m p i n g  in the huts, h i g h  s tor e p r i c e s  and lack of 
s a n i t a t i o n  we re l o n g - s t a n d i n g  p r o b l e m s ;  but in a d d i t i o n  the 
s h e a re rs , like some o t h e r  b u s h  w o r k e r s ,  s e e m  to have felt that 
th e i r  w o r k i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  w ere  d e t e r i o r a t i n g .  This s e n t i m e n t
10. On B r o k e n  Hill u n i o n i s m  see b e l o w  p p . 277ff.
11. See b e l o w  p p . 255-7.
12. A . I . B . R . ,  S e p t e m b e r  1890, p. 699.
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was s u c c i n c t l y  e x p r e s s e d  in a Q u e e n s l a n d  s h e e p w a s h e r 1s song:
"W he n fi rst  I t o o k  to the W e s t e r n  track, 'twas m a n y  y ea r s  
ago
No m a s t e r  t he n  st ood  up so high, no s e r v a n t  s to od  so low; 
But now  the s q u a t t e r s ,  p u f f e d  w i t h  pride , do t rea t us w it h  
d i s d a i n .
L a m e n t  w i t h  me the b y g o n e  days t h at  will not come again.
I had a pa i r of p o n i e s  once, to b e a r  me on m y  road;
I e a r n e d  a d e c e n t  ch eq u e at t im es , a nd b l u e d  it like a 
lord.
But l o n e l y  n o w  I h u m p  my d r u m  in s u n s h i n e  and in rain, 
L a m e n t i n g  on the b y g o n e  days that w ill  not come 
ag a in . " ^
The s l o w e r  pa c e of s t a t i o n  d e v e l o p m e n t  a ft e r  the
i n i t i a l  b o o m  p r o d u c e d  some d e c l i n e  in wag e e a r n i n g s .  The se ve r e
l a b o u r  s h o r t a g e s  w h i c h  had i n d u c e d  e m p l o y e r s  to p ay b o n u s e s
ab ove the 20/- rate s i m p l y  to get the s h e a r i n g  done w ere  a
1 4t h i n g  of the p a s t  by the m i d - 1 8 8 0 s .  O p p o r t u n i t i e s  for w o rk  
in the w e s t  d u r i n g  the o f f - s e a s o n  h a d b e e n  r e d u c e d  by the
s l o w i n g  of c o n s t r u c t i o n  w o r k  and the d i s c o n t i n u a t i o n  of the
1 5sc a lp  bo n u s  s y s t e m  for r a b b i t e r s  in 1888. The i n c r e a s e d
v o l u m e  of sand and b u r r  in the f l e e c e  c o n s e q u e n t  on p a s t u r e  
d e t e r i o r a t i o n  p r o b a b l y  s l o w e d  the s h e a r er s'  e a r n i n g  rate, and 
as o v e r s t o c k i n g  and r a b b i t s  took t h e i r  toll of w e s t e r n  p a s t u r e s  
it b e c a m e  c o m m o n p l a c e  for s h e a r i n g  to be d e l a y e d  b e c a u s e  of 
sh ee p b e i n g  too w e a k  to m u s t e r .  S uc h d e l a y s  d i s r u p t e d  the 
s h e a r e r ' s  run of sh e d s  and o f t e n  r e n d e r e d  w a s t e d  the e f f o r t  
i n v e s t e d  in t r a m p i n g  to the o u t b a c k  s t a t i o n s . ^
13. J.S. M a n i f o l d ,  e d . , The P e n g u i n  A u s t r a l i a n  S o n g  B o o k , 
M e l b o u r n e ,  1964. p. 138.
14. See ab o v e  p. 218; cf. Cog hl an , op. c i t . , p. 1444.
15. See Rolls, op. cit., pp . 70- 1 , 8 9-9 0 .
p p . 595-6.16. M e r r i t t ,  op. cit.,
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There was also a lot of scope for employers to cut 
costs without overtly reducing wage levels. The docking of 
wages for early departure, liberal use of the "raddle" to 
penalize shearers for supposedly injuring the sheep, and the 
raising of store prices all reduced shearers' effective 
earnings. Furthermore, the employer had a strong interest in 
having the shearing finished quickly to avoid missing the rise 
in the river, to minimize the cost of shed hands' weekly wages 
and to reduce the time the stock had to spend mustered close to 
the sheds. This could only be achieved at the shearers' 
expense, by raising the number of stands and therefore reducing 
individual shearers' earnings, or by increasing the number of 
hours worked. Employers were also likely to be intolerant of 
delays arising from claims that the sheep were wet. During the 
boom years simple labour scarcity had curtailed the employers' 
ability to exercise their powers over their workers. But the 
shearers feared a general crackdown on wages and conditions, 
especially one spearheaded by the financial institutions, in 
the wake of falling prices and rising debts. In the Hu m m e r 's 
words, "It is notorious that the old-time squatter, who wasn't 
under the thumb of the bank, was a better man than the present 
squatter who is mortgaged to the eyebrows." The prospect
of such a crackdown spurred a systematic assertion of the 
workers' collective bargaining rights against the prevailing 
p a t ernalism.
17. H u m m e r , 16 January 1892.
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Unionism's base of support in the west was broadened 
by popular resentment at the growing power of outsiders over 
the regional economy, the accompanying demise of the self- 
employed operator in several fields and the colonial govern­
ment's apparent indifference to the region's needs for even the 
most basic services. The rise of the A.S.U. was parallelled by 
the growth of unionism in other industries, notably mining and 
transport. Both were industries in which the rise of large
companies had reduced self-employed men to wage labourer status
1 8over the decade. The miners were second only to the
1 9pastoral workers in numbers, and in Broken Hill the
Amalgamated Miners' Association was claiming a membership rate
2 0of over eighty per cent by 1889. The carriers were smaller
numerically and, after an attempt to unionize in 1885 came to 
2 1nothing, they did not organize until the end of the decade, 
but they were well-placed for bargaining because of the 
essential nature of the services they provided.
The unions also received support from tradesmen and
petty businessmen whose own livelihoods were dependent on the
prosperity of the labouring classes. In the early 1890s it was
reported that publicans, storekeepers and even newspaper
2 2proprietors were joining the A.S.U. Within the country 
towns the A.S.U. showed little hesitation in sponsoring the
18. Hardy, o p . c i t ., p p . 208-9; Kennedy, o p . c i t ., p p . 51-2.
19. See above p. 224.
20. Kennedy, o p . c i t ., p. 54.
21. Hardy, op. cit., p. 208.
22. A.P.R., February 1893, p. 1070.
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cause of workers in other occupations; in Bourke, for example, 
the eight-hour day for shop-workers was enforced by the 
boycotting and public ridicule of storekeepers who kept longer
hours, and the A.S.U. was instrumental in assisting the
2 4shed hands and carriers to organize. There were even moves
? Sto establish a domestic servants' union in Broken Hill.
The unions' opposition to Asian labour also found 
sympathy among white town-dwe11 ers . Their prejudice against 
the use of Chinese labourers for unskilled work complemented 
the "respectable" white townspeople's dislike of the Chinese, 
who dwelt on the fringes of several western towns and were 
suspected of every vice from opiurn-smoking to abducting white 
women. In the case of Bourke an extraordinary alliance
between the townspeople and the carriers' union succeeded in 
restricting access to the town by the local "Afghans" and their 
camels, which the townspeople disliked for their smell and the
carriers for their cheapness and their use in breaking 
2 7strikes. Unionists and townspeople were also united in 
their opposition to absentees' and urban capitalists' siphoning
off their profits from the region without deigning to live 
2 8there. The bush unions emerged as the one indigenous
23. Hu m m e r , 13 August 1892.
24. Town and Country J o u r n a l , 2 August 1890; for comment, see
Merritt, o p . c i t ., p p . 606-7.
25. Town and Country J o u r n a l , 18 October 1890.
26. The Riverine Grazier, in particular, carried extensive
reports of the local Chinese community's foibles. Cf . the 
Hummer's description of the Chinese as "dirty leprous, 
opium eating brutes" (9 April 1892) and N.S.W. Legislative 
Assembly, Votes and Proceedings, 1883-4 vol. 9, p p . 659-66.
27. A.P.R., November 1892, p. 902; October 1893, p. 361.
28. See e.g. H u m m e r , 28 May 1892.
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expression of political and economic aspirations for a region
which hitherto had largely been represented in parliament by
absentees. As Kennedy describes the situation in Broken
Hill, by 1889 the union was assuming the role of "defender of
local and regional interests against Melbourne-based companies
and the far-off state government", becoming the standard-bearer
in the struggle "between the Barrier and its remote, impersonal 
o oexploiters." At its peak the union movement in the west 
possessed the moral force of a revolt against outside 
domination.
After its initial thrusts in 1886 and 1887 the 
A.S.U., under Spence's leadership, fostered a respectable 
image, emphasizing conciliation rather than confrontation in 
its dealings with the pastora1i st s . There were still occasion­
al strikes when squatters refused to accept the very moderate
3 1terms of the A.S.U. agreement; but in general the A.S.U. 
attempted to get the pastoralists to negotiate over the terms 
of agreement before the shearing season started rather than 
risk disruption later in the season. A.S.U. organizers were 
eager to foster the development of squatters' associations to 
expedite the bargaining process, and a few local groupings of 
pastoralists did emerge for this p u r p o s e , ^  but on the whole
29. See e.g. Kennedy, op. cit . , p p . 28-9; Federal Standard,
23 April 1898 and 16 July 1898.
30. Kennedy, ibid., p. 55.
31. Text is given (inter alia) by Riverina Recorder, 1 October 
1890; on strikes see Australasian, July 1888 passim.
32. Australasian, 4 February 1888, 30 June 1888.
33. Merritt, o p . c i t . , pp. 599-600; F. Piggin, "New South Wales 
Pastoralists and the Strikes of 1890 and 1891", in 
Historical Studies, 14, 56, April 1971. p p . 550 - 1 .
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agreements were made at the level of the individual station. 
Thus in Cobar rates for the 1888 season were negotiated between 
the A.S.U. and a group of large local landholders,^  while in 
the same year numerous Bourke district squatters, even includ­
ing some original signatories to the 1886 advertisement, 
individually accepted the agreement.
Few squatters were in a position to resist the union. 
Rural labour was still scarce over much of the region, as in
O  ftthe colony generally, during the shearing season. Non-union
labour was hard to recruit locally except on the eastern fringe 
o 7of the region, and there were few instances of squatters'
3 8successully importing non-union labourers from the cities.
By 1890 the vast majority of western stations were shearing
3 9under the A.S.U. agreement, and by bush standards the 
A.S.U. had become a mass movement, with a total membership of 
twenty t h o u s a n d . ^
But the A . S . U . 's hopes of assuring itself of a 
permanent role in collective bargaining were frustrated by a 
recalcitrant minority of squatters who refused to recognize the 
legitimacy of A.S.U. spokesmen and were determined not to
34. Spence, o p . c i t ., p. 26.
35. Those who changed their stance included the Hebdens of 
Wanaaring and Robertson of Jandra, Gundabooka and Wapwellah 
(Australasian, 7 July 1888).
36. Coghlan, op. c i t . , p. 1452.
37. Australasian, 14 July 1888, 25 August 1888.
38. One example is given in ibid., 27 August 1887; this was in 
the comparatively accessible western Riverina.
39. Town and Country Journal, 3 May 1890.
p~. 596 .40. Merritt, op. cit.,
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surrender any of their power over their employees. With 
unemployment looming as a threat to the shearers' organization 
after the Victorian collapse in 1889, the A.S.U. needed to 
secure a closed shop as soon as possible; but in the absence of 
an employer association which could force the diehards to the 
conference table, this could not be achieved by negotiation.
Nor could a unilateral shearers' strike achieve the desired 
aim. The strategy of negotiating with individual pastoralists 
had left the A.S.U. in the invidious position of being able to 
engage in strike action only at the expense of employers who 
were shearing union, leaving the anti-union employers of the 
central and eastern districts safe with their non-union 
workers. The shift in tactics which led up to the 1890 
maritime strike constituted a tacit admission that the A . S . U . 's 
earlier strategy was bankrupt. The A.S.U. leaders set out in 
the first half of 1890 to construct a network of alliances 
centred on the Sydney Trades and Labour Council in the hope 
that the threat of industrial action on a wide front to block
the export of non-union wool would induce the recalcitrant
4 1pastoralists to recognize the union. But the A . S . U . 's
attempt to have other unions implement membership sanctions on 
its b e h a l f i n s t e a d  gave the squatters the impetus to 
organize themselves in opposition to the union.
41. See B. Nairn, "The 1890 Maritime Strike in New South
Wales", in Historical Studies, 10, 37, November 1961
p p . 13-15.
42. Merritt, o p . cit . , p p . 601, 607.
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The Squatters' Response and the Strikes of 1890 and 1891
If Spence believed that the Ä.S.U. would be able to 
establish a closed shop without provoking a confrontation, he 
was seriously overestimating the squatters' willingness to 
conciliate. It is open to question how far the pastoralists 
who accepted the A.S.U. agreement had actually recognized the 
union as a permanent institution, and how far they were merely 
making a virtue of necessity, minimizing disruption until 
labour market conditions turned in their favour. While the 
emphasis was on negotiation between individual employers and 
the union, negotiation did not imply any long-term commitment 
to recognizing the union, and the anti-unionists' refusal to 
co-operate prevented the A.S.U. from establishing control over 
all sheds. The moderate pastoralists could therefore accept 
the A.S.U. for the present, secure in the knowledge that if and 
when they decided to draw the line they would have the anti­
unionists' support.
By 1890 a growing number of pastoralists were inclin­
ed to draw the line. Urban unemployment was rising and the
4 3effects were filtering through to the rural areas. Wool 
prices had slumped and the western districts were facing a 
depression, making squatters reluctant to accept any further 
union demands. Furthermore, the pastoralists had a new and 
potent weapon, in the shape of a cheap and efficient shearing 
machine. Though there was much debate as to whether the machines
43. Coghlan, o p . c i t ., pp. 1453-5; J. Rickard, Class and 
Politics : New South Wales, Victoria and the early Commonwealth,
1890-1910, Canberra, 1976. p. 21.
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were as fast as blade shears in the hands of a competent
s h e a r e r , ^  it was early recognized that the machines required
less training and effort to use than hand shears. As their
inventor put it, "the greatest benefit [machine shearing]
confers is that it makes the employer to a great extent
4 6independent of skilled labour." Anti-union squatters led
the field in installing the machines, and shearers greeted them 
with s u s p i c i o n . ^  There was an elementary recognition on 
both sides that the machines had the potential to break the 
skill monopoly on which the shearers' bargaining strength was 
based.
Under these circumstances it was unthinkable that the 
squatters, when they finally began to organize, would saddle 
themselves with a permanent obligation to give employment 
preference to A.S.U. members and exclude non-members. The 
squatters' associations which emerged in m i d - 1890 were founded 
on a determination to resist any such agreement. Between May 
and July 1890, Pastora1 ists' Unions were established in 
Victoria and New South Wales, each including a number of 
western New South Wales landholders and enjoying the support of 
the troubled pastoral finance companies. In Victoria, Young of 
the A.M.L.F. spent much of his visit to the colonies in organ­
izing the Victorian pastoral interest. His initial circulariz­
ation of squatters produced only a small response in May, but
44. Peel in Alexander and Williams, e d . , o p . c i t ., p. 58; cf.
Australasian, 19 March 1887, A.P.R., February 1892, p. 494.
45. A .P .R ., May 1893, p. 118.
46. A. Fraser, This Century of Ours, Sydney, 1938. pp. 16 9 f f ; 
Hardy, op. c i t ., p. 214; I. Ryan, Sheep Shearing Expertise, 
Sydney 1957. pp. 1-2, 4; F. Wheelhouse, Digging Stick to 
Rotary H o e , Melbourne, 1966. p. 144.
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the Pastoralists1 Union was established nonetheless and 
proceeded to seek negotiations with the A.S.U. The negotiat­
ions foundered when Spence insisted on acceptance of the closed 
shop, and in August Young and his associates called another 
meeting to seek a mandate to resist the union. In an atmosph­
ere of deepening conflict two hundred pastoralists turned up to 
hear Young, from the chair, berating the A.S.U. and informing 
them that "it behoved them as pastoralists to see that shearers 
were not coerced into joining a union which would infallibly be 
used in the future to extort inequitable and unreasonable terms 
from pastoralists." The meeting squarely centred the issue on 
freedom of contract and the anti-union tone of the association 
. 47wa s set.
In New South Wales sporadic attempts had been made to
establish squatters' associations in various districts in the
late 1880s, and there had also been some unsuccessful moves to
4 8set up a colony-wide association before 1890. The Pastoral- 
ist s 1 Union which was set up in Sydney in July of that year
included several local associations and other squatting lobby 
4 9groups. Members of the new association were drawn predomin­
antly from the eastern districts, with only a few Cobar 
squatters and a handful of absentees and finance companies with 
western interests p r e s e n t . ^  Though some hard-line employers
47. Proceedings quoted in Age, 21 August 1890. For a general
outline of the events of these months see Rickard, o p . c i t ., 
p p . 10 f f .
48. Merritt, o p . c i t ., p. 600.
49. Piggin, o p . c i t . , p p . 550-1.
50. Ibid., p p . 547, 548, 553.
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5 1played an active role in the first meeting, the tone of its 
resolutions was moderate. The meeting agreed to negotiate with 
the A.S.U. on the basis that contracts for 1890 would be unaff­
ected, but in the following season members would accept the 
A.S.U. agreement and permit their shearers to join the union 
"if they so desired". This did not, however, mean that the
closed shop would necessarily be operative in 1891, as Nairn 
has claimed it would. There was no provision for enforcing the 
closed shop; the Pastoralists1 Union commitment fell far short 
of an undertaking to give preference to unionists, and the 
association's ability to induce its own members, let alone the
host of non-members, to employ unionists was open to
5 3considerable doubt. In any event, Spence rejected the
pastoralists' resolutions, preferring quick gains through 
direct action to an uncertain concession in the following
C Aseason. His manifesto calling for a boycott of non-union
wool and the large-scale strikes which followed put paid to any
c cfurther talk of conciliation by the pastoralists.
In the west the atmosphere at the start of the
shearing season was pacific. The vast majority of sheds were
6 6shearing under the A.S.U. agreement. Even after the
boycott of non-union wool was called the local A.S.U. officials
51. For example, the motion to establish the pastoralists' 
union was moved and seconded by hard-liners.
52. Nairn, o p . c i t ., p p . 13-14.
53. See Merritt, op. c i t ., p. 605; Rickard, o p . c i t ., p. 30.
54. On Spence's possible motivation, see Merrit, i b id.,
p p . 604-5.
55. Piggin, op. cit., p p • 554-5.
56. See account in Town and Country Journal, 3 May 1890.
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in the western Riverina maintained a conciliatory attitude. 
Squatters were circularized to warn them of the boycott, and 
the union went on to explain that the boycott had been called 
because "those who now combat our aims do so on the question of 
unionism versus non-unionism and we have determined at any cost
c 7to assert our right to combine." There was some unease
around Hay, where a few river squatters were shearing non-union
and the police, fearing retaliation, were patrolling the river 
S 8nearby. There were also stirrings among the carriers; the
Bourke carriers' union was set up early in August and the Hay
carriers' union affiliated with the Trades and Labour Council,
5 9both emphasizing the need for solidarity with the shearers.
The A.S.U. itself announced that fines and expulsions would be 
imposed on members who shore under non-union agreements or
worked against the interests of the union in other unspecified 
60ways .
But for several weeks after strikes were sparked off 
in the port cities by the maritime dispute, the western 
districts were virtually unaffected and the wool issue was 
pushed into the background. The western unionists saw their 
main role as being to provide financial assistance to their 
striking allies. Contributions were forthcoming on a generous 
scale; by the end of August the A.S.U. had raised ten thousand
57. Riverina Recorder, 6 August 1890.
58. Town and Country Journal, 9 August 1890.
59. Ibid., 2 and 9 August 1890.
6 September 1890.60. Ibid.,
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6  ipounds and the Amalgamated Miners' Association £7,500.
Only in Broken Hill did the maritime strike have a direct 
effect before mid-September; even there, the initiative came 
not from the unions but from the B.H.P. board, which on
r  ^September 5th ordered that the mines be closed. The
residents of Broken Hill were infuriated at this provocative 
action; there was an immediate run on the banks and a Labour 
Defence Committee was set up to assist the miners and to 
attempt to sway the resolve of the directors by personal 
n e g o t i a t i o n s . ^  Otherwise, until the A.S.U. unexpectedly 
decided to display solidarity with the other unions by issuing 
a strike call on September 1 9 t h , ^  the industrial harmony of 
the western districts contrasted sharply with the clashes 
proceeding in the cities.
With the strike call the A.S.U. leadership found 
itself trapped by the very dilemma it had initially tried to 
circumvent by enlisting the assistance of other unions. Many 
employers of union labour were greatly aggrieved that they were 
penalized by a seemingly arbitrary decision of the union 
leadership in spite of the fact that they had played no part in 
the confrontation. In the short term some employers put up no 
resistance to the strike; there were even reports of squatters'
61. Ibid., 30 August 1890. Broken Hill miners raised £500 
in the first week (Kennedy, op. c i t ., p. 59).
62. Kennedy, ibid., p p . 59-60.
63. Kennedy, loc. cit.; see also Silver A g e , September and 
October 1890, passim, Town and Country Journal,
13 September 1890.
64. Town and Country Journal, 27 September 1890.
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employing strikers as rabbiters for the d u r a t i o n . B u t  a
number of employers refused to take union men back when the
strike was called off, and several squatters prosecuted
strikers for breach of contract. A few of these cases were
withdrawn when the men returned to work, but some
employers were implacably incensed and pressed on with the 
f) 8charges. In the longer term the strike vindicated the
hard-line employers' assertion that the union could not be 
f) 9trusted, and by the next season the employer goodwill on 
which the A.S.U. depended had largely evaporated, to be 
replaced by a determination to avoid employing unionists if 
po s sible .
From the shearers' point of view the short-lived 
display of solidarity was inordinately costly. The manner and 
timing of the strike call could hardly have been worse. By 
insisting that strikes take place simultaneously on all 
stations in mid-season, the A.S.U. executive lumbered those 
shearers whose sheds were on the point of cutting out with 
disproportionately heavy penalties. From the Corner country to 
the western Riverina, shearers with only a few days to go were 
penalized for early departure in proportion to the time they
65. Riverine Grazier, 3 October 1890.
66. Ibid. , 17 October 1890 ; Town and Country J o u r n a l ,
18 October 1890.
67. Riverina Recorder, 8 October 1890 ; Riverine Grazier , 10 and
17 October 1890; Town and Country Journal, 11 October 1890.
68. Piggin, op. c i t ., p p . 556-7; Riverine Grazier, 10 October
1 890 .
69. Piggin, ibid., p. 555.
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7 0had already worked. Those who were prosecuted incurred 
even heavier costs, as the courts ruled that the punitive 
provisions of the Masters and Servants Act took precedence over
the less severe penalties in the A.S.U. agreement, and declared
7 1all wages forfeit.
If testimony were needed of the shearers' loyalty to
the union, it was provided by the overwhelming response to the
strike call. It was estimated that in total thirty-five thous-
7 2and shearers and shed hands participated in the strike, and 
there was great excitement in the western towns as shearers 
flocked in from neighbouring stations. But a few sheds 
refused to go out before the shearing was c o m p l e t e d , ^  and 
some shearers participated through a sense of duty, or from a 
feeling that it was "as well to be fined by the Bench as by the
t r ~j runion", rather than out of any enthusiasm. The carriers
were less solid; though the Bourke carriers stopped work, the
Riverina and Balranald carriers resisted the suggestion that
7 7they break the season's contracts. And strike camps had
70. Australasian, 8 November 1890; Riverine Grazier, 3 and 21 
October 1890. Under the ASU agreement, shearers were 
required to pay 18/- per week for board if they departed 
early .
7 1. Pig g i n , o p . c i t . , pp. 555-6 ; see also Australasian,
4 October 1890; Bulletin, 29 November 1890, p. 5.
72. Town and Country Journal, 4 October 1890.
73. Riverina Recorder, 1 October 1890; Riverine Grazier,
3 Oc tober 1 890 .
74. Riverina Recorder, loc. c i t .; Riverine Grazier,
30 September and 14 October 1890.
75. Riverina Recor d e r , loc. cit.
76. A u s tralasian, 8 November 1890; Riverine Grazier, 3 October
1890; Town and Country Journal, 27 September 1890.
77. Riverina Recorder, 1 October 1890; Town and Country
J o u r n a l , 27 September 1890.
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barely been formed when the men were inexplicably ordered back 
to work, ostensibly to pave the way for a conference with the 
employers. The impression left in the minds of many
western observers was one of a union leadership which had
7 9abused the shearers' trust for its own ends.
The apparent confusion of the A.S.U. leadership 
contrasted markedly with the employers' decisive and increas­
ingly aggressive reactions to the boycott. Even before the 
maritime strike had started, the Victorian Pastora1i s t s ' Union 
imposed a boycott of its own, persuading the wool houses to 
ship wool only in vessels which employed non-unionists. By 
the time the strike started it was evident that the employers 
had no intention of backing away from a confrontation. There 
were moves from several sides to establish an intercolonial 
employers' association to organize resistance to the strikers. 
Young foreshadowed the idea in his address to the Victorian 
Pastora1i s t s ' Union on August 20th, and within a few weeks 
he was chairing a meeting of the Associated Shipowners and
o 2Employers. Meanwhile in New South Wales an Employers'
8 3Defence Association had been established. By mid-
September, when the long-awaited intercolonial conference was 
held, the employers present were determined to break the
78. Town and Country J o u r n a l , 11 October 1890.
79. See for example editorial comments in Riverine Graz i e r , 
21 October 1890.
80. Australasian, 9 and 16 August 1890.
81. Age, 21 August 1890.
82. Town and Country Journal, 13 September 1890.
., 6 September 1890.83. Ibid
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unions. The conference affirmed a commitment to "freedom of
ft 4contract" and refused to negotiate with the unions. Though 
the unions' immediate response was to widen the strike, the 
employers' assessment of their own strength proved accurate.
By early October the back of the unions' resistance was broken; 
even B.H.P. managed to elicit significant concessions from the
militant Broken Hill miners in return for opening the 
85mine s .
As far as the Pastora1ists' Unions were concerned,
matters did not stop there. For the following season they
determined to press home their advantage, still within their
original strategy of maintaining wage rates while insisting on
freedom of contract. An intercolonial conference was held in
late November and early December to draft terms along these 
ftlines. It was also evident that the Pastora1ists' Unions
needed to federate, if only because the prevalence of absentee 
ownership made it necessary for members of the Victorian 
Pastora1ists ' Union in particular to rely on other associations 
to assist them in resisting the unions on their more distant 
properties. Accordingly, a Pastora1i s t s ' Federal Council of 
Australia met in Brisbane in March 1891 to arrange the 
boundaries for the various associations in South Australia, 
Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria. The western 
districts of New South Wales were carved up among three
84. Ibid., 13 and 20 September 1890.
85. Kennedy, op. c i t ., p. 59.
86. Piggin, op. cit., p. 557.
- 270 -
colonies , with the west Darling going to South Australia, the
87Riverina to Victoria and the rest to New South Wales. The
resources of all three Pastoralists1 Unions could thus be used 
if necessary to enforce the pastoralists" terms on the A.S.U.'s 
home ground.
After the A.S.U. unanimously rejected the pastoral-
88ists' agreement and called a strike for the 1891 season, a
further organizational effort was necessary on the part of the
Pastoralists' Unions. One of their first tasks was to attempt
to dispel the unfortunate if accurate impression that the
associations were run by a cabal of hard-liners, Pitt and
Collins Street squatters and finance company representat- 
89ives. Their association with the finance companies was
especially unfortunate at a time when relations between
creditor and debtor were becoming rather strained and popular
90resentment of foreign financiers was growing. Nevertheless 
the financiers' support was crucial for the Pastoralists' 
Unions, especially in Victoria but also to a lesser extent in 
New South Wales. Young of the A.M.L.F. had not been the only 
financier to grow alarmed at the prospect of British 
investment being withdrawn from Australia in consequence of 
the maritime strike. Financiers had taken a number of 
initiatives in organizing the employers' resistance in 1890.
87. There were some objections to this, as the south Darling 
pastoralists preferred to be treated as part of Victoria 
(Pastoralists' Federal Journal, First Meeting, Minutes.) 
I am indebted to Dr. J. Merritt for this and subsequent 
references to Pastoralists' Union records.
88. Piggin, o p . c i t ., p. 557.
89. See comment in A.P.R., March 1892, p p . 507-8.
90. See above p p . 171-2.
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In New South Wales Buckland of the Bank of New South Wales and
Maiden of Goldsbrough Mort were prominent in the employers'
9 1associations, while in Victoria a veritable constellation 
of pastoral financiers joined the Pastoralists1 Union. Young 
and J.S. Horsfall, then of N.Z.L.M.A., were members of the 
three-man delegation sent by the Victorian Pastoralists' Union 
to the December conference. Young also drafted the associat­
ion's rules, which allowed for members' voting strength to be
9 2weighted according to the number of sheep they represented; 
this distinctly undemocratic provision was much to the 
advantage of the companies and large absentees. The finance 
companies were to remain strong in the Victorian Pastoralists' 
Union throughout the decade; in 1891 and 1901 alike, five of 
the six major finance companies were represented on the
association's Council, several of them by paid staff who had no
9 3personal squatting interests. In New South Wales the
companies also had some influence, in spite of the establish­
ment of district pastoralists' committees to allow squatters in
9 4the more remote areas to participate in the association.
The Council positions which were left to be filled at general
91. Town and Country Journal, 6 and 20th September 1890.
92. Victorian Pastoralists' Union, Annual General Meeting, 
1891. Minute s .
93. Ibid., 1891 and 1901. Those involved were; 1891 -
A. Blackwood (Dalgety director), John Cooke (A.M.L.F., 
Manager), W. Drysdale (U.M.A. Inspector), D. Elder 
(N.Z.L.M.A. Manager), A. Fisken (A.M.A. Director),
L. Kiddle (A.M.A. Manager), J.B. Nutting (U.M.A. Station 
Inspector; 1901 - A. Austin (A.M.L.F. Board of Advice),
J. Aitken (Dalgety Manager), R.G. Casey (Goldsbrough Mort 
Director), Cooke, Elder, J.J. Falconer (A.M.L.F. Manager), 
Fisken, J.M. Niall (Goldsbrough Mort Manager).
94. A.P.R., March 1892, pp. 507-8; Piggin, o p . c i t . , p . 557.
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m e e t i n g s  we r e o f t e n  o c c u p i e d  by  m e n  from the p a s t o r a l  f i n a n c e  
9 5h o u s e s ,  and at one p o i n t  w h e n  the a s s o c i a t i o n ' s  g e n e r a l  
p o p u l a r i t y  had  w a n e d  b a n k  and f i n a n c e  c o m p a n y  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
Q  f.m a d e  up h a l f  the a u d i e n c e  at the a n n u a l  g e n e r a l  m e e t i n g .
In 1893 D a v i d  Elder, who h ad  no i n v o l v e m e n t  in s q u a t t i n g
o u t s i d e  his r o l e  as N . Z . L . M . A .  m a n a g e r ,  was e v e n  e l e c t e d
9 7p r e s i d e n t  of the P a s t o r a l i s t s ' F e d e r a l  C ou nc i l .  For the 
i m p e n d i n g  c l a s h e s  of 1891, a m e m b e r s h i p  b a s e d  on a b s e n t e e s  and 
c r e d i t o r s  was c l e a r l y  i n a d e q u a t e .
The P a s t o r a l i s t s 1 U n i o n s  did, h o w e v e r ,  h a v e  a m a j o r
d r a w c a r d  to a t t r a c t  ne w m e m b e r s .  T he y  w ere  well p r e p a r e d  to
9 Rr e s i s t  the sh e a r e r s ,  h a v i n g  b eg u n  to o r g a n i z e  in April,  and 
m u c h  of t h e i r  e f f o r t  h ad  b e e n  d e v o t e d  to c o m p i l i n g  a r e g i s t e r  
of s h e a r e r s  who w er e  p r e p a r e d  to w o r k  u n d e r  the D e c e m b e r  
c o n f e r e n c e  a g r e e m e n t .  S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  a d v e r t i s e m e n t s  for n o n ­
u n i o n  l a b o u r e r s  in w e s t e r n  N e w S ou t h  W a l e s  n e w s p a p e r s  e l i c i t e d  
no r e s po n se , b ut  by J u l y  v i g o r o u s  r e c r u i t m e n t  as far a wa y  
as N e w  Z e a l a n d  had p r o v i d e d  the p a s t o r a l i s t s  w it h  m o r e  t han  a 
t h o u s a n d  n o n - u n i o n  w o r k e r s  who w er e  r e a d y  to be r a i l e d  to the 
w e s t e r n  d i s t r i c t s  and the R i v e r i n a . W i t h  t his  o f f e r  to 
s u p p l y  m e m b e r s  w i t h  n o n - u n i o n  lab o ur ,  the P a s t o r a l i s t s '  U n i o n s
95. NSW P a s t o r a l i s t s '  Union, A n n u a l  M e e t i n g s ,  M i n u t e s  1892- 
1902. Th ose  i n v o l v e d  i n c l u d e d  W. L a w r y  ( N . Z . L . M . A . ) ,  G. 
M a i d e n  ( G o l d s b r o u g h  Mort), C. L i t t l e  (U. M.A.), W. K i l g o u r  
(D al ge t y) , W. C o t t e e  ( A . M . L . F . ) ,  a nd J. K id d  ( A. M. L . F . ) .
96. Ibid., 1894 m e e t i n g .
97. P a s t o r a l i s t s '  F e d e r a l  C o u n c i l ,  M i n u t e s ,  N o v e m b e r  1893.
98. Piggi n, op. c i t ., p. 557.
99. W h i t e l e y  K i n g ' s  r e p o r t  to NSW P a s t o r a l i s t s '  U ni on , 1892.
100. Ibid. V i c t o r i a n  P a s t o r a l i s t s  Union , M in ut e s .
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we re  able to m o b i l i z e  the s q u a t t e r s '  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  with the 
u n i o n i s t s '  p e r f o r m a n c e  in the p r e v i o u s  year, a nd d u r i n g  1891 
the to t a l m e m b e r s h i p  of the P a s t o r a 1 i s t s ' U n i o n s  r e a c h e d  618, 
r e p r e s e n t i n g  t w e n t y - f o u r  m i l l i o n  sheep. T hi s was o n l y  just
ov er  a q u a r t e r  of the e a s t e r n  c o l o ni es ' t ota l s h e e p  p o p u l a t i o n ,  
but the rate of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a p p e a r s  to h a ve  b e e n  s o m e w h a t  
h i g h e r  in the i n l a n d  d i s t r i c t s  w h e r e  n o n - u n i o n  l a b o u r  was in 
s h o r t  suppl y. It was on t ho se  d i s t r i c t s  that a t t e n t i o n  was
fi x e d  as the s h e a r i n g  s e a s o n  b e g an , e s p e c i a l l y  a ft e r  the 
Q u e e n s l a n d  shear ers ' v i g o r o u s  if u n s u c c e s s f u l  r e s i s t a n c e  had 
m a d e  it cl e ar  th a t the i n l a n d  sheds w o u l d  not be e a s i l y  won.
The c l a s h e s  of 1891 r e s u l t e d  in a d e c i s i v e  v i c t o r y  
for the P a s t o r a 1 i s t s ' Un io ns . I n i t i a l l y  in J u l y  it a p p e a r e d  
that the A.S.U. m i g h t  s u c c e e d  in b l o c k a d i n g  some of the 
s t a t i o n s  w h i c h  w er e  i m p o r t i n g  n o n - u n i o n  l ab ou r. The u ni on i s t s '  
m a i n  s t r a t e g y  was to w a y l a y  s h e a r e r s  b e i n g  b r o u g h t  in by the 
P a s t o r a 1 i s t s ' U n i o n  and  c a j o l e  t he m into d e f e c t i n g  to the 
A.S.U.  T h e y  had some s u c c e s s  in this; the m e n  at D u n l o p  and 
D u m b l e  were p e r s u a d e d  to join the str i ke ,  and q u i t e  a few of 
the c o n t i n g e n t s  a r r i v e d  at t h e i r  d e s t i n a t i o n s  r a t h e r  d e p l e t e d  
in n u m b e r s .  But t h e s e  t a c t i c s  l ost  t h e i r  e f f e c t  a f t e r
p o l i c e  were sent in to k e e p  the s t r i k e r s  a w a y  f rom  the 
P a s t o r a 1 i s t s ' Un i o n  w o r k e r s .  The f l o o d  of n o n - u n i o n  l a b o u r e r s
101. F i g u r e s  from " N u m b e r  of M e m b e r s  and N u m b e r  of S hee p for 
ea ch  year", u n i n d e x e d  folio, P a s t o r a 1 i s t s ' U n i o n  r eco rd s.
102. See A .P . R. ,  A u g u s t  1892, p. 759 for li st s of s t a t i o n s  
u n d e r  the P.U. e n g a g e m e n t  system.
103. K i n g ' s  r e p o r t  to NSW P a s t o r a 1 i s t s ' Union, 1892.
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unleashed by the Pastoralists1 Union overwhelmed the A.S.U. 
men; more than five hundred men were sent to the early sheds 
around the Riverina, and an even greater number to the Bourke 
d i s t r i c t . F u r t h e r m o r e ,  the A .S.U.'s allies in other 
unions were still in the doldrums after the maritime strike and 
were therefore in no position to offer vigorous assistance.
Some western carriers' unions had banned the transportation of 
non-union w o o l , but the A.S.U. had given in before this 
could take effect; and in Bourke the local carriers paid the 
penalty for refusing to admit Asian cameleers to the union when 
the camels were used to break their blockade.  ^^
The residents of Bourke had called for a conference
between the A.S.U. and the pastoralists when it became apparent
10 7that the flow of non-union workers would not diminish.
Towards the end of the month the call was supported by the
10 8Trades and Labour Council, and by then the A.S.U. had
little option. On August 7th and 8th the A.S.U. leaders met 
with a Pastoralists' Federal Council delegation comprising 
three squatters and two finance company managers, the latter 
being Elder of N.Z.L.M.A. and Cottee, the Sydney manager of the 
A.M.L.F.109 There were some difficulties when Spence balked 
at Elder's suggestion that the phrase "freedom of contract" be
104. Ibid.; Victorian Pastoralists' Union, 1891.
105. The Hay carriers had decided this in 1890 (Town and
Country Journal, 11 October 1890).
106. Ibid., 13 September 1890; A.P.R., November 1892, p. 902.
107. King's report, 1892.
108. Town and Country Journal, 1 August 1891.
109. King's report, 1892; Piggin, op. c i t ., p p . 558-9.
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1 1 0included in their agreement; but the result of the
conference was a foregone conclusion. The A.S.U. conceded the 
open shop, and the employers were able to rejoice in a second 
vic tor y .
The Onset of Depression and the 1894 Uprising
In spite of the Pastoralists' Unions' repeated
assertions that their interest was in ensuring freedom of
contract rather than in imposing wage reductions, the critical
problems facing the industry did not allow the wage question to
lie dormant for long. General economic conditions in the colony
were conducive to an assault on wages. By 1892 the rural
labour market had collapsed. While station investment was
virtually at a standstill, large numbers of urban unemployed
were taking advantage of the New South Wales government's free
rail pass system to move to rural areas in search of work. By
mid-1892 a thousand men had been given rail passes to 
1 1 1Bou r k e , and from all over the west there were reports of
1 1 2large-scale unemployment. The influx had serious
consequences for the bush towns, as those who did find work
1 1 3spent their wages elsewhere and the unemployed were a
heavy burden on private charity in the rural centres. The 
labour market was especially bad in 1892, as the shearing 
season was delayed by a dry spell and stock losses reduced
110. Piggin, ibid., p. 558.
111. Hummer, 2 July 1892.
112. Ibid., 2 and 16 July 1892, 13 August 1892.
113. Ibi d ., 16 July 1892.
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1 1 4shearers' earnings on several Darling stations. Work
1 1 5remained hard to get in 1893, though the influx of outside
labour slowed a little and some unemployed left for the Wyalong 
goldfields while others emigrated to South Africa or under the 
"New Australia" banner to Paraguay J  ^  In both years large 
numbers of unemployed men were reported camped along the 
Darling in the off-season, trying to eke out a living as best 
they could. As the Hummer commented on the plight of the
immigrants from the cities: "They left the city with the hope
of bettering their condition. They have failed to do so. All
1 1 8they can do now is to swear hard and steal mutton." To
add insult to injury, outback squatters began to refuse to 
supply rations to the growing number of wandering unemployed 
who were coming to their stations; this remarkably callous
decision was justified on the grounds that it eliminated
parasitic sundowners and forced the unemployed to look harder
-  , 1 2  0 for w o r k .
The west in 1892 and 1893 was ripe for wage cuts. In 
May 1892 it was reported that a Nyngan squatter had replaced
114. A.P.R., September 1892, p. 803; Hummer, 13 August 1892; 
Worker, 24 September 1892.
115. Worker, 22 July 1893 includes a warning to shearers to 
stay out of the Bourke district if they haven't booked in 
a dvanc e .
116. A.I.B.R., June 1893, p. 591; Coghlan, o p . c i t ., p . 2020;
Worker, 26 November 1892.
117. Hummer, 26 March 1892; Worker, 7 January 1893.
118. Ibid., 3 September 1892.
119. Those who discontinued rations included the squatters of 
the arid Corner country (A.P.R., July 1893, p. 201) and, 
according to the Hummer, millionaire James Tyson
(13 August 1892).
120. A .P .R ., October 1892, p. 856.
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sixty men for objecting to a sixpence per day wage reduct- 
1 2 1ion; and there was much concern that cuts would become
general. Nevertheless the militancy of the bush unionists
was hardly dented; on the contrary, it seemed to thrive on
frustration and over the two-year period unionism gained wide
support, often from surprising quarters, among the western
townspeople. Strike tactics were variously used by Broken Hill
12 3schoolchildren wanting a reduction in school hours,
bookmakers at the Bourke racecourse protesting at high betting 
1 ? 4fees and a Broken Hill church choir objecting to a non-
1 2 Sunionist's singing with them. The eight-hour day movement
also flourished, especially in Bourke where a boycott of late 
closing stores was enforced by the local unions.  ^^  And in 
spite of the adverse economic situation, the major western 
unions vigorously resisted pressure from employers, engaging in 
a series of courageous rearguard actions only to emerge with an 
almost unbroken series of defeats.
The most crushing single blow was the defeat of the
Broken Hill miners who struck in 1892 against the introduction
12 7of contract mining. The silver companies, feeling the
pinch as a result of falling world silver prices, were intent
121. Hummer, 14 May 1892.
122. See e.g. ibid., 9 July 1892.
123. Worker, 8 October 1892.
124. Hummer, 21 May 1892.
125. Ibid., 17 September 1892.
126. Worker, 1 October 1892.
127. For general accounts of the strike see Blainey, R .B .H .,
op. c i t ., p p . 600-602;
Hardy op. cit., pp. 209-10 ; Kennedy, op. cit. , p p . 62-72 .
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on passing some of the burden onto the miners. Though stoping 
by contract was contrary to the agreement entered into in 1890 
between the miners and management, the companies believed it 
would be a more acceptable way of intensifying their exploit­
ation of labour than a simple wage cut. The miners for their 
part were totally opposed to contract stoping both for its 
effect on wages and out of a fear that competition and haste at
the workface would increase the already considerable hazards of
12 8mining at the Hill. But the companies were adamant, and
refused to engage in negotiation or arbitration, thereby
12 9breaching another section of the 1890 agreement. The res-
13 0ult was "war to the end with no quarter asked or given."
The eighteen-week strike which followed had the 
quality of an archetypal confrontation between organized labour 
and monopoly capital, and the miners received massive support 
both from the Broken Hill population and from sympathizers 
elsewhere in the west. The companies' protestations that they 
could not make profits without the contract system were
dismissed scornfully by those who remembered the fortunes made
1 3 1from Broken Hill by Melbourne capitalists. The miners
enjoyed popular sympathy partly because the introduction of 
contracting was a matter of immediate concern to many other 
w o r k e r s , b u t  even more because of the symbolic nature of
128. Kennedy, ibid., p p . 66-7.
129. Ibi d ., pp. 67-8.
13 0. Ibid. , p . 68 .
131. Hummer, 15 July 1892.
132. See e.g. ibid., 16 January 1892; see also below p. 301.
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their resistance to the greed and inhumanity of a capitalism 
which could "sacrifice human beings to the lead-poison fiend 
who lurks in the tunnels of the great profit-making mines of 
the Barrier".
Financial assistance came from all sides. In all, 
twenty-five thousand pounds were raised to aid the strikers.
The contributors included many Broken Hill businessmen, the 
Sydney Trades and Labour Council and a bevy of other organiz­
ations. The shearing season had started, and there was
an intensive effort to solicit contributions from shearers and 
shed hands. In the Bourke district alone over a thousand 
pounds were raised in this manner in the space of a few weeks, 
with many of the contributions coming from Pastoralists1 Union 
sheds. But this support was of no avail when confronted
with the companies' determination to reopen the mines with non­
union labour. The reopening took place on August 25th, super­
vised by more than a hundred police who had been thoughtfully
A O CLprovided by the New South Wales government. Non-unionists
were harassed and ostracised in the town, and the strike 
continued; but in early November, faced with a "steady trickle" 
of defections and the misery of prolonged unemployment, the 
union finally gave in. Mine management did not hesitate
to press home its advantage; the companies refused to recognize
133. Ibid., 9 July 1892.
134. Kennedy, op. c i t . , p. 68.
135. Hummer, 6 August to 17 September 1892.
136. Kennedy, op. cit., pp . 68-9.
137. Ibid., pp. 70-1.
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the union, blackballed well-known activists and revoked
1 O Oconcessions won in earlier industrial actions. The
miners' defeat heralded a period of wage cuts in the mines and
1 O  Qdepression for the town as a whole; and the manner in
which the State had intervened to assist the employers in 
crushing the union by sheer, unreasoning force left a bitter 
taste in the mouths of unionists throughout the colony.
By contrast with Broken Hill, industrial action among
the pastoral workers was on a small scale. Early in 1892 the
General Labourers' Union, which covered shed hands and other
station employees, called for wage increases across the
b o a r d . T h i s  call was backed up by intermittent action
during the next two seasons at the individual station level. A
14 1few employers gave in at the mere threat of strike action, 
but for the most part squatters had little difficulty in engag­
ing more tractable hands either from local sources or through
14 2the Pastora1ists ' Union office. Nevertheless, the shed
hands kept up what the Pastora 1i s t s ' Review described as "a 
kind of guerrilla w a r f a r e " ^ ^  in the south-west Riverina and 
around Bourke, reaching a climax in August 1893 with a series 
of strikes and an attempt to burn the woolshed at Dumble
138. Ibid., p. 71; Blainey, op. c i t . , p. 62.
139. Kennedy, i b i d ., p p . 71, 75.
140. The rates demanded were 25/- per week for general hands 
and 30/- per week for shearing hands and drivers; this 
amounted to an increase of roughly 5/- per week (A .P .R ., 
March 1892, p. 508).
141. Hummer, 16 and 30 July 1892.
142. See e.g. ibid., 30 July 1892, 3 September 1892; King's
report to N.S.W. Pastora1i s t s ' Union, July 1893.
143. A.P.R., September 1893, p. 310.
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station. In some cases they also succeeded in gaining the 
backing of the shearers, and even of permanent station 
hands. Ineffectual though it was, the shed hands' campaign
demonstrated that the militant spirit of the bush unions was 
not to be lightly crushed, either by employers or by "moderate" 
union 1eaders.
The A.S.U. for its part was taking no initiatives.
The Pastoralists' Unions were still on the offensive, attemp­
ting to consolidate their control over the engagement of 
shearers, initially by persuading squatters to engage men 
through the Pastoralists' Union office and then by proposing 
the introduction of references for shearers to weed out 
activists and inefficient w o r k e r s . T h e  A.S.U. opposed 
both measures, but to little effect. In 1892 it urged members 
to engage directly at the stations to bypass the Pastoralists' 
Union office; but few of the early sheds engaged their hands 
directly and, after a season in which many unionists were left
without work, the A.S.U. in 1893 allowed members to engage
1 4 7through the Pastoralists' Union. Similarly, though the
A.S.U. protested vigorously at the introduction of references 
and called on members to refuse them, no action was taken
to enforce this policy. The A.S.U. was hamstrung by the fact 
that its refusal to co-operate with the Pastoralists' Unions'
144. Ibid., September 1893, p. 352.
145. Ibid., November 1892, p. 901.
146. Ibid., April 1893, p. 53.
147. Ibid., March 1 893 , pp . 6-7; Hummer, 28 May 1 892 .
148. A .P .R ., May 1893, p p . 99-10o7~
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engagement system merely handicapped its members in the search 
for w o r k .
The Pastoralists' Unions meanwhile had problems of
their own, as their members were divided on several issues
which were of central importance to the organisations'
operations. The first concerned the scope of the Pastoralists'
Unions' activities. Within a year of the industrial crisis'
passing over, there was a move to widen the New South Wales
association's aims to include agitation for more lenient terms
for Crown tenants and the promotion of the frozen meat export
trade. Demands that the associations involve themselves
in lobbying on wider economic and political issues became more
insistent as the decade wore on and the depression in the
15 0pastoral industry deepened; but all such suggestions were
dismissed by the hard core of New South Wales and Victorian
Pastora1 i s t s ' Union activists, who claimed that lack of
consensus would make it impossible for the associations to take
up the advocacy of pastoral interests outside the industrial 
1 S 1sphere. Their refusal detracted greatly from the
associations' impetus and continuity of support as, having 
failed to secure Pastora1 is ts' Union co-operation, those who 
wished to lobby on wider issues set up alternative associations 
for that purpose. Prominent among these were the Crown 
Tenants' Associations which sprang up in several areas during
149. Ibid., July 1892, p. 714.
150. Ibid., January 1896, p. 606; February 1896, p. 653; March
1 896 , p . 45 .
151. Ibid., March 1896, p. 3; July 1896, p. 266.
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1 892 and 1 893 ^ ^  and the right-wing National Association, 
widely known to radicals as the "National Ass" , which
conducted a vigorous campaign against the introduction of one- 
man-one-vote in 1892 and in succeeding years represented
pastoral interests on both the Crown tenancy and industrial 
issues. The squatting lobby's energies were thus diffused
in the short term, while in the longer term, as industrial 
problems were eclipsed by the deepening structural crisis 
facing the industry, the Pastoralists' Unions' narrow focus 
rendered their activities irrelevant to the squatting 
interest's major concerns.
Even in the industrial relations sphere there was 
serious dissension about the Pastora1i s t s ' Unions' proper role, 
hingeing on the question of whether "freedom of contract" was 
an end in itself or merely an initial step towards the 
reduction of wages. Within the inner circle of Pastoralists' 
Union activists there were several adherents of the "freedom of 
contract" school, but they were outnumbered by those who
wanted to bring in wage cuts. The wage question was first 
raised at the Pastora1 ists' Federal Council in December 1892 by 
the South Australian and West Darling association; at the time,
152. Ibid., August 1892, p. 791; September 1892, p. 840; 
November 1892, p. 937; May 1893, p. 107.
153. Or, to give it its full title, the "Capitalistic Freedom 
of Contract Plural Voting National Ass" (H u m m e r ,
6 February 1 892 ). See also Rickard, op. c i t . , p p . 54ff.
154. See ibid., 19 March and 14 May 1892.
155. A.P.R., January 1894, p. 520; September 1894, p. 267.
156. See Pastora1 ist s ' Federal Council report, 7th meeting, 
April 1894.
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David Elder of N.Z.L.M.A. suggested that reductions be brought 
in via lower rates for machine shearers, but the issue was
1 Cldeferred until the following year. When it came up again
the proponents of financial stringency were victorious; it was
agreed that the conference agreement of 1891 be abandoned and
18 8reduced rates set. Accordingly a new agreement was
announced before the start of the 1894 shearing season; in New 
South Wales shearers were to receive 20/- per hundred for hand 
shearing and 17/- with machines in all districts except the 
southern Riverina, where the rates were 18/6 and 17/—
respectively, and the Western Division east of the Darling,
1 S 9where 20/- was paid all round.
The imposition of wage cuts was strongly supported by 
the banks and finance companies, with the exception of a few 
small finance companies in Queensland whose position was so 
parlous that they could not afford to s t r i k e . B u t  the 
Pastoralists1 Federal Council had overestimated the extent to 
which wage cuts would be supported by their members. Many 
squatters had joined the Pastoralists' Unions principally to 
resist the A.S.U.'s encroachments on their prerogatives as 
employers. Though they had been prepared to abrogate their 
power to hire and fire as a matter of temporary necessity to 
ensure an adequate supply of non-union labour through the
157. Ibid., Dec ember 1 892 m e e t i n g .
158. Ibid., 6th Council meeting, November 1 893 .
159. A . P . R . , May 1894 * P • 10 2.
160. See comments by J . L . Stirling in Pastoralists' Federal
Council report, 7 th Council meeting, April 1894.
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Pastoralists 1 Union offices, they had no intention of substit­
uting one form of outside control for another on any long-term 
basis. Yet the Pastoralists1 Federal Council's imposition of 
new wage-rates from above amounted to an attempt to exercise 
precisely the kind of hegemonic control the squatters had 
fought against. Opposition to the new agreement was intens­
ified by a widespread feeling that the change in policy 
constituted a breach of the faith vested in the employers by 
those shearers who had been tempted away from the A.S.U. with 
the promise that no wage reductions would ensue. Even before 
the shearing season started, the Pastoralists' Unions' own
A Arhetoric had begun to be used against them. D
The problems the Pastoralists' Union constituents had 
with the new agreement were, however, overshadowed by the sheer 
fury inspired among the shearers by the employers' apparent 
deceit. The Pastoralists' Federal Council had seriously 
miscalculated the likelihood of resistance from the shearers.
In spite of the amalgamation of the A.S.U. and the General 
Labourers' Union to form the Australian Workers' Union (A.W.U.) 
early in 1894, the union had been experiencing severe problems; 
in April 1894 the Pastoralists' Review confidently pronounced 
shearer unionism e x t i n c t . B u t  if union discipline was 
breaking down, the outback militants had by no means been 
mellowed by the rigours of the past two seasons; and, in
161. See e.g. comments by W. Allison, ibid., 7th and 8th 
Council meetings.
162. A .P .R ., April 1894, p. 55.
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ass um i n g that central control over the engagement of hands 
would make the imposition of wage cuts a simple matter, the 
Pastoralists1 Union organizers had overlooked the possibility 
that the workers they hired would turn against them. The 
oversight proved to be a costly one.
The first signs of trouble in western New South Wales
came in July, when the first batches of hands sent to two of
1 ft ^the earliest sheds struck and had to be replaced. The
hands at Dunlop also went out over rouseabouts' pay, and some 
sheds started under the 1891 agreement. Within a few
weeks resistance to the new agreement was evident in all the 
districts where shearing had started. The shearers at Bourke 
tried to persuade employers to enter into negotiations about
a r cthe agreement, but their overtures were rebuffed;
thereafter the field was left to the militants, who set out to 
use every weapon at their command to prevent shearing from 
taking place under the new agreement.
Their first step was to persuade shearers to act en 
bloc in rejecting the agreement when they arrived on the 
stations. The task presented few difficulties; many a station 
manager called the roll only to discover to his chagrin that 
the Pastoralists' Union office had supplied him with a full 
complement of strikers. By the second week of August at least
163. Ibid., July 1894, p. 239.
164. Town and Country Journal, 21 July 1894.
165. Coghlan, op. cit. , p. 2022 .
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ten s t a t i o n s  in B o u r k e  d i s t r i c t  and a r o u n d  B r o k e n  Hill w er e on 
s t ri ke  , and the n u m b e r  of s t a t i o n s  s h e a r i n g  u n d e r  the 1891
1 ^ 7a g r e e m e n t  or on v e r b a l  a g r e e m e n t s  was g r o w i n g .  L arg e
st rik e c am ps  had  b e e n  f o r m e d  on s e v e r a l  s t a t i o n s  and  c los e to
1 ft ftthe m a j o r  r a i l h e a d s ,  and p i c k e t s  w ere  soon m o u n t e d  to
i ft Qi n t e r c e p t  n e w  g r o u p s  of w o r k e r s  as t h e y  w e r e  sent up.
Th ese sc ene s were r e p e a t e d  in the s e c o n d  half of A u g u s t  in the
1 7 0Cobar , W a l g e t t  and Hay d i s t r i c t s  as s h e a r i n g  b e g a n  there.
The n u m b e r  of s t a t i o n s  on s t r ik e e s c a l a t e d .  N e w  s h e a r e r s  w ere
i n t e r c e p t e d  as th e y came off the t r a i n  at Hay a nd w a y l a i d  on
the ro ad to W a l g e t t ;  near C o b a r  a c o n t i n g e n t  of m e n u n d e r
the c h a r g e  of a U.M.A. s t a t i o n  m a n a g e r  was s t o p p e d  on the way
to the s t a t i o n  by a gr o u p  of u ni o n  s h e a r e r s  a n d  m i n e r s ,  who
17 2p e r s u a d e d  s e v e r a l  to defect . M i l i t a n t s  p e r s u a d e d  the m e n
in a n u m b e r  of sheds  to s t r i k e  a f t e r  t he y had s t a r t e d  
17 f ts h e a ri ng , and few s t a t i o n s  w e re  r e p o r t e d  to h a ve  s t a r t e d
17 4s m o o t h l y  un d e r  the n e w  a g r e e m e n t .
The P a s t o r a l i s t s ' U n i o n s  r e a c t e d  to the d e f e c t i o n  of 
a larg e s e g m e n t  of "t hei r"  w o r k f o r c e  w i t h  some d is m a y ,  b u t  th ey
166. T o w n  and C o u n t r y  Jo u r n a l ,  11 A u g u s t  1894.
167. A . P. R. ,  A u g u s t  1894, pp . 311-2.
168. Hardy, op. c i t . , p. 215; Spenc e,  o p . c i t . , p . 6 5.
169. See e.g. Hardy, loc. cit.
170. A. P.R ., S e p t e m b e r  1894, p. 367; T o w n  and  C o u n t r y  J o u r n a l , 
25 A u g u s t  1894.
171. A .P .R . , S e p t e m b e r  1 894, pp . 367-8 ; T o w n  and C o u n t r y
Jo u rn a l ,  25 A u g u s t  1894.
172. A. P.R ., S e p t e m b e r  1 894, pp . 367-8 .
173. Th es e  i n c l u d e d  C o r o n g a  D ow n s  (ibid. A u g us t 1894, p. 311) 
and Al ma (ibid., S e p t e m b e r  1894, p. 367).
. T o w n  and C o u n t r y  Jo u r n a l ,  25 A u g u s t  1894; K i n c h e g a  c o u l d  
on ly get one t h i r d  of its full c o m p l e m e n t  of hands .
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did not surrender lightly. They stepped up the supply of 
labour in the hope that the dissidents would be swamped by 
sheer weight of numbers; by mid-September A.G. Milson of the
U.M.A. had sent at least three thousand shearers out to New
17 8South Wales stations from the Pastora1ists 1 Union office.
The employers also called on the New South Wales government to
provide police escorts for non-unionists at the very least, and
17 6preferably to send in troops to break up the strike camps.
Police had already been sent out to guard many Darling and 
17 7Barrier runs, but they were spread thinly and could not
control the unionists to any great extent.
Concern at the weakness of the police forces in the
area mounted as the unionists, having failed to stem the flood
17 8of non-union labour with moral suasion and picketing, 
began to resort to physically harrassing non-unionists. The 
first blow was struck early in August, when a large group of 
unionists rushed the men's huts at Wonnaminta and Salisbury 
Downs and abducted several non-unionists; though the perpe­
trators of the attack were arrested after a police chase and 
17 9later jailed, their example was followed by unionists
elsewhere. In the succeeding weeks at least four other sheds
175. A.P.R., September 1894, p. 421. For Milson's affiliation
see ibid., April 1 894, p p . 60-1.
176. Town and Country Journal, 15 September 1894.
177. A.P.R., August 1894, p. 311; Hardy, op . cit . , p. 2 15.
178. See e.g. Hardy, loc. cit.; Town and Country Journal,
2 5 August 1894.
179. A.P.R., August 1894, p p . 263, 311; Town and Country 
Journal, 11 August 1894.
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were raided in a similar manner and in one case the raid
took place under the very noses of the police. There were
also some attacks on property. Several arson attempts were 
reported, most of them aimed at woolsheds, and Darling
steamers carrying non-unionists were repeatedly bombarded and 
1 8 8obstructed. But the only attack which caused serious
damage was the seizure and burning of the steamer "Rodney" en 
route to Tolarno with a group of non-unionists. This was
in marked contrast to the simultaneous uprising in western
Queensland where unionists succeeded in burning a large number
18 5of woolsheds and prevented many stations from shearing.
On the Colonial Secretary's orders, police protection
for non-unionists was stepped up in western New South Wales
1 8 6during the second half of September, and by the beginning
of October the shearers' revolt was petering out. Though the 
picketing of roads was still widespread and a few minor attacks 
on property took place, the police were able to forestall at 
least one major raid and escort Pastora1is ts' Union hands to 
many stations. The shearers' rage had spent its force, and
180. A.P.R., September 1894, pp. 367, 368; October 1894,
p. 418; Town and Country J o u r n a l , 25 August, 1 September 
and 15 September 1894.
181. Town and Country Journal, 15 September 1894.
182. Ibid., 25 August 1894; A.P.R., September 1894, p. 368;
October 1894, p. 418.
183. A.P.R., September 1894, p. 368; Hardy, o p . c i t .,
pp. 215-6; Spence, op. cit., p. 68; Town and Country 
Journal, 1 September 1894.
184. See A.I.B.R. September 1894, p. 368; Hardy, i b i d . , p . 216;
Spence, ibid., p p . 70-1; Town and Country Jou r n a l ,
1 September 1894.
185. See A.I.B.R., September 1 894, pp . 641-2.
186. Town and Country Journal, 15 September 1894.
187. Ibid., 29 September 1894, A.P.R., September 1894, p. 380.
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the harsh sentences meted out to unionists by the courts were 
accepted with a spirit of bitter resignation.
The violence associated with the shearers' uprising
in 1894 horrified contemporary conservatives and liberals
alike; even the Bulletin derided the strike as "an aimless,
purposeless, burlesque uprising which is foredoomed to defeat,
18 8because its leaders have no idea whither they are going".
This judgement was both premature and harsh. The revolt was 
far from purposeless; on the contrary, it was a systematic 
attempt to prevent the implementation of the 1894 agreement in 
the inland sheds, initially by persuasion and later by the 
limited use of physical force. It was also noteworthy that the 
rebels did not inflict bodily harm on their opponents; abduc­
tions and attacks on property there were in plenty, but the 
only physical injuries reported during the strike were
- t a ginflicted on unionists by "warning shots" from the police.
The odds were heavily weighted against the shearers' 
unilateral action. With unemployment rife in the urban areas 
moral suasion alone could not counter the employers' carefully- 
orchestrated strike-breaking organization, but as soon as the 
shearers went beyond moral suasion they exposed themselves to 
legal retaliation and brought the forces of the state in on the 
employers' side. Nevertheless, in terms of its own limited aim 
the strike was partially successful at least. Many "respect­
able" shearers, most of them small selectors, were deterred
188. Quoted in A.P.R., September 1894, p. 370.
189. At Grasmere during a raid (Hardy, op. cit. p. 215).
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fr om  go i n g  o u t b a c k  for the s e a so n,  and the P a s t o r a l i s t s 1 U n i o n s  
fo un d it i m p o s s i b l e  to m u s t e r  t r a c t a b l e  w o r k e r s  f ast  e n o u g h  and 
in s u f f i c i e n t  n u m b e r s  to m a k e  the n ew a g r e e m e n t  s t i c k . B y
N o v e m b e r  e v e n  the P a s t o r a l i s t s *  R e v i e w  was a d m i t t i n g  that a
19 1s i z e a b l e  n u m b e r  of sheds had not a d o p t e d  the w a g e  cuts.
The s t r i k e r s  were a b l e  to c a p i t a l i z e  on s qu at ter s'  
g r o w i n g  d o u b t s  a b o u t  the P a s t o r a l i s t s '  Unions' s t r a t e g y .  The 
c e n t r a l  e n g a g e m e n t  s y s t e m ' s  e f f i c a c y  was  t h r o w n  into q u e s t i o n  
w h e n  d e f e c t i o n s  by s h e a r e r s  on a r r i v a l  e x p o s e d  its v u l n e r a b i l -
i q  nity to i n f i l t r a t i o n ,  and the str i ke  s t r e n g t h e n e d  the d i s ­
s i d e n t  s q u a t t e r s '  c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  the P a s t o r a l i s t s '  U n i o n  o r g ­
a n i z e r s  we re l e a d i n g  e m p l o y e r s  into t r o u b l e  by b r e a k i n g  t hei r  
u n d e r t a k i n g  not to re du ce  wages . A l t h o u g h  u n d e r  n o r m a l  c i r c u m ­
s t a n c e s  e m p l o y e r  a s s o c i a t i o n  m e m b e r s h i p  w o u l d  be e x p e c t e d  to
rise when s t r i k e s  we re t h r e a t e n i n g ,  the P a s t o r a l i s t s '  Unions'
19 3to ta l m e m b e r s h i p  fell by m o r e  tha n a q u a r t e r  d u r i n g  1894.
T h o u g h  the F e d e r a l  C o u n c i l  m a d e  a p a r t i a l  r e t r e a t  on the wage  
q u e s t i o n  in 1 89 5* *^  and the N e w  So ut h  W a l e s  and V i c t o r i a n  
a s s o c i a t i o n s  set out  on a c a m p a i g n  to d e v o l v e  some p o w e r s  to 
the d i s t r i c t  c o m m i t t e e s  in the hope of w i n n i n g  b a ck  the s u p p o r t
190. A. P.R ., O c t o b e r  1894, p. 380; T o w n  and C o u n t r y  J o u r n a l ,
18 A u g u s t  1894.
191. Ibid., N o v e m b e r  1894, p. 425.
192. At l e a s t  six P a s t o r a l i s t s *  U n i o n - s u p p l i e d  s t a t i o n s  were 
a f f e c t e d  by str ik es .  Th es e  wer e G u n d a b o o k a  , E l s i n o r a ,  Fo rt  
B ou rke , Me l ro s e ,  C o r o n g a  D ow n s  and W i l l a n d r a .  A b o u t  190 
s h e a r e r s  wer e i n v o l v e d  (A.P.R., A u g u s t  1894, p. 313 give s
a list of P a s t o r a l i s t s '  U ni o n  s t a t i o n s )  .
193. F i g u r e s  from " Nu m be r  of M e m b e r s  a nd N u m b e r  of S h e e p  for 
each year",  u n i n d e x e d  folio, P a s t o r a l i s t s '  U ni o n  r e co rd s.  
P a s t o r a l i s t s '  F e d e r a l  C o u n c i l  rep o rt , 8th C o u n c i l  m e e t i n g ,  
F e b r u a r y  1895.
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<1 Q  Cthey had lost, the organization was showing every sign of
becoming moribund. The central engagement system fell into 
d i s u s e , d i s t r i c t  committees restored the shearing rate in 
most districts to its 1891 level, and there was a general
loss of interest in the Pastora1ists 1 Unions, reflected in the
fact that all candidates for Council positions in the New South
19 8Wales association in 1895 were elected unopposed.
The Federal Council had overplayed its hand in 
proposing wage cuts. By 1894 many squatters were in such a 
disastrous financial position they they could not risk delaying 
the shearing for the sake of an agreement which would bring 
only minor cost savings and which had been formulated in the 
interests of financiers and pastoral plutocrats. The strike 
revived the employer dissension which had hampered the 
establishment of pastoralists1 associations before 1890, and 
limited the extent to which wage reductions were imposed on 
the seasonal workforce in the west even in the depths of 
drought.1^  But it also heightened the tension between the 
militant bush unionists and the moderate A.W.U. leadership. 
Having called the Pastoralists1 Unions' bluff, the outback 
unionists were enraged when the A.W.U. executive went on to
195. A.P.R., March 1895, p. 48.
196. King's report to N.S.W. Pastoralists' Union, 1897.
197. A.P.R., June 1895, p. 215. Rates were 20/- all round in 
B o u r k e , Brewarrina, Cobar, Goodo o g a , Nyngarn, Nymagee, 
Warren, Walgett and Wanaaring, with Hay on 20/- for hand 
and 18/6 for machine.
198. N.S.W. Pastoralists' Union, Minutes of Annual General 
Me eting, 1895.
199. See below p. 300 for a summary of the cuts which were 
instituted.
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accept the new agreement, and the Wilcannia branch formally 
censured the executive for its action. 200 For several years 
thereafter the A.W.U. was largely inactive. As the depression 
in the western districts deepened, class organization on both 
sides went into temporary decline, signalling a retreat from 
large-scale confrontations to the pattern of ad hoc bargaining 
which had reigned in earlier years, but under labour market 
conditions distinctly less favourable to the working class.
Bushworkers in the Depression
The influx of free rail pass holders into the west
during the early 1890s was only one manifestation of a wider
population shift which hastened the deterioration of the rural
labour market in the early stages of the depression. The
collapse of the urban construction boom, followed by the
financial crisis of 1893, sent urban unemployed fleeing into
the country in search of work. Melbourne's population dropped
o o 1by 3.5% in 1892 alone, and the urban population of New
South Wales fell from 34.2% of the total population in 1891 to 
31.5% six years later.
This exodus placed an intolerable strain on a rural 
labour market which was already depressed by the stagnation of 
employment in pastoralism and mining. Even before drought 
struck in 1895, unemployment and destitution were widespread in
200. A .P .R ., June 1895, p. 213.
201. A .I .B .R ., May 1893, p. 292.
202. Ibid., March 1897, p. 158.
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the western districts. Around Bourke men who were dependent on 
seasonal earnings were reported to be half-starving, women and 
children were to be found begging in the south-west, and
the mining towns of Broken Hill and Cobar were blighted by 
retrenchments in the wake of a world price slump.204 The 
financial stringency consequent on the collapse of British 
pastoral investment was also having a severe effect on the 
demand for station labour. The financial institutions were 
engaging in systematic retrenchments on foreclosed 
holdings, halting the installation of improvements and
managing stations in consolidated groups to cut down labour 
requirements. The threat of foreclosure was used to bludgeon 
clients who were still in possession of their holdings into 
implementing similar e c o n o m i e s . ^ ^
The onset of drought in 1895 introduced a new element 
into the situation. Sheep numbers declined drastically, and 
with them the demand for seasonal labour; station accounts show 
large falls in payments for shearers and other shed hands over 
the period from 1 895 to 1 902 . ^ ^  The bullockies were also 
affected by the reduced volume of wool production and by the 
severe water and feed shortages experienced during the drought,
203. A.P.R., September 1894, p p . 374-5; Hummer, 2 July 1892.
204. Kennedy, op. c i t ., p p . 71, 75.
205. A .I .B .R ., April ^894, p. 217.
206. See e.g. Bailey, op. cit., p. 139.
207. The magnitude of the fall varied widely, depending on the 
severity of drought on individual stations, whether 
additional sheep were purchased, and other factors. 
Decreases in shearing expenditure ranged from about 40%
(Weilmoring1e , in R.C.W.D., Minutes, p. 135) to 94% 
(Tindarey, Australian Estates papers, file 5/16).
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which stimulated a shift to camel transport in many parts of
p n othe north-west . The falling demand for shearing labour
had adverse effects on employment in the pastoral towns, which
were already suffering from the slump in construction activity
2 0 9and the flight of smallholders from the afflicted region.
To some extent the persistent drought eventually
created its own demands for labour, albeit of the most menial
kind. Large numbers of scrub-cutters were required to carry
out the systematic denudation of the country which station
managers deemed necessary to preserve the flocks in times of
feed shortage. As the topsoil of the region came adrift a
sustained effort was also necessary to prevent tanks, drains,
fences and other station structures from disappearing beneath
2 11the rising sand. On some stations men were even employed
2 12solely to pull bogged sheep out of the drying waterholes.
These frenetic efforts to resist the drought's effects were all 
highly labour-intensive, but workers were poorly-paid and cond­
itions on the runs harsh; such work was only taken as a last 
resort, often by Chinese labourers who were discriminated
208. T.L. M cKnight, The Camel in Australia, Melbourne, 1969.
pp . 5 4-5.
209. See above, p p . 235-6, 240ff.
210. See e.g. A.P.R. August 1895, p. 286; June 1896, p. 211;
Australian Estates papers, files 5/10 (1899 report), 5/12
(1897-1902 reports), 5/15 (1898-9).
211. Australian Estates papers, file 5/14 (1895 and 1900
reports); R.C.W.D. M i n u t e s , evidence of W . Parker, p. 429, 
and A. Cudmore, p. 435.
Australian Estate papers, files 5/13 (1899 report); 5/15
(1897 report).
2 1 2 .
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9  1 Qagainst in other employment. Furthermore, the labour
demand created by such activities was more than offset by the 
reduced demand for shearing labour and the retrenchments imple­
mented by cost-conscious squatters and finance companies. The 
financial institutions extended their practice of administering 
holdings in consolidated blocs, deploying general hands from 
station to station to minimize wage costs, dispensing with 
managers and clerical staff, and insisting that even minor 
repairs be made only with the approval of company 
officials.214 a group of about twenty stations whose
accounts are available these practices, coupled with falling 
stock numbers, reduced average expenditure per station on 
wages, rations and shearing by over fifty per cent between 1894 
and 19022 1 5 .
There was little scope for displaced pastoral workers 
to find alternative employment in the west, though a few of the 
towns were able to take some surplus labour. The establishment 
of boiling-down and/or meat-processing works at Bourke, Hay, 
Menindie and Nyngan created some jobs in those t o w n s , a n d  
the Cobar and Nymagee copper mines went back into full operation
213. Ibid., file 5/10 (1895 report); Coghlan, o p . c i t . ,
p. 1332; R.C.W.D. Minutes, evidence of M. Armstrong, 
p. 351.
214. Australian Estates papers, file 165; A.M.L.F. papers, file
6/106; Bailey, op. c i t . , pp. 139, 165; R.C.W.D. Min u t e s ,
evidence of L. Kiddle, (p p . 256-7), C. May, (p. 471),
F. Vandeleur (p. 578).
215. Based on records in Australian Estates papers, filed 5/10, 
5/12-16; A.M.L.F. papers, loc. cit.; and R.C.W.D. Minutes, 
evidence of T. Keats (Weilmoring1e ), p. 135; G .Riddoch 
(Weinteriga), pp. 321-3; and P. Waite (Momba), p. 410. 
A.P.R., November 1895, Supplement, p. 1.2 1 6 .
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2 1 7in 1895 after a rise in world copper prices. The White
Cliffs opal field also grew, and in spite of primitive living 
conditions about two thousand people were on the field by
O 1 Q1899, but Broken Hill, the largest urban centre in the
region, remained in the doldrums until the early years of the
O 1 Qtwentieth century. Various schemes to provide relief work
were set up in the region. Local governments provided
intermittent work on public facilities when funds were 
o ? navailable, irrigation settlements were established at Pera
p 2 1Bore near Bourke and along the Darling, and the colonial
government's i 11-coneeived scheme to clear the west Bogan
scrublands provided many bushworkers with comparatively well-
222paid relief work. But while the colonial economy as a
whole was in a state of depression, schemes such as these were 
unable to accommodate more than a small fraction of the 
unemployed.
Many employers took advantage of the poor labour 
market to cut wages. The piecemeal manner in which wages were 
set makes it difficult to assess how widespread the fall was, 
but press comments, court reports, station accounts and 
evidence given to the Royal Commission in 1900 indicate a
217. A .I .B .R ., March 1896, p. 164.
218. Western Free Press, 16 June and 28 July 1899.
219. Coghlan, o p . c i t ., p. 2127; Kennedy, o p . c i t . , p p . 75ff.
220. Kennedy, ibid., p. 77; Western Free P r e s s , 2 June 1899; 
Western Herald, 25 March 1896.
221. A.P.R., June 1896, p. 205 ; Kennedy, o p . cit . , p. 81;
R.C.W.D. Summary of Evidence, p p . 25-6.
222. A.P.R., December 1896, p. 495; June 1899, p. 207; Coghlan, 
op. c i t . , p p . 2039-40.
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widespread fall, in line with that in the colony as a whole, 
between about 1892 and 1897. J Station managers' wages fell 
generally, and on company-held stations managers were often
O 0 Areplaced by overseers who earned less than half as much.
In 1893 Broken Hill mine management brought in an across-the-
2 2 Sboard wage cut of ten per cent. Three years later further
wage cuts were still being reported in Bo u r k e , where municipal
employees and workers in the Cobb and Co. factory both suffered
P P 6reductions in pay.
Labourers who would normally have been employed on
day rates found that employers would only offer them the much
despised "pound a week and keep", previously the standard pay
of ordinary station hands. In 1899 it was noted that the
Wilcannia woolscour was paying men at that rate for working a 
2 2 7ten-hour day. On the stations themselves, wage costs were
reduced by using ordinary station labourers to perform work 
such as fencing and tank excavation, which had widely been 
performed by contract labour in the previous decade. Even a 
pound a week and keep seems to have been considered excessive 
for unskilled station work by many employers, and in 1899 the
o n oPastoralists1 Review spoke of 15/- a week as the norm.
These were starvation wages for workers with dependants; one
22 3 . Coghlan, ibid., p. 1464; McCarthy, op. cit . , pp . 52, 68.
224. Australian Estates papers, file 5/10; A.P.R., August 1896,
p . 302.
225. Kennedy, op. cit., p. 71.
226. Western He r a l d , 19 February and 25 April 1896.
227. Western Free Press, 22 September 1899.
228. A .P .R ., June 1899, p. 207.
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such was the boundary rider on FitzWilliam Wentworth's 
Burrabogie station who when summonsed for defaulting on his 
doctor's bills gave as his excuse the fact that he was 
attempting to support himself, his wife and their nine children
2 29on 15/- a week and two full rations.
Accompanying the general wage fall there were 
numerous cases of gross exploitation by employers who did not 
scruple to take advantage of the fact that unemployment had 
reduced some individuals to such a state of desperation that 
they would sell their labour for the most pitiful remuneration. 
Practices revealed in various court cases included a young
girl's being employed as a domestic servant for 2/6 per 
2 3 0week, and employers' taking men on for manual work without
2 3 1paying them any money wages. In some cases these practices
were challenged in the courts, but frequently they only came to 
light in the course of actions on unrelated matters; overall, 
they must have contributed substantially to the declining 
earnings of the western workforce.
The white unionists' hostility to workers of other 
races had also exacerbated a fragmentation in the pastoral 
workforce which employers were able to turn their own 
advantage. Asian workers were subject to systematic employment 
discrimination, partly due to white workers' using boycott 
tactics against employers who took Asians on in any but the
229. Riverine Gra z i e r , 16 February 1897.
230. Ibid., 6 July 1897.
231. Western Herald, 7 March 1896.
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l o w e s t - s k i 1 1 ed jobs. They w e re  a lso  p r e p a r e d  to a c c e p t  l owe r
wa g e s  th an w h i t e  w o r k e r s ,  t h o u g h  l i t t l e  h a r d  e v i d e n c e  on t hei r
ra te s of pay  is a v a i l a b l e .  In e v i d e n c e  to the 1900 Royal
C o m m i s s i o n ,  a s t a t i o n  m a n a g e r  c o n c e d e d  t hat  C h i n e s e  scrub-
p o ocu t t e r s  w e r e  " s o m e t i m e s "  c h e a p e r  t ha n w h i t e  l a b o u r e r s ,  and
it se ems u n l i k e l y  th at ca mel t r a n s p o r t  w o u l d  h av e b e e n  a ble  to
u n d e r c u t  the t e a m s t e r s '  r at es  by  f i f t y  per cent u n l e s s
c a me le er s'  p ay  was lo w er  t ha n  w h i t e  c a r r i e r s .  A b o r i g i n a l s
were in an even w o r s e  p o s i t i o n ;  a c c u s t o m e d  to s u p p l e m e n t i n g
th e i r  m e a g r e  e a r n i n g s  by h u n t i n g  and fis hi ng ,  t h e y  w ere
r e n d e r e d  d e s t i t u t e  by the c o m b i n e d  e f f e c t s  of d r o u g h t  and
u n e m p l o y m e n t  and b e c a m e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  r e l i a n t  on g o v e r n m e n t  
? 3 4h a n d - o u t s .
The s e a s o n a l  e a r n i n g s  of p a s t o r a l  w o r k e r s  w ere  also 
s u b j e c t  to p r e s s u r e  d u r i n g  the fi rs t  y e a r s  of the d ro u g h t .  
R o u s e a b o u t s '  w a g e s  we re w i d e l y  r e d u c e d  to 22/6 p e r  week, and in 
1896 the P a s t o r a l i s t s ' U n i o n  c o m m i t t e e s  in Cobar, H i l l s t o n  and
N y n g a n  cut m a c h i n e  s h e a r i n g  r a t e s  to 17/- per  h u n d r e d ,  t h o u g h
2 3 5e l s e w h e r e  sh e ar er s ' w a g e s  r e m a i n e d  o f f i c i a l l y  u n c h a n g e d .
Ho w e x t e n s i v e l y  t h e s e  cuts w ere  i m p l e m e n t e d  is o p e n  to 
q u e s t i o n ,  g i v e n  the w e a k n e s s  of the P a s t o r a 1 ists ' U ni o n  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  at the time; but a n u m b e r  of d e v e l o p m e n t s  were
232. R. C.W .D.  M i n u t e s ,  e v i d e n c e  of M. A r m s t r o n g ,  p. 351.
233. Hardy, op. c i t ., p. 219; J er v i s ,  " Wes t D a r l i n g " ,  o p . c i t . ,
p . 17 6.
234. See e.g. H i l l s t o n  S p e c t a t o r ,  24 S e p t e m b e r  1898.
235. A .P . R. , A p r i l  1896, p. 101. It is n o t e w o r t h y  that in spite 
of this, s h e a r e r s  on the A . E . M . ' s  C o b a r  s t a t i o n s  w ere  still 
b e i n g  p a i d  the full rate ( A u s t r a l i a n  E s t a t e s  p a p e r s ,
5 s e r i e s ) .
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eroding the shearers' bargaining power concurrently. The 
shearers' skill monopoly was steadily whittled away by the 
introduction of machine shears, which by 1898 were used to 
shear 27% of the New South Wales flock. 236 The use of 
contract shearing after 1896 also constituted a threat to 
seasonal earnings, as it meant that the hiring of hands was 
placed in the charge of an entrepreneur who had a strong 
interest in securing labour at the lowest possible cost. 
Finally, the pastora1i s t s ' use of references to eliminate 
"undesirables" was successful enough for a black market in good
2 ^  Qreferences to have developed by the end of the decade.
But probably the largest reduction in shearers' income was due
to the inescapable effects of drought rather than deliberate
wage reductions. Falling numbers of sheep per stand, repeated
delays in starting and the difficulties of travelling through
the parched countryside, especially for shearers who did not
2 3 9equip themselves with the newly-available bicycle, all
made outback shearing an unattractive proposition.
In the early years of the drought, while the colonial 
economy in general was still depressed and the ranks of the 
migratory pastoral workers were swelled by urban unemployed, 
effective industrial action was impossible and the A.W.U., like
236. Ibid., April 1899, p. 78.
237. Ibid., June 1896, p. 251; September 1896, p. 332.
238 . Ibid., May 1 899, pp . 123-4.
239. On which see J. Fitzpatrick, "The Bicycle in Rural
Australia : A Study of Man, Machine and Milieu", P h .D .,
unpublished, A.N.U. 1978.
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other unions, could only turn a blind eye to wage c u t s .
But in the slightly longer term the seasonal workers had a 
major bargaining counter against their employers: unlike the
squatters, the workers were not tied to western New South 
Wales, but could move to take advantage of opportunities which 
arose elsewhere. They proceeded to do so as soon as the 
depression showed signs of lifting in other regions, and by the 
early years of the twentieth century when the drought was at 
its peak, in spite of a massive fall in demand for shearing 
labour, the outback labour market had begun once again to 
operate in the workers' favour.
Bushworkers began to vote with their feet during
1896, after the drought which had interrupted work on the
Western Australian goldfields broke and the building trade in
2 4 1the cities revived somewhat. By early 1897 the Insurance
and Banking Record was talking of New South Wales undergoing 
"the semblance, if not the substance" of a r e c o v e r y ; ^ ^  the 
urban labour market picked up and the government started having 
some difficulty in mustering gangs for rural relief works.243 
In the following years displaced pastoral workers moved to the 
mining fields and into the cities to take advantage of the 
gradual improvement in employment in manufacturing and
240. There were still a few attempts at local industrial action 
in 1895-6, but those involved were quickly replaced (see 
A.P.R., October 1895, p. 407; September 1896, p. 333). On 
the general situation see Coghlan, op. cit . , p. 2027.
241. Coghlan, ibid., p p . 2039, 2041.
242. A .I ♦B .R ., January 1897, p. 12.
24 3 . Coghlan, o p . cit., p. 204 1 .
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c o m m e r c e  ; this e x o d u s  d a s h e d  the s q u a t t e r s '  h o p e s  that the 
d e p r e s s i o n  w o u l d  i n a u g u r a t e  a new era of r ur a l  l a b ou r  s ur p l u s  
a nd  led th em to r e p e n t  of t he i r  d e c i s i o n  to f orc e s w a g m e n  off 
the road by r e f u s i n g  t h e m  r at io n s .  W i t h  the m i g r a t o r y  
w o r k f o r c e  s e v e r e l y  r ed u ce d , s e a s o n a l  l a b o u r  s h o r t a g e s  were 
r e p o r t e d  d u r i n g  1897 and in m o s t  y e a r s  t h e r e a f t e r . D u r i n g  
1 9 00- 19 01 the l a b o u r  s c a r c i t y  was e x a c e r b a t e d  by the d e p a r t u r e  
of two b u s h m e n ' s  c o n t i n g e n t s ,  w i t h  a t o t a l  s t r e n g t h  of ove r  
t w e l v e  hu n d r e d ,  to fi gh t in the B oer  War. T h r o u g h  all this
the s q u a t t e r s  r a i l e d  at the g o v e r n m e n t ' s  r e l i e f  works , b l a m i n g  
t h e m  for the l a b o u r  s c a r c i t y  a nd c l a i m i n g  t ha t  t he y  d e m o r a l i z e d  
the w o r k f o r c e ; ^ ^  th e y s t e a d f a s t l y  r e f u s e d  to c o n c e d e  that 
th e ir  own e m p l o y m e n t  p r a c t i c e s  m i g h t  b e a r  some of the blame.
The A.W.U. r e v i v e d  w i t h  the t u rn  in the l ab o u r
m a r k e t .  After tw o s e a s o n s  of c o m p a r a t i v e  i n a c t i v i t y ,  d u r i n g
w h i c h  on l y s p o r a d i c  local  a c t i o n s  h ad o c c u r r e d  and the s u rp lu s
2 4 7of la bo u r  had e n a b l e d  s t r i k e r s  to be q u i c k l y  r ep la c ed ,  
u n i o n  o r g a n i z e r s  we n t on the roa d a g a i n  d u r i n g  1 8 9 7 . ^ ®
L i t t l e  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t y  e n s u e d  in t h a t  or the f o l l o w i n g  
s e as on , but by 1899 the w ag e  q u e s t i o n  h ad b e g u n  to ra is e
244. A.P.R. , S e p t e m b e r  1896, p. 359; M a r c h  1897, p. 32; June
1899, p. 189; S e p t e m b e r  1899, p. 380; A u g u s t  1900, p. 3 35 ; 
A p r i l  1901, p. 67.
245. P. Mur ra y , e d . , O f f i c i a l  R e c o r d s  of the A u s t r a l i a n  
M i l i t a r y  C o n t i n g e n t s  to the War in S o u t h  A f r i c a  ,
M e l b o u r n e ,  1911, p p . 70-1, 85-6.
246. A.P.R ., June 1899, p. 207; A u g u s t  1900, p. 335; O c t o b e r
1900, p . 478.
247. Ibid., O c t o b e r  1895, p. 407; S e p t e m b e r  1896, p. 33.
2 4 8 . R i v e r i n e  G r a z i e r , 10 A u g u s t  1897 ; Spenc e, o p . c i t . , p . 91.
249 . One of the few s t r i k e s  r e c o r d e d  w as by w o o 1 - s c o u r e r s  on
the rem ot e  Y a n d a m a  S t a t i o n  (Stur t R e c o r d e r  and M i l p a r i n k a
A d v e r t i s e r ,  17 S e p t e m b e r  1897).
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its head again. On the Paroo some shed-hands struck for
higher wages, and were supported by the shearers, but employers
were able to replace activists locally and did not have to
resort to the Pastoralists1 Union engagement system. There
were also difficulties in enforcing Pastoralists' Union rates
on several members' stations in the Nyngan area, and in the
southern Riverina the reduced rate for machine shears was
? S 0widely abandoned.
Much of the pressure for higher wage-rates arose out
of the fall in earnings which the shearers were experiencing as
a result of the decreased number of sheep per stand and,
probably more importantly, from the flock improvement achieved
by systematic culling and the introduction of the heavy-f1eeced
2 5 1Vermont merino strain, both of which slowed shearers down.
With the labour market improving and the Pastoralists' Union 
engagement system in disarray, the A.W.U. began to reassert 
itself and make progressively stronger demands, culminating in 
early 1902 with a demand for an increase in the shearing rate 
to 25/-, a substantial pay rise for shed hands and, among a 
battery of other claims, the recognition of a closed shop for 
the A.W.U. However, while the general market improvement
was inspiring the workers to voice their pent-up demands, their 
employers were still pleading inability to pay on account of
250. Based on G. Mair's and W. King's reports to the 
Pastoralists' Federal Council, 11th Council Meeting, March 
1900. The A . P . R . , by contrast, dismissed the disturbances 
as "local and unimportant" (November 1 899, p. 504 ) .
251. King's report, l o c . cit.
252. A.P . R . , February 1902, p. 805.
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the continuing depression in the pastoral sector. In 1900, 
after the wool price rise of 1899 had collapsed, the New South 
Wales Pastoralists1 Union attempted to cut the shearing rate in
many areas indirectly by specifying that shearers should be
2 5 3paid 20/- but required to pay for their own equipment. In
the following season this practice was applied throughout 
Queensland and New South Wales by decision of the Pastoralists' 
Federal Council, presumably on the assumption that shearers
would accept the small pay rise this effected in the late sheds
2 5 4as offsetting the cuts it produced in the outback.
From these polarized positions the contending parties 
launched into a new and protracted phase of industrial disputa­
tion in the first decade of the twentieth century. But the re­
newed demands of the pastoral workers found expression within a 
political climate far different from that of the early 1890s. 
With the rise of the parliamentary labour movement, unionism 
had ceased to be the sole vehicle for the collective aspirat­
ions of the labouring classes. The universalism and the 
crusading spirit of unionism in the early 1890s had faded as 
the functions of industrial action were more narrowly deline­
ated and unionism's political content attentuated. Even the 
unions' mode of industrial action had been altered by the 
intervention of the State through arbitration legislation 
which clearly established the primacy of negotiation between 
employer and employee organizations over direct action at the
253. Ibi d ., April 1900, p. 70.
254. Ibid., December 1900, p. 621.
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level of the individual station, thereby legislatively
entrenching a hegemonic control over their constituents which
neither the Pastoralists1 Unions nor, to a lesser extent, the
A.W.U. had been able to achieve by virtue of their industrial
practice. The Pastoralists' Unions were able to make use of
the arbitration system both to legitimate their status as
employer spokesmen and to harrass the A.W.U. by promoting the
tame Machine Shearers' Union as an alternative employee 
2 S 5organization. But eventually, in spite of the
Pastoralists' Unions' machinations and their substantial 
expenditures on strike-breaking, the A.W.U. managed to
wring concessions from the squatters by the sheer persistence 
with which its members struck for season after season.
The A .W.U.'s comparative success in the early years 
of the twentieth century owed much to the reduced importance of 
pastoralism within the colonial economy and the consequent 
erosion of the squatting interest's power. The strikes of the 
early 1890's had been directed against an unprecedentedly 
strong opposition. Not only had the squatting interest's 
privileged access to credit and its comparative independence of 
local markets insulated it, and permitted it to benefit from, 
the disruption facing the urban economy, but British financiers 
had moved in to galvanize the squatters' opposition. For a time
255. Ibid., February 1902 p. 826; April 1902, p. 67; May 1902, 
p. 138; June 1902, p. 207; December 1902, p. 700.
256. The Victorian, N.S.W. and South Australian Pastoralists' 
Unions spent £1,100 in 1902 alone, much of it in western 
New South Wales (see Appendix A, Pastoralists' Federal 
Council papers, vol. 9).
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the more reactionary squatters had permitted themselves to 
dream of a Utopia in which, equipped with a deferential work­
force, they would at last be able to underdevelop the colonies 
untrammelled by competition from other interests. But this 
hope was frustrated by the workers' stubborn resistance, by 
dissension among the employers and, in the last analysis, by 
the internal problems of the pastoral industry. Colonial 
economic recovery began in other quarters while the pastoral 
industry had still to reach the nadir of depression and 
drought, and the beleaguered squatting interest was in no 
position to resist the wage pressures which then arose from 
other sectors. This shift was significant, but merely for the 
immediate gains it permitted the pastoral workers but as a 
symptom of the squatting interest's inability, in spite of 
imperial backing, to dictate the terms under which the 
colonies' pastoral resources were to be exploited.
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CONCLUSION
Western Squatting and the Imperial Connection.
To state that the outback pastoral experience had a 
significance beyond itself is not to claim that the episode was 
typical of late nineteenth century Australian colonization. On 
the contrary, the western districts were clearly exceptional on 
several counts : in the extent of their economic dependence on
the production of a handful of primary commodities for export; 
in the magnitude of British investment during the hectic boom 
years and the scope of the retrenchments which followed during 
the depression; and in the depth of the social gulf which, in 
the absence of a strong local petty-bourgeois or small 
landowner class, divided those who owned the western lands from 
those who inhabited t h e m .However, seen as an extreme case, 
almost a caricature, the outback experience throws light on 
some important issues relating to the nature of Australian 
settlement and its position within the British empire.
At the heart of contemporary debate on nineteenth-
century Australian political economy has been the question of
whether this country was a beneficiary or victim of British
imperialism. From the older radical nationalist position
enunciated by Fitzpatrick, who categorically asserted that the
history of the Long Boom was "the story of an economic
utilization of the colonies to meet the needs of the imperial 
1country", the weight of opinion has in recent years shifted
1. B. Fitzpatrick, The British Empire in Australia, Melbourne 
1941. pp. 90-1.
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towards a contrary position, with writers of such diverse views
as Butlin and Rowley emphasizing the positive contribution of
British investment and McQueen characterizing Australia as "a
2willing, often over-anxious partner" of British imperialism.
As Clark has argued, the question cannot be answered unequi­
vocally; while the colonies' rapid economic growth and the high 
levels of per capita income and consumption they enjoyed during 
the main phase of British capital exports suggest that the 
colonies shared in the spoils of imperialism, the adverse 
effects of colonial indebtedness in the stringent lending
3climate of the 1890s tend towards the opposite conclusion. 
However it is preferable to elucidate the sources of this 
ambiguity, rather than simply periodize Australian history into 
phases of partnership and phases of exploitation.
At the most fundamental level, the colonial economy
was based on the expropriation of the Aboriginal population.
Whatever the ultimate limitations of its physical environment,
the new territory afforded plentiful natural resources for its
small white population, without the large pool of super-
4exploitable labour available in more populous peripheral 
regions whose indigenous peoples had not been so thoroughly and 
ruthlessly overwhelmed by white settlement. Insofar as the high
2. McQueen, o p . c i t . , p. 21.
3. Clark, o p . c i t . , passim.
4. On the super-exploitation of labour at the periphery, as
opposed to the simple exploitation of labour at the 
metropole, see S. Amin, The Law of Value and Historical 
Materialism, New York, 1978 . pp . 63ff.
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wages and abundance of resources which provided the mainsprings 
of the colonies' prosperity proceeded from this initial act of 
plunder, colonists of all classes participated in the fruits 
of British colonialism.
Beyond this point, however, the influence of the 
imperial connection was by no means uniformly benign. The fact 
that the predominantly white colonial working class commanded 
wages commensurate with or exceeding those of its British 
counterpart limited, but did not preclude, imperial exploit­
ation. With labour dear, the economic diversification required 
to break the colonies' dependence on British imports necessarily 
rested on the introduction of capital-intensive production 
techniques. But Britain's trade with, and investment in, the 
colonies selectively assisted those sectors whose development 
was compatible with the maintenance of British manufacturing and 
commercial dominance. In doing so, it diverted much of the 
capital accumulated in the colonies towards the production of 
raw materials for British industry, enabled British interests to 
lay claim to a share in the proceeds of colonial prosperity and 
buttressed the power of the favoured segments of the colonial 
bourgeoisie at other colonists' expense.
The colonial pastoral interest was pre-eminently a 
beneficiary of the imperial connection. The high returns the 
squatters derived from supplying raw materials to the British 
and Continental textile industries, the ease with which they 
could circumvent high labour costs by the application of a 
rudimentary paddocking and watering technology and the minimal
infrastructural investment they required to establish themselves
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in new territories all made pastoralism a natural focus for the
attentions of British and colonial investors. Thus assisted,
the expanding pastoral industry spearheaded the dispossession
of the Aboriginals and monopolized the spoils; with astonishing
rapidity, landed abundance was succeeded by a situation in
which unsatisfied land hunger was rampant in the settler
population. The imperial partnership became increasingly
exclusive as the pastoral interest's power increased. Contrary
to their initial aspirations, most of the settlers remained
subject to wage exploitation and were shut out from any
5opportunity to own land. High real incomes alone did not 
extinguish the opposition between the interests of the land­
less labourer and those of the large landowner and employer; 
and, as the depression of the 1890s demonstrated, the 
concessions the colonial working class enjoyed during the boom 
could be revoked as soon as the labour market conditions turned 
in the employers' favour and the power of the workers' 
organizations was broken.
Furthermore, in spite of its importance as a source
of income, pastoralism provided little stimulus to colonial
6economic diversification. Indeed, in some respects its 
growth was achieved at the expense of other sectors. The
5. Ward, op. cit., p. 101 discusses the barriers to workers 
purchasing land.
6. McCarty, while attempting to apply staple theory to
Australian economic development, nevertheless conceded that 
the wool industry's "linkage" effects were weak (J. McCarty, 
"The Staple Approach in Australian Economic History", in 
Business Archives and History, 4 , 1 , 1 964. p p . 7-8).
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industry's low, erratic labour requirements, the mobility it 
demanded of its seasonal workforce and the primitive living 
conditions which prevailed, especially on absentee-owned 
stations, were not conducive to the growth of a large, settled 
rural population or the attendant development of house 
construction, small-scale manufacturing and service industries. 
The bulk of the wool clip was exported with minimal processing, 
only a tiny fraction being used by the colonial textile 
industry. Even the pastoral construction boom gave colonial 
manufacturers little joy, as many raw materials for paddocking 
and water conservation were obtained directly from the natural 
environment and much of the remainder had to be supplied by 
British heavy industry. As pastoral land ownership became more 
concentrated and absentee ownership more prevalent, pastoralism 
came to resemble a form of internal colonization, dissipating 
the proceeds of rural development in conspicuous consumption at 
Home or in the colonial capitals.
Though the squatters grudgingly reimbursed the Crown 
for their use of the land and made occasional excursions into 
mining and into ancillary industries such as meat freezing, on 
the whole capital accumulated within the pastoral industry was 
seldom applied to promoting the development of other sectors. 
The flow of funds was mostly in the opposite direction. Within 
the colonial private sector, pa storalism's primacy as an avenue 
of investment was unchallenged until the penultimate phase of 
the Long Boom. Many of those who entered the industry with the 
wool boom of the early 1860s had made their fortunes on the 
goldfields, usually as entrepreneurs rather than as diggers,
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and for the remainder of the boom period private investment 
and institutional lending produced a consistent flow of local 
funds into the industry. Pastoralism's burgeoning capital 
requirements contributed largely to the capital shortages which 
hampered urban, industrial and agricultural development during 
the first two decades of the boom and created conditions highly 
favourable to British capital exports in the 1880s.
But by the time British lenders made their full-scale 
entry to the pastoral scene, the squatters' very exclusivism 
had spurred a countervailing political reaction which threatened 
to undermine the access to cheap land on which the industry's 
early successes had been based. Popular resentment at the 
squatters' landed hegemony and aristocratic pretensions had 
issued in a series of legislative measures intended to curb 
the pastoral lessees' power. The New South Wales Robertson Acts 
had struck at the squatting interest in its Riverina heartland. 
The cost of defending pastoral holdings against selection in 
the arable districts had drained the industry of funds and 
given added impetus to the occupation of the interior, in turn 
forcing up the cost of entry in the western districts and nec­
essitating heavy capital expenditures to harness the capricious 
environment of the semi-arid plains. Unable to finance freehold 
purchase and outback expansion from its wool income alone, the 
pastoral interest enlisted connections established through the 
wool trade to give it access to the British money market. It 
was the squatters' urge to circumvent closer settlement legis­
lation which inaugurated the new phase in their relationship
with Britain. Far from being a politically neutral contribution
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to c o l o n i a l  a d v a n c e m e n t /  the s u b s e q u e n t  i n f l o w  of B r i t i s h  
funds, e s p e c i a l l y  that c h a n n e l l e d  t h r o u g h  the s p e c i a l i s t  
p a s t o r a l  f i n a n c e  ho u s e s ,  s e r v e d  to i n h i b i t  a m o re  e q u i t a b l e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of the land, p r o m o t e  s p e c u l a t i o n  in the i n t e r i o r  
and b l o c k  the d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  of the r ur al  e c o n o m y  in the 
c e n t r a l  d i s t r i c t s .
The su r ge  of p a s t o r a l  a c t i v i t y  in w e s t e r n  N e w  S out h
W a l e s  d u r i n g  the 1880s was one of the m o r e  s p e c t a c u l a r ,  if
l e a s t  s u c c e s s f u l ,  p r o d u c t s  of this u n h o l y  a l l i a n c e .  P a s t o r a l i s m
7was n e v e r  w i t h o u t  its s p e c u l a t i v e  e l e m e n t :  its a c c u m u l a t e d
f l o c k  a s s e t s  we r e v u l n e r a b l e  to a m u l t i t u d e  of u n c o n t r o l l a b l e  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  v a r i a b l e s ;  the p r i c e  it r e c e i v e d  for its p r o d u c t  
d e p e n d e d  on the st ate  of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t  w h o s e  v a g a r i e s  
w e r e  s t r o n g l y  i n f l u e n c e d  by s p e c u l a t i o n  on a ct u a l  or a n t i c i p ­
a t e d  f l u c t u a t i o n s  in A u s t r a l i a n  s u p p l y  c o n d i t i o n s ;  and, d u r i n g  
the bo om, the e x p e c t a t i o n  of c a p i t a l  g ain s f r om  the r e a l i z a t i o n  
of s t o c k  a nd  land had b e c o m e  an i m p o r t a n t ,  o f t e n  a d o m i n a n t ,  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  in the f o r m a t i o n  a nd m a n a g e m e n t  of p a s t o r a l  e n t ­
e r p r i s e s .  As e n t r y  co st s rose and the i n d u s t r y  m o v e d  inland,  
the e l e m e n t  of risk i n c r e a s e d  and the m a r g i n  for e r r o r  d i m i n ­
ished . Ye t the s q u a t t e r s  and t he ir  f i n a n c i e r s  w er e r e l u c t a n t  to 
c o n c e d e  th a t any s e t b a c k  was m o r e  than t e m p o r a r y .  The c o n d i ­
t i o n s  w h i c h  had a c t u a t e d  the land b o o m  of the e a r l y  1880s w ere  
s u c c e s s i v e l y  d e m o l i s h e d  over  the f o l l o w i n g  d eca de ; b ut t h r o u g h  
two d r o u g h t s ,  a r a b b i t  influx, a h i g h l y  u n f a v o u r a b l e  L a n d  Act
7. C f . d i s c u s s i o n  in P. M c M i c h a e l ,  "The G e n e s i s  of S e t t l e r
C a p i t a l i s m  in A u s t r a l i a " ,  in I n t e r v e n t i o n , 13, 1979. p. 68
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and a downward trend in wool prices, the inflow of funds to the 
western districts squatters continued. The latitude British 
lenders permitted their colonial agents and clients was only 
curtailed when a general tightening of the British money market 
made it inescapably obvious that the pastoral finance compan­
ies' outback investments were not yielding the expected return.
The consequences of pastoral marginalisation were 
uniformly negative. In their attempts to maximise their share 
in the dwindling returns of the outback stations, squatters and 
financiers intensified their exploitation of land and labour, 
at the same time mounting a sustained lobby for a reduction in 
their rental contributions to public revenue. During the 1880s 
it was left to the squatters to initiate this process, and by 
and large they took the course of least resistance, concentr­
ating on lobbying for reduced rents and on maximising output 
rather than tackling the wage issue. Though there was probably 
some decline in wage levels, and underemployment during the 
off-season took its toll of workers' earnings as construction 
activity subsided and the longer-term labour displacement 
effects of paddocking and watering came into play, the surge of 
union activism provoked by the squatters' ham-fisted move to 
cut shearers' wages in 1886 made it clear that wage cuts would 
encounter strong opposition. But by the close of the decade the 
wage question could no longer be evaded. The gains from 
increasing output were approaching their end; remorseless 
overstocking had already produced widespread pastoral 
deterioration and left the western districts squatters without
drought reserve fodder. The pastoral lobby had only succeeded
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in eliciting half-hearted concessions from the Crown. And, with 
the prospect of a slackening in British lending imminent, 
financiers were becoming increasingly anxious to put their 
western districts accounts on a sounder footing. The active 
role played by the pastoral financiers in galvanising the 
squatters' opposition to the unions in 1890 and 1891 heralded a 
shift within the imperial partnership. Thereafter British 
interests intervened on an ever-increasing scale to ensure that 
their business in the colonies was managed with maximum 
efficiency. This entailed some changes in station management 
and a curtailment of pastoral clients' personal expenditure; 
but its main thrust was to enforce wage cuts and retrenchments, 
passing on to the pastoral workers the costs of a crisis in 
whose making they had played no part.
The squatters themselves were unable to escape the 
ramifications of the crisis. British lenders' attitudes towards 
their colonial agents and clients hardened. Most of the 
companies still treated the older-estab1 ished, well-connected 
squatters with solicitude, and pastoralists of managerial 
expertise who were willing to place their skills at their 
creditors' disposal were usually kept on their stations, albeit 
often as employees rather than as proprietors in their own 
right. But where savings could be made by placing groups of 
holdings under collective management, or where pastoral clients 
were reluctant or incompetent to meet the requirements of the 
new regime, the squatters were ousted with little ceremony. 
Retrenchments and salary cuts were also widespread in the 
companies' Australian offices, and those financiers who
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retained their positions were generally placed under detailed 
supervision from London.
In a wider sense, the failure of the outback 
experiment seriously compromised the independence of the 
colonial squatting interest. Not only were many of the largest 
colonial landowners dragged down by their injudicious 
excursions into the interior, but the annihilation of capital 
which resulted left the industry as a whole with little option 
but a continued dependence on borrowed funds. As crisis and 
drought ran their course, the pastoral interest came 
increasingly to display the characteristics of a comprador 
bourgeoisie, defined by Poulantzas as:
"that fraction of the bourgeoisie which lacks its own base 
for capital accumulation, which acts in some way as a 
simple intermediary of foreign imperial control... and 
which is thus triply subordinated - economically,
Opolitically and ideologically - to foreign capital."
At the political level, the squatting interest laboured tire­
lessly to safeguard the imperial connection against the medd­
lings of radical nationalists and bourgeois protectionists. The 
squatters' vehement oppposition to State intervention in the 
economic sphere, their disdainful rejection of the labour mo ve­
ment's claims and their contempt for bourgeois politicians who 
toadied to the labour vote were conditioned both by a desire to 
protect their own privileges as landowners and employers and by 
a concern that political conditions in the colonies should not
8. N. Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, London, 
1975. p . 71.
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jeopardize the security and profitability of present or future 
British investment. This stance was buttressed by a firm belief 
that, contrary to the claims of the self-interested demagogues 
of the left, the interests of squatters and British investors 
were those of the polity at large.
This, however, remained a minority opinion. Far from 
inducing a pampered colonial population to pull together for 
the benefit of the pastoral interest, the depression had exac­
erbated class tensions and bred a deep suspicion of foreign 
bankers and all those associated with them. In the eyes of the 
colonial working class, the imperial connection was grounded in 
oppression; during the boom they had been paid no more than 
they deserved, and they had been the first to suffer when their 
masters' schemes went awry. Smallholders who had long chafed at 
the finance houses' preferential treatment of the squatters 
were appalled to witness the land falling into the hands of 
lending institutions. The many colonists whose funds had been 
locked up in failed financial institutions were deeply resent­
ful that a coalition of local and British capitalists should 
thus be holding the colonial economy to ransom. The balance of 
payments crisis of 1891 had also made the penalties of import 
dependence painfully obvious and given a fillip to the protect­
ionist manufacturing lobby. These dissident voices merged in a 
new political consensus inimical to the international division 
of labour advocated by the squatting interest and its British 
m e n t o r s .
In this sense, not even the British emerged unequi­
vocally victorious from the debacle of the 1890s. Certainly
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many of their initial expectations had remained unrealized.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, many British 
debenture-holders who had looked to Australia to provide them 
with remunerative, easily realizable securities were unable 
to extricate their funds from colonial institutions and had 
to content themselves with low returns and a distant prospect 
of repayment. Though foreclosures ensured that the brunt of 
the capital losses fell upon mortgagors rather than mortgagees, 
in several cases the shrinkage of values had been so severe 
as to necessitate calls on British shareholders' funds. These 
short-term difficulties reflected a more fundamental problem: a
substantial share of the funds which British investors so 
insistently directed towards lending on land in the 1880s had 
simply served to enhance land values and fuel speculation by 
monopolistic colonial proprietors rather than to make concrete 
additions to the colonies' productive assets. In consequence, 
during the following decade, British lenders found their 
capital concentrated at the margins of the colonial economy, 
incapable of influencing or profiting from a recovery which had 
originated elsewhere.
Reviewing the havoc wrought in the New South Wales 
interior by little more than a generation of pastoral occup­
ation, it is difficult to believe that even the most fervent 
adherent of the gospel of progress could maintain that the net 
outcome was a positive one. The outback experience offers an 
extreme example of the ill-effects of the precipitate rush to 
render the colonies' resources accessible to the imperial 
economy. Its very 'irrationality' points up the large role
-32 0 -
played by class and sectional conflicts in shaping the process 
of Australian colonization and the lineaments of the imperial 
presence. It argues for an appreciation of imperialism, not 
as a relationship between monolithic national entities, but as 
a process determined by and in turn determining the contradic­
tions which shape the changing configuration of political and 
economic power within the colonized nation. In this sense, 
Australia was neither a victim nor a partner of British 
imperialism, but merely a field on which the beneficiaries and 
victims of the imperial nexus engaged in a series of 
vituperative but inconclusive skirmishes.
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Note: Suggestions for Further Research
It has often been noted that the interpretation of 
nineteenth-century Australian history from a Marxist perspec­
tive, as indeed from any perspective, has suffered from the
1deficiencies of its empirical base. The history of the 1860- 
1900 period is no exception. In spite of N.G. Butlin's labours 
to assemble and interpret a mass of quantitative data relating 
to this period, many important questions remain unanswered. The 
following are only a few of the areas immediately suggested to 
me in the course of this research.
There are large gaps in our knowledge of the condi­
tion of the Australian working class during the Long Boom. 
Commentaries on the subject have tended to be couched in gen­
eralizations, relying heavily on per capita income and cons­
umption figures. With the exception of Coghlan's figures on 
cash incomes, little has been done to examine income distrib­
ution, and we are still far from having an adequate real income 
series; the effects of qualitative factors also need to be 
taken into account. Another area of particular relevance to the 
conclusions of this study is the role of local mercantile and 
banking capital in rural development, especially in the eastern 
districts; this merits examination for its relationship to 
pastoral capital on the one hand and imported British capital
1. See e.g. articles by G. Snooks and T. Rowse in Labour
History, 28, 1975 and by D. Clark in Labour Hist ory, 30,
1976. Also D. Clark, "Unequal Exchange and Australian 
Economic Development", in Wheelwright and Buckley, e d . , 
op. c i t . , vol. 3, p p . 159ff.
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on the other. Finally, though the causes of the 1890s 
depression have been extensively discussed, it is perhaps a 
reflection of the optimism which has prevailed during the 
second Long Boom that there has been no thoroughgoing analysis 
of the depression itself, either for its immediate social 
impact or for the changes it wrought in the configuration of 
Australian capitalism.
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Appendix A : Forfeitures, Surrenders etc., 1890-1901
1. Western Division
Year Pastoral Leases Forfeited Resumed Areas Forfeited
Number Area (acres) Number Area (acres)
1891 5 309,040 21* 1,326,443
1892 1 19,400 14 1,104,256
1893 2 45,080 7* 317,401
1894 5 805,850 7 324,794
1895 1 32,840 6 134,003
1896 - - 3 606,260
1897 1 63,160 2 16,820
1898 - - 2 139,690
1899 - - 2* 3,715
1900 - - - -
1901 “ “ 2 16,688
Total 15 1,275,370 66 3,990,070
* includes one resumed area of unknown size.
Sources: N.S.W. Lands Department, 8/2225; R.C.W.D Return Z
2. Central Division Adjacent to Western Division.
Preferential Occupation Licences: Twelve preferential occupation licences
with a total area of 501,546 acres were surrendered, converted to scrub
leases
Year
or converted 
Resumed
to improvement leases. 
Areas Forfeited
Number Area (acres)
1890 2 12,120
1891 6 539,478
1892 5 24,564
1893 2 40,068
1894 2 54,628
1895 4 241,375
1896 3 172,012
1897 1 50,000
1898 2 12,817
1899 2 21,986
1900 4 30,319
1901 2 15,027
Total 66 1,214,394
Source: R.C.W.D Return AA
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Appendix B
Australian Estates and Mortgage Co. Stations* 
Sheep Numbers, Working Expenses and Income, 1895-1902.
Year Sheep
numbers
Working Working Expenses Net 
Expenses per head income
(£) (£) (£)
Net Yield 
per head 
(d.)
Yield on 
Capital 
invested by 
Company (%)
[...negative indicates loss...]
1895 184364 21739 28.3 +9054 + 11.8 + 1.5
1896 218466 21696 23.8 +6884 +7.6 + 1.2
1897 197640 19450 23.6 +24286 +29.5 +4.1
1898 198779 22198 26.8 +5410 +6.5 + 0.9
1899 76965 18423 57.4 +291 +0.9 • • •
1900** 131071 17312 31.7 -7094 -13.0 -0.9
1901 134749 17820 31.7 +13513 +24. 1 + 1.7
1902 98775 19921 48.4 +4639 + 11.3 + 0.6
Source : Australian Estates Co. Papers, station reports.
* Properties involved are The Overflow, Panjee, Tiltagara, Tindarey,
Piangobla, Springfield (1895-1902); The Priory, Moothumbil, New Babinda, 
Hermitage Plains (1900-1902).
** The increase in sheep numbers hereafter is attributable to the
inclusion of four new stations in the "Cobar Group" (see note above).
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Appendix C
Western Districts Population Statistics 1891 and 1901
Notes: 1. The "Barrier district" is taken as being co-extensive 
with Yancowinna county.
2. Discrepancies in percentage totals are due to rounding.
3. Aboriginals are excluded from all figures.
1. Urban and Rural Populations
Year Urban (%) Rural (%) Total
1891
1901
34185 (56.7)
45019 (69.1)
26063
20151
(43.3)
(30.9)
60248
65170
2. Dependent Population
Year Dependent as % of Dependent as % of Total
Males Male Females Female Dependents
Population Population
as % of 
Total
Population
1891
1901
9425 24.3 17848
11124 28.9 22092
83.4
82.6
27273
33216
45.3
51.0
3. Housing Materials
Year Stone Brick Concrete 
(etc)
Iron Wood Lath
and
Plaster
Canvas Not
Stated
1891 6.0 5.2 0.5 8.4 47.4 0.7 30.5 1.3
1901 9.9 5.3 0.5 17.1 54.1 0.6 10.8 1.5
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